Partition libcxx build code from build/config/sanitizers

components/nacl/loader/nacl_helper_linux.cc

 // Copyright 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 // A mini-zygote specifically for Native Client.
 
 #include "components/nacl/loader/nacl_helper_linux.h"
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
@@ skipping 393 matching lines @@
   return prereserved_sandbox_size;
 }
 #endif
 
 }  // namespace
 
 #if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
 // Do not install the SIGSEGV handler in ASan. This should make the NaCl
 // platform qualification test pass.
 // detect_odr_violation=0: http://crbug.com/376306
-static const char kAsanDefaultOptionsNaCl[] =
-    "handle_segv=0:detect_odr_violation=0";
-
-// Override the default ASan options for the NaCl helper.
-// __asan_default_options should not be instrumented, because it is called
-// before ASan is initialized.
-extern "C"
-__attribute__((no_sanitize_address))

[bradnelson, 2017/05/26 17:52:43]

Why isn't this needed anymore?
(This executable gets crazy stuff done to it)

-// The function isn't referenced from the executable itself. Make sure it isn't
-// stripped by the linker.
-__attribute__((used))
-__attribute__((visibility("default")))
-const char* __asan_default_options() {
-  return kAsanDefaultOptionsNaCl;
-}
+extern const char* kAsanDefaultOptionsNaCl;
+const char* kAsanDefaultOptionsNaCl = "handle_segv=0:detect_odr_violation=0";
 #endif
 
 int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
   base::CommandLine::Init(argc, argv);
   base::AtExitManager exit_manager;
   base::RandUint64();  // acquire /dev/urandom fd before sandbox is raised
 
   const NaClLoaderSystemInfo system_info = {
 #if !defined(OS_NACL_NONSFI)
     // These are not used by nacl_helper_nonsfi.
@@ skipping 28 matching lines @@
   // Now handle requests from the Zygote.
   while (true) {
     bool request_handled = HandleZygoteRequest(
         kNaClZygoteDescriptor, system_info, nacl_sandbox.get());
     // Do not turn this into a CHECK() without thinking about robustness
     // against malicious IPC requests.
     DCHECK(request_handled);
   }
   NOTREACHED();
 }