Index: openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c |
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c |
deleted file mode 100644 |
index 03ed461add30d27567750ca73abc20e289c84ca6..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c |
+++ /dev/null |
@@ -1,1538 +0,0 @@ |
-/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ |
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
- * All rights reserved. |
- * |
- * This package is an SSL implementation written |
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
- * |
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
- * |
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
- * the code are not to be removed. |
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
- * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
- * |
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
- * are met: |
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
- * must display the following acknowledgement: |
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
- * |
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
- * SUCH DAMAGE. |
- * |
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
- * copied and put under another distribution licence |
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
- */ |
-/* ==================================================================== |
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
- * |
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
- * are met: |
- * |
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
- * |
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
- * distribution. |
- * |
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
- * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
- * |
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
- * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
- * |
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
- * |
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
- * acknowledgment: |
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
- * |
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
- * ==================================================================== |
- * |
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
- * |
- */ |
- |
-#include <stdio.h> |
-#include <errno.h> |
-#define USE_SOCKETS |
-#include "ssl_locl.h" |
-#include <openssl/evp.h> |
-#include <openssl/buffer.h> |
-#include <openssl/rand.h> |
- |
-static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
- unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); |
-static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); |
- |
-int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) |
- { |
- /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase |
- * packet by another n bytes. |
- * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified |
- * by s->packet and s->packet_length. |
- * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf |
- * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) |
- */ |
- int i,len,left; |
- long align=0; |
- unsigned char *pkt; |
- SSL3_BUFFER *rb; |
- |
- if (n <= 0) return n; |
- |
- rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); |
- if (rb->buf == NULL) |
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) |
- return -1; |
- |
- left = rb->left; |
-#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
- align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); |
-#endif |
- |
- if (!extend) |
- { |
- /* start with empty packet ... */ |
- if (left == 0) |
- rb->offset = align; |
- else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
- { |
- /* check if next packet length is large |
- * enough to justify payload alignment... */ |
- pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; |
- if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA |
- && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) |
- { |
- /* Note that even if packet is corrupted |
- * and its length field is insane, we can |
- * only be led to wrong decision about |
- * whether memmove will occur or not. |
- * Header values has no effect on memmove |
- * arguments and therefore no buffer |
- * overrun can be triggered. */ |
- memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left); |
- rb->offset = align; |
- } |
- } |
- s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; |
- s->packet_length = 0; |
- /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ |
- } |
- |
- /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets |
- * because the read operation returns the whole packet |
- * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ |
- if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
- { |
- if (left > 0 && n > left) |
- n = left; |
- } |
- |
- /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ |
- if (left >= n) |
- { |
- s->packet_length+=n; |
- rb->left=left-n; |
- rb->offset+=n; |
- return(n); |
- } |
- |
- /* else we need to read more data */ |
- |
- len = s->packet_length; |
- pkt = rb->buf+align; |
- /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: |
- * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', |
- * 'left' extra ones at the end */ |
- if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */ |
- { |
- memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left); |
- s->packet = pkt; |
- rb->offset = len + align; |
- } |
- |
- if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */ |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- if (!s->read_ahead) |
- /* ignore max parameter */ |
- max = n; |
- else |
- { |
- if (max < n) |
- max = n; |
- if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) |
- max = rb->len - rb->offset; |
- } |
- |
- while (left < n) |
- { |
- /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf |
- * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to |
- * len+max if possible) */ |
- |
- clear_sys_error(); |
- if (s->rbio != NULL) |
- { |
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
- i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left); |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); |
- i = -1; |
- } |
- |
- if (i <= 0) |
- { |
- rb->left = left; |
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && |
- SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
- if (len+left == 0) |
- ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); |
- return(i); |
- } |
- left+=i; |
- /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because |
- * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed |
- * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ |
- if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
- { |
- if (n > left) |
- n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ |
- } |
- } |
- |
- /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ |
- rb->offset += n; |
- rb->left = left - n; |
- s->packet_length += n; |
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
- return(n); |
- } |
- |
-/* Call this to get a new input record. |
- * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
- * or non-blocking IO. |
- * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes |
- */ |
-/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ |
-static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) |
- { |
- int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al; |
- int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1; |
- SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
- SSL_SESSION *sess; |
- unsigned char *p; |
- unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
- short version; |
- unsigned mac_size, orig_len; |
- size_t extra; |
- |
- rr= &(s->s3->rrec); |
- sess=s->session; |
- |
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) |
- extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; |
- else |
- extra=0; |
- if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) |
- { |
- /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER |
- * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
-again: |
- /* check if we have the header */ |
- if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || |
- (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) |
- { |
- n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); |
