| Index: openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
|
| diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
|
| deleted file mode 100644
|
| index d7ea9a5238d37f562142cafcd91ad566c1ec5ca8..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
|
| --- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
|
| +++ /dev/null
|
| @@ -1,2737 +0,0 @@
|
| -/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
|
| -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
| - * All rights reserved.
|
| - *
|
| - * This package is an SSL implementation written
|
| - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
|
| - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
|
| - *
|
| - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
|
| - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
|
| - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
|
| - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
|
| - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
|
| - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
| - *
|
| - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
|
| - * the code are not to be removed.
|
| - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
|
| - * as the author of the parts of the library used.
|
| - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
|
| - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
|
| - *
|
| - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
| - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
| - * are met:
|
| - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
| - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
| - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
| - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
| - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
| - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
| - * must display the following acknowledgement:
|
| - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
|
| - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
|
| - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
|
| - * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
|
| - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
|
| - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
|
| - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
|
| - *
|
| - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
|
| - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
| - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
| - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
| - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
| - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
| - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
| - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
| - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
| - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
| - * SUCH DAMAGE.
|
| - *
|
| - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
|
| - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
|
| - * copied and put under another distribution licence
|
| - * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
|
| - */
|
| -/* ====================================================================
|
| - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
|
| - *
|
| - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
| - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
| - * are met:
|
| - *
|
| - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
| - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
| - *
|
| - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
| - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
| - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
| - * distribution.
|
| - *
|
| - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
|
| - * software must display the following acknowledgment:
|
| - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
| - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
| - *
|
| - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
|
| - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
|
| - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
|
| - * openssl-core@openssl.org.
|
| - *
|
| - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
|
| - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
|
| - * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
|
| - *
|
| - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
|
| - * acknowledgment:
|
| - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
| - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
| - *
|
| - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
|
| - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
| - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
|
| - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
|
| - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
| - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
| - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
| - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
| - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
| - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
| - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
| - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
| - * ====================================================================
|
| - *
|
| - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
|
| - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
|
| - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
| - *
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -#include <stdio.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/objects.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/hmac.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
| -#include "ssl_locl.h"
|
| -
|
| -const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| -static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
|
| - const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
|
| - SSL_SESSION **psess);
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
|
| - tls1_enc,
|
| - tls1_mac,
|
| - tls1_setup_key_block,
|
| - tls1_generate_master_secret,
|
| - tls1_change_cipher_state,
|
| - tls1_final_finish_mac,
|
| - TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
|
| - tls1_cert_verify_mac,
|
| - TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
|
| - TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
|
| - tls1_alert_code,
|
| - tls1_export_keying_material,
|
| - };
|
| -
|
| -long tls1_default_timeout(void)
|
| - {
|
| - /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
|
| - * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
|
| - return(60*60*2);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int tls1_new(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
|
| - s->method->ssl_clear(s);
|
| - return(1);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void tls1_free(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| - if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
|
| - {
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
|
| - }
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
|
| - ssl3_free(s);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - ssl3_clear(s);
|
| - s->version = s->method->version;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
| -
|
| -static int nid_list[] =
|
| - {
|
| - NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
|
| - NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
|
| - NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
|
| - NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
|
| - NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
|
| - NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
|
| - NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
|
| - NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
|
| - NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
|
| - NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
|
| - NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
|
| - NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
|
| - NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
|
| - NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
|
| - NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
|
| - NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
|
| - NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
|
| - NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
|
| - NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
|
| - NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
|
| - NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
|
| - NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
|
| - NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
|
| - NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
|
| - NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
|
| - };
|
| -
|
| -/* We support only the elliptic curves that are also supported by NSS
|
| - * to improve compatibility with sites that don't accept large ClientHellos.
