Index: openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c |
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c |
deleted file mode 100644 |
index 02edf3f9189e3888df67e7074b0b88c3d45fc576..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c |
+++ /dev/null |
@@ -1,790 +0,0 @@ |
-/* ssl/s3_cbc.c */ |
-/* ==================================================================== |
- * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
- * |
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
- * are met: |
- * |
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
- * |
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
- * distribution. |
- * |
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
- * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
- * |
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
- * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
- * |
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
- * |
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
- * acknowledgment: |
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
- * |
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
- * ==================================================================== |
- * |
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
- * |
- */ |
- |
-#include "ssl_locl.h" |
- |
-#include <openssl/md5.h> |
-#include <openssl/sha.h> |
- |
-/* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length |
- * field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */ |
-#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16 |
- |
-/* MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support. |
- * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest |
- * supported by TLS.) */ |
-#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128 |
- |
-/* Some utility functions are needed: |
- * |
- * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other |
- * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit. |
- * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace |
- * them with something else on odd CPUs. */ |
-#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) ) |
-#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x))) |
- |
-/* constant_time_lt returns 0xff if a<b and 0x00 otherwise. */ |
-static unsigned constant_time_lt(unsigned a, unsigned b) |
- { |
- a -= b; |
- return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(a); |
- } |
- |
-/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */ |
-static unsigned constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b) |
- { |
- a -= b; |
- return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a); |
- } |
- |
-/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */ |
-static unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned a, unsigned b) |
- { |
- unsigned c = a ^ b; |
- c--; |
- return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c); |
- } |
- |
-/* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC |
- * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time. |
- * |
- * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. |
- * returns: |
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. |
- * 1: if the padding was valid |
- * -1: otherwise. */ |
-int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, |
- SSL3_RECORD *rec, |
- unsigned block_size, |
- unsigned mac_size) |
- { |
- unsigned padding_length, good; |
- const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; |
- |
- /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant |
- * time. */ |
- if (overhead > rec->length) |
- return 0; |
- |
- padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1]; |
- good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length+overhead); |
- /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ |
- good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length+1); |
- padding_length = good & (padding_length+1); |
- rec->length -= padding_length; |
- rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */ |
- return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1)); |
-} |
- |
-/* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC |
- * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and |
- * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record |
- * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the |
- * padding was removed. |
- * |
- * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. |
- * returns: |
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. |
- * 1: if the padding was valid |
- * -1: otherwise. */ |
-int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, |
- SSL3_RECORD *rec, |
- unsigned block_size, |
- unsigned mac_size) |
- { |
- unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i; |
- const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; |
- /* Check if version requires explicit IV */ |
- if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in |
- * non-constant time. |
- */ |
- if (overhead + block_size > rec->length) |
- return 0; |
- /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */ |
- rec->data += block_size; |
- rec->input += block_size; |
- rec->length -= block_size; |
- } |
- else if (overhead > rec->length) |
- return 0; |
- |
- padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1]; |
- |
- /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of |
- * even length so the padding bug check cannot be performed. This bug |
- * workaround has been around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either |
- * fixed now or no buggy implementation supports compression [steve] |
- */ |
- if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand) |
- { |
- /* First packet is even in size, so check */ |
- if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && |
- !(padding_length & 1)) |
- { |
- s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG; |
- } |
- if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) && |
- padding_length > 0) |
- { |
- padding_length--; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) |
- { |
- /* padding is already verified */ |
- rec->length -= padding_length + 1; |
- return 1; |
- } |
- |
- good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead+padding_length); |
- /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and |
- * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the |
- * length byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 |
- * bytes of padding. |
- * |
- * We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that leaks |
- * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum |
- * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is |
- * public information so we can use it.) */ |
- to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */ |
- if (to_check > rec->length-1) |
- to_check = rec->length-1; |
- |
- for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) |
- { |
- unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i); |
- unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i]; |
- /* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value |
- * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */ |
- good &= ~(mask&(padding_length ^ b)); |
- } |
- |
- /* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, |
- * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We |
- * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the |
- * bits. */ |
- good &= good >> 4; |
- good &= good >> 2; |
- good &= good >> 1; |
- good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1; |
