Delete bundled copy of OpenSSL and replace with README.

openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c

Index: openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index d30ce6137ed38873eb717c4a503b6c37239b857b..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1530 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-#include <openssl/comp.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-#include <openssl/des.h>
-#endif
-
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
-			int sec_len,
-			const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
-			const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
-			const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
-			const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
-			const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
-			unsigned char *out, int olen)
-	{
-	int chunk;
-	size_t j;
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
-	EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
-	unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	size_t A1_len;
-	int ret = 0;
-	
-	chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
-	OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-	mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
-	if (!mac_key)
-		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
-		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
-		goto err;
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		/* Reinit mac contexts */
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
-			goto err;
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
-			goto err;
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
-			goto err;
-
-		if (olen > chunk)
-			{
-			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
-				goto err;
-			out+=j;
-			olen-=j;
-			/* calc the next A1 value */
-			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		else	/* last one */
-			{
-			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
-				goto err;
-			memcpy(out,A1,olen);
-			break;
-			}
-		}
-	ret = 1;
-err:
-	EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
-		     const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
-		     const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
-		     const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
-		     const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
-		     const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
-		     const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
-		     unsigned char *out1,
-		     unsigned char *out2, int olen)
-	{
-	int len,i,idx,count;
-	const unsigned char *S1;
-	long m;
-	const EVP_MD *md;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	/* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
-	count=0;
-	for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
-		if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
-	}	
-	len=slen/count;
-	if (count == 1)
-		slen = 0;
-	S1=sec;
-	memset(out1,0,olen);
-	for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
-		if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
-			if (!md) {
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
-				SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
-				goto err;				
-			}
-			if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
-					seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len,
-					out2,olen))
-				goto err;
-			S1+=len;
-			for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
-			{
-				out1[i]^=out2[i];
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	ret = 1;
-err:
-	return ret;
-}
-static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
-	     unsigned char *tmp, int num)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-		 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
-		 s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-		 s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-		 NULL,0,NULL,0,
-		 s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-		 km,tmp,num);
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
-                s->session->master_key_length);
-	{
-        int i;
-        for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++)
-                {
-                printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
-                }
-        printf("\n");  }
-#endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-/* tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates |*aead_ctx|, if needed and returns 1. It
- * returns 0 on malloc error. */
-static int tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx)
-	{
-	if (*aead_ctx != NULL)
-		EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx);
-	else
-		{
-		*aead_ctx = (SSL_AEAD_CTX*) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX));
-		if (*aead_ctx == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_AEAD_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return 0;
-			}
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-static int tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read,
-	const unsigned char *key, unsigned key_len,
-	const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len)
-	{
-	const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
-	SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx;
-
-	if (is_read)
-		{
-		if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_read_ctx))
-			return 0;
-		aead_ctx = s->aead_read_ctx;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_write_ctx))
-			return 0;
-		aead_ctx = s->aead_write_ctx;
-		}
-
-	if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len,
-			       EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL /* engine */))
-		return 0;
-	if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len);
-	aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len;
-	aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8;  /* always the case, currently. */
-	aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record =
-		(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_INCLUDED_IN_RECORD) != 0;
-	if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead);
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-/* tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher
- * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument |is_read| is true iff this
- * function is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a
- * ChangeCipherSpec message. In order to support export ciphersuites,
- * use_client_keys indicates whether the key material provided is in the
- * "client write" direction. */
-static int tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(
-	SSL *s, char is_read, char use_client_keys,
-	const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned mac_secret_len,
-	const unsigned char *key, unsigned key_len,
-	const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len)
-	{
-	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
-	const char is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) != 0;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx;
-	EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
-	char is_aead_cipher;
-
-	unsigned char export_tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-	unsigned char export_tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-	unsigned char export_iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
-	unsigned char export_iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
-
-	if (is_read)
-		{
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
-			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-		else
-			s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-
-		if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
-		else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		else
-			/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
-
-		cipher_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
-		mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
-
-		memcpy(s->s3->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