|
| - */
|
| -static int pref_list[] =
|
| - {
|
| - NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
|
| - NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
|
| - NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
|
| - };
|
| -
|
| -int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
|
| - {
|
| - /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
|
| - if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
|
| - sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
|
| - return 0;
|
| - return nid_list[curve_id-1];
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
|
| - {
|
| - /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
|
| - switch (nid)
|
| - {
|
| - case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
|
| - return 1;
|
| - case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
|
| - return 2;
|
| - case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
|
| - return 3;
|
| - case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
|
| - return 4;
|
| - case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
|
| - return 5;
|
| - case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
|
| - return 6;
|
| - case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
|
| - return 7;
|
| - case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
|
| - return 8;
|
| - case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
|
| - return 9;
|
| - case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
|
| - return 10;
|
| - case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
|
| - return 11;
|
| - case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
|
| - return 12;
|
| - case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
|
| - return 13;
|
| - case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
|
| - return 14;
|
| - case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
|
| - return 15;
|
| - case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
|
| - return 16;
|
| - case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
|
| - return 17;
|
| - case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
|
| - return 18;
|
| - case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
|
| - return 19;
|
| - case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
|
| - return 20;
|
| - case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
|
| - return 21;
|
| - case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
|
| - return 22;
|
| - case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
|
| - return 23;
|
| - case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
|
| - return 24;
|
| - case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
|
| - return 25;
|
| - default:
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| -
|
| -/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
|
| - * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| -#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
|
| -#else
|
| -#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
| -#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
|
| -#else
|
| -#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
| -#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
|
| -#else
|
| -#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
|
| - tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
|
| - tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
|
| - tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
|
| -
|
| -static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
|
| - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
|
| - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
|
| - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
|
| - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
|
| - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
|
| - tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
|
| -#endif
|
| -};
|
| -
|
| -int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
|
| - {
|
| - size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
|
| -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
|
| - /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
|
| - if (FIPS_mode())
|
| - slen -= 2;
|
| -#endif
|
| - if (p)
|
| - memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
|
| - return (int)slen;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* header_len is the length of the ClientHello header written so far, used to
|
| - * compute padding. It does not include the record header. Pass 0 if no padding
|
| - * is to be done. */
|
| -unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, size_t header_len)
|
| - {
|
| - int extdatalen=0;
|
| - unsigned char *orig = buf;
|
| - unsigned char *ret = buf;
|
| -
|
| - /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
|
| - if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
|
| - && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
|
| - return orig;
|
| -
|
| - ret+=2;
|
| -
|
| - if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
|
| -
|
| - if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
|
| - unsigned long size_str;
|
| - long lenmax;
|
| -
|
| - /* check for enough space.
|
| - 4 for the servername type and entension length
|
| - 2 for servernamelist length
|
| - 1 for the hostname type
|
| - 2 for hostname length
|
| - + hostname length
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
|
| - || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| -
|
| - /* extension type and length */
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
|
| - s2n(size_str+5,ret);
|
| -
|
| - /* length of servername list */
|
| - s2n(size_str+3,ret);
|
| -
|
| - /* hostname type, length and hostname */
|
| - *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
|
| - s2n(size_str,ret);
|
| - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
|
| - ret+=size_str;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Add RI if renegotiating */
|
| - if (s->renegotiate)
|
| - {
|
| - int el;
|
| -
|
| - if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
|
| -
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
|
| - s2n(el,ret);
|
| -
|
| - if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - ret += el;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
| - /* Add SRP username if there is one */
|
| - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
|
| - { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
|
| -
|
| - int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
|
| - if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* check for enough space.
|
| - 4 for the srp type type and entension length
|
| - 1 for the srp user identity
|
| - + srp user identity length
|
| - */
|
| - if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
|
| -
|
| - /* fill in the extension */
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
|
| - s2n(login_len+1,ret);
|
| - (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
|
| - memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
|
| - ret+=login_len;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
|
| - {
|
| - int ticklen;
|
| - if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
| - ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
|
| - else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
|
| - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
|
| - {
|
| - ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
|
| - s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
|
| - if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
|
| - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
|
| - ticklen);
|
| - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - ticklen = 0;
|
| - if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
|
| - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
|
| - goto skip_ext;
|
| - /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
|
| - * rest for ticket
|
| - */
|
| - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
|
| - s2n(ticklen,ret);
|
| - if (ticklen)
|
| - {
|
| - memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
|
| - ret += ticklen;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - skip_ext:
|
| -
|
| - if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
|
| - s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
|
| - s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
|
| - memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
|
| - ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
| - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
|
| - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
|
| -
|
| - if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
|
| - return NULL;
|
| -
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
|
| - s2n(col + 2, ret);
|
| - s2n(col, ret);
|
| - memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
|
| - ret += col;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
|
| - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - int i;
|
| - long extlen, idlen, itmp;
|
| - OCSP_RESPID *id;
|
| -
|
| - idlen = 0;
|
| - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
|
| - {
|
| - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
|
| - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
|
| - if (itmp <= 0)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - idlen += itmp + 2;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
|
| - {
|
| - extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
|
| - if (extlen < 0)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - extlen = 0;
|
| -
|
| - if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
|
| - if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
|
| - *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
|
| - s2n(idlen, ret);
|
| - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
|
| - {
|
| - /* save position of id len */
|
| - unsigned char *q = ret;
|
| - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
|
| - /* skip over id len */
|
| - ret += 2;
|
| - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
|
| - /* write id len */
|
| - s2n(itmp, q);
|
| - }
|
| - s2n(extlen, ret);
|
| - if (extlen > 0)
|
| - i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
|
| - /* Add Heartbeat extension */
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
|
| - s2n(1,ret);
|
| - /* Set mode:
|
| - * 1: peer may send requests
|
| - * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
|
| - */
|
| - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
|
| - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
|
| - else
|
| - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
| - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
|
| - {
|
| - /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
|
| - * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
|
| - if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
|
| - s2n(0,ret);
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
|
| - {
|
| - /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
|
| - * support for Channel ID. */
|
| - if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
|
| - s2n(0,ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
| - if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
|
| - {
|
| - int el;
|
| -
|
| - ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
|
| -
|
| - if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
|
| -
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
|
| - s2n(el,ret);
|
| -
|
| - if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - ret += el;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
| - /* WebSphere Application Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension
|
| - * being zero-length. ECC extensions are non-empty and not dropped until
|
| - * fallback to SSL3, at which point all extensions are gone. */
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
|
| - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
|
| - long lenmax;
|
| -
|
| - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
|
| - s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
|
| - *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
|
| - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
|
| - ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
|
| - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
|
| - long lenmax;
|
| -
|
| - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
|
| - s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
|
| -
|
| - /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
|
| - * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
|
| - * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
|
| - * resolves this to two bytes.
