Index: third_party/google-endpoints/urllib3/packages/ssl_match_hostname/_implementation.py |
diff --git a/third_party/google-endpoints/urllib3/packages/ssl_match_hostname/_implementation.py b/third_party/google-endpoints/urllib3/packages/ssl_match_hostname/_implementation.py |
new file mode 100644 |
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1fd42f38aec5c0ca639f03d1a900e4e58c22eb1f |
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+++ b/third_party/google-endpoints/urllib3/packages/ssl_match_hostname/_implementation.py |
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ |
+"""The match_hostname() function from Python 3.3.3, essential when using SSL.""" |
+ |
+# Note: This file is under the PSF license as the code comes from the python |
+# stdlib. http://docs.python.org/3/license.html |
+ |
+import re |
+import sys |
+ |
+# ipaddress has been backported to 2.6+ in pypi. If it is installed on the |
+# system, use it to handle IPAddress ServerAltnames (this was added in |
+# python-3.5) otherwise only do DNS matching. This allows |
+# backports.ssl_match_hostname to continue to be used all the way back to |
+# python-2.4. |
+try: |
+ import ipaddress |
+except ImportError: |
+ ipaddress = None |
+ |
+__version__ = '3.5.0.1' |
+ |
+ |
+class CertificateError(ValueError): |
+ pass |
+ |
+ |
+def _dnsname_match(dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1): |
+ """Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3 |
+ |
+ http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3 |
+ """ |
+ pats = [] |
+ if not dn: |
+ return False |
+ |
+ # Ported from python3-syntax: |
+ # leftmost, *remainder = dn.split(r'.') |
+ parts = dn.split(r'.') |
+ leftmost = parts[0] |
+ remainder = parts[1:] |
+ |
+ wildcards = leftmost.count('*') |
+ if wildcards > max_wildcards: |
+ # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more |
+ # than one wildcard per fragment. A survey of established |
+ # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a |
+ # reasonable choice. |
+ raise CertificateError( |
+ "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn)) |
+ |
+ # speed up common case w/o wildcards |
+ if not wildcards: |
+ return dn.lower() == hostname.lower() |
+ |
+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1. |
+ # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which |
+ # the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label. |
+ if leftmost == '*': |
+ # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless |
+ # fragment. |
+ pats.append('[^.]+') |
+ elif leftmost.startswith('xn--') or hostname.startswith('xn--'): |
+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3. |
+ # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier |
+ # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or |
+ # U-label of an internationalized domain name. |
+ pats.append(re.escape(leftmost)) |
+ else: |
+ # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www* |
+ pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r'\*', '[^.]*')) |
+ |
+ # add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards |
+ for frag in remainder: |
+ pats.append(re.escape(frag)) |
+ |
+ pat = re.compile(r'\A' + r'\.'.join(pats) + r'\Z', re.IGNORECASE) |
+ return pat.match(hostname) |
+ |
+ |
+def _to_unicode(obj): |
+ if isinstance(obj, str) and sys.version_info < (3,): |
+ obj = unicode(obj, encoding='ascii', errors='strict') |
+ return obj |
+ |
+def _ipaddress_match(ipname, host_ip): |
+ """Exact matching of IP addresses. |
+ |
+ RFC 6125 explicitly doesn't define an algorithm for this |
+ (section 1.7.2 - "Out of Scope"). |
+ """ |
+ # OpenSSL may add a trailing newline to a subjectAltName's IP address |
+ # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str |
+ ip = ipaddress.ip_address(_to_unicode(ipname).rstrip()) |
+ return ip == host_ip |
+ |
+ |
+def match_hostname(cert, hostname): |
+ """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by |
+ SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*. RFC 2818 and RFC 6125 |
+ rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*. |
+ |
+ CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function |
+ returns nothing. |
+ """ |
+ if not cert: |
+ raise ValueError("empty or no certificate, match_hostname needs a " |
+ "SSL socket or SSL context with either " |
+ "CERT_OPTIONAL or CERT_REQUIRED") |
+ try: |
+ # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str |
+ host_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(_to_unicode(hostname)) |
+ except ValueError: |
+ # Not an IP address (common case) |
+ host_ip = None |
+ except UnicodeError: |
+ # Divergence from upstream: Have to deal with ipaddress not taking |
+ # byte strings. addresses should be all ascii, so we consider it not |
+ # an ipaddress in this case |
+ host_ip = None |
+ except AttributeError: |
+ # Divergence from upstream: Make ipaddress library optional |
+ if ipaddress is None: |
+ host_ip = None |
+ else: |
+ raise |
+ dnsnames = [] |
+ san = cert.get('subjectAltName', ()) |
+ for key, value in san: |
+ if key == 'DNS': |
+ if host_ip is None and _dnsname_match(value, hostname): |
+ return |
+ dnsnames.append(value) |
+ elif key == 'IP Address': |
+ if host_ip is not None and _ipaddress_match(value, host_ip): |
+ return |
+ dnsnames.append(value) |
+ if not dnsnames: |
+ # The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry |
+ # in subjectAltName |
+ for sub in cert.get('subject', ()): |
+ for key, value in sub: |
+ # XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name |
+ # must be used. |
+ if key == 'commonName': |
+ if _dnsname_match(value, hostname): |
+ return |
+ dnsnames.append(value) |
+ if len(dnsnames) > 1: |
+ raise CertificateError("hostname %r " |
+ "doesn't match either of %s" |
+ % (hostname, ', '.join(map(repr, dnsnames)))) |
+ elif len(dnsnames) == 1: |
+ raise CertificateError("hostname %r " |
+ "doesn't match %r" |
+ % (hostname, dnsnames[0])) |
+ else: |
+ raise CertificateError("no appropriate commonName or " |
+ "subjectAltName fields were found") |