Index: openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c |
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c |
deleted file mode 100644 |
index 1e3bcb9bc426a7580b3926bedc0b3ba4a9e259aa..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c |
+++ /dev/null |
@@ -1,592 +0,0 @@ |
-/* crypto/rand/md_rand.c */ |
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
- * All rights reserved. |
- * |
- * This package is an SSL implementation written |
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
- * |
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
- * |
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
- * the code are not to be removed. |
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
- * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
- * |
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
- * are met: |
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
- * must display the following acknowledgement: |
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
- * |
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
- * SUCH DAMAGE. |
- * |
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
- * copied and put under another distribution licence |
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
- */ |
-/* ==================================================================== |
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
- * |
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
- * are met: |
- * |
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
- * |
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
- * distribution. |
- * |
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
- * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
- * |
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
- * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
- * |
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
- * |
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
- * acknowledgment: |
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
- * |
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
- * ==================================================================== |
- * |
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
- * |
- */ |
- |
-#define OPENSSL_FIPSEVP |
- |
-#ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG |
-# ifndef NDEBUG |
-# define NDEBUG |
-# endif |
-#endif |
- |
-#include <assert.h> |
-#include <stdio.h> |
-#include <string.h> |
- |
-#include "e_os.h" |
- |
-#include <openssl/crypto.h> |
-#include <openssl/rand.h> |
-#include "rand_lcl.h" |
- |
-#include <openssl/err.h> |
- |
-#ifdef BN_DEBUG |
-# define PREDICT |
-#endif |
- |
-/* #define PREDICT 1 */ |
- |
-#define STATE_SIZE 1023 |
-static int state_num=0,state_index=0; |
-static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
-static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
-static long md_count[2]={0,0}; |
-static double entropy=0; |
-static int initialized=0; |
- |
-static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread |
- * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND |
- * (to prevent double locking) */ |
-/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */ |
-static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ |
- |
- |
-#ifdef PREDICT |
-int rand_predictable=0; |
-#endif |
- |
-const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
- |
-static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void); |
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); |
-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); |
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo); |
-static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); |
-static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); |
-static int ssleay_rand_status(void); |
- |
-RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={ |
- ssleay_rand_seed, |
- ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes, |
- ssleay_rand_cleanup, |
- ssleay_rand_add, |
- ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes, |
- ssleay_rand_status |
- }; |
- |
-RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) |
- { |
- return(&rand_ssleay_meth); |
- } |
- |
-static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void) |
- { |
- OPENSSL_cleanse(state,sizeof(state)); |
- state_num=0; |
- state_index=0; |
- OPENSSL_cleanse(md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
- md_count[0]=0; |
- md_count[1]=0; |
- entropy=0; |
- initialized=0; |
- } |
- |
-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) |
- { |
- int i,j,k,st_idx; |
- long md_c[2]; |
- unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
- EVP_MD_CTX m; |
- int do_not_lock; |
- |
- /* |
- * (Based on the rand(3) manpage) |
- * |
- * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for |
- * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash |
- * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function |
- * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' |
- * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as |
- * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' |
- * (which is incremented after each use). |
- * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the |
- * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the |
- * hash function. |
- */ |
- |
- /* check if we already have the lock */ |
- if (crypto_lock_rand) |
- { |
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur; |
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); |
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); |
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
- } |
- else |
- do_not_lock = 0; |
- |
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
- st_idx=state_index; |
- |
- /* use our own copies of the counters so that even |
- * if a concurrent thread seeds with exactly the |
- * same data and uses the same subarray there's _some_ |
- * difference */ |
- md_c[0] = md_count[0]; |
- md_c[1] = md_count[1]; |
- |
- memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); |
- |
- /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ |
- state_index += num; |
- if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) |
- { |
- state_index%=STATE_SIZE; |
- state_num=STATE_SIZE; |
- } |
- else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) |
- { |
- if (state_index > state_num) |
- state_num=state_index; |
- } |
- /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ |
- |
- /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] |
- * are what we will use now, but other threads may use them |
- * as well */ |
- |
- md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); |
- |
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
- |
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m); |
- for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) |
- { |
- j=(num-i); |
- j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j; |
- |
- MD_Init(&m); |
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
- k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE; |
- if (k > 0) |
- { |
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k); |
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k); |
- } |
- else |
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j); |
- |
- /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ |
- MD_Update(&m,buf,j); |
- /* We know that line may cause programs such as |
- purify and valgrind to complain about use of |
- uninitialized data. The problem is not, it's |
- with the caller. Removing that line will make |
- sure you get really bad randomness and thereby |
- other problems such as very insecure keys. */ |
- |
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); |
- MD_Final(&m,local_md); |
- md_c[1]++; |
- |
- buf=(const char *)buf + j; |
- |
- for (k=0; k<j; k++) |
- { |
- /* Parallel threads may interfere with this, |
- * but always each byte of the new state is |
- * the XOR of some previous value of its |
- * and local_md (itermediate values may be lost). |
- * Alway using locking could hurt performance more |
- * than necessary given that conflicts occur only |
- * when the total seeding is longer than the random |
- * state. */ |
- state[st_idx++]^=local_md[k]; |
- if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE) |
- st_idx=0; |
- } |
- } |
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); |
- |
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
- /* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that |
- * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for |
