Pull out IDN_Spoof_Checker to separate cc/h files.

components/url_formatter/url_formatter.cc

Index: components/url_formatter/url_formatter.cc
diff --git a/components/url_formatter/url_formatter.cc b/components/url_formatter/url_formatter.cc
index ed790a9b73915018ecab0043b364f12eea6a3f3f..f3da52cb748435f3f75c4525550882ad9033aeaf 100644
--- a/components/url_formatter/url_formatter.cc
+++ b/components/url_formatter/url_formatter.cc
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 
 #include <algorithm>
 #include <utility>
+#include <vector>
 
 #include "base/lazy_instance.h"
 #include "base/macros.h"
@@ -15,13 +16,9 @@
 #include "base/strings/utf_offset_string_conversions.h"
 #include "base/strings/utf_string_conversions.h"
 #include "base/threading/thread_local_storage.h"
-#include "third_party/icu/source/common/unicode/schriter.h"
+#include "components/url_formatter/idn_spoof_checker.h"
 #include "third_party/icu/source/common/unicode/uidna.h"
-#include "third_party/icu/source/common/unicode/uniset.h"
-#include "third_party/icu/source/common/unicode/uscript.h"
-#include "third_party/icu/source/common/unicode/uvernum.h"
-#include "third_party/icu/source/i18n/unicode/regex.h"
-#include "third_party/icu/source/i18n/unicode/uspoof.h"
+#include "third_party/icu/source/common/unicode/utypes.h"
 #include "url/gurl.h"
 #include "url/third_party/mozilla/url_parse.h"
 
@@ -191,6 +188,9 @@ base::string16 FormatViewSourceUrl(
   return result;
 }
 
+base::LazyInstance<IDNSpoofChecker>::Leaky g_idn_spoof_checker =
+    LAZY_INSTANCE_INITIALIZER;
+
 // TODO(brettw): We may want to skip this step in the case of file URLs to
 // allow unicode UNC hostnames regardless of encodings.
 base::string16 IDNToUnicodeWithAdjustments(
@@ -242,309 +242,12 @@ base::string16 IDNToUnicodeWithAdjustments(
   return out16;
 }
 
