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Unified Diff: net/cert/known_roots_win.cc

Issue 2833623002: Extract IsKnownRoot() functionality for testing if a certificate is a (Closed)
Patch Set: remove another unused header Created 3 years, 8 months ago
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Index: net/cert/known_roots_win.cc
diff --git a/net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.cc b/net/cert/known_roots_win.cc
similarity index 3%
copy from net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.cc
copy to net/cert/known_roots_win.cc
index 7f4d98d23345c705c4c2d743d536af026c804557..0a1d3acd82fd78e8dcb18fd5958aba7e7507a405 100644
--- a/net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.cc
+++ b/net/cert/known_roots_win.cc
@@ -1,290 +1,17 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Copyright (c) 2017 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
-#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_win.h"
+#include "net/cert/known_roots_win.h"
-#include <memory>
-#include <string>
-#include <vector>
-
-#include "base/memory/free_deleter.h"
#include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h"
-#include "base/sha1.h"
-#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
-#include "base/strings/utf_string_conversions.h"
-#include "base/threading/thread_local.h"
-#include "crypto/capi_util.h"
-#include "crypto/scoped_capi_types.h"
#include "crypto/sha2.h"
-#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
-#include "net/cert/asn1_util.h"
-#include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
-#include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h"
-#include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h"
-#include "net/cert/crl_set.h"
-#include "net/cert/ev_root_ca_metadata.h"
-#include "net/cert/test_root_certs.h"
#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
#include "net/cert/x509_certificate_known_roots_win.h"
-#if !defined(CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE)
-// This was introduced in Windows 8 / Windows Server 2012, but retroactively
-// ported as far back as Windows XP via system update.
-#define CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE 0x00100000
-#endif
-
namespace net {
-namespace {
-
-struct FreeChainEngineFunctor {
- void operator()(HCERTCHAINENGINE engine) const {
- if (engine)
- CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine);
- }
-};
-
-struct FreeCertChainContextFunctor {
- void operator()(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context) const {
- if (chain_context)
- CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context);
- }
-};
-
-struct FreeCertContextFunctor {
- void operator()(PCCERT_CONTEXT context) const {
- if (context)
- CertFreeCertificateContext(context);
- }
-};
-
-typedef crypto::ScopedCAPIHandle<HCERTCHAINENGINE, FreeChainEngineFunctor>
- ScopedHCERTCHAINENGINE;
-
-typedef std::unique_ptr<const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT, FreeCertChainContextFunctor>
- ScopedPCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT;
-
-typedef std::unique_ptr<const CERT_CONTEXT, FreeCertContextFunctor>
- ScopedPCCERT_CONTEXT;
-
-//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-int MapSecurityError(SECURITY_STATUS err) {
- // There are numerous security error codes, but these are the ones we thus
- // far find interesting.
- switch (err) {
- case SEC_E_WRONG_PRINCIPAL: // Schannel
- case CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH: // CryptoAPI
- return ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
- case SEC_E_UNTRUSTED_ROOT: // Schannel
- case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT: // CryptoAPI
- case TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE: // CryptoAPI. Caused by weak crypto or bad
- // signatures, but not differentiable.
- return ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
- case SEC_E_CERT_EXPIRED: // Schannel
- case CERT_E_EXPIRED: // CryptoAPI
- return ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID;
- case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK:
- return ERR_CERT_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM;
- case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE:
- return ERR_CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION;
- case CRYPT_E_REVOKED: // Schannel and CryptoAPI
- return ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
- case SEC_E_CERT_UNKNOWN:
- case CERT_E_ROLE:
- return ERR_CERT_INVALID;
- case CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE:
- // TODO(wtc): Should we add ERR_CERT_WRONG_USAGE?
- return ERR_CERT_INVALID;
- // We received an unexpected_message or illegal_parameter alert message
- // from the server.
- case SEC_E_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE:
- return ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
- case SEC_E_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH:
- return ERR_SSL_VERSION_OR_CIPHER_MISMATCH;
- case SEC_E_INVALID_HANDLE:
- return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
- case SEC_E_OK:
- return OK;
- default:
- LOG(WARNING) << "Unknown error " << err << " mapped to net::ERR_FAILED";
- return ERR_FAILED;
- }
-}
-
-// Map the errors in the chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus returned by
-// CertGetCertificateChain to our certificate status flags.
-int MapCertChainErrorStatusToCertStatus(DWORD error_status) {
- CertStatus cert_status = 0;
-
- // We don't include CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED because it's obsolete and
- // we wouldn't consider it an error anyway
- const DWORD kDateInvalidErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID |
- CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID;
- if (error_status & kDateInvalidErrors)
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
-
- const DWORD kAuthorityInvalidErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT |
- CERT_TRUST_IS_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST |
- CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
- if (error_status & kAuthorityInvalidErrors)
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
-
- if ((error_status & CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN) &&
- !(error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION))
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM;
-
- if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION)
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION;
-
- if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED)
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
-
- const DWORD kWrongUsageErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE |
- CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
- if (error_status & kWrongUsageErrors) {
- // TODO(wtc): Should we add CERT_STATUS_WRONG_USAGE?
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
- }
-
- if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID) {
- // Check for a signature that does not meet the OS criteria for strong
- // signatures.
- // Note: These checks may be more restrictive than the current weak key
- // criteria implemented within CertVerifier, such as excluding SHA-1 or
- // excluding RSA keys < 2048 bits. However, if the user has configured
- // these more stringent checks, respect that configuration and err on the
- // more restrictive criteria.
- if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE) {
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY;
- } else {
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
- }
- }
-
- // The rest of the errors.
