openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c - Issue 2072073002: Delete bundled copy of OpenSSL and replace with README.

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Issue 2072073002: Delete bundled copy of OpenSSL and replace with README. (Closed) Base URL: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/deps/openssl@master

Patch Set: Delete bundled copy of OpenSSL and replace with README. Created 4 years, 6 months ago

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1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */

2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)

3 * All rights reserved.

4 *

5 * This package is an SSL implementation written

6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).

7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.

8 *

9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as

10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions

11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,

12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation

13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms

14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

15 *

16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in

17 * the code are not to be removed.

18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution

19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.

20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or

21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.

22 *

23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

25 * are met:

26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright

27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the

30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.

31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software

32 * must display the following acknowledgement:

33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by

34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"

35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library

36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).

37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from

38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:

39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"

40 *

41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND

42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE

44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE

45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL

46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS

47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT

49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY

50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF

51 * SUCH DAMAGE.

52 *

53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or

54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be

55 * copied and put under another distribution licence

56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]

57 */

58 /* ====================================================================

59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.

60 *

61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

63 * are met:

64 *

65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright

66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

67 *

68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in

70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the

71 * distribution.

72 *

73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this

74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:

75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"

77 *

78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to

79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without

80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact

81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.

82 *

83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"

84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written

85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.

86 *

87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following

88 * acknowledgment:

89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"

91 *

92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY

93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR

95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR

96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,

97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT

98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;

99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,

101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)

102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED

103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

104 * ====================================================================

105 *

106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young

107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim

108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

109 *

110 */

111

112 #include <stdio.h>

113 #include <errno.h>

114 #define USE_SOCKETS

115 #include "ssl_locl.h"

116 #include <openssl/evp.h>

117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>

118 #include <openssl/rand.h>

119

120 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL s, int type, const unsigned char buf,

121 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);

122 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);

123

124 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)

125 {

126 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase

127 * packet by another n bytes.

128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified

129 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.

130 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf

131 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)

132 */

133 int i,len,left;

134 long align=0;

135 unsigned char *pkt;

136 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;

137

138 if (n <= 0) return n;

139

140 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);

141 if (rb->buf == NULL)

142 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))

143 return -1;

144

145 left = rb->left;

146 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0

147 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;

148 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);

149 #endif

150

151 if (!extend)

152 {

153 /* start with empty packet ... */

154 if (left == 0)

155 rb->offset = align;

156 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)

157 {

158 /* check if next packet length is large

159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */

160 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;

161 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA

162 && (pkt[3]<<8\|pkt[4]) >= 128)

163 {

164 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted

165 * and its length field is insane, we can

166 * only be led to wrong decision about

167 * whether memmove will occur or not.

168 * Header values has no effect on memmove

169 * arguments and therefore no buffer

170 * overrun can be triggered. */

171 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);

172 rb->offset = align;

173 }

174 }

175 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;

176 s->packet_length = 0;

177 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */

178 }

179

180 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets

181 * because the read operation returns the whole packet

182 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */

183 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION \|\| SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)

184 {

185 if (left > 0 && n > left)

186 n = left;

187 }

188

189 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */

190 if (left >= n)

191 {

192 s->packet_length+=n;

193 rb->left=left-n;

194 rb->offset+=n;

195 return(n);

196 }

197

198 /* else we need to read more data */

199

200 len = s->packet_length;

201 pkt = rb->buf+align;

202 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:

203 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',

204 * 'left' extra ones at the end */

205 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */

206 {

207 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);

208 s->packet = pkt;

209 rb->offset = len + align;

210 }

211

212 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */

213 {

214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

215 return -1;

216 }

217

218 if (!s->read_ahead)

219 /* ignore max parameter */

220 max = n;

221 else

222 {

223 if (max < n)

224 max = n;

225 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))

226 max = rb->len - rb->offset;

227 }

228

229 while (left < n)

230 {

231 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf

232 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to

233 * len+max if possible) */

234

235 clear_sys_error();

236 if (s->rbio != NULL)

237 {

238 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;

239 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);

240 }

241 else

242 {

243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);

244 i = -1;

245 }

246

247 if (i <= 0)

248 {

249 rb->left = left;

250 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&

251 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)

252 if (len+left == 0)

253 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);

254 return(i);

255 }

256 left+=i;

257 /* reads should never span multiple packets for DTLS because

258 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as oppo sed

259 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */

260 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION \|\| SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_B AD_VER)

261 {

262 if (n > left)

263 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */

264 }

265 }

266

267 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */

268 rb->offset += n;

269 rb->left = left - n;

270 s->packet_length += n;

271 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

272 return(n);

273 }

274

275 /* Call this to get a new input record.