-// A helper class for IDN Spoof checking, used to ensure that no IDN input is
-// spoofable per Chromium's standard of spoofability. For a more thorough
-// explanation of how spoof checking works in Chromium, see
-// http://dev.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/idn-in-google-chrome .
-class IDNSpoofChecker {
- public:
-  IDNSpoofChecker();
-
-  // Returns true if |label| is safe to display as Unicode. When the TLD is
-  // ASCII, check if a label is entirely made of Cyrillic letters that look like
-  // Latin letters. In the event of library failure, all IDN inputs will be
-  // treated as unsafe.
-  bool Check(base::StringPiece16 label, bool is_tld_ascii);
-
- private:
-  void SetAllowedUnicodeSet(UErrorCode* status);
-  bool IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(const icu::UnicodeString& label_string);
-
-  USpoofChecker* checker_;
-  icu::UnicodeSet deviation_characters_;
-  icu::UnicodeSet non_ascii_latin_letters_;
-  icu::UnicodeSet kana_letters_exceptions_;
-  icu::UnicodeSet cyrillic_letters_;
-  icu::UnicodeSet cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_;
-
-  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(IDNSpoofChecker);
-};
-
-base::LazyInstance<IDNSpoofChecker>::Leaky g_idn_spoof_checker =
-    LAZY_INSTANCE_INITIALIZER;
-base::ThreadLocalStorage::StaticSlot tls_index = TLS_INITIALIZER;
-
-void OnThreadTermination(void* regex_matcher) {
-  delete reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(regex_matcher);
-}
-
-IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
-  UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
-  checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
-  if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
-    checker_ = nullptr;
-    return;
-  }
-
-  // At this point, USpoofChecker has all the checks enabled except
-  // for USPOOF_CHAR_LIMIT (USPOOF_{RESTRICTION_LEVEL, INVISIBLE,
-  // MIXED_SCRIPT_CONFUSABLE, WHOLE_SCRIPT_CONFUSABLE, MIXED_NUMBERS, ANY_CASE})
-  // This default configuration is adjusted below as necessary.
-
-  // Set the restriction level to moderate. It allows mixing Latin with another
-  // script (+ COMMON and INHERITED). Except for Chinese(Han + Bopomofo),
-  // Japanese(Hiragana + Katakana + Han), and Korean(Hangul + Han), only one
-  // script other than Common and Inherited can be mixed with Latin. Cyrillic
-  // and Greek are not allowed to mix with Latin.
-  // See http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr39/#Restriction_Level_Detection
-  uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_MODERATELY_RESTRICTIVE);
-
-  // Restrict allowed characters in IDN labels and turn on USPOOF_CHAR_LIMIT.
-  SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
-
-  // Enable the return of auxillary (non-error) information.
-  // We used to disable WHOLE_SCRIPT_CONFUSABLE check explicitly, but as of
-  // ICU 58.1, WSC is a no-op in a single string check API.
-  int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
-  uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
-
-  // Four characters handled differently by IDNA 2003 and IDNA 2008. UTS46
-  // transitional processing treats them as IDNA 2003 does; maps U+00DF and
-  // U+03C2 and drops U+200[CD].
-  deviation_characters_ =
-      icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"),
-                      status);
-  deviation_characters_.freeze();
-
-  // Latin letters outside ASCII. 'Script_Extensions=Latin' is not necessary
-  // because additional characters pulled in with scx=Latn are not included in
-  // the allowed set.
-  non_ascii_latin_letters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
-      UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
-  non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
-
-  // These letters are parts of |dangerous_patterns_|.
-  kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
-      UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
-      status);
-  kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
-
-  // These Cyrillic letters look like Latin. A domain label entirely made of
-  // these letters is blocked as a simplified whole-script-spoofable.
-  cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ =
-      icu::UnicodeSet(icu::UnicodeString("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
-  cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
-
-  cyrillic_letters_ =
-      icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
-  cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
-
-  DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
-}
-
-bool IDNSpoofChecker::Check(base::StringPiece16 label, bool is_tld_ascii) {
-  UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
-  int32_t result = uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
-                                base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()),
-                                NULL, &status);
-  // If uspoof_check fails (due to library failure), or if any of the checks
-  // fail, treat the IDN as unsafe.
-  if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
