Index: openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c |
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c |
deleted file mode 100644 |
index d7ea9a5238d37f562142cafcd91ad566c1ec5ca8..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c |
+++ /dev/null |
@@ -1,2737 +0,0 @@ |
-/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ |
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
- * All rights reserved. |
- * |
- * This package is an SSL implementation written |
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
- * |
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
- * |
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
- * the code are not to be removed. |
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
- * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
- * |
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
- * are met: |
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
- * must display the following acknowledgement: |
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
- * |
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
- * SUCH DAMAGE. |
- * |
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
- * copied and put under another distribution licence |
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
- */ |
-/* ==================================================================== |
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
- * |
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
- * are met: |
- * |
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
- * |
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
- * distribution. |
- * |
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
- * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
- * |
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
- * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
- * |
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
- * |
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
- * acknowledgment: |
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
- * |
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
- * ==================================================================== |
- * |
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
- * |
- */ |
- |
-#include <stdio.h> |
-#include <openssl/objects.h> |
-#include <openssl/evp.h> |
-#include <openssl/hmac.h> |
-#include <openssl/ocsp.h> |
-#include <openssl/rand.h> |
-#include "ssl_locl.h" |
- |
-const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, |
- const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, |
- SSL_SESSION **psess); |
-#endif |
- |
-SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ |
- tls1_enc, |
- tls1_mac, |
- tls1_setup_key_block, |
- tls1_generate_master_secret, |
- tls1_change_cipher_state, |
- tls1_final_finish_mac, |
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, |
- tls1_cert_verify_mac, |
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, |
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, |
- tls1_alert_code, |
- tls1_export_keying_material, |
- }; |
- |
-long tls1_default_timeout(void) |
- { |
- /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec |
- * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ |
- return(60*60*2); |
- } |
- |
-int tls1_new(SSL *s) |
- { |
- if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); |
- s->method->ssl_clear(s); |
- return(1); |
- } |
- |
-void tls1_free(SSL *s) |
- { |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
- if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) |
- { |
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); |
- } |
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ |
- ssl3_free(s); |
- } |
- |
-void tls1_clear(SSL *s) |
- { |
- ssl3_clear(s); |
- s->version = s->method->version; |
- } |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
- |
-static int nid_list[] = |
- { |
- NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ |
- NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ |
- NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ |
- NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ |
- NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ |
- NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ |
- NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ |
- NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ |
- NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ |
- NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ |
- NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ |
- NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ |
- NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ |
- NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ |
- NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ |
- NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ |
- NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ |
- NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ |
- NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ |
- NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ |
- NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ |
- NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ |
- NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ |
- NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ |
- NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ |
- }; |
- |
-/* We support only the elliptic curves that are also supported by NSS |
- * to improve compatibility with sites that don't accept large ClientHellos. |
- */ |
-static int pref_list[] = |
- { |
- NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ |
- NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ |
- NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ |
- }; |
- |
-int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) |
- { |
- /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ |
- if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > |
- sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) |
- return 0; |
- return nid_list[curve_id-1]; |
- } |
- |
-int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) |
- { |
- /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ |
- switch (nid) |
- { |
- case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ |
- return 1; |
- case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ |
- return 2; |
- case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ |
- return 3; |
- case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ |
- return 4; |
- case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ |
- return 5; |
- case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ |
- return 6; |
- case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ |
- return 7; |
- case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ |
- return 8; |
- case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ |
- return 9; |
- case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ |
- return 10; |
- case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ |
- return 11; |
- case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ |
- return 12; |
- case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ |
- return 13; |
- case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ |
- return 14; |
- case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ |
- return 15; |
- case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ |
- return 16; |
- case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ |
- return 17; |
- case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ |
- return 18; |
- case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ |
- return 19; |
- case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ |
- return 20; |
- case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ |
- return 21; |
- case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ |
- return 22; |
- case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ |
- return 23; |
- case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ |
- return 24; |
- case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ |
- return 25; |
- default: |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
- |
-/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this |
- * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. |
- */ |
- |
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
-#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ |
-#else |
-#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, |
-#endif |
- |
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
-#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ |
-#else |
-#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, |
-#endif |
- |
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
-#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ |
-#else |
-#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, |
-#endif |
- |
-#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ |
- tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ |
- tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ |
- tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) |
- |
-static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 |
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) |
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 |
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) |
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
- tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5) |
-#endif |
-}; |
- |
-int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) |
- { |
- size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); |
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS |
- /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */ |
- if (FIPS_mode()) |
- slen -= 2; |
-#endif |
- if (p) |
- memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); |
- return (int)slen; |
- } |
- |
-/* header_len is the length of the ClientHello header written so far, used to |
- * compute padding. It does not include the record header. Pass 0 if no padding |
- * is to be done. */ |
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, size_t header_len) |
- { |
- int extdatalen=0; |
- unsigned char *orig = buf; |
- unsigned char *ret = buf; |
- |
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ |
- if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION |
- && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) |
- return orig; |
- |
- ret+=2; |
- |
- if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ |
- |
- if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) |
- { |
- /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ |
- unsigned long size_str; |
- long lenmax; |
- |
- /* check for enough space. |
- 4 for the servername type and entension length |
- 2 for servernamelist length |
- 1 for the hostname type |
- 2 for hostname length |
- + hostname length |
- */ |
- |
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 |
- || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) |
- return NULL; |
- |
- /* extension type and length */ |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); |
- s2n(size_str+5,ret); |
- |
- /* length of servername list */ |
- s2n(size_str+3,ret); |
- |
- /* hostname type, length and hostname */ |
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; |
- s2n(size_str,ret); |
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); |
- ret+=size_str; |
- } |
- |
- /* Add RI if renegotiating */ |
- if (s->renegotiate) |
- { |
- int el; |
- |
- if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- |
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; |
- |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); |
- s2n(el,ret); |
- |
- if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- |
- ret += el; |
- } |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
- /* Add SRP username if there is one */ |
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) |
- { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */ |
- |
- int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); |
- if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- |
- /* check for enough space. |
- 4 for the srp type type and entension length |
- 1 for the srp user identity |
- + srp user identity length |
- */ |
- if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; |
- |
- /* fill in the extension */ |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret); |
- s2n(login_len+1,ret); |
- (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len; |
- memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); |
- ret+=login_len; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) |
- { |
- int ticklen; |
- if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) |
- ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; |
- else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && |
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) |
- { |
- ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; |
- s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); |
- if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) |
- return NULL; |
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, |
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, |
- ticklen); |
- s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; |
- } |
- else |
- ticklen = 0; |
- if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && |
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) |
- goto skip_ext; |
- /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len |
- * rest for ticket |
- */ |
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); |
- s2n(ticklen,ret); |
- if (ticklen) |
- { |
- memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); |
- ret += ticklen; |
- } |
- } |
- skip_ext: |
- |
- if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) |
- { |
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) |
- return NULL; |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret); |
- s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); |
- s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); |
- memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); |
- ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); |
- } |
- |
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && |
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; |
- |
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) |
- return NULL; |
- if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ |
- return NULL; |
- |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); |
- s2n(col + 2, ret); |
- s2n(col, ret); |
- memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); |
- ret += col; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && |
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- int i; |
- long extlen, idlen, itmp; |
- OCSP_RESPID *id; |
- |
- idlen = 0; |
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) |
- { |
- id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); |
- itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); |
- if (itmp <= 0) |
- return NULL; |
- idlen += itmp + 2; |
- } |
- |
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) |
- { |
- extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); |
- if (extlen < 0) |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- else |
- extlen = 0; |
- |
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); |
- if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) |
- return NULL; |
- s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); |
- *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; |
- s2n(idlen, ret); |
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) |
- { |
- /* save position of id len */ |
- unsigned char *q = ret; |
- id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); |
- /* skip over id len */ |
- ret += 2; |
- itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); |
- /* write id len */ |
- s2n(itmp, q); |
- } |
- s2n(extlen, ret); |
- if (extlen > 0) |
- i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); |
- } |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
- /* Add Heartbeat extension */ |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); |
- s2n(1,ret); |
- /* Set mode: |
- * 1: peer may send requests |
- * 2: peer not allowed to send requests |
- */ |
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) |
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; |
- else |
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
-#endif |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) |
- { |
- /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its |
- * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ |
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) |
- return NULL; |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); |
- s2n(0,ret); |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled) |
- { |
- /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its |
- * support for Channel ID. */ |
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) |
- return NULL; |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret); |
- s2n(0,ret); |
- } |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
- if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) |
- { |
- int el; |
- |
- ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); |
- |
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; |
- |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); |
- s2n(el,ret); |
- |
- if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- ret += el; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
- /* WebSphere Application Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension |
- * being zero-length. ECC extensions are non-empty and not dropped until |
- * fallback to SSL3, at which point all extensions are gone. */ |
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && |
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ |
- long lenmax; |
- |
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; |
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; |
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); |
- s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); |
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); |
- ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
- } |
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && |
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ |
- long lenmax; |
- |
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; |
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; |
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); |
- s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); |
- |
- /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for |
- * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. |
- * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html |
- * resolves this to two bytes. |
- */ |
- s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); |
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); |
- ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; |
- } |
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
- |
- /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. |
- * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02 */ |
- if (header_len > 0) |
- { |
- header_len += ret - orig; |
- if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200) |
- { |
- size_t padding_len = 0x200 - header_len; |
- /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always |
- * include least one byte of data if including the |
- * extension. WebSphere Application Server 7.0 is |
- * intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */ |
- if (padding_len >= 4 + 1) |
- padding_len -= 4; |
- else |
- padding_len = 1; |
- if (limit - ret - 4 - (long)padding_len < 0) |
- return NULL; |
- |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); |
- s2n(padding_len, ret); |
- memset(ret, 0, padding_len); |
- ret += padding_len; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- |
- if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) |
- return orig; |
- |
- s2n(extdatalen, orig); |
- return ret; |
- } |
- |
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit) |
- { |
- int extdatalen=0; |
- unsigned char *orig = buf; |
- unsigned char *ret = buf; |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
- int next_proto_neg_seen; |
-#endif |
- |
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ |
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) |
- return orig; |
- |
- ret+=2; |
- if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ |
- |
- if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) |
- { |
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; |
- |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); |
- s2n(0,ret); |
- } |
- |
- if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) |
- { |
- int el; |
- |
- if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- |
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; |
- |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); |
- s2n(el,ret); |
- |
- if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- |
- ret += el; |
- } |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && |
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ |
- long lenmax; |
- |
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; |
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; |
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); |
- s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); |
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); |
- ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
- |
- } |
- /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ |
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
- |
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected |
- && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) |
- { |
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); |
- s2n(0,ret); |
- } |
- |
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected) |
- { |
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); |
- s2n(0,ret); |
- } |
- |
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && |
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; |
- |
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) |
- return NULL; |
- if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ |
- return NULL; |
- |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); |
- s2n(sol + 2, ret); |
- s2n(sol, ret); |
- memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); |
- ret += sol; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
- if(s->srtp_profile) |
- { |
- int el; |
- |
- ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); |
- |
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; |
- |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); |
- s2n(el,ret); |
- |
- if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- ret+=el; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) |
- && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) |
- { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { |
- 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ |
- 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ |
- 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, |
- 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, |
- 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, |
- 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; |
- if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; |
- memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); |
- ret+=36; |
- |
- } |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
- /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ |
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) |
- { |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); |
- s2n(1,ret); |
- /* Set mode: |
- * 1: peer may send requests |
- * 2: peer not allowed to send requests |
- */ |
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) |
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; |
- else |
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
- |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
- next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; |
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; |
- if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) |
- { |
- const unsigned char *npa; |
- unsigned int npalen; |
- int r; |
- |
- r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); |
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) |
- { |
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); |
- s2n(npalen,ret); |
- memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); |
- ret += npalen; |
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
- } |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- /* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it |
- * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */ |
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) |
- { |
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) |
- return NULL; |
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret); |
- s2n(0,ret); |
- } |
- |
- if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) |
- return orig; |
- |
- s2n(extdatalen, orig); |
- return ret; |
- } |
- |
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) |
- { |
- unsigned short type; |
- unsigned short size; |
- unsigned short len; |
- unsigned char *data = *p; |
- int renegotiate_seen = 0; |
- int sigalg_seen = 0; |
- |
- s->servername_done = 0; |
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1; |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; |
-#endif |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
- s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | |
- SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); |
-#endif |
- |
- if (data >= (d+n-2)) |
- goto ri_check; |
- n2s(data,len); |
- |
- if (data > (d+n-len)) |
- goto ri_check; |
- |
- while (data <= (d+n-4)) |
- { |
- n2s(data,type); |
- n2s(data,size); |
- |
- if (data+size > (d+n)) |
- goto ri_check; |
-#if 0 |
- fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); |
-#endif |
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) |
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, |
- s->tlsext_debug_arg); |
-/* The servername extension is treated as follows: |
- |
- - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. |
- - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, |
- in which case an fatal alert is generated. |
- - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. |
- - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order |
- to allow the application to position itself to the right context. |
- - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when |