276 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error

277 * or non-blocking IO.

278 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in

279 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record

280 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data

281 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes

282 */

283 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */

284 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)

285 {

286 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;

287 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;

288 SSL3_RECORD *rr;

289 SSL_SESSION *sess;

290 unsigned char *p;

291 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

292 short version;

293 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;

294 size_t extra;

295

296 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);

297 sess=s->session;

298

299 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)

300 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;

301 else

302 extra=0;

303 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)

304 {

305 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER

306 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */

307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

308 return -1;

309 }

310

311 again:

312 /* check if we have the header */

313 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) \|\|

314 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))

315 {

316 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);

317 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */

318 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;

319

320 p=s->packet;

321

322 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */

323 rr->type= *(p++);

324 ssl_major= *(p++);

325 ssl_minor= *(p++);

326 version=(ssl_major<<8)\|ssl_minor;

327 n2s(p,rr->length);

328 #if 0

329 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);

330 #endif

331

332 /* Lets check version */

333 if (!s->first_packet)

334 {

335 if (version != s->version)

336 {

337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION _NUMBER);

338 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))

339 /* Send back error using their minor ver sion number :-) */

340 s->version = (unsigned short)version;

341 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;

342 goto f_err;

343 }

344 }

345

346 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)

347 {

348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER) ;

349 goto err;

350 }

351

352 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)

353 {

354 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;

355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LON G);

356 goto f_err;

357 }

358

359 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */

360 }

361

362 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */

363

364 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)

365 {

366 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */

367 i=rr->length;

368 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);

369 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */

370 /* now n == rr->length,

371 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */

372 }

373

374 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */

375

376 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,

377 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet

378 */

379 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);

380

381 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'

382 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which

383 * need to be copied into rr->data by either

384 * the decryption or by the decompression

385 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,

386 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */

387

388 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]

389 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */

390

391 /* check is not needed I believe */

392 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)

393 {

394 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;

395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

396 goto f_err;

397 }

398

399 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */

400 rr->data=rr->input;

401

402 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);

403 /* enc_err is:

404 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.

405 * 1: if the padding is valid

406 * -1: if the padding is invalid */

407 if (enc_err == 0)

408 {

409 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;

410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);

411 goto f_err;

412 }

413

414 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG

415 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);

416 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1 )%16)?' ':'\n'); }

417 printf("\n");

418 #endif

419

420 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */

421 if ((sess != NULL) &&

422 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&

423 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))

424 {

425 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */

426 unsigned char *mac = NULL;

427 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

428 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);

429 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);

430

431 /* kludge: _cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->typ e /

432 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);

433

434 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was

435 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,

436 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different

437 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.

438 */

439 if (orig_len < mac_size \|\|

440 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */

441 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE & &

442 orig_len < mac_size+1))

443 {

444 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);

446 goto f_err;

447 }

448

449 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)

450 {

451 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes

452 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract

453 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,

454 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.

455 * */

456 mac = mac_tmp;

457 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);

458 rr->length -= mac_size;

459 }

460 else

461 {

462 /* In this case there's no padding, so \|orig_len\|

463 * equals \|rec->length\| and we checked that there's

464 * enough bytes for \|mac_size\| above. */

465 rr->length -= mac_size;

466 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];

467 }

468

469 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);

470 if (i < 0 \|\| mac == NULL \|\| CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_s ize) != 0)

471 enc_err = -1;

472 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)

473 enc_err = -1;

474 }

475

476 if (enc_err < 0)

477 {

478 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,

479 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption

480 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,

481 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this

482 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */

483 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;

484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECO RD_MAC);

485 goto f_err;

486 }

487

488 /* r->length is now just compressed */

489 if (s->expand != NULL)

490 {

491 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)

492 {

493 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;

494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO _LONG);

495 goto f_err;

496 }

497 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))

498 {

499 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;

500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);

501 goto f_err;

502 }

503 }

504

505 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)

506 {

507 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;

508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

509 goto f_err;

510 }

511

512 rr->off=0;

513 /* So at this point the following is true

514 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record

515 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record

516 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte

517 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment

518 * after use :-).