- if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ |
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; |
- |
- p=s->packet; |
- |
- /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ |
- rr->type= *(p++); |
- ssl_major= *(p++); |
- ssl_minor= *(p++); |
- version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; |
- n2s(p,rr->length); |
-#if 0 |
-fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); |
-#endif |
- |
- /* Lets check version */ |
- if (!s->first_packet) |
- { |
- if (version != s->version) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); |
- if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)) |
- /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ |
- s->version = (unsigned short)version; |
- al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); |
- goto err; |
- } |
- |
- if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ |
- } |
- |
- /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ |
- |
- if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
- { |
- /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
- i=rr->length; |
- n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); |
- if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ |
- /* now n == rr->length, |
- * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ |
- } |
- |
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ |
- |
- /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, |
- * and we have that many bytes in s->packet |
- */ |
- rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
- |
- /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' |
- * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which |
- * need to be copied into rr->data by either |
- * the decryption or by the decompression |
- * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, |
- * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ |
- |
- /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] |
- * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ |
- |
- /* check is not needed I believe */ |
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ |
- rr->data=rr->input; |
- |
- enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); |
- /* enc_err is: |
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. |
- * 1: if the padding is valid |
- * -1: if the padding is invalid */ |
- if (enc_err == 0) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
-printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); |
-{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
-printf("\n"); |
-#endif |
- |
- /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ |
- if ((sess != NULL) && |
- (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && |
- (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) |
- { |
- /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ |
- unsigned char *mac = NULL; |
- unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
- mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
- |
- /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ |
- orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8); |
- |
- /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was |
- * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, |
- * therefore we can safely process the record in a different |
- * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. |
- */ |
- if (orig_len < mac_size || |
- /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ |
- (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
- orig_len < mac_size+1)) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
- { |
- /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes |
- * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract |
- * the MAC in constant time from within the record, |
- * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. |
- * */ |
- mac = mac_tmp; |
- ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); |
- rr->length -= mac_size; |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| |
- * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's |
- * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ |
- rr->length -= mac_size; |
- mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; |
- } |
- |
- i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); |
- if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) |
- enc_err = -1; |
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) |
- enc_err = -1; |
- } |
- |
- if (enc_err < 0) |
- { |
- /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, |
- * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption |
- * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, |
- * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this |
- * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ |
- al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- /* r->length is now just compressed */ |
- if (s->expand != NULL) |
- { |
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- rr->off=0; |
- /* So at this point the following is true |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment |
- * after use :-). |
- */ |
- |
- /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ |
- s->packet_length=0; |
- |
- /* just read a 0 length packet */ |
- if (rr->length == 0) goto again; |
- |
-#if 0 |
-fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); |
-#endif |
- |
- return(1); |
- |
-f_err: |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
-err: |
- return(ret); |
- } |
- |
-int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) |
- { |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
- int i; |
- SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
- |
- rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec); |
- i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp, |
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length); |
- if (i < 0) |
- return(0); |
- else |
- rr->length=i; |
- rr->data=rr->comp; |
-#endif |
- return(1); |
- } |
- |
-int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) |
- { |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
- int i; |
- SSL3_RECORD *wr; |
- |
- wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec); |
- i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data, |
- SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, |
- wr->input,(int)wr->length); |
- if (i < 0) |
- return(0); |
- else |
- wr->length=i; |
- |
- wr->input=wr->data; |
-#endif |
- return(1); |
- } |
- |
-/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' |
- * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. |
- */ |
-int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) |
- { |
- const unsigned char *buf=buf_; |
- unsigned int tot,n,nw; |
- int i; |
- |
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
- tot=s->s3->wnum; |
- s->s3->wnum=0; |
- |
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) |
- { |
- i=s->handshake_func(s); |
- if (i < 0) return(i); |
- if (i == 0) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- n=(len-tot); |
- for (;;) |
- { |
- if (n > s->max_send_fragment) |
- nw=s->max_send_fragment; |
- else |
- nw=n; |
- |
- i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); |
- if (i <= 0) |
- { |
- s->s3->wnum=tot; |
- return i; |
- } |
- |
- if ((i == (int)n) || |
- (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && |
- (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) |
- { |
- /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment |
- * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ |
- s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; |
- |
- return tot+i; |
- } |
- |
- n-=i; |
- tot+=i; |
- } |
- } |
- |
-static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
- unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) |
- { |
- unsigned char *p,*plen; |
- int i,mac_size,clear=0; |
- int prefix_len=0; |
- int eivlen; |
- long align=0; |
- SSL3_RECORD *wr; |
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); |
- SSL_SESSION *sess; |
- |
- |
- /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written |
- * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ |
- if (wb->left != 0) |
- return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); |