- it is identical to a previously used for the same session. |
- Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time |
- set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the |
- case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and |
- a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername |
- presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches |
- the value of the Host: field. |
- - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION |
- if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, |
- i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. |
- - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. |
- |
-*/ |
- |
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
- { |
- unsigned char *sdata; |
- int servname_type; |
- int dsize; |
- |
- if (size < 2) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- n2s(data,dsize); |
- size -= 2; |
- if (dsize > size ) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- sdata = data; |
- while (dsize > 3) |
- { |
- servname_type = *(sdata++); |
- n2s(sdata,len); |
- dsize -= 3; |
- |
- if (len > dsize) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- if (s->servername_done == 0) |
- switch (servname_type) |
- { |
- case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: |
- if (!s->hit) |
- { |
- if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); |
- s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; |
- if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { |
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); |
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; |
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- s->servername_done = 1; |
- |
- } |
- else |
- s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname |
- && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len |
- && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; |
- |
- break; |
- |
- default: |
- break; |
- } |
- |
- dsize -= len; |
- } |
- if (dsize != 0) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- } |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) |
- { |
- if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1)) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) |
- return -1; |
- memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); |
- s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0'; |
- |
- if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && |
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- unsigned char *sdata = data; |
- int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); |
- |
- if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- if (!s->hit) |
- { |
- if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) |
- { |
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; |
- } |
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; |
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; |
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); |
- } |
-#if 0 |
- fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); |
- sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; |
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) |
- fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); |
- fprintf(stderr,"\n"); |
-#endif |
- } |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && |
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- unsigned char *sdata = data; |
- int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); |
- ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); |
- |
- if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || |
- ellipticcurvelist_length < 1) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- if (!s->hit) |
- { |
- if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; |
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; |
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); |
- } |
-#if 0 |
- fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); |
- sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; |
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) |
- fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); |
- fprintf(stderr,"\n"); |
-#endif |
- } |
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && |
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- unsigned char *sdata = data; |
- |
- if (size < 2) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); |
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ |
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); |
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) |
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
- else |
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); |
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
-#endif |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) |
- { |
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && |
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) |
- { |
- if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) |
- return 0; |
- renegotiate_seen = 1; |
- } |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) |
- { |
- int dsize; |
- if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- sigalg_seen = 1; |
- n2s(data,dsize); |
- size -= 2; |
- if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && |
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) |
- { |
- |
- if (size < 5) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; |
- size--; |
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) |
- { |
- const unsigned char *sdata; |
- int dsize; |
- /* Read in responder_id_list */ |
- n2s(data,dsize); |
- size -= 2; |
- if (dsize > size ) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- while (dsize > 0) |
- { |
- OCSP_RESPID *id; |
- int idsize; |
- if (dsize < 4) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- n2s(data, idsize); |
- dsize -= 2 + idsize; |
- size -= 2 + idsize; |
- if (dsize < 0) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- sdata = data; |
- data += idsize; |
- id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, |
- &sdata, idsize); |
- if (!id) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- if (data != sdata) |
- { |
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id); |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids |
- && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = |
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) |
- { |
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id); |
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( |
- s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) |
- { |
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id); |
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- /* Read in request_extensions */ |
- if (size < 2) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- n2s(data,dsize); |
- size -= 2; |
- if (dsize != size) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- sdata = data; |
- if (dsize > 0) |
- { |
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) |
- { |
- sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, |
- X509_EXTENSION_free); |
- } |
- |
- s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = |
- d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, |
- &sdata, dsize); |
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts |
- || (data + dsize != sdata)) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
- } |
- /* We don't know what to do with any other type |
- * so ignore it. |
- */ |
- else |
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1; |
- } |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) |
- { |
- switch(data[0]) |
- { |
- case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ |
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
- break; |
- case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ |
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; |
- break; |
- default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && |
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) |
- { |
- /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a |
- * renegotiation. |
- * |
- * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we |
- * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on |
- * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when |
- * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an |
- * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing |
- * anything like that, but this might change). |
- |
- * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake |
- * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > |
- * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen |
- * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new |
- * Finished message could have been computed.) */ |
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled) |
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; |
- |
- /* session ticket processed earlier */ |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) |