519 */

520

521 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */

522 s->packet_length=0;

523

524 /* just read a 0 length packet */

525 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;

526

527 #if 0

528 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);

529 #endif

530

531 return(1);

532

533 f_err:

534 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

535 err:

536 return(ret);

537 }

538

539 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)

540 {

541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

542 int i;

543 SSL3_RECORD *rr;

544

545 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);

546 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,

547 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);

548 if (i < 0)

549 return(0);

550 else

551 rr->length=i;

552 rr->data=rr->comp;

553 #endif

554 return(1);

555 }

556

557 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)

558 {

559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

560 int i;

561 SSL3_RECORD *wr;

562

563 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);

564 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,

565 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,

566 wr->input,(int)wr->length);

567 if (i < 0)

568 return(0);

569 else

570 wr->length=i;

571

572 wr->input=wr->data;

573 #endif

574 return(1);

575 }

576

577 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'

578 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.

579 */

580 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL s, int type, const void buf_, int len)

581 {

582 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;

583 unsigned int tot,n,nw;

584 int i;

585

586 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

587 tot=s->s3->wnum;

588 s->s3->wnum=0;

589

590 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)

591 {

592 i=s->handshake_func(s);

593 if (i < 0) return(i);

594 if (i == 0)

595 {

596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILUR E);

597 return -1;

598 }

599 }

600

601 n=(len-tot);

602 for (;;)

603 {

604 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)

605 nw=s->max_send_fragment;

606 else

607 nw=n;

608

609 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);

610 if (i <= 0)

611 {

612 s->s3->wnum=tot;

613 return i;

614 }

615

616 if ((i == (int)n) \|\|

617 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&

618 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))

619 {

620 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment

621 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */

622 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;

623

624 return tot+i;

625 }

626

627 n-=i;

628 tot+=i;

629 }

630 }

631

632 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL s, int type, const unsigned char buf,

633 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)

634 {

635 unsigned char p,plen;

636 int i,mac_size,clear=0;

637 int prefix_len=0;

638 int eivlen;

639 long align=0;

640 SSL3_RECORD *wr;

641 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);

642 SSL_SESSION *sess;

643

644

645 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written

646 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */

647 if (wb->left != 0)

648 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));

649

650 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */

651 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)

652 {

653 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);

654 if (i <= 0)

655 return(i);

656 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */

657 }

658

659 if (wb->buf == NULL)

660 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))

661 return -1;

662

663 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)

664 return 0;

665

666 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);

667 sess=s->session;

668

669 if ( (sess == NULL) \|\|

670 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) \|\|

671 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))

672 {

673 #if 1

674 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */

675 #else

676 clear=1;

677 #endif

678 mac_size=0;

679 }

680 else

681 {

682 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);

683 if (mac_size < 0)

684 goto err;

685 }

686

687 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */

688 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)

689 {

690 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites

691 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */

692

693 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_D ATA)

694 {

695 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;

696 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragm ent

697 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later

698 * together with the actual payload) */

699 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);

700 if (prefix_len <= 0)

701 goto err;

702

703 if (prefix_len >

704 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))

705 {

706 /* insufficient space */

707 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR );

708 goto err;

709 }

710 }

711

712 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;

713 }

714

715 if (create_empty_fragment)

716 {

717 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0

718 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,

719 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so

720 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can

721 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */

722 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;

723 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);

724 #endif

725 p = wb->buf + align;

726 wb->offset = align;

727 }

728 else if (prefix_len)

729 {

730 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;

731 }

732 else

733 {

734 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0

735 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;

736 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);

737 #endif

738 p = wb->buf + align;

739 wb->offset = align;

740 }

741

742 /* write the header */

743

744 *(p++)=type&0xff;

745 wr->type=type;

746

747 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);

748 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256

749 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0

750 */

751 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B

752 && !s->renegotiate

753 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)

754 *(p++) = 0x1;

755 else

756 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;

757

758 /* field where we are to write out packet length */

759 plen=p;

760 p+=2;

761 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */

762 if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)

763 {

764 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);

765 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)

766 {

767 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);

768 if (eivlen <= 1)

769 eivlen = 0;

770 }

771 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */

772 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)

773 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;

774 else

775 eivlen = 0;

776 }

777 else if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL &&

778 s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record)

779 {

780 eivlen = s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_len;

781 }

782 else

783 eivlen = 0;

784

785 /* lets setup the record stuff. */

786 wr->data=p + eivlen;

787 wr->length=(int)len;

788 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;

789

790 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into

791 * wr->data */

792

793 /* first we compress */

794 if (s->compress != NULL)

795 {

796 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))

797 {

798 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);

799 goto err;

800 }

801 }

802 else

803 {

804 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);

805 wr->input=wr->data;

806 }

807

808 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input

809 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.