|
| - */
|
| - s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
|
| - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
|
| - ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
| -
|
| - /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
|
| - * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02 */
|
| - if (header_len > 0)
|
| - {
|
| - header_len += ret - orig;
|
| - if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200)
|
| - {
|
| - size_t padding_len = 0x200 - header_len;
|
| - /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always
|
| - * include least one byte of data if including the
|
| - * extension. WebSphere Application Server 7.0 is
|
| - * intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */
|
| - if (padding_len >= 4 + 1)
|
| - padding_len -= 4;
|
| - else
|
| - padding_len = 1;
|
| - if (limit - ret - 4 - (long)padding_len < 0)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| -
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
|
| - s2n(padding_len, ret);
|
| - memset(ret, 0, padding_len);
|
| - ret += padding_len;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -
|
| - if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
|
| - return orig;
|
| -
|
| - s2n(extdatalen, orig);
|
| - return ret;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
|
| - {
|
| - int extdatalen=0;
|
| - unsigned char *orig = buf;
|
| - unsigned char *ret = buf;
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
| - int next_proto_neg_seen;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
|
| - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
|
| - return orig;
|
| -
|
| - ret+=2;
|
| - if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
|
| -
|
| - if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
|
| -
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
|
| - s2n(0,ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
|
| - {
|
| - int el;
|
| -
|
| - if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
|
| -
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
|
| - s2n(el,ret);
|
| -
|
| - if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - ret += el;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
|
| - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
|
| - long lenmax;
|
| -
|
| - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
|
| - s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
|
| - *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
|
| - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
|
| - ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
|
| -
|
| - }
|
| - /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
| -
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
|
| - && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
|
| - {
|
| - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
|
| - s2n(0,ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
|
| - {
|
| - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
|
| - s2n(0,ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
| - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
|
| - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
|
| -
|
| - if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
|
| - return NULL;
|
| -
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
|
| - s2n(sol + 2, ret);
|
| - s2n(sol, ret);
|
| - memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
|
| - ret += sol;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
| - if(s->srtp_profile)
|
| - {
|
| - int el;
|
| -
|
| - ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
|
| -
|
| - if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
|
| -
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
|
| - s2n(el,ret);
|
| -
|
| - if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - ret+=el;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
|
| - && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
|
| - { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
|
| - 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
|
| - 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
|
| - 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
|
| - 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
|
| - 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
|
| - 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
|
| - if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
|
| - memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
|
| - ret+=36;
|
| -
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
|
| - /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
|
| - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
|
| - {
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
|
| - s2n(1,ret);
|
| - /* Set mode:
|
| - * 1: peer may send requests
|
| - * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
|
| - */
|
| - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
|
| - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
|
| - else
|
| - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
|
| -
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
| - next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
|
| - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
| - if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
|
| - {
|
| - const unsigned char *npa;
|
| - unsigned int npalen;
|
| - int r;
|
| -
|
| - r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
|
| - if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
|
| - {
|
| - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
|
| - s2n(npalen,ret);
|
| - memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
|
| - ret += npalen;
|
| - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - /* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it
|
| - * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */
|
| - if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
|
| - {
|
| - if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
|
| - s2n(0,ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
|
| - return orig;
|
| -
|
| - s2n(extdatalen, orig);
|
| - return ret;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned short type;
|
| - unsigned short size;
|
| - unsigned short len;
|
| - unsigned char *data = *p;
|
| - int renegotiate_seen = 0;
|
| - int sigalg_seen = 0;
|
| -
|
| - s->servername_done = 0;
|
| - s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
| - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
|
| - s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
|
| - SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (data >= (d+n-2))
|
| - goto ri_check;
|
| - n2s(data,len);
|
| -
|
| - if (data > (d+n-len))
|
| - goto ri_check;
|
| -
|
| - while (data <= (d+n-4))
|
| - {
|
| - n2s(data,type);
|
| - n2s(data,size);
|
| -
|
| - if (data+size > (d+n))
|
| - goto ri_check;
|
| -#if 0
|
| - fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
|
| -#endif
|
| - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
|
| - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
|
| - s->tlsext_debug_arg);
|
| -/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
|
| -
|
| - - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
|
| - - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
|
| - in which case an fatal alert is generated.