-		s->s3->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_len;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
-			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
-		else
-			s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
-
-		if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
-		else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		else
-			/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
-
-		cipher_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
-		mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
-
-		memcpy(s->s3->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
-		s->s3->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_len;
-		}
-
-	if (is_export)
-		{
-		/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
-		 * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
-		 */
-		const unsigned char *label;
-		unsigned label_len;
-
-		if (use_client_keys)
-			{
-			label = (const unsigned char*) TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
-			label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			label = (const unsigned char*) TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
-			label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
-			}
-
-		if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-				label, label_len,
-				s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-				s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-				NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
-				key /* secret */, key_len /* secret length */,
-				export_tmp1 /* output */,
-				export_tmp2 /* scratch space */,
-				EVP_CIPHER_key_length(s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc) /* output length */))
-			return 0;
-		key = export_tmp1;
-
-		if (iv_len > 0)
-			{
-			static const unsigned char empty[] = "";
-
-			if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-					TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
-					s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-					s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-					NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
-					empty /* secret */ ,0 /* secret length */,
-					export_iv1 /* output */,
-					export_iv2 /* scratch space */,
-					iv_len * 2 /* output length */))
-				return 0;
-
-			if (use_client_keys)
-				iv = export_iv1;
-			else
-				iv = &export_iv1[iv_len];
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* is_aead_cipher indicates whether the EVP_CIPHER implements an AEAD
-	 * interface. This is different from the newer EVP_AEAD interface. */
-	is_aead_cipher = (EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0;
-
-	if (!is_aead_cipher)
-		{
-		EVP_PKEY *mac_key =
-			EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type,
-					     NULL, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
-		if (!mac_key)
-			return 0;
-		EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, s->s3->tmp.new_hash, NULL, mac_key);
-		EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-		}
-
-	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-		{
-		EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL /* engine */, key,
-				  NULL /* iv */, !is_read);
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, iv_len, (void*) iv);
-		}
-	else
-		EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL /* engine */, key, iv, !is_read);
-
-	/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
-	if (is_aead_cipher && mac_secret_len > 0)
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
-				    mac_secret_len, (void*) mac_secret);
-
-	if (is_export)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(export_tmp1, sizeof(export_tmp1));
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(export_tmp2, sizeof(export_tmp1));
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(export_iv1, sizeof(export_iv1));
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(export_iv2, sizeof(export_iv2));
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-
-err:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
-	{
-	/* is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message -
-	 * i.e. we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have just
-	 * written one. */
-	const char is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0;
-	/* use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client
-	 * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a
-	 * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. */
-	const char use_client_keys = which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE ||
-				     which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
-	const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret, *mac_secret;
-	const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key, *key;
-	const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv, *iv;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
-	const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
-	unsigned key_len, iv_len, mac_secret_len;
-	const unsigned char *key_data;
-	const char is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) != 0;
-
-	/* Update compression contexts. */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	const SSL_COMP *comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
-
-	if (is_read)
-		{
-		if (s->expand != NULL)
-			{
-			COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
-			s->expand = NULL;
-			}
-		if (comp != NULL)
-			{
-			s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
-			if (s->expand == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
-				return 0;
-				}
-			if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
-				s->s3->rrec.comp =
-					(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
-			if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
-				goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (s->compress != NULL)
-			{
-			COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
-			s->compress = NULL;
-			}
-		if (comp != NULL)
-			{
-			s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
-			if (s->compress == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-#endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
-
-	/* Reset sequence number to zero. */
-	memset(is_read ? s->s3->read_sequence : s->s3->write_sequence, 0, 8);
-
-	/* key_arg is used for SSLv2. We don't need it for TLS. */
-	s->session->key_arg_length = 0;
-
-	mac_secret_len = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
-
-	if (aead != NULL)
-		{
-		key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
-		iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
-		if (is_export && key_len > SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
-			key_len = SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-			iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
-		else
-			iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
-		}
-
-	key_data = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
-	client_write_mac_secret = key_data; key_data += mac_secret_len;
-	server_write_mac_secret = key_data; key_data += mac_secret_len;
-	client_write_key =        key_data; key_data += key_len;
-	server_write_key =        key_data; key_data += key_len;
-	client_write_iv  =        key_data; key_data += iv_len;
-	server_write_iv  =        key_data; key_data += iv_len;
-
-	if (use_client_keys)
-		{
-		mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret;
-		key = client_write_key;
-		iv = client_write_iv;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret;
-		key = server_write_key;
-		iv = server_write_iv;
-		}
-
-	if (key_data - s->s3->tmp.key_block != s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	if (aead != NULL)
-		{
-		if (!tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read,
-						   key, key_len, iv, iv_len))
-			return 0;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (!tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, use_client_keys,
-						     mac_secret, mac_secret_len,
-						     key, key_len,
-						     iv, iv_len))