- good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good); |
- |
- padding_length = good & (padding_length+1); |
- rec->length -= padding_length; |
- rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */ |
- |
- return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1)); |
- } |
- |
-/* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in |
- * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may |
- * vary within a 256-byte window). |
- * |
- * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to |
- * this function. |
- * |
- * On entry: |
- * rec->orig_len >= md_size |
- * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE |
- * |
- * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with |
- * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into |
- * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't |
- * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are |
- * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. |
- */ |
-#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE |
- |
-void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, |
- const SSL3_RECORD *rec, |
- unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len) |
- { |
-#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) |
- unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64+EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
- unsigned char *rotated_mac; |
-#else |
- unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
-#endif |
- |
- /* mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */ |
- unsigned mac_end = rec->length; |
- unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size; |
- /* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because |
- * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */ |
- unsigned scan_start = 0; |
- unsigned i, j; |
- unsigned div_spoiler; |
- unsigned rotate_offset; |
- |
- OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size); |
- OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
- |
-#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) |
- rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0-(size_t)rotated_mac_buf)&63); |
-#endif |
- |
- /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ |
- if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) |
- scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); |
- /* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the |
- * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies |
- * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least. |
- * |
- * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't |
- * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it |
- * to prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */ |
- div_spoiler = md_size >> 1; |
- div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler)-1)*8; |
- rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size; |
- |
- memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); |
- for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++) |
- { |
- unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start); |
- unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end); |
- unsigned char b = rec->data[i]; |
- rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended; |
- j &= constant_time_lt(j,md_size); |
- } |
- |
- /* Now rotate the MAC */ |
-#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) |
- j = 0; |
- for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) |
- { |
- /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */ |
- ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset^32]; |
- out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]; |
- rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size); |
- } |
-#else |
- memset(out, 0, md_size); |
- rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset; |
- rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size); |
- for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) |
- { |
- for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) |
- out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset); |
- rotate_offset++; |
- rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size); |
- } |
-#endif |
- } |
- |
-/* u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in |
- * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four. */ |
-#define u32toLE(n, p) \ |
- (*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \ |
- *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \ |
- *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \ |
- *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24)) |
- |
-/* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard |
- * "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function |
- * typically does. */ |
-static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) |
- { |
- MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx; |
- u32toLE(md5->A, md_out); |
- u32toLE(md5->B, md_out); |
- u32toLE(md5->C, md_out); |
- u32toLE(md5->D, md_out); |
- } |
- |
-static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) |
- { |
- SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx; |
- l2n(sha1->h0, md_out); |
- l2n(sha1->h1, md_out); |
- l2n(sha1->h2, md_out); |
- l2n(sha1->h3, md_out); |
- l2n(sha1->h4, md_out); |
- } |
-#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 |
-static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) |
- { |
- SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx; |
- unsigned i; |
- |
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) |
- { |
- l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out); |
- } |
- } |
-#undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX |
-#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA256_CTX |
-#endif |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 |
-static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) |
- { |
- SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx; |
- unsigned i; |
- |
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) |
- { |
- l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out); |
- } |
- } |
-#undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX |
-#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX |
-#endif |
- |
-/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function |
- * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. */ |
-char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) |
- { |
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS |
- if (FIPS_mode()) |
- return 0; |
-#endif |
- switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) |
- { |
- case NID_md5: |
- case NID_sha1: |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 |
- case NID_sha224: |
- case NID_sha256: |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 |
- case NID_sha384: |
- case NID_sha512: |
-#endif |
- return 1; |
- default: |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
- |
-/* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS |
- * record. |
- * |
- * ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function. |
- * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX. |
- * md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written. |
- * md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here. |
- * header: the 13-byte, TLS record header. |
- * data: the record data itself, less any preceeding explicit IV. |
- * data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC |
- * once the padding has been removed. |
- * data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole |
- * record, including padding. |
- * is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS. |
- * |
- * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding |
- * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain |
- * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the |
- * padding too. ) */ |
-void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( |
- const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, |
- unsigned char* md_out, |
- size_t* md_out_size, |
- const unsigned char header[13], |
- const unsigned char *data, |
- size_t data_plus_mac_size, |
- size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, |
- const unsigned char *mac_secret, |
- unsigned mac_secret_length, |
- char is_sslv3) |
- { |
- union { double align; |
- unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)]; } md_state; |
- void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out); |
- void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block); |
- unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64; |
- unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks, |
- len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks, |
- num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b; |
- unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */ |
- unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES]; |
- /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */ |
- unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
- unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
- unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
- unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u; |
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
- /* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates |
- * the hash. */ |
- unsigned md_length_size = 8; |
- char length_is_big_endian = 1; |
- |
- /* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about |
- * many possible overflows later in this function. */ |
- OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024*1024); |
- |
- switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) |
- { |
- case NID_md5: |
- MD5_Init((MD5_CTX*)md_state.c); |
- md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw; |
- md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) MD5_Transform; |
- md_size = 16; |
- sslv3_pad_length = 48; |
- length_is_big_endian = 0; |
- break; |
- case NID_sha1: |
- SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX*)md_state.c); |
- md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw; |
- md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA1_Transform; |
- md_size = 20; |
- break; |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 |
- case NID_sha224: |
- SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c); |
- md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; |
- md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform; |
- md_size = 224/8; |
- break; |
- case NID_sha256: |
- SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c); |
- md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; |
- md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform; |
- md_size = 32; |
- break; |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 |
- case NID_sha384: |
- SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c); |
- md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; |
- md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform; |
- md_size = 384/8; |
- md_block_size = 128; |
- md_length_size = 16; |
- break; |
- case NID_sha512: |
- SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c); |
- md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; |
- md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform; |
- md_size = 64; |
- md_block_size = 128; |
- md_length_size = 16; |
- break; |
-#endif |
- default: |
- /* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been |
- * called first to check that the hash function is |
- * supported. */ |
- OPENSSL_assert(0); |
- if (md_out_size) |
- *md_out_size = -1; |
- return; |
- } |
- |
- OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES); |
- OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE); |
- OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
- |
- header_length = 13; |
- if (is_sslv3) |
- { |
- header_length = |
- mac_secret_length + |
- sslv3_pad_length + |
- 8 /* sequence number */ + |
- 1 /* record type */ + |
- 2 /* record length */; |
- } |
- |
- /* variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to |
- * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the |
- * padding value. |
- * |
- * In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of the plaintext |
- * varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively assume that |
- * the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes of hash |
- * termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final block, we |
- * say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding. |
- * |
- * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not |
- * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks |
- * can vary based on the padding. |
- * |
- * Later in the function, if the message is short and there obviously |
- * cannot be this many blocks then variance_blocks can be reduced. */ |
- variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6; |
- /* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13 |
- * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes |
- * (SSLv3) */ |
- len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length; |
- /* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including |
- * |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */ |
- max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1; |
- /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */ |
- num_blocks = (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size; |
- /* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle |
- * the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the |
- * end to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we |
- * can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can |
- * be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether |
- * they are plaintext. */ |
- num_starting_blocks = 0; |
- /* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where |
- * we start processing. */ |
- k = 0; |
- /* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be |
- * MACed. */ |
- mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size; |
- /* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that |
- * contains application data. */ |
- c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size; |
- /* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating |
- * value. */ |
- index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size; |
- /* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash |
- * length, in bits. */ |
- index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size; |
- /* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash |
- * block for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of |
- * SSLv3. */ |
- |
- /* For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need |
- * at least two because the header is larger than a single block. */ |
- if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0)) |
- { |
- num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks; |
- k = md_block_size*num_starting_blocks; |
- } |
- |
- bits = 8*mac_end_offset; |
- if (!is_sslv3) |
- { |
- /* Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and |