|
| - - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
|
| - - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
|
| - to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
|
| - - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
|
| - it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
|
| - Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
|
| - set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
|
| - case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
|
| - a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
|
| - presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
|
| - the value of the Host: field.
|
| - - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
|
| - if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
|
| - i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
|
| - - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
|
| -
|
| -*/
|
| -
|
| - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned char *sdata;
|
| - int servname_type;
|
| - int dsize;
|
| -
|
| - if (size < 2)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - n2s(data,dsize);
|
| - size -= 2;
|
| - if (dsize > size )
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - sdata = data;
|
| - while (dsize > 3)
|
| - {
|
| - servname_type = *(sdata++);
|
| - n2s(sdata,len);
|
| - dsize -= 3;
|
| -
|
| - if (len > dsize)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->servername_done == 0)
|
| - switch (servname_type)
|
| - {
|
| - case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
|
| - if (!s->hit)
|
| - {
|
| - if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
|
| - s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
|
| - if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
|
| - s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - s->servername_done = 1;
|
| -
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
|
| - && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
|
| - && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
|
| -
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - default:
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - dsize -= len;
|
| - }
|
| - if (dsize != 0)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - }
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
|
| - {
|
| - if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
|
| - return -1;
|
| - memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
|
| - s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
|
| -
|
| - if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
|
| - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned char *sdata = data;
|
| - int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
|
| -
|
| - if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (!s->hit)
|
| - {
|
| - if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
|
| - {
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
|
| - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
|
| - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
|
| - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
|
| - }
|
| -#if 0
|
| - fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
|
| - sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
|
| - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
|
| - fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
|
| - fprintf(stderr,"\n");
|
| -#endif
|
| - }
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
|
| - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned char *sdata = data;
|
| - int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
|
| - ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
|
| -
|
| - if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
|
| - ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (!s->hit)
|
| - {
|
| - if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
|
| - if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
|
| - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
|
| - }
|
| -#if 0
|
| - fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
|
| - sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
|
| - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
|
| - fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
|
| - fprintf(stderr,"\n");
|
| -#endif
|
| - }
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
| -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
|
| - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned char *sdata = data;
|
| -
|
| - if (size < 2)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
|
| - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
|
| - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
|
| - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
|
| - else
|
| - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
|
| - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
|
| - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|
| - {
|
| - if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
|
| - return 0;
|
| - renegotiate_seen = 1;
|
| - }
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
|
| - {
|
| - int dsize;
|
| - if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - sigalg_seen = 1;
|
| - n2s(data,dsize);
|
| - size -= 2;
|
| - if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
|
| - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
|
| - {
|
| -
|
| - if (size < 5)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
|
| - size--;
|
| - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
|
| - {
|
| - const unsigned char *sdata;
|
| - int dsize;
|
| - /* Read in responder_id_list */
|
| - n2s(data,dsize);
|
| - size -= 2;
|
| - if (dsize > size )
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - while (dsize > 0)
|
| - {
|
| - OCSP_RESPID *id;
|
| - int idsize;
|
| - if (dsize < 4)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - n2s(data, idsize);
|
| - dsize -= 2 + idsize;
|
| - size -= 2 + idsize;
|
| - if (dsize < 0)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - sdata = data;
|
| - data += idsize;
|
| - id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
|
| - &sdata, idsize);
|
| - if (!id)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (data != sdata)
|
| - {
|
| - OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
|
| - && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
|
| - sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
|
| - {
|
| - OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
|
| - s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
|
| - {
|
| - OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Read in request_extensions */
|
| - if (size < 2)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - n2s(data,dsize);
|
| - size -= 2;
|
| - if (dsize != size)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - sdata = data;
|
| - if (dsize > 0)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
|
| - {
|
| - sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
|
| - X509_EXTENSION_free);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
|
| - d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
|
| - &sdata, dsize);
|
| - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
|
| - || (data + dsize != sdata))
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - /* We don't know what to do with any other type
|
| - * so ignore it.