- const DWORD kCertInvalidErrors =
- CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC |
- CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION |
- CERT_TRUST_INVALID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS |
- CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS |
- CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS |
- CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID |
- CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT |
- CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_DEFINED_NAME_CONSTRAINT |
- CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT |
- CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT |
- CERT_TRUST_NO_ISSUANCE_CHAIN_POLICY |
- CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT;
- if (error_status & kCertInvalidErrors)
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
-
- return cert_status;
-}
-
-// Returns true if any common name in the certificate's Subject field contains
-// a NULL character.
-bool CertSubjectCommonNameHasNull(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) {
- CRYPT_DECODE_PARA decode_para;
- decode_para.cbSize = sizeof(decode_para);
- decode_para.pfnAlloc = crypto::CryptAlloc;
- decode_para.pfnFree = crypto::CryptFree;
- CERT_NAME_INFO* name_info = NULL;
- DWORD name_info_size = 0;
- BOOL rv;
- rv = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
- WINCRYPT_X509_NAME,
- cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData,
- cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData,
- CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG,
- &decode_para,
- &name_info,
- &name_info_size);
- if (rv) {
- std::unique_ptr<CERT_NAME_INFO, base::FreeDeleter> scoped_name_info(
- name_info);
-
- // The Subject field may have multiple common names. According to the
- // "PKI Layer Cake" paper, CryptoAPI uses every common name in the
- // Subject field, so we inspect every common name.
- //
- // From RFC 5280:
- // X520CommonName ::= CHOICE {
- // teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
- // printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
- // universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
- // utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
- // bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)) }
- //
- // We also check IA5String and VisibleString.
- for (DWORD i = 0; i < name_info->cRDN; ++i) {
- PCERT_RDN rdn = &name_info->rgRDN[i];
- for (DWORD j = 0; j < rdn->cRDNAttr; ++j) {
- PCERT_RDN_ATTR rdn_attr = &rdn->rgRDNAttr[j];
- if (strcmp(rdn_attr->pszObjId, szOID_COMMON_NAME) == 0) {
- switch (rdn_attr->dwValueType) {
- // After the CryptoAPI ASN.1 security vulnerabilities described in
- // http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS09-056.mspx
- // were patched, we get CERT_RDN_ENCODED_BLOB for a common name
- // that contains a NULL character.
- case CERT_RDN_ENCODED_BLOB:
- break;
- // Array of 8-bit characters.
- case CERT_RDN_PRINTABLE_STRING:
- case CERT_RDN_TELETEX_STRING:
- case CERT_RDN_IA5_STRING:
- case CERT_RDN_VISIBLE_STRING:
- for (DWORD k = 0; k < rdn_attr->Value.cbData; ++k) {
- if (rdn_attr->Value.pbData[k] == '\0')
- return true;
- }
- break;
- // Array of 16-bit characters.
- case CERT_RDN_BMP_STRING:
- case CERT_RDN_UTF8_STRING: {
- DWORD num_wchars = rdn_attr->Value.cbData / 2;
- wchar_t* common_name =
- reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(rdn_attr->Value.pbData);
- for (DWORD k = 0; k < num_wchars; ++k) {
- if (common_name[k] == L'\0')
- return true;
- }
- break;
- }
- // Array of ints (32-bit).
- case CERT_RDN_UNIVERSAL_STRING: {
- DWORD num_ints = rdn_attr->Value.cbData / 4;
- int* common_name =
- reinterpret_cast<int*>(rdn_attr->Value.pbData);
- for (DWORD k = 0; k < num_ints; ++k) {
- if (common_name[k] == 0)
- return true;
- }
- break;
- }
- default:
- NOTREACHED();
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- return false;
-}
-
-// IsIssuedByKnownRoot returns true if the given chain is rooted at a root CA
-// which we recognise as a standard root.
-// static
-bool IsIssuedByKnownRoot(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context) {
- PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain_context->rgpChain[0];
- int num_elements = first_chain->cElement;
- if (num_elements < 1)
- return false;
- PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement;
- PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext;
-
+bool IsKnownRoot(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) {
SHA256HashValue hash = X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint256(cert);
bool is_builtin =
IsSHA256HashInSortedArray(hash, &kKnownRootCertSHA256Hashes[0][0],
@@ -326,900 +53,4 @@ bool IsIssuedByKnownRoot(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context) {
return is_builtin;
}
-// Saves some information about the certificate chain |chain_context| in
-// |*verify_result|. The caller MUST initialize |*verify_result| before
-// calling this function.
-void GetCertChainInfo(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context,
- CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
- if (chain_context->cChain == 0)
- return;
-
- PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain_context->rgpChain[0];
- DWORD num_elements = first_chain->cElement;
- PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement;
-
- PCCERT_CONTEXT verified_cert = NULL;
- std::vector<PCCERT_CONTEXT> verified_chain;
-
- bool has_root_ca = num_elements > 1 &&
- !(chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
- CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
-
- // Each chain starts with the end entity certificate (i = 0) and ends with
- // either the root CA certificate or the last available intermediate. If a
- // root CA certificate is present, do not inspect the signature algorithm of
- // the root CA certificate because the signature on the trust anchor is not
- // important.
- if (has_root_ca) {
- // If a full chain was constructed, regardless of whether it was trusted,
- // don't inspect the root's signature algorithm.
- num_elements -= 1;
- }
-
- for (DWORD i = 0; i < num_elements; ++i) {
- PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext;
- if (i == 0) {
- verified_cert = cert;
- } else {
- verified_chain.push_back(cert);
- }
- }
-
- if (verified_cert) {
- // Add the root certificate, if present, as it was not added above.