-    return false;
-
-  icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
-                                  base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
-
-  // A punycode label with 'xn--' prefix is not subject to the URL
-  // canonicalization and is stored as it is in GURL. If it encodes a deviation
-  // character (UTS 46; e.g. U+00DF/sharp-s), it should be still shown in
-  // punycode instead of Unicode. Without this check, xn--fu-hia for
-  // 'fu<sharp-s>' would be converted to 'fu<sharp-s>' for display because
-  // "UTS 46 section 4 Processing step 4" applies validity criteria for
-  // non-transitional processing (i.e. do not map deviation characters) to any
-  // punycode labels regardless of whether transitional or non-transitional is
-  // chosen. On the other hand, 'fu<sharp-s>' typed or copy and pasted
-  // as Unicode would be canonicalized to 'fuss' by GURL and is displayed as
-  // such. See http://crbug.com/595263 .
-  if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
-    return false;
-
-  // If there's no script mixing, the input is regarded as safe without any
-  // extra check unless it contains Kana letter exceptions or it's made entirely
-  // of Cyrillic letters that look like Latin letters. Note that the following
-  // combinations of scripts are treated as a 'logical' single script.
-  //  - Chinese: Han, Bopomofo, Common
-  //  - Japanese: Han, Hiragana, Katakana, Common
-  //  - Korean: Hangul, Han, Common
-  result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
-  if (result == USPOOF_ASCII) return true;
-  if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
-      kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
-    // Check Cyrillic confusable only for ASCII TLDs.
-    return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
-  }
-
-  // Additional checks for |label| with multiple scripts, one of which is Latin.
-  // Disallow non-ASCII Latin letters to mix with a non-Latin script.
-  if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string))
-    return false;
-
-  if (!tls_index.initialized())
-    tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
-  icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
-      reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
-  if (!dangerous_pattern) {
-    // Disallow the katakana no, so, zo, or n, as they may be mistaken for
-    // slashes when they're surrounded by non-Japanese scripts (i.e. scripts
-    // other than Katakana, Hiragana or Han). If {no, so, zo, n} next to a
-    // non-Japanese script on either side is disallowed, legitimate cases like
-    // '{vitamin in Katakana}b6' are blocked. Note that trying to block those
-    // characters when used alone as a label is futile because those cases
-    // would not reach here.
-    // Also disallow what used to be blocked by mixed-script-confusable (MSC)
-    // detection. ICU 58 does not detect MSC any more for a single input string.
-    // See http://bugs.icu-project.org/trac/ticket/12823 .
-    // TODO(jshin): adjust the pattern once the above ICU bug is fixed.
-    // - Disallow U+30FB (Katakana Middle Dot) and U+30FC (Hiragana-Katakana
-    //   Prolonged Sound) used out-of-context.
-    // - Dislallow U+30FD/E (Katakana iteration mark/voiced iteration mark)
-    //   unless they're preceded by a Katakana.
-    // - Disallow three Hiragana letters (U+307[8-A]) or Katakana letters
-    //   (U+30D[8-A]) that look exactly like each other when they're used in a
-    //   label otherwise entirely in Katakna or Hiragana.
-    // - Disallow U+0585 (Armenian Small Letter Oh) and U+0581 (Armenian Small
-    //   Letter Co) to be next to Latin.
-    // - Disallow Latin 'o' and 'g' next to Armenian.
-    // - Disalow mixing of Latin and Canadian Syllabary.
-    dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
-        icu::UnicodeString(
-            "[^\\p{scx=kana}\\p{scx=hira}\\p{scx=hani}]"
-            "[\\u30ce\\u30f3\\u30bd\\u30be]"
-            "[^\\p{scx=kana}\\p{scx=hira}\\p{scx=hani}]|"
-            "[^\\p{scx=kana}\\p{scx=hira}]\\u30fc|^\\u30fc|"
-            "[^\\p{scx=kana}][\\u30fd\\u30fe]|^[\\u30fd\\u30fe]|"
-            "^[\\p{scx=kana}]+[\\u3078-\\u307a][\\p{scx=kana}]+$|"
-            "^[\\p{scx=hira}]+[\\u30d8-\\u30da][\\p{scx=hira}]+$|"
-            "[a-z]\\u30fb|\\u30fb[a-z]|"
-            "^[\\u0585\\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\\u0585\\u0581]+$|"
-            "[a-z][\\u0585\\u0581]+[a-z]|"
-            "^[og]+[\\p{scx=armn}]|[\\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|"
-            "[\\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\\p{scx=armn}]|"
-            "[\\p{sc=cans}].*[a-z]|[a-z].*[\\p{sc=cans}]",
-            -1, US_INV),
-        0, status);
-    tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
-  }
-  dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
-  return !dangerous_pattern->find();
-}
-
-bool IDNSpoofChecker::IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(
-    const icu::UnicodeString& label_string) {
-  // Collect all the Cyrillic letters in |label_string| and see if they're