|
| - */
|
| - else
|
| - s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
|
| - }
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
|
| - {
|
| - switch(data[0])
|
| - {
|
| - case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
|
| - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
|
| - break;
|
| - case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
|
| - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
|
| - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
|
| - break;
|
| - default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
|
| - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
|
| - {
|
| - /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
|
| - * renegotiation.
|
| - *
|
| - * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
|
| - * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
|
| - * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
|
| - * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
|
| - * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
|
| - * anything like that, but this might change).
|
| -
|
| - * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
|
| - * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
|
| - * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
|
| - * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
|
| - * Finished message could have been computed.) */
|
| - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
|
| - s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
|
| -
|
| - /* session ticket processed earlier */
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
|
| - {
|
| - if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
|
| - al))
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - data+=size;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - *p = data;
|
| -
|
| - ri_check:
|
| -
|
| - /* Need RI if renegotiating */
|
| -
|
| - if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
|
| - !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
| - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
| -/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
|
| - * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
|
| - * the length of the block. */
|
| -static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned int off = 0;
|
| -
|
| - while (off < len)
|
| - {
|
| - if (d[off] == 0)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - off += d[off];
|
| - off++;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return off == len;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned short length;
|
| - unsigned short type;
|
| - unsigned short size;
|
| - unsigned char *data = *p;
|
| - int tlsext_servername = 0;
|
| - int renegotiate_seen = 0;
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
| - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
|
| - s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
|
| - SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (data >= (d+n-2))
|
| - goto ri_check;
|
| -
|
| - n2s(data,length);
|
| - if (data+length != d+n)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - while(data <= (d+n-4))
|
| - {
|
| - n2s(data,type);
|
| - n2s(data,size);
|
| -
|
| - if (data+size > (d+n))
|
| - goto ri_check;
|
| -
|
| - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
|
| - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
|
| - s->tlsext_debug_arg);
|
| -
|
| - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - tlsext_servername = 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
|
| - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned char *sdata = data;
|
| - int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
|
| -
|
| - if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
|
| - ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
|
| - if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
|
| - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
|
| - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
|
| -#if 0
|
| - fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
|
| - sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
|
| - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
|
| - fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
|
| - fprintf(stderr,"\n");
|
| -#endif
|
| - }
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
| -
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
|
| - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
|
| - || (size > 0))
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
| - }
|
| -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
|
| - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned char *sdata = data;
|
| -
|
| - if (size < 2)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
|
| - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
|
| - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
|
| - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
|
| - else
|
| - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
|
| -
|
| - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
|
| - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
|
| - * a status request message.
|
| - */
|
| - if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
|
| - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
|
| - }
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
|
| - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned char *selected;
|
| - unsigned char selected_len;
|
| -
|
| - /* We must have requested it. */
|
| - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - /* The data must be valid */
|
| - if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
|
| - if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
|
| - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
|
| - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id)
|
| - s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
|
| -
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|
| - {
|
| - if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
|
| - return 0;
|
| - renegotiate_seen = 1;
|
| - }
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
|
| - {
|
| - switch(data[0])
|
| - {
|
| - case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
|
| - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
|
| - break;
|
| - case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
|
| - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
|
| - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
|
| - break;
|
| - default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
| - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
|
| - {
|
| - if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
|
| - al))
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - data+=size;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (data != d+n)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->tlsext_hostname)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
|
| - if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - *p = data;
|
| -
|
| - ri_check:
|
| -
|
| - /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
|
| - * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
|
| - * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
|
| - * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
|
| - * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
|
| - * absence on initial connect only.
|
| - */
|
| - if (!renegotiate_seen
|
| - && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
|
| - && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
|
| - {
|
| - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
| - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
| - /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
|
| - * and elliptic curves we support.
|
| - */
|
| - int using_ecc = 0;
|
| - int i;
|
| - unsigned char *j;
|
| - unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
|
| - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
|
| -
|
| - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
|
| -
|
| - alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
|
| - alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
|
| - if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
|
| - {
|
| - using_ecc = 1;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
|
| - if (using_ecc)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
|
| - /* To save an additional 2 bytes in the ClientHello, we only advertise support
|
| - * for the only EC Point Format that NSS supports (instead of all 3).