810 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */

811

812 if (mac_size != 0)

813 {

814 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)

815 goto err;

816 wr->length+=mac_size;

817 }

818

819 wr->input=p;

820 wr->data=p;

821

822 if (eivlen)

823 {

824 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)

825 goto err; */

826 wr->length += eivlen;

827 }

828

829 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */

830 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);

831

832 /* record length after mac and block padding */

833 s2n(wr->length,plen);

834

835 /* we should now have

836 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is

837 * wr->length long */

838 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */

839 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;

840

841 if (create_empty_fragment)

842 {

843 /* we are in a recursive call;

844 * just return the length, don't write out anything here

845 */

846 return wr->length;

847 }

848

849 /* now let's set up wb */

850 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;

851

852 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write re tries later */

853 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;

854 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;

855 s->s3->wpend_type=type;

856 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;

857

858 /* we now just need to write the buffer */

859 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);

860 err:

861 return -1;

862 }

863

864 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */

865 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL s, int type, const unsigned char buf,

866 unsigned int len)

867 {

868 int i;

869 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);

870

871 /* XXXX */

872 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)

873 \|\| ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&

874 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))

875 \|\| (s->s3->wpend_type != type))

876 {

877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);

878 return(-1);

879 }

880

881 for (;;)

882 {

883 clear_sys_error();

884 if (s->wbio != NULL)

885 {

886 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;

887 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,

888 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),

889 (unsigned int)wb->left);

890 }

891 else

892 {

893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);

894 i= -1;

895 }

896 if (i == wb->left)

897 {

898 wb->left=0;

899 wb->offset+=i;

900 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&

901 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)

902 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);

903 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

904 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);

905 }

906 else if (i <= 0) {

907 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION \|\|

908 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {

909 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the wh ole

910 point in using a datagram service */

911 wb->left = 0;

912 }

913 return(i);

914 }

915 wb->offset+=i;

916 wb->left-=i;

917 }

918 }

919

920 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.

921 * 'type' is one of the following:

922 *

923 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)

924 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)

925 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)

926 *

927 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first

928 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).

929 *

930 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as

931 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really

932 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.

933 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store

934 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol

935 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):

936 * Change cipher spec protocol

937 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored

938 * Alert protocol

939 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)

940 * Handshake protocol

941 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have

942 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages

943 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers

944 * Application data protocol

945 * none of our business

946 */

947 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL s, int type, unsigned char buf, int len, int peek)

948 {

949 int al,i,j,ret;

950 unsigned int n;

951 SSL3_RECORD *rr;

952 void (cb)(const SSL ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;

953

954 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */

955 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))

956 return(-1);

957

958 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HAND SHAKE) && type) \|\|

959 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))

960 {

961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

962 return -1;

963 }

964

965 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))

966 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */

967 {

968 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;

969 unsigned char *dst = buf;

970 unsigned int k;

971

972 /* peek == 0 */

973 n = 0;

974 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))

975 {

976 dst++ = src++;

977 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;

978 n++;

979 }

980 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */

981 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)

982 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;

983 return n;

984 }

985

986 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */

987

988 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))

989 {

990 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */

991 i=s->handshake_func(s);

992 if (i < 0) return(i);

993 if (i == 0)

994 {

995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );

996 return(-1);

997 }

998 }

999 start:

1000 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

1001

1002 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record

1003 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data

1004 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read

1005 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */

1006 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);

1007

1008 /* get new packet if necessary */

1009 if ((rr->length == 0) \|\| (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))

1010 {

1011 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);

1012 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);

1013 }

1014

1015 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */

1016

1017 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,

1018 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */

1019 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))

1020 {

1021 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED );

1023 goto f_err;

1024 }

1025

1026 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away

1027 * (even in 'peek' mode) */

1028 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)

1029 {

1030 rr->length=0;

1031 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

1032 return(0);

1033 }

1034

1035

1036 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE * /

1037 {

1038 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we

1039 * are doing a handshake for the first time */

1040 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&

1041 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))

1042 {

1043 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE );

1045 goto f_err;

1046 }

1047

1048 if (len <= 0) return(len);

1049

1050 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)

1051 n = rr->length;

1052 else

1053 n = (unsigned int)len;

1054

1055 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);

1056 if (!peek)

1057 {

1058 rr->length-=n;

1059 rr->off+=n;

1060 if (rr->length == 0)

1061 {

1062 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;

1063 rr->off=0;

1064 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3- >rbuf.left == 0)

1065 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);

1066 }

1067 }

1068 return(n);

1069 }

1070

1071

1072 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake

1073 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */

1074

1075 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,

1076 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.