- * secret bytes are included in |header| because they take more |
- * than a single block. */ |
- bits += 8*md_block_size; |
- memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size); |
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad)); |
- memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length); |
- for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) |
- hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36; |
- |
- md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad); |
- } |
- |
- if (length_is_big_endian) |
- { |
- memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size-4); |
- length_bytes[md_length_size-4] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24); |
- length_bytes[md_length_size-3] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16); |
- length_bytes[md_length_size-2] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8); |
- length_bytes[md_length_size-1] = (unsigned char)bits; |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size); |
- length_bytes[md_length_size-5] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24); |
- length_bytes[md_length_size-6] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16); |
- length_bytes[md_length_size-7] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8); |
- length_bytes[md_length_size-8] = (unsigned char)bits; |
- } |
- |
- if (k > 0) |
- { |
- if (is_sslv3) |
- { |
- /* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. |
- * overhang is the number of bytes beyond a single |
- * block that the header consumes: either 7 bytes |
- * (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). */ |
- unsigned overhang = header_length-md_block_size; |
- md_transform(md_state.c, header); |
- memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang); |
- memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size-overhang); |
- md_transform(md_state.c, first_block); |
- for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size - 1; i++) |
- md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - overhang); |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */ |
- memcpy(first_block, header, 13); |
- memcpy(first_block+13, data, md_block_size-13); |
- md_transform(md_state.c, first_block); |
- for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++) |
- md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13); |
- } |
- } |
- |
- memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out)); |
- |
- /* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct |
- * it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80 |
- * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in |
- * constant time, to |mac_out|. */ |
- for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks+variance_blocks; i++) |
- { |
- unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
- unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a); |
- unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b); |
- for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) |
- { |
- unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1; |
- if (k < header_length) |
- b = header[k]; |
- else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length) |
- b = data[k-header_length]; |
- k++; |
- |
- is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c); |
- is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1); |
- /* If this is the block containing the end of the |
- * application data, and we are at the offset for the |
- * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */ |
- b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c); |
- /* If this the the block containing the end of the |
- * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then |
- * just write zero. */ |
- b = b&~is_past_cp1; |
- /* If this is index_b (the final block), but not |
- * index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit |
- * length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to |
- * add an extra block of zeros. */ |
- b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a; |
- |
- /* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the |
- * length. */ |
- if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) |
- { |
- /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */ |
- b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]); |
- } |
- block[j] = b; |
- } |
- |
- md_transform(md_state.c, block); |
- md_final_raw(md_state.c, block); |
- /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */ |
- for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) |
- mac_out[j] |= block[j]&is_block_b; |
- } |
- |
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */); |
- if (is_sslv3) |
- { |
- /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */ |
- memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length); |
- |
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length); |
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length); |
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size); |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */ |
- for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) |
- hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a; |
- |
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size); |
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size); |
- } |
- EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u); |
- if (md_out_size) |
- *md_out_size = md_out_size_u; |
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
- } |
- |
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS |
- |
-/* Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but |
- * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases |
- * by digesting additional data. |
- */ |
- |
-void tls_fips_digest_extra( |
- const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, |
- const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len) |
- { |
- size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig; |
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
- return; |
- block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx); |
- /* We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA* |
- * digests and TLS to deal with. |
- * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9 |
- * otherwise. |
- * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks |
- * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest |
- * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise. |
- * So we have: |
- * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size |
- * equivalently: |
- * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1 |
- * HMAC adds a constant overhead. |
- * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes |
- * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128 |
- * for SHA384/SHA512 and |
- * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64 |
- * otherwise. |
- */ |
- digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29; |
- blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad)/block_size; |
- blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad)/block_size; |
- /* MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original |
- * and actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a |
- * no op. The "data" pointer should always have enough space to |
- * perform this operation as it is large enough for a maximum |
- * length TLS buffer. |
- */ |
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, data, |
- (blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size); |
- } |
-#endif |