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-err:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *c = NULL;
-	const EVP_MD *hash = NULL;
-	const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL;
-	int num;
-	SSL_COMP *comp;
-	int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
-	int ret=0;
-	unsigned key_len, iv_len;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
-		return(1);
-
-	if (!ssl_cipher_get_comp(s->session, &comp))
-		goto cipher_unavailable_err;
-
-	if (s->session->cipher &&
-	    (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD))
-		{
-		if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead))
-			goto cipher_unavailable_err;
-		key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
-		iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size))
-			goto cipher_unavailable_err;
-		key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
-
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-			iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
-		else
-			iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
-		}
-
-	s->s3->tmp.new_aead=aead;
-	s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
-	s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
-	s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
-	s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
-
-	num=key_len+mac_secret_size+iv_len;
-	num*=2;
-
-	ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
-	if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
-	s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
-
-	if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("client random\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("server random\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("pre-master\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-#endif
-	if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num))
-		goto err;
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("\nkey block\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-#endif
-
-	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
-		&& s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION)
-		{
-		/* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
-		 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
-		 */
-		s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
-
-		if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
-			{
-			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
-				s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-			
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
-			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
-				s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-#endif
-			}
-		}
-		
-	ret = 1;
-err:
-	if (p2)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
-		OPENSSL_free(p2);
-		}
-	return(ret);
-
-cipher_unavailable_err:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
- *
- * Returns:
- *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
- *       short etc).
- *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
- *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
- *       an internal error occured.
- */
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
-	{
-	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
-	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-	const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead;
-
-	if (send)
-		rec = &s->s3->wrec;
-	else
-		rec = &s->s3->rrec;
-
-	if (send)
-		aead = s->aead_write_ctx;
-	else
-		aead = s->aead_read_ctx;
-
-	if (aead)
-		{
-		unsigned char ad[13], *seq, *in, *out, nonce[16];
-		unsigned nonce_used;
-		ssize_t n;
-
-		seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
-
-		if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-			{
-			unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
-
-			s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p);
-			memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
-			memcpy(ad, dtlsseq, 8);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			memcpy(ad, seq, 8);
-			for (i=7; i>=0; i--)	/* increment */
-				{
-				++seq[i];
-				if (seq[i] != 0)
-					break;
-				}
-			}
-
-		ad[8]  = rec->type;
-		ad[9]  = (unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
-		ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
-
-		if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) ||
-		    aead->variable_nonce_len > 8)
-			return -1;  /* internal error - should never happen. */
-
-		memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, aead->fixed_nonce_len);
-		nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len;
-
-		if (send)
-			{
-			size_t len = rec->length;
-			size_t eivlen = 0;
-			in = rec->input;
-			out = rec->data;
-
-			/* When sending we use the sequence number as the
-			 * variable part of the nonce. */
-			if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8)
-				return -1;
-			memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len);
-			nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len;
-
-			/* in do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by
-			 * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the
-			 * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number
-			 * bytes into place without overwriting any of the
-			 * plaintext. */
-			if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record)
-				{
-				memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len);
-				len -= aead->variable_nonce_len;
-				eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len;
-				}
-
-			ad[11] = len >> 8;
-			ad[12] = len & 0xff;
-
-			n = EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx,
-					      out + eivlen, len + aead->tag_len,
-					      nonce, nonce_used,
-					      in + eivlen, len,
-					      ad, sizeof(ad));
-			if (n >= 0 && aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record)
-				n += aead->variable_nonce_len;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			/* receive */
-			size_t len = rec->length;
-
-			if (rec->data != rec->input)
-				return -1;  /* internal error - should never happen. */
-			out = in = rec->input;
-
-			if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len)
-				return 0;
-			memcpy(nonce + nonce_used,
-			       aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record ? in : ad,
-			       aead->variable_nonce_len);
-			nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len;
-
-			if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record)
-				{
-				in += aead->variable_nonce_len;
-				len -= aead->variable_nonce_len;
-				out += aead->variable_nonce_len;
-				}
-
-			if (len < aead->tag_len)
-				return 0;
-			len -= aead->tag_len;
-
-			ad[11] = len >> 8;
-			ad[12] = len & 0xff;
-
-			n = EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, len, nonce, nonce_used,
-					      in, len + aead->tag_len, ad, sizeof(ad));
-
-			rec->data = rec->input = out;
-			}
-
-		if (n == -1)
-			return -1;
-		rec->length = n;
-		return 1;
-		}
-
-	if (send)
-		{
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
-			{
-			int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-			OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
-			}
-		ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
-		rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
-		if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
-			enc=NULL;
-		else
-			{
-			int ivlen;
-			enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
-			/* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
-			if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
-				&& EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-				ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
-			else
-				ivlen = 0;
-			if (ivlen > 1)
-				{
-				if ( rec->data != rec->input)
-					/* we can't write into the input stream:
-					 * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
-					 */
-					fprintf(stderr,
-						"%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
-						__FILE__, __LINE__);
-				else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