|
| - */
|
| - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(1)) == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 1;
|
| - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
|
| -
|
| - /* we only advertise support for elliptic curves in NSA Suite B */
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
|
| - s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
|
| - if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| - for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
|
| - sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
|
| - {
|
| - int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
|
| - s2n(id,j);
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
| - {
|
| - int r = 1;
|
| -
|
| - if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
|
| - {
|
| - r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
|
| - if (!r)
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
|
| -
|
| - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
|
| - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
|
| - else
|
| - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
|
| - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (r == 2)
|
| - /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
|
| - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
| - /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
|
| - * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
|
| - * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
| - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
| - int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
|
| - using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
|
| -
|
| - if (using_ecc)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
|
| - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
|
| - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
|
| - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
|
| - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
| -
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
| - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
| - /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
|
| - * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
|
| - */
|
| - /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
|
| - * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
|
| - */
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
| - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
| - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
| - ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
| - {
|
| - /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
|
| - * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
|
| - * so this has to happen here in
|
| - * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
|
| -
|
| - int r = 1;
|
| -
|
| - if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
|
| - {
|
| - r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
|
| - if (!r)
|
| - {
|
| - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
| - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
|
| - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
|
| -
|
| - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
|
| - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
|
| - {
|
| - /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
|
| - * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
|
| -
|
| - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
|
| - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
|
| - else
|
| - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
|
| - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
| - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
|
| - * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
|
| - * abort the handshake.
|
| - */
|
| - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
| - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - err:
|
| -#endif
|
| - switch (ret)
|
| - {
|
| - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
| - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
| - return -1;
|
| -
|
| - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
|
| - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
|
| - return 1;
|
| -
|
| - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
|
| - s->servername_done=0;
|
| - default:
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
| - int al;
|
| -
|
| - /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
|
| - * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
|
| - * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
|
| - * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
|
| - */
|
| - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
|
| - {
|
| - int r;
|
| - CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
|
| - certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
|
| - /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
|
| - if (certpkey == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| - /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
|
| - * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
|
| - */
|
| - s->cert->key = certpkey;
|
| - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
|
| - switch (r)
|
| - {
|
| - /* We don't want to send a status request response */
|
| - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
|
| - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
|
| - break;
|
| - /* status request response should be sent */
|
| - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
|
| - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
|
| - else
|
| - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
|
| - break;
|
| - /* something bad happened */
|
| - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
| - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
| - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
|
| -
|
| - err:
|
| - switch (ret)
|
| - {
|
| - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
| - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
| - return -1;
|
| -
|
| - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
|
| - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
|
| - return 1;
|
| -
|
| - default:
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
| - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
| - /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
|
| - * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
|
| - * it must contain uncompressed.
|
| - */
|
| - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
| - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
| - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
|
| - (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
|
| - ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
|
| - {
|
| - /* we are using an ECC cipher */
|
| - size_t i;
|
| - unsigned char *list;
|
| - int found_uncompressed = 0;
|
| - list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
|
| - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
|
| - {
|
| - if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
|
| - {
|
| - found_uncompressed = 1;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - if (!found_uncompressed)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
| -
|
| - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
| - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
| - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
| - ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
| - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
|
| - {
|
| - /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
|
| - * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
|
| -
|
| - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
| - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
|
| - * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
|
| - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
|
| - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
|
| - {
|
| - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
| - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
|
| - * tell the callback
|
| - */
|
| - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
|
| - && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
|
| - {
|
| - int r;
|
| - /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
|
| - * there is no response.
|
| - */
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
|
| - {
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
|
| - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
|
| - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
|
| - if (r == 0)
|
| - {
|
| - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
|
| - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
| - }
|
| - if (r < 0)
|
| - {
|
| - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - switch (ret)
|
| - {
|
| - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
| - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
| - return -1;
|
| -
|
| - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
|
| - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
|
| - return 1;
|
| -
|
| - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
|
| - s->servername_done=0;
|
| - default:
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
|
| - * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
|
| - * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
|
| - *
|
| - * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
|
| - * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
|
| - * extension, if any.
|
| - * len: the length of the session ID.
|
| - * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
|
| - * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
|
| - * point to the resulting session.
|
| - *
|
| - * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
|
| - * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
|
| - * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
|
| - *
|
| - * Returns:
|
| - * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
|
| - * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
|
| - * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
|
| - * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
|
| - * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
|
| - * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
|
| - * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
|
| - *
|
| - * Side effects:
|
| - * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
|
| - * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
|
| - * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
|
| - * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
|
| - * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
|
| - * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
|
| - */
|
| -int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
|
| - const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
|
| - {
|
| - /* Point after session ID in client hello */
|
| - const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
|
| - unsigned short i;
|
| -
|
| - *ret = NULL;
|
| - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
|
| -
|
| - /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
|
| - * to permit stateful resumption.