- if (has_root_ca)
- verified_chain.push_back(element[num_elements]->pCertContext);
- scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> verified_cert_with_chain =
- X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_cert, verified_chain);
- if (verified_cert_with_chain)
- verify_result->verified_cert = std::move(verified_cert_with_chain);
- else
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
- }
-}
-
-// Decodes the cert's certificatePolicies extension into a CERT_POLICIES_INFO
-// structure and stores it in *output.
-void GetCertPoliciesInfo(
- PCCERT_CONTEXT cert,
- std::unique_ptr<CERT_POLICIES_INFO, base::FreeDeleter>* output) {
- PCERT_EXTENSION extension = CertFindExtension(szOID_CERT_POLICIES,
- cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
- cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
- if (!extension)
- return;
-
- CRYPT_DECODE_PARA decode_para;
- decode_para.cbSize = sizeof(decode_para);
- decode_para.pfnAlloc = crypto::CryptAlloc;
- decode_para.pfnFree = crypto::CryptFree;
- CERT_POLICIES_INFO* policies_info = NULL;
- DWORD policies_info_size = 0;
- BOOL rv;
- rv = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
- szOID_CERT_POLICIES,
- extension->Value.pbData,
- extension->Value.cbData,
- CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG,
- &decode_para,
- &policies_info,
- &policies_info_size);
- if (rv)
- output->reset(policies_info);
-}
-
-// Computes the SHA-256 hash of the SPKI of |cert| and stores it in |hash|,
-// returning true. If an error occurs, returns false and leaves |hash|
-// unmodified.
-bool HashSPKI(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, std::string* hash) {
- base::StringPiece der_bytes(
- reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert->pbCertEncoded), cert->cbCertEncoded);
-
- base::StringPiece spki;
- if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki))
- return false;
-
- *hash = crypto::SHA256HashString(spki);
- return true;
-}
-
-enum CRLSetResult {
- // Indicates an error happened while attempting to determine CRLSet status.
- // For example, if the certificate's SPKI could not be extracted.
- kCRLSetError,
-
- // Indicates there is no fresh information about the certificate, or if the
- // CRLSet has expired.
- // In the case of certificate chains, this is only returned if the leaf
- // certificate is not covered by the CRLSet; this is because some
- // intermediates are fully covered, but after filtering, the issuer's CRL
- // is empty and thus omitted from the CRLSet. Since online checking is
- // performed for EV certificates when this status is returned, this would
- // result in needless online lookups for certificates known not-revoked.
- kCRLSetUnknown,
-
- // Indicates that the certificate (or a certificate in the chain) has been
- // revoked.
- kCRLSetRevoked,
-
- // The certificate (or certificate chain) has no revocations.
- kCRLSetOk,
-};
-
-// Determines if |subject_cert| is revoked within |crl_set|,
-// storing the SubjectPublicKeyInfo hash of |subject_cert| in
-// |*previous_hash|.
-//
-// CRLSets store revocations by both SPKI and by the tuple of Issuer SPKI
-// Hash & Serial. While |subject_cert| contains enough information to check
-// for SPKI revocations, to determine the issuer's SPKI, either |issuer_cert|
-// must be supplied, or the hash of the issuer's SPKI provided in
-// |*previous_hash|. If |issuer_cert| is omitted, and |*previous_hash| is empty,
-// only SPKI checks are performed.
-//
-// To avoid recomputing SPKI hashes, the hash of |subject_cert| is stored in
-// |*previous_hash|. This allows chaining revocation checking, by starting
-// at the root and iterating to the leaf, supplying |previous_hash| each time.
-//
-// In the event of a parsing error, |*previous_hash| is cleared, to prevent the
-// wrong Issuer&Serial tuple from being used.
-CRLSetResult CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(CRLSet* crl_set,
- PCCERT_CONTEXT subject_cert,
- PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer_cert,
- std::string* previous_hash) {
- DCHECK(crl_set);
- DCHECK(subject_cert);
-
- // Check to see if |subject_cert|'s SPKI is revoked. The actual revocation
- // is handled by the SHA-256 hash of the SPKI, so compute that.
- std::string subject_hash;
- if (!HashSPKI(subject_cert, &subject_hash)) {
- NOTREACHED(); // Indicates Windows accepted something irrecoverably bad.
- previous_hash->clear();
- return kCRLSetError;
- }
-
- CRLSet::Result result = crl_set->CheckSPKI(subject_hash);
- if (result == CRLSet::REVOKED)
- return kCRLSetRevoked;
-
- // If no issuer cert is provided, nor a hash of the issuer's SPKI, no
- // further checks can be done.
- if (!issuer_cert && previous_hash->empty()) {
- previous_hash->swap(subject_hash);
- return kCRLSetUnknown;
- }
-
- // Compute the subject's serial.
- const CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB* serial_blob =
- &subject_cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber;
- std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> serial_bytes(new uint8_t[serial_blob->cbData]);
- // The bytes of the serial number are stored little-endian.
- // Note: While MSDN implies that bytes are stripped from this serial,
- // they are not - only CertCompareIntegerBlob actually removes bytes.
- for (DWORD j = 0; j < serial_blob->cbData; j++)
- serial_bytes[j] = serial_blob->pbData[serial_blob->cbData - j - 1];
- base::StringPiece serial(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(serial_bytes.get()),
- serial_blob->cbData);
-
- // Compute the issuer's hash. If it was provided (via previous_hash),
- // use that; otherwise, compute it based on |issuer_cert|.
- std::string issuer_hash_local;
- std::string* issuer_hash = previous_hash;
- if (issuer_hash->empty()) {
- if (!HashSPKI(issuer_cert, &issuer_hash_local)) {
- NOTREACHED(); // Indicates Windows accepted something irrecoverably bad.