-					return -1;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
-			{
-			int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-			OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
-			}
-		ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
-		rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
-		if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
-			enc=NULL;
-		else
-			enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
-		}
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
-#endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
-		{
-		memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
-		rec->input=rec->data;
-		ret = 1;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		l=rec->length;
-		bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
-
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
-			{
-			unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
-
-			seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
-
-			if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-				{
-				unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
-
-				s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
-				memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
-				memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				memcpy(buf,seq,8);
-				for (i=7; i>=0; i--)	/* increment */
-					{
-					++seq[i];
-					if (seq[i] != 0) break; 
-					}
-				}
-
-			buf[8]=rec->type;
-			buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
-			buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
-			buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
-			buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
-			pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
-			if (send)
-				{
-				l+=pad;
-				rec->length+=pad;
-				}
-			}
-		else if ((bs != 1) && send)
-			{
-			i=bs-((int)l%bs);
-
-			/* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
-
-			/* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
-			j=i-1;
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-				{
-				if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-					j++;
-				}
-			for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
-				rec->input[k]=j;
-			l+=i;
-			rec->length+=i;
-			}
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-		{
-		unsigned long ui;
-		printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-			ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
-		printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
-			ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
-			DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
-			ds->cipher->iv_len);
-		printf("\t\tIV: ");
-		for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
-		printf("\n");
-		printf("\trec->input=");
-		for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
-		printf("\n");
-		}
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-		if (!send)
-			{
-			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				return 0;
-			}
-		
-		i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
-		if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
-						?(i<0)
-						:(i==0))
-			return -1;	/* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
-			{
-			rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-			rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-			rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-			}
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-		{
-		unsigned long i;
-		printf("\trec->data=");
-		for (i=0; i<l; i++)
-			printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
-		}
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-		ret = 1;
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
-			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
-		if (pad && !send)
-			rec->length -= pad;
-		}
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
-	{
-	unsigned int ret;
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL;
-	int i;
-
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 
-		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-			return 0;
-
-	for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) 
-		{
-		  if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid) 
-		  	{
-		  	d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
-			break;
-			}
-		}
-	if (!d) {
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
-		return 0;
-	}	
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
-	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-	return((int)ret);
-	}
-
-/* tls1_handshake_digest calculates the current handshake hash and writes it to
- * |out|, which has space for |out_len| bytes. It returns the number of bytes
- * written or -1 in the event of an error. This function works on a copy of the
- * underlying digests so can be called multiple times and prior to the final
- * update etc. */
-int tls1_handshake_digest(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len)
-	{
-	const EVP_MD *md;
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-	int i, err = 0, len = 0;
-	long mask;
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
-	for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++)
-		{
-		int hash_size;
-		unsigned int digest_len;
-		EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
-
-		if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) == 0)
-			continue;
-
-		hash_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
-		if (!hdgst || hash_size < 0 || (size_t)hash_size > out_len)
-			{
-			err = 1;
-			break;
-			}
-
-		if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
-		    !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &digest_len) ||
-		    digest_len != (unsigned int)hash_size) /* internal error */
-			{
-			err = 1;
-			break;
-			}
-		out += digest_len;
-		out_len -= digest_len;
-		len += digest_len;
-		}
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-	if (err != 0)
-		return -1;
-	return len;
-	}
-
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
-	     const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
-	{
-	unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	unsigned char buf2[12];
-	int err=0;
-	int digests_len;
-
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-			return 0;
-
-	digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(s, buf, sizeof(buf));
-	if (digests_len < 0)
-		{
-		err = 1;
-		digests_len = 0;
-		}
-
-	if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-			str,slen, buf, digests_len, NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
-			s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-			out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
-		err = 1;
-
-	if (err)
-		return 0;
-	else
-		return sizeof buf2;
-	}
-
-int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
-	{
-	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-	unsigned char *seq;
-	EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-	size_t md_size, orig_len;
-	int i;
-	EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
-	unsigned char header[13];
-	int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
-	int t;
-
-	if (send)
-		{
-		rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
-		seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
-		hash=ssl->write_hash;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
-		seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
-		hash=ssl->read_hash;
-		}
-
-	t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
-	OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
-	md_size=t;
-
-	/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
-	if (stream_mac) 
-		{
-			mac_ctx = hash;
-		}
-		else
-		{
-			EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash);
-			mac_ctx = &hmac;
-		}
-
-	if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
-
-		s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
-		memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
-
-		memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
-		}
-	else
-		memcpy(header, seq, 8);
-