- { |
- if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, |
- al)) |
- return 0; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- data+=size; |
- } |
- |
- *p = data; |
- |
- ri_check: |
- |
- /* Need RI if renegotiating */ |
- |
- if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && |
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, |
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- return 1; |
- } |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
-/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No |
- * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill |
- * the length of the block. */ |
-static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) |
- { |
- unsigned int off = 0; |
- |
- while (off < len) |
- { |
- if (d[off] == 0) |
- return 0; |
- off += d[off]; |
- off++; |
- } |
- |
- return off == len; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) |
- { |
- unsigned short length; |
- unsigned short type; |
- unsigned short size; |
- unsigned char *data = *p; |
- int tlsext_servername = 0; |
- int renegotiate_seen = 0; |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; |
-#endif |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
- s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | |
- SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); |
-#endif |
- |
- if (data >= (d+n-2)) |
- goto ri_check; |
- |
- n2s(data,length); |
- if (data+length != d+n) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- while(data <= (d+n-4)) |
- { |
- n2s(data,type); |
- n2s(data,size); |
- |
- if (data+size > (d+n)) |
- goto ri_check; |
- |
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) |
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, |
- s->tlsext_debug_arg); |
- |
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
- { |
- if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- tlsext_servername = 1; |
- } |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && |
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- unsigned char *sdata = data; |
- int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); |
- |
- if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || |
- ecpointformatlist_length < 1) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; |
- if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; |
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); |
-#if 0 |
- fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); |
- sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; |
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) |
- fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); |
- fprintf(stderr,"\n"); |
-#endif |
- } |
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
- |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) |
- { |
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && |
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) |
- || (size > 0)) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
- } |
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && |
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- unsigned char *sdata = data; |
- |
- if (size < 2) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); |
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ |
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); |
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) |
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
- else |
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); |
- |
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
-#endif |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && |
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested |
- * a status request message. |
- */ |
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ |
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; |
- } |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && |
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) |
- { |
- unsigned char *selected; |
- unsigned char selected_len; |
- |
- /* We must have requested it. */ |
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- /* The data must be valid */ |
- if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); |
- if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) |
- { |
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); |
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; |
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
- } |
-#endif |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) |
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; |
- |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) |
- { |
- if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) |
- return 0; |
- renegotiate_seen = 1; |
- } |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) |
- { |
- switch(data[0]) |
- { |
- case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ |
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
- break; |
- case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ |
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; |
- break; |
- default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) |
- { |
- if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, |
- al)) |
- return 0; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- data+=size; |
- } |
- |
- if (data != d+n) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) |
- { |
- if (s->tlsext_hostname) |
- { |
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) |
- { |
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); |
- if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
- } |
- |
- *p = data; |
- |
- ri_check: |
- |
- /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to |
- * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server |
- * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an |
- * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server |
- * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI |
- * absence on initial connect only. |
- */ |
- if (!renegotiate_seen |
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) |
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) |
- { |
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, |
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- return 1; |
- } |
- |
- |
-int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
- { |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
- /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats |
- * and elliptic curves we support. |
- */ |
- int using_ecc = 0; |
- int i; |
- unsigned char *j; |
- unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; |
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
- |
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) |
- { |
- SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); |
- |
- alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; |
- alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; |
- if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) |
- { |
- using_ecc = 1; |
- break; |
- } |
- } |
- using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); |
- if (using_ecc) |
- { |
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
- /* To save an additional 2 bytes in the ClientHello, we only advertise support |
- * for the only EC Point Format that NSS supports (instead of all 3). |
- */ |
- if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(1)) == NULL) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 1; |
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; |
- |
- /* we only advertise support for elliptic curves in NSA Suite B */ |
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); |
- s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; |
- if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) |
- { |
- s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < |
- sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) |
- { |
- int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); |
- s2n(id,j); |
- } |
- } |
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
- |
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
- { |
- int r = 1; |
- |
- if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) |
- { |
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); |
- if (!r) |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) |
- { |
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ |
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); |
- |
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) |
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
- else |
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); |
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; |
- } |
- |
- if (r == 2) |
- /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ |
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- return 1; |
- } |
- |
-int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