1077 */

1078 {

1079 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;

1080 unsigned char *dest = NULL;

1081 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;

1082

1083 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)

1084 {

1085 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;

1086 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;

1087 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;

1088 }

1089 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)

1090 {

1091 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;

1092 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;

1093 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;

1094 }

1095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS

1096 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)

1097 {

1098 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);

1099

1100 /* Exit and notify application to read again */

1101 rr->length = 0;

1102 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;

1103 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));

1104 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));

1105 return(-1);

1106 }

1107 #endif

1108

1109 if (dest_maxlen > 0)

1110 {

1111 n = dest_maxlen - dest_len; / available space in 'dest ' */

1112 if (rr->length < n)

1113 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */

1114

1115 /* now move 'n' bytes: */

1116 while (n-- > 0)

1117 {

1118 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];

1119 rr->length--;

1120 }

1121

1122 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)

1123 goto start; /* fragment was too small */

1124 }

1125 }

1126

1127 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAK E;

1128 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.

1129 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */

1130

1131 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */

1132 if ((!s->server) &&

1133 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&

1134 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&

1135 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))

1136 {

1137 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;

1138

1139 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) \|\|

1140 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) \|\|

1141 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))

1142 {

1143 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);

1145 goto f_err;

1146 }

1147

1148 if (s->msg_callback)

1149 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3- >handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);

1150

1151 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&

1152 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&

1153 !s->s3->renegotiate)

1154 {

1155 ssl3_renegotiate(s);

1156 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))

1157 {

1158 i=s->handshake_func(s);

1159 if (i < 0) return(i);

1160 if (i == 0)

1161 {

1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_H ANDSHAKE_FAILURE);

1163 return(-1);

1164 }

1165

1166 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))

1167 {

1168 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ah ead left? */

1169 {

1170 BIO *bio;

1171 /* In the case where we try to r ead application data,

1172 * but we trigger an SSL handsha ke, we return -1 with

1173 * the retry option set. Otherw ise renegotiation may

1174 * cause nasty problems in the b locking world */

1175 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;

1176 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);

1177 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);

1178 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);

1179 return(-1);

1180 }

1181 }

1182 }

1183 }

1184 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,

1185 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */

1186 goto start;

1187 }

1188 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't

1189 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.

1190 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)

1191 */

1192 if (s->server &&

1193 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&

1194 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&

1195 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&

1196 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&

1197 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&

1198 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&

1199 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))

1200

1201 {

1202 /s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;/

1203 rr->length = 0;

1204 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);

1205 goto start;

1206 }

1207 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)

1208 {

1209 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];

1210 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];

1211

1212 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;

1213

1214 if (s->msg_callback)

1215 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->ale rt_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);

1216

1217 if (s->info_callback != NULL)

1218 cb=s->info_callback;

1219 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)

1220 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;

1221

1222 if (cb != NULL)

1223 {

1224 j = (alert_level << 8) \| alert_descr;

1225 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);

1226 }

1227

1228 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */

1229 {

1230 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;

1231 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)

1232 {

1233 s->shutdown \|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;

1234 return(0);

1235 }

1236 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested

1237 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with

1238 * a fatal alert because if application tried to

1239 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and

1240 * expects it to succeed.

1241 *

1242 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we

1243 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.