- previous_hash->clear();
- return kCRLSetError;
- }
- issuer_hash = &issuer_hash_local;
- }
-
- // Look up by serial & issuer SPKI.
- result = crl_set->CheckSerial(serial, *issuer_hash);
- if (result == CRLSet::REVOKED)
- return kCRLSetRevoked;
-
- previous_hash->swap(subject_hash);
- if (result == CRLSet::GOOD)
- return kCRLSetOk;
- if (result == CRLSet::UNKNOWN)
- return kCRLSetUnknown;
-
- NOTREACHED();
- return kCRLSetError;
-}
-
-// CheckChainRevocationWithCRLSet attempts to check each element of |chain|
-// against |crl_set|. It returns:
-// kCRLSetRevoked: if any element of the chain is known to have been revoked.
-// kCRLSetUnknown: if there is no fresh information about the leaf
-// certificate in the chain or if the CRLSet has expired.
-//
-// Only the leaf certificate is considered for coverage because some
-// intermediates have CRLs with no revocations (after filtering) and
-// those CRLs are pruned from the CRLSet at generation time. This means
-// that some EV sites would otherwise take the hit of an OCSP lookup for
-// no reason.
-// kCRLSetOk: otherwise.
-CRLSetResult CheckChainRevocationWithCRLSet(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
- CRLSet* crl_set) {
- if (chain->cChain == 0 || chain->rgpChain[0]->cElement == 0)
- return kCRLSetOk;
-
- PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* elements = chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement;
- DWORD num_elements = chain->rgpChain[0]->cElement;
-
- bool had_error = false;
- CRLSetResult result = kCRLSetError;
- std::string issuer_spki_hash;
- for (DWORD i = 0; i < num_elements; ++i) {
- PCCERT_CONTEXT subject = elements[num_elements - i - 1]->pCertContext;
- result =
- CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(crl_set, subject, nullptr, &issuer_spki_hash);
- if (result == kCRLSetRevoked)
- return result;
- if (result == kCRLSetError)
- had_error = true;
- }
- if (had_error || crl_set->IsExpired())
- return kCRLSetUnknown;
- return result;
-}
-
-void AppendPublicKeyHashes(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
- HashValueVector* hashes) {
- if (chain->cChain == 0)
- return;
-
- PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain->rgpChain[0];
- PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* const element = first_chain->rgpElement;
-
- const DWORD num_elements = first_chain->cElement;
- for (DWORD i = 0; i < num_elements; i++) {
- PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext;
-
- base::StringPiece der_bytes(
- reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert->pbCertEncoded),
- cert->cbCertEncoded);
- base::StringPiece spki_bytes;
- if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki_bytes))
- continue;
-
- HashValue sha1(HASH_VALUE_SHA1);
- base::SHA1HashBytes(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(spki_bytes.data()),
- spki_bytes.size(), sha1.data());
- hashes->push_back(sha1);
-
- HashValue sha256(HASH_VALUE_SHA256);
- crypto::SHA256HashString(spki_bytes, sha256.data(), crypto::kSHA256Length);
- hashes->push_back(sha256);
- }
-}
-
-// Returns true if the certificate is an extended-validation certificate.
-//
-// This function checks the certificatePolicies extensions of the
-// certificates in the certificate chain according to Section 7 (pp. 11-12)
-// of the EV Certificate Guidelines Version 1.0 at
-// http://cabforum.org/EV_Certificate_Guidelines.pdf.
-bool CheckEV(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context,
- bool rev_checking_enabled,
- const char* policy_oid) {
- DCHECK_NE(static_cast<DWORD>(0), chain_context->cChain);
- // If the cert doesn't match any of the policies, the
- // CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE bit (0x10) in
- // chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus is set.
- DWORD error_status = chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus;
-
- if (!rev_checking_enabled) {
- // If online revocation checking is disabled then we will have still
- // requested that the revocation cache be checked. However, that will often
- // cause the following two error bits to be set. These error bits mean that
- // the local OCSP/CRL is stale or missing entries for these certificates.
- // Since they are expected, we mask them away.
- error_status &= ~(CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION |
- CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN);
- }
- if (!chain_context->cChain || error_status != CERT_TRUST_NO_ERROR)
- return false;
-
- // Check the end certificate simple chain (chain_context->rgpChain[0]).
- // If the end certificate's certificatePolicies extension contains the
- // EV policy OID of the root CA, return true.
- PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = chain_context->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement;
- int num_elements = chain_context->rgpChain[0]->cElement;
- if (num_elements < 2)
- return false;
-
- // Look up the EV policy OID of the root CA.
- PCCERT_CONTEXT root_cert = element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext;
- SHA1HashValue weak_fingerprint;
- base::SHA1HashBytes(root_cert->pbCertEncoded, root_cert->cbCertEncoded,
- weak_fingerprint.data);
- EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance();
- return metadata->HasEVPolicyOID(weak_fingerprint, policy_oid);
-}
-
-// Custom revocation provider function that compares incoming certificates with
-// those in CRLSets. This is called BEFORE the default CRL & OCSP handling
-// is invoked (which is handled by the revocation provider function
-// "CertDllVerifyRevocation" in cryptnet.dll)
-BOOL WINAPI
-CertDllVerifyRevocationWithCRLSet(DWORD encoding_type,
- DWORD revocation_type,
- DWORD num_contexts,
- void* rgpvContext[],
- DWORD flags,
- PCERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocation_params,
- PCERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocation_status);
-
-// Helper class that installs the CRLSet-based Revocation Provider as the
-// default revocation provider. Because it is installed as a function address
-// (meaning only scoped to the process, and not stored in the registry), it
-// will be used before any registry-based providers, including Microsoft's
-// default provider.
