| Index: sandbox/linux/services/credentials.cc
|
| diff --git a/sandbox/linux/services/credentials.cc b/sandbox/linux/services/credentials.cc
|
| index a745220bb5a37e7403b2cf54b768a788fb5877ae..f926ce8e85dcc117dabf85ece4f8581c728b94f7 100644
|
| --- a/sandbox/linux/services/credentials.cc
|
| +++ b/sandbox/linux/services/credentials.cc
|
| @@ -4,13 +4,10 @@
|
|
|
| #include "sandbox/linux/services/credentials.h"
|
|
|
| -#include <dirent.h>
|
| #include <errno.h>
|
| -#include <fcntl.h>
|
| #include <signal.h>
|
| #include <stdio.h>
|
| #include <sys/capability.h>
|
| -#include <sys/stat.h>
|
| #include <sys/syscall.h>
|
| #include <sys/types.h>
|
| #include <sys/wait.h>
|
| @@ -24,6 +21,7 @@
|
| #include "base/template_util.h"
|
| #include "base/third_party/valgrind/valgrind.h"
|
| #include "base/threading/thread.h"
|
| +#include "sandbox/linux/services/proc_util.h"
|
| #include "sandbox/linux/services/syscall_wrappers.h"
|
|
|
| namespace {
|
| @@ -61,15 +59,6 @@ struct FILECloser {
|
| // TODO(jln): fix base/.
|
| typedef scoped_ptr<FILE, FILECloser> ScopedFILE;
|
|
|
| -struct DIRCloser {
|
| - void operator()(DIR* d) const {
|
| - DCHECK(d);
|
| - PCHECK(0 == closedir(d));
|
| - }
|
| -};
|
| -
|
| -typedef scoped_ptr<DIR, DIRCloser> ScopedDIR;
|
| -
|
| COMPILE_ASSERT((base::is_same<uid_t, gid_t>::value), UidAndGidAreSameType);
|
| // generic_id_t can be used for either uid_t or gid_t.
|
| typedef uid_t generic_id_t;
|
| @@ -174,86 +163,6 @@ Credentials::Credentials() {
|
| Credentials::~Credentials() {
|
| }
|
|
|
| -int Credentials::CountOpenFds(int proc_fd) {
|
| - DCHECK_LE(0, proc_fd);
|
| - int proc_self_fd = openat(proc_fd, "self/fd", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
|
| - PCHECK(0 <= proc_self_fd);
|
| -
|
| - // Ownership of proc_self_fd is transferred here, it must not be closed
|
| - // or modified afterwards except via dir.
|
| - ScopedDIR dir(fdopendir(proc_self_fd));
|
| - CHECK(dir);
|
| -
|
| - int count = 0;
|
| - struct dirent e;
|
| - struct dirent* de;
|
| - while (!readdir_r(dir.get(), &e, &de) && de) {
|
| - if (strcmp(e.d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(e.d_name, "..") == 0) {
|
| - continue;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - int fd_num;
|
| - CHECK(base::StringToInt(e.d_name, &fd_num));
|
| - if (fd_num == proc_fd || fd_num == proc_self_fd) {
|
| - continue;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - ++count;
|
| - }
|
| - return count;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -bool Credentials::HasOpenDirectory(int proc_fd) {
|
| - int proc_self_fd = -1;
|
| - if (proc_fd >= 0) {
|
| - proc_self_fd = openat(proc_fd, "self/fd", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
|
| - } else {
|
| - proc_self_fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/fd", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
|
| - if (proc_self_fd < 0) {
|
| - // If this process has been chrooted (eg into /proc/self/fdinfo) then
|
| - // the new root dir will not have directory listing permissions for us
|
| - // (hence EACCES). And if we do have this permission, then /proc won't
|
| - // exist anyway (hence ENOENT).
|
| - DPCHECK(errno == EACCES || errno == ENOENT)
|
| - << "Unexpected failure when trying to open /proc/self/fd: ("
|
| - << errno << ") " << strerror(errno);
|
| -
|
| - // If not available, guess false.
|
| - return false;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - PCHECK(0 <= proc_self_fd);
|
| -
|
| - // Ownership of proc_self_fd is transferred here, it must not be closed
|
| - // or modified afterwards except via dir.
|
| - ScopedDIR dir(fdopendir(proc_self_fd));
|
| - CHECK(dir);
|
| -
|
| - struct dirent e;
|
| - struct dirent* de;
|
| - while (!readdir_r(dir.get(), &e, &de) && de) {
|
| - if (strcmp(e.d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(e.d_name, "..") == 0) {
|
| - continue;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - int fd_num;
|
| - CHECK(base::StringToInt(e.d_name, &fd_num));
|
| - if (fd_num == proc_fd || fd_num == proc_self_fd) {
|
| - continue;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - struct stat s;
|
| - // It's OK to use proc_self_fd here, fstatat won't modify it.
|
| - CHECK(fstatat(proc_self_fd, e.d_name, &s, 0) == 0);
|
| - if (S_ISDIR(s.st_mode)) {
|
| - return true;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - // No open unmanaged directories found.
|
| - return false;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| bool Credentials::DropAllCapabilities() {
|
| ScopedCap cap(cap_init());
|
| CHECK(cap);
|
| @@ -341,7 +250,7 @@ bool Credentials::MoveToNewUserNS() {
|
| bool Credentials::DropFileSystemAccess() {
|
| // Chrooting to a safe empty dir will only be safe if no directory file
|
| // descriptor is available to the process.
|
| - DCHECK(!HasOpenDirectory(-1));
|
| + DCHECK(!ProcUtil::HasOpenDirectory(-1));
|
| return ChrootToSafeEmptyDir();
|
| }
|
|
|
|
|