Add google-endpoints to third_party/.

third_party/google-endpoints/urllib3/packages/ssl_match_hostname/_implementation.py

+"""The match_hostname() function from Python 3.3.3, essential when using SSL."""
+
+# Note: This file is under the PSF license as the code comes from the python
+# stdlib.   http://docs.python.org/3/license.html
+
+import re
+import sys
+
+# ipaddress has been backported to 2.6+ in pypi.  If it is installed on the
+# system, use it to handle IPAddress ServerAltnames (this was added in
+# python-3.5) otherwise only do DNS matching.  This allows
+# backports.ssl_match_hostname to continue to be used all the way back to
+# python-2.4.
+try:
+    import ipaddress
+except ImportError:
+    ipaddress = None
+
+__version__ = '3.5.0.1'
+
+
+class CertificateError(ValueError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _dnsname_match(dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1):
+    """Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
+
+    http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
+    """
+    pats = []
+    if not dn:
+        return False
+
+    # Ported from python3-syntax:
+    # leftmost, *remainder = dn.split(r'.')
+    parts = dn.split(r'.')
+    leftmost = parts[0]
+    remainder = parts[1:]
+
+    wildcards = leftmost.count('*')
+    if wildcards > max_wildcards:
+        # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
+        # than one wildcard per fragment.  A survey of established
+        # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
+        # reasonable choice.
+        raise CertificateError(
+            "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn))
+
+    # speed up common case w/o wildcards
+    if not wildcards:
+        return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
+
+    # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
+    # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
+    # the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
+    if leftmost == '*':
+        # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
+        # fragment.
+        pats.append('[^.]+')
+    elif leftmost.startswith('xn--') or hostname.startswith('xn--'):
+        # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
+        # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
+        # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
+        # U-label of an internationalized domain name.
+        pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
+    else:
+        # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
+        pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r'\*', '[^.]*'))
+
+    # add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
+    for frag in remainder:
+        pats.append(re.escape(frag))
+
+    pat = re.compile(r'\A' + r'\.'.join(pats) + r'\Z', re.IGNORECASE)
+    return pat.match(hostname)
+
+
+def _to_unicode(obj):
+    if isinstance(obj, str) and sys.version_info < (3,):
+        obj = unicode(obj, encoding='ascii', errors='strict')
+    return obj
+
+def _ipaddress_match(ipname, host_ip):
+    """Exact matching of IP addresses.
+
+    RFC 6125 explicitly doesn't define an algorithm for this
+    (section 1.7.2 - "Out of Scope").
+    """
+    # OpenSSL may add a trailing newline to a subjectAltName's IP address
+    # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
+    ip = ipaddress.ip_address(_to_unicode(ipname).rstrip())
+    return ip == host_ip
+
+
+def match_hostname(cert, hostname):
+    """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
+    SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*.  RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
+    rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
+
+    CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
+    returns nothing.
+    """
+    if not cert:
+        raise ValueError("empty or no certificate, match_hostname needs a "
+                         "SSL socket or SSL context with either "
+                         "CERT_OPTIONAL or CERT_REQUIRED")
+    try:
+        # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
+        host_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(_to_unicode(hostname))
+    except ValueError:
+        # Not an IP address (common case)
+        host_ip = None
+    except UnicodeError:
+        # Divergence from upstream: Have to deal with ipaddress not taking
+        # byte strings.  addresses should be all ascii, so we consider it not
+        # an ipaddress in this case
+        host_ip = None
+    except AttributeError:
+        # Divergence from upstream: Make ipaddress library optional
+        if ipaddress is None:
+            host_ip = None
+        else:
+            raise
+    dnsnames = []
+    san = cert.get('subjectAltName', ())
+    for key, value in san:
+        if key == 'DNS':
+            if host_ip is None and _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
+                return
+            dnsnames.append(value)
+        elif key == 'IP Address':
+            if host_ip is not None and _ipaddress_match(value, host_ip):
+                return
+            dnsnames.append(value)
+    if not dnsnames:
+        # The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
+        # in subjectAltName
+        for sub in cert.get('subject', ()):
+            for key, value in sub:
+                # XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
+                # must be used.
+                if key == 'commonName':
+                    if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
+                        return
+                    dnsnames.append(value)
+    if len(dnsnames) > 1:
+        raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
+            "doesn't match either of %s"
+            % (hostname, ', '.join(map(repr, dnsnames))))
+    elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
+        raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
+            "doesn't match %r"
+            % (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
+    else:
+        raise CertificateError("no appropriate commonName or "
+            "subjectAltName fields were found")