-  // a subset of |cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_|.
-  // A shortcut of defining cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ to include [0-9] and
-  // [_-] and checking if the set contains all letters of |label_string|
-  // would work in most cases, but not if a label has non-letters outside
-  // ASCII.
-  icu::UnicodeSet cyrillic_in_label;
-  icu::StringCharacterIterator it(label_string);
-  for (it.setToStart(); it.hasNext();) {
-    const UChar32 c = it.next32PostInc();
-    if (cyrillic_letters_.contains(c))
-      cyrillic_in_label.add(c);
-  }
-  return !cyrillic_in_label.isEmpty() &&
-         cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.containsAll(cyrillic_in_label);
-}
-
-void IDNSpoofChecker::SetAllowedUnicodeSet(UErrorCode* status) {
-  if (U_FAILURE(*status))
-    return;
-
-  // The recommended set is a set of characters for identifiers in a
-  // security-sensitive environment taken from UTR 39
-  // (http://unicode.org/reports/tr39/) and
-  // http://www.unicode.org/Public/security/latest/xidmodifications.txt .
-  // The inclusion set comes from "Candidate Characters for Inclusion
-  // in idenfiers" of UTR 31 (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr31). The list
-  // may change over the time and will be updated whenever the version of ICU
-  // used in Chromium is updated.
-  const icu::UnicodeSet* recommended_set =
-      uspoof_getRecommendedUnicodeSet(status);
-  icu::UnicodeSet allowed_set;
-  allowed_set.addAll(*recommended_set);
-  const icu::UnicodeSet* inclusion_set = uspoof_getInclusionUnicodeSet(status);
-  allowed_set.addAll(*inclusion_set);
-
-  // Five aspirational scripts are taken from UTR 31 Table 6 at
-  // http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr31/#Aspirational_Use_Scripts .
-  // Not all the characters of aspirational scripts are suitable for
-  // identifiers. Therefore, only characters belonging to
-  // [:Identifier_Type=Aspirational:] (listed in 'Status/Type=Aspirational'
-  // section at
-  // http://www.unicode.org/Public/security/latest/xidmodifications.txt) are
-  // are added to the allowed set. The list has to be updated when a new
-  // version of Unicode is released. The current version is 9.0.0 and ICU 60
-  // will have Unicode 10.0 data.
-#if U_ICU_VERSION_MAJOR_NUM < 60
-  const icu::UnicodeSet aspirational_scripts(
-      icu::UnicodeString(
-          // Unified Canadian Syllabics
-          "[\\u1401-\\u166C\\u166F-\\u167F"
-          // Mongolian
-          "\\u1810-\\u1819\\u1820-\\u1877\\u1880-\\u18AA"
-          // Unified Canadian Syllabics
-          "\\u18B0-\\u18F5"
-          // Tifinagh
-          "\\u2D30-\\u2D67\\u2D7F"
-          // Yi
-          "\\uA000-\\uA48C"
-          // Miao
-          "\\U00016F00-\\U00016F44\\U00016F50-\\U00016F7E"
-          "\\U00016F8F-\\U00016F9F]",
-          -1, US_INV),
-      *status);
-  allowed_set.addAll(aspirational_scripts);
-#else
-#error "Update aspirational_scripts per Unicode 10.0"
-#endif
-
-  // U+0338 is included in the recommended set, while U+05F4 and U+2027 are in
-  // the inclusion set. However, they are blacklisted as a part of Mozilla's
-  // IDN blacklist (http://kb.mozillazine.org/Network.IDN.blacklist_chars).
-  // U+2010 is in the inclusion set, but we drop it because it can be confused
-  // with an ASCII U+002D (Hyphen-Minus).
-  // U+0338 and U+2027 are dropped; the former can look like a slash when
-  // rendered with a broken font, and the latter can be confused with U+30FB
-  // (Katakana Middle Dot). U+05F4 (Hebrew Punctuation Gershayim) is kept,
-  // even though it can look like a double quotation mark. Using it in Hebrew
-  // should be safe. When used with a non-Hebrew script, it'd be filtered by
-  // other checks in place.
-  allowed_set.remove(0x338u);   // Combining Long Solidus Overlay
-  allowed_set.remove(0x2010u);  // Hyphen
-  allowed_set.remove(0x2027u);  // Hyphenation Point
-
-#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
-  // The following characters are reported as present in the default macOS
-  // system UI font, but they render as blank. Remove them from the allowed
-  // set to prevent spoofing.
-  // Tibetan characters used for transliteration of ancient texts:
-  allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Cu);
-  allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Du);
-  allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Eu);
-  allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Fu);
-#endif
-
-  uspoof_setAllowedUnicodeSet(checker_, &allowed_set, status);
-}
-
 // Returns true if the given Unicode host component is safe to display to the
 // user. Note that this function does not deal with pure ASCII domain labels at
 // all even though it's possible to make up look-alike labels with ASCII
 // characters alone.
 bool IsIDNComponentSafe(base::StringPiece16 label, bool is_tld_ascii) {
-  return g_idn_spoof_checker.Get().Check(label, is_tld_ascii);
+  return g_idn_spoof_checker.Get().SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(label, is_tld_ascii);
 }
 
 // A wrapper to use LazyInstance<>::Leaky with ICU's UIDNA, a C pointer to