|
| - */
|
| - if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - if (p >= limit)
|
| - return -1;
|
| - /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
|
| - if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
| - {
|
| - i = *(p++);
|
| - p+= i;
|
| - if (p >= limit)
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| - /* Skip past cipher list */
|
| - n2s(p, i);
|
| - p+= i;
|
| - if (p >= limit)
|
| - return -1;
|
| - /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
|
| - i = *(p++);
|
| - p += i;
|
| - if (p > limit)
|
| - return -1;
|
| - /* Now at start of extensions */
|
| - if ((p + 2) >= limit)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - n2s(p, i);
|
| - while ((p + 4) <= limit)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned short type, size;
|
| - n2s(p, type);
|
| - n2s(p, size);
|
| - if (p + size > limit)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|
| - {
|
| - int r;
|
| - if (size == 0)
|
| - {
|
| - /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
|
| - * currently have one. */
|
| - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
|
| - {
|
| - /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
|
| - * decrypted rather than generating the session
|
| - * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
|
| - * handshake based on external mechanism to
|
| - * calculate the master secret later. */
|
| - return 2;
|
| - }
|
| - r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
|
| - switch (r)
|
| - {
|
| - case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
|
| - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
| - return 2;
|
| - case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
|
| - return r;
|
| - case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
|
| - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
| - return 3;
|
| - default: /* fatal error */
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - p += size;
|
| - }
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
|
| - *
|
| - * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
|
| - * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
|
| - * sess_id: points at the session ID.
|
| - * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
|
| - * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
|
| - * point to the resulting session.
|
| - *
|
| - * Returns:
|
| - * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
|
| - * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
|
| - * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
|
| - * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
|
| - */
|
| -static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
|
| - const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
|
| - SSL_SESSION **psess)
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
| - unsigned char *sdec;
|
| - const unsigned char *p;
|
| - int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
|
| - unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
| - HMAC_CTX hctx;
|
| - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
|
| - SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
|
| - /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
|
| - if (eticklen < 48)
|
| - return 2;
|
| - /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
|
| - HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
|
| - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
| - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
|
| - int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
|
| - &ctx, &hctx, 0);
|
| - if (rv < 0)
|
| - return -1;
|
| - if (rv == 0)
|
| - return 2;
|
| - if (rv == 2)
|
| - renew_ticket = 1;
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - {
|
| - /* Check key name matches */
|
| - if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
|
| - return 2;
|
| - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
|
| - tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
|
| - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
|
| - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
|
| - }
|
| - /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
|
| - * integrity checks on ticket.
|
| - */
|
| - mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
|
| - if (mlen < 0)
|
| - {
|
| - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| - eticklen -= mlen;
|
| - /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
|
| - HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
|
| - HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
|
| - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
|
| - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
|
| - return 2;
|
| - /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
|
| - /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
|
| - p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
|
| - eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
|
| - sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
|
| - if (!sdec)
|
| - {
|
| - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| - EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
|
| - if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
|
| - return 2;
|
| - slen += mlen;
|
| - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
| - p = sdec;
|
| -
|
| - sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
|
| - OPENSSL_free(sdec);
|
| - if (sess)
|
| - {
|
| - /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
|
| - * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
|
| - * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
|
| - * as required by standard.
|
| - */
|
| - if (sesslen)
|
| - memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
|
| - sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
|
| - *psess = sess;
|
| - if (renew_ticket)
|
| - return 4;
|
| - else
|
| - return 3;
|
| - }
|
| - ERR_clear_error();
|
| - /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
|
| - * ticket. */
|
| - return 2;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
|
| -
|
| -typedef struct
|
| - {
|
| - int nid;
|
| - int id;
|
| - } tls12_lookup;
|
| -
|
| -static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
|
| - {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
|
| - {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
|
| - {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
|
| - {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
|
| - {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
|
| - {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
|
| -#endif
|
| -};
|
| -
|
| -static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| - {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
| - {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
| - {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
|
| -#endif
|
| -};
|
| -
|
| -static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
|
| - {
|
| - size_t i;
|
| - for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
|
| - {
|
| - if (table[i].nid == nid)
|
| - return table[i].id;
|
| - }
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| -#if 0
|
| -static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
|
| - {
|
| - size_t i;
|
| - for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
|
| - {
|
| - if (table[i].id == id)
|
| - return table[i].nid;
|
| - }
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
|
| - {
|
| - int sig_id, md_id;
|
| - if (!md)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
|
| - sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
|
| - if (md_id == -1)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
|
| - if (sig_id == -1)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
|
| - p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
|
| - {
|
| - return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
|
| - sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
|
| - {
|
| - switch(hash_alg)
|
| - {
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
|
| - case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
|
| -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
|
| - if (FIPS_mode())
|
| - return NULL;
|
| -#endif
|
| - return EVP_md5();
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
|
| - case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
|
| - return EVP_sha1();
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
|
| - case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
|
| - return EVP_sha224();
|
| -
|
| - case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
|
| - return EVP_sha256();
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
|
| - case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
|
| - return EVP_sha384();
|
| -
|
| - case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
|
| - return EVP_sha512();
|
| -#endif
|
| - default:
|
| - return NULL;
|
| -
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
|
| -
|
| -int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
|
| - {
|
| - int i, idx;
|
| - const EVP_MD *md;
|
| - CERT *c = s->cert;
|
| - /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
|
| - if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
| - return 1;
|
| - /* Should never happen */
|
| - if (!c)
|
| - return 0;
|
| -
|
| - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
|
| - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
|
| - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
|
| - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
|
| -
|
| - for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
|
| -
|
| - switch(sig_alg)
|
| - {
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| - case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
|
| - idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
| - case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
|
| - idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
| - case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
|
| - idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif
|
| - default:
|
| - continue;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
|
| - if (md)
|
| - {
|
| - c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
|
| - if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
|
| - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -
|
| - /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
|
| - * supported it stays as NULL.