- * the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as |
- * much entropy as fits into md. */ |
- for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) |
- { |
- md[k] ^= local_md[k]; |
- } |
- if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ |
- entropy += add; |
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
- |
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) |
- assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]); |
-#endif |
- } |
- |
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) |
- { |
- ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num); |
- } |
- |
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) |
- { |
- static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; |
- int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx; |
- int num_ceil; |
- int ok; |
- long md_c[2]; |
- unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
- EVP_MD_CTX m; |
-#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS |
- pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); |
-#endif |
- int do_stir_pool = 0; |
- |
-#ifdef PREDICT |
- if (rand_predictable) |
- { |
- static unsigned char val=0; |
- |
- for (i=0; i<num; i++) |
- buf[i]=val++; |
- return(1); |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- if (num <= 0) |
- return 1; |
- |
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m); |
- /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ |
- num_ceil = (1 + (num-1)/(MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2); |
- |
- /* |
- * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:) |
- * |
- * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following: |
- * |
- * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from |
- * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to |
- * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state' |
- * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept |
- * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the |
- * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'. |
- * |
- * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the |
- * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' |
- * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the |
- * global 'md'. |
- */ |
- |
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
- |
- /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ |
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid); |
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
- crypto_lock_rand = 1; |
- |
- if (!initialized) |
- { |
- RAND_poll(); |
- initialized = 1; |
- } |
- |
- if (!stirred_pool) |
- do_stir_pool = 1; |
- |
- ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); |
- if (!ok) |
- { |
- /* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing |
- * the PRNG output may help attackers to determine the new |
- * state; thus we have to decrease the entropy estimate. |
- * Once we've had enough initial seeding we don't bother to |
- * adjust the entropy count, though, because we're not ambitious |
- * to provide *information-theoretic* randomness. |
- * |
- * NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before |
- * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected |
- * in a separate input pool and be transferred to the |
- * output pool only when the entropy limit has been reached. |
- */ |
- entropy -= num; |
- if (entropy < 0) |
- entropy = 0; |
- } |
- |
- if (do_stir_pool) |
- { |
- /* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, |
- * so we better make sure that the required entropy gets |
- * 'evenly distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. |
- * The input function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md', |
- * which makes it more suitable for this purpose. |
- */ |
- |
- int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */ |
- while (n > 0) |
- { |
-#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 |
-# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED." |
-#endif |
-#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */ |
- /* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that |
- * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash. */ |
- ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); |
- n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
- } |
- if (ok) |
- stirred_pool = 1; |
- } |
- |
- st_idx=state_index; |
- st_num=state_num; |
- md_c[0] = md_count[0]; |
- md_c[1] = md_count[1]; |
- memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); |
- |
- state_index+=num_ceil; |
- if (state_index > state_num) |
- state_index %= state_num; |
- |
- /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] |
- * are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */ |
- |
- md_count[0] += 1; |
- |
- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ |
- crypto_lock_rand = 0; |
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
- |
- while (num > 0) |
- { |
- /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ |
- j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num; |
- num-=j; |
- MD_Init(&m); |
-#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS |
- if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */ |
- { |
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid); |
- curr_pid = 0; |
- } |
-#endif |
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); |
- |
-#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */ |
- /* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small |
- * source of entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised |
- * it may cause programs such as purify or valgrind to |
- * complain. So for those builds it is not used: the removal |
- * of such a small source of entropy has negligible impact on |
- * security. |
- */ |
- MD_Update(&m,buf,j); |
-#endif |
- |
- k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num; |
- if (k > 0) |
- { |
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k); |
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k); |
- } |
- else |
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2); |
- MD_Final(&m,local_md); |
- |
- for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++) |
- { |
- state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i]; /* may compete with other threads */ |
- if (st_idx >= st_num) |
- st_idx=0; |
- if (i < j) |
- *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- MD_Init(&m); |
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); |
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
- MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
- MD_Final(&m,md); |
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
- |
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); |
- if (ok) |
- return(1); |
- else if (pseudo) |
- return 0; |
- else |
- { |
- RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); |
- ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " |
- "http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html"); |
- return(0); |
- } |
- } |
- |
-static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) |
- { |
- return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0); |
- } |
- |
-/* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not |
- unpredictable */ |
-static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) |
- { |
- return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1); |
- } |
- |
-static int ssleay_rand_status(void) |
- { |
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur; |
- int ret; |
- int do_not_lock; |
- |
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); |
- /* check if we already have the lock |
- * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */ |
- if (crypto_lock_rand) |
- { |
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); |
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
- } |
- else |
- do_not_lock = 0; |
- |
- if (!do_not_lock) |
- { |
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
- |
- /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ |
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
- CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur); |
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
- crypto_lock_rand = 1; |
- } |
- |
- if (!initialized) |
- { |
- RAND_poll(); |
- initialized = 1; |
- } |
- |
- ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED; |
- |
- if (!do_not_lock) |
- { |
- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ |
- crypto_lock_rand = 0; |
- |
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
- } |
- |
- return ret; |
- } |