- |
- /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ |
- if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) |
- { |
- i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
- if (i <= 0) |
- return(i); |
- /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ |
- } |
- |
- if (wb->buf == NULL) |
- if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) |
- return -1; |
- |
- if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) |
- return 0; |
- |
- wr= &(s->s3->wrec); |
- sess=s->session; |
- |
- if ( (sess == NULL) || |
- (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || |
- (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) |
- { |
-#if 1 |
- clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ |
-#else |
- clear=1; |
-#endif |
- mac_size=0; |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); |
- if (mac_size < 0) |
- goto err; |
- } |
- |
- /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ |
- if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) |
- { |
- /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites |
- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ |
- |
- if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) |
- { |
- /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; |
- * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment |
- * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later |
- * together with the actual payload) */ |
- prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); |
- if (prefix_len <= 0) |
- goto err; |
- |
- if (prefix_len > |
- (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) |
- { |
- /* insufficient space */ |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- goto err; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; |
- } |
- |
- if (create_empty_fragment) |
- { |
-#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
- /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, |
- * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so |
- * if we want to align the real payload, then we can |
- * just pretent we simply have two headers. */ |
- align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); |
-#endif |
- p = wb->buf + align; |
- wb->offset = align; |
- } |
- else if (prefix_len) |
- { |
- p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; |
- } |
- else |
- { |
-#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
- align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); |
-#endif |
- p = wb->buf + align; |
- wb->offset = align; |
- } |
- |
- /* write the header */ |
- |
- *(p++)=type&0xff; |
- wr->type=type; |
- |
- *(p++)=(s->version>>8); |
- /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 |
- * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0 |
- */ |
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B |
- && !s->renegotiate |
- && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) |
- *(p++) = 0x1; |
- else |
- *(p++)=s->version&0xff; |
- |
- /* field where we are to write out packet length */ |
- plen=p; |
- p+=2; |
- /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */ |
- if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) |
- { |
- int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); |
- if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
- { |
- eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); |
- if (eivlen <= 1) |
- eivlen = 0; |
- } |
- /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ |
- else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) |
- eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
- else |
- eivlen = 0; |
- } |
- else if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL && |
- s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record) |
- { |
- eivlen = s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_len; |
- } |
- else |
- eivlen = 0; |
- |
- /* lets setup the record stuff. */ |
- wr->data=p + eivlen; |
- wr->length=(int)len; |
- wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; |
- |
- /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into |
- * wr->data */ |
- |
- /* first we compress */ |
- if (s->compress != NULL) |
- { |
- if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); |
- goto err; |
- } |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); |
- wr->input=wr->data; |
- } |
- |
- /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input |
- * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. |
- * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ |
- |
- if (mac_size != 0) |
- { |
- if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0) |
- goto err; |
- wr->length+=mac_size; |
- } |
- |
- wr->input=p; |
- wr->data=p; |
- |
- if (eivlen) |
- { |
- /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) |
- goto err; */ |
- wr->length += eivlen; |
- } |
- |
- /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ |
- s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); |
- |
- /* record length after mac and block padding */ |
- s2n(wr->length,plen); |
- |
- /* we should now have |
- * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is |
- * wr->length long */ |
- wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ |
- wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- |
- if (create_empty_fragment) |
- { |
- /* we are in a recursive call; |
- * just return the length, don't write out anything here |
- */ |
- return wr->length; |
- } |
- |
- /* now let's set up wb */ |
- wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; |
- |
- /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ |
- s->s3->wpend_tot=len; |
- s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; |
- s->s3->wpend_type=type; |
- s->s3->wpend_ret=len; |
- |
- /* we now just need to write the buffer */ |
- return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); |
-err: |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
-/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ |
-int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
- unsigned int len) |
- { |
- int i; |
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); |
- |
-/* XXXX */ |
- if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) |
- || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && |
- !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) |
- || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- |
- for (;;) |
- { |
- clear_sys_error(); |
- if (s->wbio != NULL) |
- { |
- s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; |
- i=BIO_write(s->wbio, |
- (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), |
- (unsigned int)wb->left); |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); |
- i= -1; |
- } |
- if (i == wb->left) |
- { |
- wb->left=0; |
- wb->offset+=i; |
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && |
- SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); |
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
- return(s->s3->wpend_ret); |
- } |
- else if (i <= 0) { |
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || |
- s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { |
- /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole |
- point in using a datagram service */ |
- wb->left = 0; |
- } |
- return(i); |
- } |
- wb->offset+=i; |
- wb->left-=i; |
- } |
- } |
- |
-/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. |
- * 'type' is one of the following: |
- * |
- * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) |
- * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) |
- * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) |
- * |
- * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first |
- * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). |
- * |
- * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as |
- * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really |
- * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. |
- * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store |
- * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol |
- * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): |
- * Change cipher spec protocol |
- * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored |
- * Alert protocol |
- * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) |
- * Handshake protocol |
- * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have |
- * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages |
- * here, anything else is handled by higher layers |
- * Application data protocol |
- * none of our business |
- */ |
-int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) |
- { |
- int al,i,j,ret; |
- unsigned int n; |
- SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; |
- |
- if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ |
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) |
- return(-1); |
- |
- if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || |
- (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
- /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ |
- { |
- unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; |
- unsigned char *dst = buf; |
- unsigned int k; |
- |
- /* peek == 0 */ |
- n = 0; |
- while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
- { |
- *dst++ = *src++; |
- len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; |
- n++; |
- } |
- /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ |
- for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) |
- s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; |
- return n; |
- } |
- |
- /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ |
- |
- if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) |
- { |
- /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ |
- i=s->handshake_func(s); |
- if (i < 0) return(i); |
- if (i == 0) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- } |
-start: |
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
- |
- /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
- * s->s3->rrec.data, - data |
- * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read |
- * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ |
- rr = &(s->s3->rrec); |
- |
- /* get new packet if necessary */ |
- if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) |
- { |
- ret=ssl3_get_record(s); |
- if (ret <= 0) return(ret); |
- } |
- |
- /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ |
- |
- if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, |
- * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ |
- && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away |
- * (even in 'peek' mode) */ |
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) |
- { |
- rr->length=0; |
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
- return(0); |
- } |
- |
- |
- if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ |
- { |
- /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we |
- * are doing a handshake for the first time */ |
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && |
- (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- if (len <= 0) return(len); |
- |
- if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) |
- n = rr->length; |
- else |
- n = (unsigned int)len; |
- |
- memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); |
- if (!peek) |
- { |
- rr->length-=n; |
- rr->off+=n; |
- if (rr->length == 0) |
- { |
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
- rr->off=0; |
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) |
- ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); |
- } |
- } |
- return(n); |
- } |
- |
- |
- /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake |
- * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ |
- |
- /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, |
- * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. |
- */ |
- { |
- unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; |
- unsigned char *dest = NULL; |
- unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; |
- |
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
- { |
- dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; |
- dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; |
- dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; |
- } |
- else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) |
- { |
- dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; |
- dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; |
- dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; |
- } |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
- else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) |
- { |
- tls1_process_heartbeat(s); |
- |
- /* Exit and notify application to read again */ |
- rr->length = 0; |
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- if (dest_maxlen > 0) |
- { |
- n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ |
- if (rr->length < n) |
- n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ |
- |
- /* now move 'n' bytes: */ |
- while (n-- > 0) |
- { |
- dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; |
- rr->length--; |
- } |
- |
- if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) |
- goto start; /* fragment was too small */ |
- } |
- } |
- |
- /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; |
- * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. |
- * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ |
- |
- /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ |
- if ((!s->server) && |
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && |
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && |
- (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) |
- { |
- s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; |
- |
- if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || |
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || |
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && |
- !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && |
- !s->s3->renegotiate) |
- { |
- ssl3_renegotiate(s); |
- if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) |
- { |
- i=s->handshake_func(s); |
- if (i < 0) return(i); |
- if (i == 0) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- |
- if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) |
- { |
- if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ |
- { |
- BIO *bio; |
- /* In the case where we try to read application data, |
- * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with |
- * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may |
- * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ |
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
- bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- } |
- } |
- } |
- /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, |
- * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ |
- goto start; |
- } |
- /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't |
- * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. |
- * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) |
- */ |
- if (s->server && |
- SSL_is_init_finished(s) && |
- !s->s3->send_connection_binding && |
- (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && |
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && |
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && |
- (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && |
- !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) |
- |
- { |
- /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ |
- rr->length = 0; |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); |
- goto start; |
- } |
- if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) |
- { |
- int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; |
- int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; |
- |
- s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; |
- |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
- cb=s->info_callback; |
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
- cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
- |
- if (cb != NULL) |
- { |
- j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; |
- cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); |
- } |
- |
- if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ |
- { |
- s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; |
- if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) |
- { |
- s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