-class RevocationInjector {
- public:
- CRLSet* GetCRLSet() { return thread_local_crlset.Get(); }
-
- void SetCRLSet(CRLSet* crl_set) { thread_local_crlset.Set(crl_set); }
-
- private:
- friend struct base::LazyInstanceTraitsBase<RevocationInjector>;
-
- RevocationInjector() {
- const CRYPT_OID_FUNC_ENTRY kInterceptFunction[] = {
- {CRYPT_DEFAULT_OID, &CertDllVerifyRevocationWithCRLSet},
- };
- BOOL ok = CryptInstallOIDFunctionAddress(
- NULL, X509_ASN_ENCODING, CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_REVOCATION_FUNC,
- arraysize(kInterceptFunction), kInterceptFunction,
- CRYPT_INSTALL_OID_FUNC_BEFORE_FLAG);
- DCHECK(ok);
- }
-
- ~RevocationInjector() {}
-
- // As the revocation parameters passed to CertVerifyProc::VerifyInternal
- // cannot be officially smuggled to the Revocation Provider
- base::ThreadLocalPointer<CRLSet> thread_local_crlset;
-};
-
-// Leaky, as CertVerifyProc workers are themselves leaky.
-base::LazyInstance<RevocationInjector>::Leaky g_revocation_injector =
- LAZY_INSTANCE_INITIALIZER;
-
-BOOL WINAPI
-CertDllVerifyRevocationWithCRLSet(DWORD encoding_type,
- DWORD revocation_type,
- DWORD num_contexts,
- void* rgpvContext[],
- DWORD flags,
- PCERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocation_params,
- PCERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocation_status) {
- PCERT_CONTEXT* cert_contexts = reinterpret_cast<PCERT_CONTEXT*>(rgpvContext);
- // The dummy CRLSet provider never returns that something is affirmatively
- // *un*revoked, as this would disable other revocation providers from being
- // checked for this certificate (much like an OCSP "Good" status would).
- // Instead, it merely indicates that insufficient information existed to
- // determine if the certificate was revoked (in the good case), or that a cert
- // is affirmatively revoked in the event it appears within the CRLSet.
- // Because of this, set up some basic bookkeeping for the results.
- CHECK(revocation_status);
- revocation_status->dwIndex = 0;
- revocation_status->dwError = static_cast<DWORD>(CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK);
- revocation_status->dwReason = 0;
-
- if (num_contexts == 0 || !cert_contexts[0]) {
- SetLastError(static_cast<DWORD>(E_INVALIDARG));
- return FALSE;
- }
-
- if ((GET_CERT_ENCODING_TYPE(encoding_type) != X509_ASN_ENCODING) ||
- revocation_type != CERT_CONTEXT_REVOCATION_TYPE) {
- SetLastError(static_cast<DWORD>(CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK));
- return FALSE;
- }
-
- // No revocation checking possible if there is no associated
- // CRLSet.
- CRLSet* crl_set = g_revocation_injector.Get().GetCRLSet();
- if (!crl_set)
- return FALSE;
-
- // |revocation_params| is an optional structure; to make life simple and avoid
- // the need to constantly check whether or not it was supplied, create a local
- // copy. If the caller didn't supply anything, it will be empty; otherwise,
- // it will be (non-owning) copies of the caller's original params.
- CERT_REVOCATION_PARA local_params;
- memset(&local_params, 0, sizeof(local_params));
- if (revocation_params) {
- DWORD bytes_to_copy = std::min(revocation_params->cbSize,
- static_cast<DWORD>(sizeof(local_params)));
- memcpy(&local_params, revocation_params, bytes_to_copy);
- }
- local_params.cbSize = sizeof(local_params);
-
- PCERT_CONTEXT subject_cert = cert_contexts[0];
-
- if ((flags & CERT_VERIFY_REV_CHAIN_FLAG) && num_contexts > 1) {
- // Verifying a chain; first verify from the last certificate in the
- // chain to the first, and then leave the last certificate (which
- // is presumably self-issued, although it may simply be a trust
- // anchor) as the |subject_cert| in order to scan for more
- // revocations.
- std::string issuer_hash;
- PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer_cert = nullptr;
- for (DWORD i = num_contexts; i > 0; --i) {
- subject_cert = cert_contexts[i - 1];
- if (!subject_cert) {
- SetLastError(static_cast<DWORD>(E_INVALIDARG));
- return FALSE;
- }
- CRLSetResult result = CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(
- crl_set, subject_cert, issuer_cert, &issuer_hash);
- if (result == kCRLSetRevoked) {
- revocation_status->dwIndex = i - 1;
- revocation_status->dwError = static_cast<DWORD>(CRYPT_E_REVOKED);
- revocation_status->dwReason = CRL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
- SetLastError(revocation_status->dwError);
- return FALSE;
- }
- issuer_cert = subject_cert;
- }
- // Verified all certificates from the trust anchor to the leaf, and none
- // were explicitly revoked. Now do a second pass to attempt to determine
- // the issuer for cert_contexts[num_contexts - 1], so that the
- // Issuer SPKI+Serial can be checked for that certificate.
- //
- // This code intentionally ignores the flag
- subject_cert = cert_contexts[num_contexts - 1];
- // Reset local_params.pIssuerCert, since it would contain the issuer
- // for cert_contexts[0].
- local_params.pIssuerCert = nullptr;
- // Fixup the revocation index to point to this cert (in the event it is
- // revoked). If it isn't revoked, this will be done undone later.