|
| - */
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
| - if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
|
| - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| - if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
|
| - {
|
| - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
|
| - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
| - if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
|
| - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
|
| -#endif
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
|
| -int
|
| -tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
|
| - unsigned short hbtype;
|
| - unsigned int payload;
|
| - unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
|
| -
|
| - /* Read type and payload length first */
|
| - hbtype = *p++;
|
| - n2s(p, payload);
|
| - pl = p;
|
| -
|
| - if (s->msg_callback)
|
| - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
|
| - &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
|
| - s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
| -
|
| - if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
|
| - int r;
|
| -
|
| - /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
|
| - * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
|
| - * payload, plus padding
|
| - */
|
| - buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
|
| - bp = buffer;
|
| -
|
| - /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
|
| - *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
|
| - s2n(payload, bp);
|
| - memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
|
| - bp += payload;
|
| - /* Random padding */
|
| - RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
|
| -
|
| - r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
|
| -
|
| - if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
|
| - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
|
| - buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
|
| - s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
| -
|
| - OPENSSL_free(buffer);
|
| -
|
| - if (r < 0)
|
| - return r;
|
| - }
|
| - else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned int seq;
|
| -
|
| - /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
|
| - * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
|
| - * sequence number */
|
| - n2s(pl, seq);
|
| -
|
| - if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
|
| - {
|
| - s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
|
| - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int
|
| -tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned char *buf, *p;
|
| - int ret;
|
| - unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
|
| - unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
|
| -
|
| - /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
|
| - if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
|
| - s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
|
| - if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
|
| - if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
|
| - * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
|
| - */
|
| - OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
|
| -
|
| - /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
|
| - * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
|
| - * some random stuff.
|
| - * - Message Type, 1 byte
|
| - * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
|
| - * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
|
| - * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
|
| - * - Padding
|
| - */
|
| - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
|
| - p = buf;
|
| - /* Message Type */
|
| - *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
|
| - /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
|
| - s2n(payload, p);
|
| - /* Sequence number */
|
| - s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
|
| - /* 16 random bytes */
|
| - RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
|
| - p += 16;
|
| - /* Random padding */
|
| - RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
|
| -
|
| - ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
|
| - if (ret >= 0)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->msg_callback)
|
| - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
|
| - buf, 3 + payload + padding,
|
| - s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
| -
|
| - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - OPENSSL_free(buf);
|
| -
|
| - return ret;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
|
| -/* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the given
|
| - * SSL connection and writes it to |md|.
|
| - */
|
| -int
|
| -tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
| - unsigned char temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
| - unsigned temp_digest_len;
|
| - int i;
|
| - static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
|
| -
|
| - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
|
| - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
| - return 0;
|
| -
|
| - EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
|
| -
|
| - if (s->hit)
|
| - {
|
| - static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
|
| - EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic,
|
| - sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
|
| - if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
|
| - s->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
| - for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL)
|
| - continue;
|
| - EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
|
| - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len);
|
| - EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len);
|
| - }
|
| - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
| -
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -/* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
|
| - * hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */
|
| -int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - int digest_len;
|
| - /* This function should never be called for a resumed session because
|
| - * the handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original,
|
| - * full handshake. */
|
| - if (s->hit)
|
| - return -1;
|
| - /* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been
|
| - * negotiated. */
|
| - if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
|
| - return -1;
|
| -
|
| - digest_len = tls1_handshake_digest(
|
| - s, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
|
| - sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash));
|
| - if (digest_len < 0)
|
| - return -1;
|
| -
|
| - s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len;
|
| -
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
|
|
Chromium Code Reviews
Issue 2072073002:
Delete bundled copy of OpenSSL and replace with README. (Closed)
Base URL: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/deps/openssl@master