-	/* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
-	orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
-	rec->type &= 0xff;
-
-	header[8]=rec->type;
-	header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
-	header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-	header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
-	header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
-
-	if (!send &&
-	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
-	    ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
-		{
-		/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
-		 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
-		 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
-		 * timing-oracle. */
-		ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
-			mac_ctx,
-			md, &md_size,
-			header, rec->input,
-			rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
-			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
-			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
-			0 /* not SSLv3 */);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-		t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
-		OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-		if (!send && FIPS_mode())
-			tls_fips_digest_extra(
-	    				ssl->enc_read_ctx,
-					mac_ctx, rec->input,
-					rec->length, orig_len);
-#endif
-		}
-		
-	if (!stream_mac)
-		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("sec=");
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
-printf("seq=");
-{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); }
-printf("buf=");
-{int z; for (z=0; z<5; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
-printf("rec=");
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
-#endif
-
-	if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
-			{
-			++seq[i];
-			if (seq[i] != 0) break; 
-			}
-		}
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); }
-#endif
-	return(md_size);
-	}
-
-int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
-	     int len)
-	{
-	unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-	const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
-	int col = 0, sol = 0;
-
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-	    s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 &&
-	    s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
-		{
-		co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
-		col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
-		so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
-		sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */
-		}
-#endif
-
-	tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-		TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
-		s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-		co, col,
-		s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-		so, sol,
-		p,len,
-		s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-	fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
-	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
-	fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
-	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
-	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
-	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-	return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
-	}
-
-int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
-	 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
-	 size_t contextlen, int use_context)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buff;
-	unsigned char *val = NULL;
-	size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
-	int rv;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
-	if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
-
-	/* construct PRF arguments
-	 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
-	 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
-	 * does not create a prohibited label.
-	 */
-	vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
-	if (use_context)
-		{
-		vallen += 2 + contextlen;
-		}
-
-	val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
-	if (val == NULL) goto err2;
-	currentvalpos = 0;
-	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
-	currentvalpos += llen;
-	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-	if (use_context)
-		{
-		val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
-		currentvalpos++;
-		val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
-		currentvalpos++;
-		if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
-			{
-			memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* disallow prohibited labels
-	 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
-	 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
-	 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
-	 */
-	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
-		 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
-		 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
-		 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
-		 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-
-	rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
-		      val, vallen,
-		      NULL, 0,
-		      NULL, 0,
-		      NULL, 0,
-		      NULL, 0,
-		      s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-		      out,buff,olen);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-	goto ret;
-err1:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
-	rv = 0;
-	goto ret;
-err2:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	rv = 0;
-ret:
-	if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
-	if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
-	return(rv);
-	}
-
-int tls1_alert_code(int code)
-	{
-	switch (code)
-		{
-	case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:	return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
-	case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:	return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:	return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
-	case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:	return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-	case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:	return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
-	case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:	return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:	return(-1);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:	return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
-	case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:	return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:		return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
-	case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:	return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
-	case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:	return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-	case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:	return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
-	case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:	return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
-	case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:	return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
-	case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
-	case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:	return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-	case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:	return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
-	case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:	return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
-	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:	return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
-#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
-	case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return 
-					  (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
-#endif
-	default:			return(-1);
-		}
-	}