- revocation_status->dwIndex = num_contexts - 1;
- }
-
- // Determine the issuer cert for the incoming cert
- ScopedPCCERT_CONTEXT issuer_cert;
- if (local_params.pIssuerCert &&
- CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(
- NULL, subject_cert->dwCertEncodingType,
- CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT, subject_cert,
- CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT,
- const_cast<PCERT_CONTEXT>(local_params.pIssuerCert), 0, nullptr)) {
- // Caller has already supplied the issuer cert via the revocation params;
- // just use that.
- issuer_cert.reset(
- CertDuplicateCertificateContext(local_params.pIssuerCert));
- } else if (CertCompareCertificateName(subject_cert->dwCertEncodingType,
- &subject_cert->pCertInfo->Subject,
- &subject_cert->pCertInfo->Issuer) &&
- CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(
- NULL, subject_cert->dwCertEncodingType,
- CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT, subject_cert,
- CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT, subject_cert, 0,
- nullptr)) {
- // Certificate is self-signed; use it as its own issuer.
- issuer_cert.reset(CertDuplicateCertificateContext(subject_cert));
- } else {
- // Scan the caller-supplied stores first, to try and find the issuer cert.
- for (DWORD i = 0; i < local_params.cCertStore && !issuer_cert; ++i) {
- PCCERT_CONTEXT previous_cert = nullptr;
- for (;;) {
- DWORD store_search_flags = CERT_STORE_SIGNATURE_FLAG;
- previous_cert = CertGetIssuerCertificateFromStore(
- local_params.rgCertStore[i], subject_cert, previous_cert,
- &store_search_flags);
- if (!previous_cert)
- break;
- // If a cert is found and meets the criteria, the flag will be reset to
- // zero. Thus NOT having the bit set is equivalent to having found a
- // matching certificate.
- if (!(store_search_flags & CERT_STORE_SIGNATURE_FLAG)) {
- // No need to dupe; reference is held.
- issuer_cert.reset(previous_cert);
- break;
- }
- }
- if (issuer_cert)
- break;
- if (GetLastError() == static_cast<DWORD>(CRYPT_E_SELF_SIGNED)) {
- issuer_cert.reset(CertDuplicateCertificateContext(subject_cert));
- break;
- }
- }
-
- // At this point, the Microsoft provider opens up the "CA", "Root", and
- // "SPC" stores to search for the issuer certificate, if not found in the
- // caller-supplied stores. It is unclear whether that is necessary here.
- }
-
- if (!issuer_cert) {
- // Rather than return CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK (indicating everything
- // is fine to try the next provider), return CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE.
- // This propogates up to the caller as an error while checking revocation,
- // which is the desired intent if there are certificates that cannot
- // be checked.
- revocation_status->dwIndex = 0;
- revocation_status->dwError = static_cast<DWORD>(CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE);
- SetLastError(revocation_status->dwError);
- return FALSE;
- }
-
- std::string unused;
- CRLSetResult result = CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(crl_set, subject_cert,
- issuer_cert.get(), &unused);
- if (result == kCRLSetRevoked) {
- revocation_status->dwError = static_cast<DWORD>(CRYPT_E_REVOKED);
- revocation_status->dwReason = CRL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
- SetLastError(revocation_status->dwError);
- return FALSE;
- }
-
- // The result is ALWAYS FALSE in order to allow the next revocation provider
- // a chance to examine. The only difference is whether or not an error is
- // indicated via dwError (and SetLastError()).
- // Reset the error index so that Windows does not believe this code has
- // examined the entire chain and found no issues until the last cert (thus
- // skipping other revocation providers).
- revocation_status->dwIndex = 0;
- return FALSE;
-}
-
-class ScopedThreadLocalCRLSet {
- public:
- explicit ScopedThreadLocalCRLSet(CRLSet* crl_set) {
- g_revocation_injector.Get().SetCRLSet(crl_set);
- }
- ~ScopedThreadLocalCRLSet() { g_revocation_injector.Get().SetCRLSet(nullptr); }
-};
-
-} // namespace
-
-CertVerifyProcWin::CertVerifyProcWin() {}
-
-CertVerifyProcWin::~CertVerifyProcWin() {}
-
-bool CertVerifyProcWin::SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const {
- return false;
-}
-
-bool CertVerifyProcWin::SupportsOCSPStapling() const {
- // CERT_OCSP_RESPONSE_PROP_ID is only implemented on Vista+, but it can be
- // set on Windows XP without error. There is some overhead from the server
- // sending the OCSP response if it supports the extension, for the subset of
- // XP clients who will request it but be unable to use it, but this is an
- // acceptable trade-off for simplicity of implementation.
- return true;
-}
-
-int CertVerifyProcWin::VerifyInternal(
- X509Certificate* cert,
- const std::string& hostname,
- const std::string& ocsp_response,
- int flags,
- CRLSet* crl_set,
- const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
- CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
- // Ensure the Revocation Provider has been installed and configured for this
- // CRLSet.
- ScopedThreadLocalCRLSet thread_local_crlset(crl_set);
-
- PCCERT_CONTEXT cert_handle = cert->os_cert_handle();
- if (!cert_handle)
- return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
-
- // Build and validate certificate chain.
- CERT_CHAIN_PARA chain_para;
- memset(&chain_para, 0, sizeof(chain_para));
- chain_para.cbSize = sizeof(chain_para);
- // ExtendedKeyUsage.
- // We still need to request szOID_SERVER_GATED_CRYPTO and szOID_SGC_NETSCAPE
- // today because some certificate chains need them. IE also requests these
- // two usages.