- return(0); |
- } |
- /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested |
- * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with |
- * a fatal alert because if application tried to |
- * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and |
- * expects it to succeed. |
- * |
- * In future we might have a renegotiation where we |
- * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. |
- */ |
- else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) |
- { |
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
-#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME |
- else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) |
- return(0); |
-#endif |
- } |
- else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ |
- { |
- char tmp[16]; |
- |
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
- s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); |
- BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); |
- ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); |
- s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); |
- return(0); |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- goto start; |
- } |
- |
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ |
- { |
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
- rr->length=0; |
- return(0); |
- } |
- |
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
- { |
- /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know |
- * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ |
- if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || |
- (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ |
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; |
- |
- rr->length=0; |
- |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; |
- if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) |
- goto err; |
- else |
- goto start; |
- } |
- |
- /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ |
- if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) |
- { |
- if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && |
- !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) |
- { |
-#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and |
- * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting |
- * protocol violations): */ |
- s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) |
- ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT |
- :SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
-#else |
- s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
-#endif |
- s->renegotiate=1; |
- s->new_session=1; |
- } |
- i=s->handshake_func(s); |
- if (i < 0) return(i); |
- if (i == 0) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- |
- if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) |
- { |
- if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ |
- { |
- BIO *bio; |
- /* In the case where we try to read application data, |
- * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with |
- * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may |
- * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ |
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
- bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- } |
- goto start; |
- } |
- |
- switch (rr->type) |
- { |
- default: |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS |
- /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: |
- * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert. |
- */ |
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) |
- { |
- rr->length = 0; |
- goto start; |
- } |
-#endif |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
- goto f_err; |
- case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
- case SSL3_RT_ALERT: |
- case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: |
- /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception |
- * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that |
- * should not happen when type != rr->type */ |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- goto f_err; |
- case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: |
- /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, |
- * but have application data. If the library was |
- * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data |
- * is set) and it makes sense to read application data |
- * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), |
- * we will indulge it. |
- */ |
- if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && |
- (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && |
- (( |
- (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && |
- (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && |
- (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) |
- ) || ( |
- (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && |
- (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && |
- (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) |
- ) |
- )) |
- { |
- s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- } |
- /* not reached */ |
- |
-f_err: |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
-err: |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- |
-int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) |
- { |
- int i; |
- const char *sender; |
- int slen; |
- |
- if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) |
- i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; |
- else |
- i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; |
- |
- if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) |
- { |
- if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) |
- { |
- /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
- return (0); |
- } |
- |
- s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0); |
- } |
- |
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) |
- return(0); |
- |
- /* we have to record the message digest at |
- * this point so we can get it before we read |
- * the finished message */ |
- if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) |
- { |
- sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
- slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; |
- slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; |
- } |
- |
- s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
- sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); |
- |
- return(1); |
- } |
- |
-int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) |
- { |
- /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ |
- desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); |
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) |
- desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ |
- if (desc < 0) return -1; |
- /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ |
- if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) |
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); |
- |
- s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; |
- s->s3->send_alert[0]=level; |
- s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc; |
- if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ |
- return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
- /* else data is still being written out, we will get written |
- * some time in the future */ |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
-int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) |
- { |
- int i,j; |
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; |
- |
- s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; |
- i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); |
- if (i <= 0) |
- { |
- s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. |
- * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, |
- * we will not worry too much. */ |
- if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) |
- (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); |
- |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
- cb=s->info_callback; |
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
- cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
- |
- if (cb != NULL) |
- { |
- j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; |
- cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); |
- } |
- } |
- return(i); |
- } |