1244 */

1245 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)

1246 {

1247 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIAT ION);

1249 goto f_err;

1250 }

1251 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME

1252 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)

1253 return(0);

1254 #endif

1255 }

1256 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */

1257 {

1258 char tmp[16];

1259

1260 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

1261 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;

1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + ale rt_descr);

1263 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);

1264 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);

1265 s->shutdown\|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;

1266 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);

1267 return(0);

1268 }

1269 else

1270 {

1271 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);

1273 goto f_err;

1274 }

1275

1276 goto start;

1277 }

1278

1279 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutd own */

1280 {

1281 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

1282 rr->length=0;

1283 return(0);

1284 }

1285

1286 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)

1287 {

1288 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know

1289 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */

1290 if ( (rr->length != 1) \|\| (rr->off != 0) \|\|

1291 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))

1292 {

1293 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPE C);

1295 goto f_err;

1296 }

1297

1298 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */

1299 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)

1300 {

1301 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);

1303 goto f_err;

1304 }

1305

1306 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))

1307 {

1308 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);

1310 goto f_err;

1311 }

1312

1313 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;

1314

1315 rr->length=0;

1316

1317 if (s->msg_callback)

1318 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPE C, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);

1319

1320 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;

1321 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))

1322 goto err;

1323 else

1324 goto start;

1325 }

1326

1327 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */

1328 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)

1329 {

1330 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&

1331 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))

1332 {

1333 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and

1334 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting

1335 * protocol violations): */

1336 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE\|(s->server)

1337 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT

1338 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;

1339 #else

1340 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;

1341 #endif

1342 s->renegotiate=1;

1343 s->new_session=1;

1344 }

1345 i=s->handshake_func(s);

1346 if (i < 0) return(i);

1347 if (i == 0)

1348 {

1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );

1350 return(-1);

1351 }

1352

1353 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))

1354 {

1355 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */

1356 {

1357 BIO *bio;

1358 /* In the case where we try to read application data,

1359 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with

1360 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiatio n may

1361 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */

1362 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;

1363 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);

1364 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);

1365 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);

1366 return(-1);

1367 }

1368 }

1369 goto start;

1370 }

1371

1372 switch (rr->type)

1373 {

1374 default:

1375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS

1376 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:

1377 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.

1378 */

1379 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)

1380 {

1381 rr->length = 0;

1382 goto start;

1383 }

1384 #endif

1385 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);

1387 goto f_err;

1388 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:

1389 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:

1390 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:

1391 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception

1392 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that

1393 * should not happen when type != rr->type */

1394 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

1396 goto f_err;

1397 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:

1398 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,

1399 * but have application data. If the library was

1400 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data

1401 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data

1402 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),

1403 * we will indulge it.

1404 */

1405 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&

1406 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&

1407 ((

1408 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&

1409 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&

1410 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)

1411 ) \|\| (

1412 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&

1413 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&

1414 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)

1415 )

1416 ))

1417 {

1418 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;

1419 return(-1);

1420 }

1421 else

1422 {

1423 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);

1425 goto f_err;

1426 }

1427 }

1428 /* not reached */

1429

1430 f_err:

1431 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

1432 err:

1433 return(-1);

1434 }

1435

1436 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)

1437 {

1438 int i;

1439 const char *sender;

1440 int slen;

1441

1442 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)

1443 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;

1444 else

1445 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;

1446

1447 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)

1448 {

1449 if (s->session == NULL \|\| s->session->master_key_length == 0)

1450 {

1451 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */

1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIV ED_EARLY);

1453 return (0);

1454 }

1455

1456 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;

1457 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);

1458 }

1459

1460 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))

1461 return(0);

1462

1463 /* we have to record the message digest at

1464 * this point so we can get it before we read

1465 * the finished message */

1466 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)

1467 {

1468 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;

1469 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;

1470 }

1471 else

1472 {

1473 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;

1474 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;

1475 }

1476

1477 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,

1478 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);

1479

1480 return(1);

1481 }

1482

1483 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)

1484 {

1485 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */

1486 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);

1487 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)

1488 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protoc ol_version alerts */

1489 if (desc < 0) return -1;

1490 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */

1491 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))

1492 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);

1493

1494 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;

1495 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;

1496 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;

1497 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */

1498 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);

1499 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written

1500 * some time in the future */

1501 return -1;

1502 }

1503

1504 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)

1505 {

1506 int i,j;

1507 void (cb)(const SSL ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;

1508

1509 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;

1510 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);

1511 if (i <= 0)

1512 {

1513 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;

1514 }

1515 else

1516 {

1517 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.

1518 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,

1519 * we will not worry too much. */

1520 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)

1521 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);

1522

1523 if (s->msg_callback)

1524 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->sen d_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);

1525

1526 if (s->info_callback != NULL)

1527 cb=s->info_callback;

1528 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)

1529 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;

1530

1531 if (cb != NULL)

1532 {

1533 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)\|s->s3->send_alert[1];

1534 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);

1535 }

1536 }

1537 return(i);

1538 }

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