- { |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
- /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support |
- * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not |
- * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. |
- */ |
- |
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
- int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); |
- using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); |
- |
- if (using_ecc) |
- { |
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
- if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; |
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; |
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; |
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; |
- } |
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
- |
- return 1; |
- } |
- |
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) |
- { |
- int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
- /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in |
- * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. |
- */ |
- /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in |
- * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. |
- */ |
-#endif |
- |
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
- ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
- |
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
- { |
- /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), |
- * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, |
- * so this has to happen here in |
- * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */ |
- |
- int r = 1; |
- |
- if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) |
- { |
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); |
- if (!r) |
- { |
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- goto err; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ |
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); |
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; |
- |
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) |
- { |
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && |
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) |
- { |
- /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input |
- * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ |
- |
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) |
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
- else |
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); |
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
- { |
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- goto err; |
- } |
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
- { |
- /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, |
- * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; |
- * abort the handshake. |
- */ |
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- err: |
-#endif |
- switch (ret) |
- { |
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
- return -1; |
- |
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); |
- return 1; |
- |
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: |
- s->servername_done=0; |
- default: |
- return 1; |
- } |
- } |
- |
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) |
- { |
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
- int al; |
- |
- /* If status request then ask callback what to do. |
- * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case |
- * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher |
- * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent |
- */ |
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) |
- { |
- int r; |
- CERT_PKEY *certpkey; |
- certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); |
- /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ |
- if (certpkey == NULL) |
- { |
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
- return 1; |
- } |
- /* Set current certificate to one we will use so |
- * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up. |
- */ |
- s->cert->key = certpkey; |
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); |
- switch (r) |
- { |
- /* We don't want to send a status request response */ |
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: |
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
- break; |
- /* status request response should be sent */ |
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: |
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) |
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; |
- else |
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
- break; |
- /* something bad happened */ |
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- goto err; |
- } |
- } |
- else |
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
- |
- err: |
- switch (ret) |
- { |
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
- return -1; |
- |
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); |
- return 1; |
- |
- default: |
- return 1; |
- } |
- } |
- |
-int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
- { |
- int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
- /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher |
- * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension |
- * it must contain uncompressed. |
- */ |
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
- if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && |
- (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && |
- ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) |
- { |
- /* we are using an ECC cipher */ |
- size_t i; |
- unsigned char *list; |
- int found_uncompressed = 0; |
- list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; |
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) |
- { |
- if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) |
- { |
- found_uncompressed = 1; |
- break; |
- } |
- } |
- if (!found_uncompressed) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- } |
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
- |
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
- ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
- |
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) |
- { |
- /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. |
- * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ |
- |
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) |
- { |
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
- } |
- |
- /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check |
- * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ |
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || |
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) |
- { |
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
- } |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one |
- * tell the callback |
- */ |
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) |
- && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) |
- { |
- int r; |
- /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows |
- * there is no response. |
- */ |
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) |
- { |
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); |
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; |
- } |
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; |
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); |
- if (r == 0) |
- { |
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; |
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
- } |
- if (r < 0) |
- { |
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- switch (ret) |
- { |
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
- return -1; |
- |
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); |
- return 1; |
- |
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: |
- s->servername_done=0; |
- default: |
- return 1; |
- } |
- } |
- |
-/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the |
- * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle |
- * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. |
- * |
- * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will |
- * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket |
- * extension, if any. |
- * len: the length of the session ID. |
- * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. |
- * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to |
- * point to the resulting session. |
- * |
- * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key |
- * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will |
- * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. |
- * |
- * Returns: |
- * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. |
- * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). |
- * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports |
- * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. |
- * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but |
- * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. |
- * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. |
- * |
- * Side effects: |
- * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue |
- * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support |
- * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have |
- * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if |
- * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. |
- * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. |
- */ |
-int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, |
- const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) |
- { |
- /* Point after session ID in client hello */ |
- const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; |
- unsigned short i; |
- |
- *ret = NULL; |
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; |
- |
- /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present |
- * to permit stateful resumption. |
- */ |
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) |
- return 0; |
- if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) |
- return 0; |
- if (p >= limit) |
- return -1; |
- /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ |
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
- { |
- i = *(p++); |
- p+= i; |
- if (p >= limit) |
- return -1; |
- } |
- /* Skip past cipher list */ |
- n2s(p, i); |
- p+= i; |
- if (p >= limit) |
- return -1; |
- /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ |
- i = *(p++); |
- p += i; |
- if (p > limit) |
- return -1; |
- /* Now at start of extensions */ |
- if ((p + 2) >= limit) |
- return 0; |
- n2s(p, i); |
- while ((p + 4) <= limit) |
- { |
- unsigned short type, size; |
- n2s(p, type); |
- n2s(p, size); |
- if (p + size > limit) |
- return 0; |
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) |
- { |
- int r; |
- if (size == 0) |
- { |
- /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't |
- * currently have one. */ |
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
- return 1; |
- } |
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) |
- { |
- /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be |
- * decrypted rather than generating the session |
- * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated |
- * handshake based on external mechanism to |
- * calculate the master secret later. */ |
- return 2; |
- } |
- r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); |
- switch (r) |
- { |
- case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ |
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
- return 2; |
- case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ |
- return r; |
- case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ |
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
- return 3; |
- default: /* fatal error */ |
- return -1; |
- } |
- } |
- p += size; |
- } |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
-/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. |
- * |
- * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. |
- * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. |
- * sess_id: points at the session ID. |
- * sesslen: the length of the session ID. |
- * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to |
- * point to the resulting session. |
- * |
- * Returns: |
- * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. |
- * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. |
- * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. |
- * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. |
- */ |
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, |
- const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, |
- SSL_SESSION **psess) |
- { |
- SSL_SESSION *sess; |
- unsigned char *sdec; |
- const unsigned char *p; |
- int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; |
- unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
- HMAC_CTX hctx; |
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; |
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; |
- /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ |
- if (eticklen < 48) |
- return 2; |
- /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ |
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); |
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); |
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) |
- { |
- unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; |
- int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, |
- &ctx, &hctx, 0); |
- if (rv < 0) |
- return -1; |
- if (rv == 0) |
- return 2; |
- if (rv == 2) |
- renew_ticket = 1; |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- /* Check key name matches */ |
- if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) |
- return 2; |
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, |
- tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); |
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, |
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); |
- } |
- /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and |
- * integrity checks on ticket. |
- */ |
- mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); |
- if (mlen < 0) |
- { |
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- eticklen -= mlen; |
- /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ |
- HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); |
- HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); |
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); |
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) |
- return 2; |
- /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ |
- /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ |
- p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); |
- eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); |
- sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); |
- if (!sdec) |
- { |
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); |
- if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) |
- return 2; |
- slen += mlen; |
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
- p = sdec; |
- |
- sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); |
- OPENSSL_free(sdec); |
- if (sess) |
- { |
- /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to |
- * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to |
- * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero |
- * as required by standard. |
- */ |
- if (sesslen) |
- memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); |
- sess->session_id_length = sesslen; |
- *psess = sess; |
- if (renew_ticket) |
- return 4; |
- else |
- return 3; |
- } |
- ERR_clear_error(); |
- /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new |
- * ticket. */ |
- return 2; |
- } |
- |
-/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ |
- |
-typedef struct |
- { |
- int nid; |
- int id; |
- } tls12_lookup; |
- |
-static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
- {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
- {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 |
- {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, |
- {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 |
- {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, |
- {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} |
-#endif |
-}; |
- |
-static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
- {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
- {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
- {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} |
-#endif |
-}; |
- |
-static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) |
- { |
- size_t i; |
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) |
- { |
- if (table[i].nid == nid) |
- return table[i].id; |
- } |
- return -1; |
- } |
-#if 0 |
-static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) |
- { |
- size_t i; |
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) |
- { |
- if (table[i].id == id) |
- return table[i].nid; |
- } |
- return -1; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
-int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) |
- { |
- int sig_id, md_id; |
- if (!md) |
- return 0; |
- md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, |
- sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); |
- if (md_id == -1) |
- return 0; |
- sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); |
- if (sig_id == -1) |
- return 0; |
- p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; |
- p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; |
- return 1; |
- } |
- |
-int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) |
- { |
- return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, |
- sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); |
- } |
- |
-const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) |
- { |
- switch(hash_alg) |
- { |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
- case TLSEXT_hash_md5: |