- static const LPCSTR usage[] = {
- szOID_PKIX_KP_SERVER_AUTH,
- szOID_SERVER_GATED_CRYPTO,
- szOID_SGC_NETSCAPE
- };
- chain_para.RequestedUsage.dwType = USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_OR;
- chain_para.RequestedUsage.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = arraysize(usage);
- chain_para.RequestedUsage.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier =
- const_cast<LPSTR*>(usage);
-
- // Get the certificatePolicies extension of the certificate.
- std::unique_ptr<CERT_POLICIES_INFO, base::FreeDeleter> policies_info;
- LPSTR ev_policy_oid = NULL;
- if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) {
- GetCertPoliciesInfo(cert_handle, &policies_info);
- if (policies_info.get()) {
- EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance();
- for (DWORD i = 0; i < policies_info->cPolicyInfo; ++i) {
- LPSTR policy_oid = policies_info->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier;
- if (metadata->IsEVPolicyOID(policy_oid)) {
- ev_policy_oid = policy_oid;
- chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.dwType = USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND;
- chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = 1;
- chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier =
- &ev_policy_oid;
-
- // De-prioritize the CA/Browser forum Extended Validation policy
- // (2.23.140.1.1). See crbug.com/705285.
- if (!EVRootCAMetadata::IsCaBrowserForumEvOid(ev_policy_oid))
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- // Revocation checking is always enabled, in order to enable CRLSets to be
- // evaluated as part of a revocation provider. However, when the caller did
- // not explicitly request revocation checking (which is to say, online
- // revocation checking), then only enable cached results. This disables OCSP
- // and CRL fetching, but still allows the revocation provider to be called.
- // Note: The root cert is also checked for revocation status, so that CRLSets
- // will cover revoked SPKIs.
- DWORD chain_flags = CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN;
- bool rev_checking_enabled =
- (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
- if (rev_checking_enabled) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
- } else {
- chain_flags |= CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY;
- }
-
- // By default, use the default HCERTCHAINENGINE (aka HCCE_CURRENT_USER). When
- // running tests, use a dynamic HCERTCHAINENGINE. All of the status and cache
- // of verified certificates and chains is tied to the HCERTCHAINENGINE. As
- // each invocation may have changed the set of known roots, invalidate the
- // cache between runs.
- //
- // This is not the most efficient means of doing so; it's possible to mark the
- // Root store used by TestRootCerts as changed, via CertControlStore with the
- // CERT_STORE_CTRL_NOTIFY_CHANGE / CERT_STORE_CTRL_RESYNC, but that's more
- // complexity for what is test-only code.
- ScopedHCERTCHAINENGINE chain_engine(NULL);
- if (TestRootCerts::HasInstance())
- chain_engine.reset(TestRootCerts::GetInstance()->GetChainEngine());
-
- ScopedPCCERT_CONTEXT cert_list(cert->CreateOSCertChainForCert());
-
- // Add stapled OCSP response data, which will be preferred over online checks
- // and used when in cache-only mode.
- if (!ocsp_response.empty()) {
- CRYPT_DATA_BLOB ocsp_response_blob;
- ocsp_response_blob.cbData = ocsp_response.size();
- ocsp_response_blob.pbData =
- reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(const_cast<char*>(ocsp_response.data()));
- CertSetCertificateContextProperty(
- cert_list.get(), CERT_OCSP_RESPONSE_PROP_ID,
- CERT_SET_PROPERTY_IGNORE_PERSIST_ERROR_FLAG, &ocsp_response_blob);
- }
-
- CERT_STRONG_SIGN_SERIALIZED_INFO strong_signed_info;
- memset(&strong_signed_info, 0, sizeof(strong_signed_info));
- strong_signed_info.dwFlags = 0; // Don't check OCSP or CRL signatures.
-
- // Note that the following two configurations result in disabling support for
- // any CNG-added algorithms, which may result in some disruption for internal
- // PKI operations that use national forms of crypto (e.g. GOST). However, the
- // fallback mechanism for this (to support SHA-1 chains) will re-enable them,
- // so they should continue to work - just with added latency.
- wchar_t hash_algs[] =
- L"RSA/SHA256;RSA/SHA384;RSA/SHA512;"
- L"ECDSA/SHA256;ECDSA/SHA384;ECDSA/SHA512";
- strong_signed_info.pwszCNGSignHashAlgids = hash_algs;
-
- // RSA-1024 bit support is intentionally enabled here. More investigation is
- // needed to determine if setting CERT_STRONG_SIGN_DISABLE_END_CHECK_FLAG in
- // the dwStrongSignFlags of |chain_para| would allow the ability to disable
- // support for intermediates/roots < 2048-bits, while still ensuring that
- // end-entity certs signed with SHA-1 are flagged/rejected.
- wchar_t key_sizes[] = L"RSA/1024;ECDSA/256";
- strong_signed_info.pwszCNGPubKeyMinBitLengths = key_sizes;
-
- CERT_STRONG_SIGN_PARA strong_sign_params;
- memset(&strong_sign_params, 0, sizeof(strong_sign_params));
- strong_sign_params.cbSize = sizeof(strong_sign_params);
- strong_sign_params.dwInfoChoice = CERT_STRONG_SIGN_SERIALIZED_INFO_CHOICE;
- strong_sign_params.pSerializedInfo = &strong_signed_info;
-
- chain_para.dwStrongSignFlags = 0;
- chain_para.pStrongSignPara = &strong_sign_params;
-
- PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context = nullptr;
-
- // First, try to verify with strong signing enabled. If this fails, or if the
- // chain is rejected, then clear it from |chain_para| so that all subsequent
- // calls will use the fallback path.
- BOOL chain_result =
- CertGetCertificateChain(chain_engine, cert_list.get(),
- NULL, // current system time
- cert_list->hCertStore, &chain_para, chain_flags,
- NULL, // reserved
- &chain_context);
- if (chain_result && chain_context &&
- (chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
- (CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE | CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID))) {
- // The attempt to verify with strong-sign (only SHA-2) failed, so fall back
- // to disabling it. This will allow SHA-1 chains to be returned, which will
- // then be subsequently signalled as weak if necessary.
- CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context);
- chain_context = nullptr;
-
- chain_para.pStrongSignPara = nullptr;
- chain_para.dwStrongSignFlags = 0;
- chain_result =
- CertGetCertificateChain(chain_engine, cert_list.get(),
- NULL, // current system time
- cert_list->hCertStore, &chain_para, chain_flags,
- NULL, // reserved
- &chain_context);
- }
-
- if (!chain_result) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
- return MapSecurityError(GetLastError());
- }
-
- // Perform a second check with CRLSets. Although the Revocation Provider
- // should have prevented invalid paths from being built, the behaviour and
- // timing of how a Revocation Provider is invoked is not well documented. This
- // is just defense in depth.
- CRLSetResult crl_set_result = kCRLSetUnknown;
- if (crl_set)
- crl_set_result = CheckChainRevocationWithCRLSet(chain_context, crl_set);
-
- if (crl_set_result == kCRLSetRevoked) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
- } else if (crl_set_result == kCRLSetUnknown &&
- (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY) &&
- !rev_checking_enabled &&
- ev_policy_oid != NULL) {
- // We don't have fresh information about this chain from the CRLSet and
- // it's probably an EV certificate. Retry with online revocation checking.
- rev_checking_enabled = true;
- chain_flags &= ~CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY;
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
-
- CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context);
- if (!CertGetCertificateChain(
- chain_engine,
- cert_list.get(),
- NULL, // current system time
- cert_list->hCertStore,
- &chain_para,
- chain_flags,
- NULL, // reserved
- &chain_context)) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
- return MapSecurityError(GetLastError());
- }
- }
-
- if (chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
- CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE) {
- ev_policy_oid = NULL;
- chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = 0;
- chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = NULL;
- CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context);
- if (!CertGetCertificateChain(
- chain_engine,
- cert_list.get(),
- NULL, // current system time
- cert_list->hCertStore,
- &chain_para,
- chain_flags,
- NULL, // reserved
- &chain_context)) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
- return MapSecurityError(GetLastError());
- }
- }
-
- CertVerifyResult temp_verify_result = *verify_result;
- GetCertChainInfo(chain_context, verify_result);
- if (!verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root &&
- (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS)) {
- *verify_result = temp_verify_result;
-
- rev_checking_enabled = true;
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
- chain_flags &= ~CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY;
-
- CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context);
- if (!CertGetCertificateChain(
- chain_engine,
- cert_list.get(),
- NULL, // current system time
- cert_list->hCertStore,
- &chain_para,
- chain_flags,
- NULL, // reserved
- &chain_context)) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
- return MapSecurityError(GetLastError());
- }
- GetCertChainInfo(chain_context, verify_result);
-
- if (chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
- CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
- }
- }
-
- ScopedPCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT scoped_chain_context(chain_context);
-
- verify_result->cert_status |= MapCertChainErrorStatusToCertStatus(
- chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus);
-
- // Flag certificates that have a Subject common name with a NULL character.
- if (CertSubjectCommonNameHasNull(cert_handle))
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
-
- base::string16 hostname16 = base::ASCIIToUTF16(hostname);
-
- SSL_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA extra_policy_para;
- memset(&extra_policy_para, 0, sizeof(extra_policy_para));
- extra_policy_para.cbSize = sizeof(extra_policy_para);
- extra_policy_para.dwAuthType = AUTHTYPE_SERVER;
- // Certificate name validation happens separately, later, using an internal
- // routine that has better support for RFC 6125 name matching.
- extra_policy_para.fdwChecks =
- 0x00001000; // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_CN_INVALID
- extra_policy_para.pwszServerName =
- const_cast<base::char16*>(hostname16.c_str());
-
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA policy_para;
- memset(&policy_para, 0, sizeof(policy_para));
- policy_para.cbSize = sizeof(policy_para);
- policy_para.dwFlags = 0;
- policy_para.pvExtraPolicyPara = &extra_policy_para;
-
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS policy_status;
- memset(&policy_status, 0, sizeof(policy_status));
- policy_status.cbSize = sizeof(policy_status);
-
- if (!CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL,
- chain_context,
- &policy_para,
- &policy_status)) {
- return MapSecurityError(GetLastError());
- }
-
- if (policy_status.dwError) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= MapNetErrorToCertStatus(
- MapSecurityError(policy_status.dwError));
- }
-
- // TODO(wtc): Suppress CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM for now to be
- // compatible with WinHTTP, which doesn't report this error (bug 3004).
- verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM;
-
- if (!rev_checking_enabled) {
- // If we didn't do online revocation checking then Windows will report
- // CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION unless it had cached OCSP or CRL
- // information for every certificate. We only want to put up revoked
- // statuses from the offline checks so we squash this error.
- verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION;
- }
-
- AppendPublicKeyHashes(chain_context, &verify_result->public_key_hashes);
- verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root = IsIssuedByKnownRoot(chain_context);
-
- if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status))
- return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
-
- if (ev_policy_oid &&
- CheckEV(chain_context, rev_checking_enabled, ev_policy_oid)) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
- }
- return OK;
-}
-
} // namespace net
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