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS |
- if (FIPS_mode()) |
- return NULL; |
-#endif |
- return EVP_md5(); |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: |
- return EVP_sha1(); |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 |
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: |
- return EVP_sha224(); |
- |
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: |
- return EVP_sha256(); |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 |
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: |
- return EVP_sha384(); |
- |
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: |
- return EVP_sha512(); |
-#endif |
- default: |
- return NULL; |
- |
- } |
- } |
- |
-/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ |
- |
-int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) |
- { |
- int i, idx; |
- const EVP_MD *md; |
- CERT *c = s->cert; |
- /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ |
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) |
- return 1; |
- /* Should never happen */ |
- if (!c) |
- return 0; |
- |
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; |
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; |
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; |
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; |
- |
- for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) |
- { |
- unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1]; |
- |
- switch(sig_alg) |
- { |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: |
- idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; |
- break; |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
- case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: |
- idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; |
- break; |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: |
- idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; |
- break; |
-#endif |
- default: |
- continue; |
- } |
- |
- if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) |
- { |
- md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); |
- if (md) |
- { |
- c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; |
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) |
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- } |
- |
- |
- /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not |
- * supported it stays as NULL. |
- */ |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
- if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) |
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
- if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) |
- { |
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
- } |
-#endif |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
- if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) |
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
-#endif |
- return 1; |
- } |
- |
-#endif |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
-int |
-tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) |
- { |
- unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; |
- unsigned short hbtype; |
- unsigned int payload; |
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ |
- |
- /* Read type and payload length first */ |
- hbtype = *p++; |
- n2s(p, payload); |
- pl = p; |
- |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, |
- &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, |
- s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) |
- { |
- unsigned char *buffer, *bp; |
- int r; |
- |
- /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes |
- * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus |
- * payload, plus padding |
- */ |
- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); |
- bp = buffer; |
- |
- /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ |
- *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; |
- s2n(payload, bp); |
- memcpy(bp, pl, payload); |
- bp += payload; |
- /* Random padding */ |
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); |
- |
- r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); |
- |
- if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, |
- buffer, 3 + payload + padding, |
- s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- OPENSSL_free(buffer); |
- |
- if (r < 0) |
- return r; |
- } |
- else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) |
- { |
- unsigned int seq; |
- |
- /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), |
- * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the |
- * sequence number */ |
- n2s(pl, seq); |
- |
- if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) |
- { |
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++; |
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
-int |
-tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) |
- { |
- unsigned char *buf, *p; |
- int ret; |
- unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ |
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ |
- |
- /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ |
- if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || |
- s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ |
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ |
- if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding |
- * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. |
- */ |
- OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); |
- |
- /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number |
- * as payload to distuingish different messages and add |
- * some random stuff. |
- * - Message Type, 1 byte |
- * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) |
- * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) |
- * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) |
- * - Padding |
- */ |
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); |
- p = buf; |
- /* Message Type */ |
- *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; |
- /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ |
- s2n(payload, p); |
- /* Sequence number */ |
- s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); |
- /* 16 random bytes */ |
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); |
- p += 16; |
- /* Random padding */ |
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding); |
- |
- ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); |
- if (ret >= 0) |
- { |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, |
- buf, 3 + payload + padding, |
- s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; |
- } |
- |
- OPENSSL_free(buf); |
- |
- return ret; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) |
-/* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the given |
- * SSL connection and writes it to |md|. |
- */ |
-int |
-tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s) |
- { |
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx; |
- unsigned char temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
- unsigned temp_digest_len; |
- int i; |
- static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature"; |
- |
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) |
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
- return 0; |
- |
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic)); |
- |
- if (s->hit) |
- { |
- static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption"; |
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic, |
- sizeof(kResumptionMagic)); |
- if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) |
- return 0; |
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash, |
- s->session->original_handshake_hash_len); |
- } |
- |
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) |
- { |
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL) |
- continue; |
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]); |
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len); |
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len); |
- } |
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
- |
- return 1; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
-/* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake |
- * hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */ |
-int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s) |
- { |
- int digest_len; |
- /* This function should never be called for a resumed session because |
- * the handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original, |
- * full handshake. */ |
- if (s->hit) |
- return -1; |
- /* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been |
- * negotiated. */ |
- if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) |
- return -1; |
- |
- digest_len = tls1_handshake_digest( |
- s, s->session->original_handshake_hash, |
- sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash)); |
- if (digest_len < 0) |
- return -1; |
- |
- s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len; |
- |
- return 1; |
- } |