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| 1 /* crypto/rand/md_rand.c */ | |
| 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| 3 * All rights reserved. | |
| 4 * | |
| 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| 8 * | |
| 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| 15 * | |
| 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| 17 * the code are not to be removed. | |
| 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| 22 * | |
| 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| 25 * are met: | |
| 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| 40 * | |
| 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| 52 * | |
| 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
| 57 */ | |
| 58 /* ==================================================================== | |
| 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| 60 * | |
| 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| 63 * are met: | |
| 64 * | |
| 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| 67 * | |
| 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| 71 * distribution. | |
| 72 * | |
| 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| 77 * | |
| 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
| 82 * | |
| 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| 86 * | |
| 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| 88 * acknowledgment: | |
| 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| 91 * | |
| 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| 104 * ==================================================================== | |
| 105 * | |
| 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| 109 * | |
| 110 */ | |
| 111 | |
| 112 #define OPENSSL_FIPSEVP | |
| 113 | |
| 114 #ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG | |
| 115 # ifndef NDEBUG | |
| 116 # define NDEBUG | |
| 117 # endif | |
| 118 #endif | |
| 119 | |
| 120 #include <assert.h> | |
| 121 #include <stdio.h> | |
| 122 #include <string.h> | |
| 123 | |
| 124 #include "e_os.h" | |
| 125 | |
| 126 #include <openssl/crypto.h> | |
| 127 #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| 128 #include "rand_lcl.h" | |
| 129 | |
| 130 #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| 131 | |
| 132 #ifdef BN_DEBUG | |
| 133 # define PREDICT | |
| 134 #endif | |
| 135 | |
| 136 /* #define PREDICT 1 */ | |
| 137 | |
| 138 #define STATE_SIZE 1023 | |
| 139 static int state_num=0,state_index=0; | |
| 140 static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
| 141 static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
| 142 static long md_count[2]={0,0}; | |
| 143 static double entropy=0; | |
| 144 static int initialized=0; | |
| 145 | |
| 146 static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread | |
| 147 * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND | |
| 148 * (to prevent double locking) */ | |
| 149 /* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */ | |
| 150 static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ | |
| 151 | |
| 152 | |
| 153 #ifdef PREDICT | |
| 154 int rand_predictable=0; | |
| 155 #endif | |
| 156 | |
| 157 const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; | |
| 158 | |
| 159 static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void); | |
| 160 static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); | |
| 161 static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); | |
| 162 static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo); | |
| 163 static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); | |
| 164 static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); | |
| 165 static int ssleay_rand_status(void); | |
| 166 | |
| 167 RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={ | |
| 168 ssleay_rand_seed, | |
| 169 ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes, | |
| 170 ssleay_rand_cleanup, | |
| 171 ssleay_rand_add, | |
| 172 ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes, | |
| 173 ssleay_rand_status | |
| 174 }; | |
| 175 | |
| 176 RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) | |
| 177 { | |
| 178 return(&rand_ssleay_meth); | |
| 179 } | |
| 180 | |
| 181 static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void) | |
| 182 { | |
| 183 OPENSSL_cleanse(state,sizeof(state)); | |
| 184 state_num=0; | |
| 185 state_index=0; | |
| 186 OPENSSL_cleanse(md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
| 187 md_count[0]=0; | |
| 188 md_count[1]=0; | |
| 189 entropy=0; | |
| 190 initialized=0; | |
| 191 } | |
| 192 | |
| 193 static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) | |
| 194 { | |
| 195 int i,j,k,st_idx; | |
| 196 long md_c[2]; | |
| 197 unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
| 198 EVP_MD_CTX m; | |
| 199 int do_not_lock; | |
| 200 | |
| 201 /* | |
| 202 * (Based on the rand(3) manpage) | |
| 203 * | |
| 204 * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for | |
| 205 * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash | |
| 206 * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function | |
| 207 * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' | |
| 208 * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as | |
| 209 * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' | |
| 210 * (which is incremented after each use). | |
| 211 * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the | |
| 212 * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the | |
| 213 * hash function. | |
| 214 */ | |
| 215 | |
| 216 /* check if we already have the lock */ | |
| 217 if (crypto_lock_rand) | |
| 218 { | |
| 219 CRYPTO_THREADID cur; | |
| 220 CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); | |
| 221 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); | |
| 222 do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); | |
| 223 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); | |
| 224 } | |
| 225 else | |
| 226 do_not_lock = 0; | |
| 227 | |
| 228 if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
| 229 st_idx=state_index; | |
| 230 | |
| 231 /* use our own copies of the counters so that even | |
| 232 * if a concurrent thread seeds with exactly the | |
| 233 * same data and uses the same subarray there's _some_ | |
| 234 * difference */ | |
| 235 md_c[0] = md_count[0]; | |
| 236 md_c[1] = md_count[1]; | |
| 237 | |
| 238 memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); | |
| 239 | |
| 240 /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ | |
| 241 state_index += num; | |
| 242 if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) | |
| 243 { | |
| 244 state_index%=STATE_SIZE; | |
| 245 state_num=STATE_SIZE; | |
| 246 } | |
| 247 else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) | |
| 248 { | |
| 249 if (state_index > state_num) | |
| 250 state_num=state_index; | |
| 251 } | |
| 252 /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ | |
| 253 | |
| 254 /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] | |
| 255 * are what we will use now, but other threads may use them | |
| 256 * as well */ | |
| 257 | |
| 258 md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); | |
| 259 | |
| 260 if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
| 261 | |
| 262 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m); | |
| 263 for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) | |
| 264 { | |
| 265 j=(num-i); | |
| 266 j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j; | |
| 267 | |
| 268 MD_Init(&m); | |
| 269 MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
| 270 k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE; | |
| 271 if (k > 0) | |
| 272 { | |
| 273 MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k); | |
| 274 MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k); | |
| 275 } | |
| 276 else | |
| 277 MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j); | |
| 278 | |
| 279 /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ | |
| 280 MD_Update(&m,buf,j); | |
| 281 /* We know that line may cause programs such as | |
| 282 purify and valgrind to complain about use of | |
| 283 uninitialized data. The problem is not, it's | |
| 284 with the caller. Removing that line will make | |
| 285 sure you get really bad randomness and thereby | |
| 286 other problems such as very insecure keys. */ | |
| 287 | |
| 288 MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); | |
| 289 MD_Final(&m,local_md); | |
| 290 md_c[1]++; | |
| 291 | |
| 292 buf=(const char *)buf + j; | |
| 293 | |
| 294 for (k=0; k<j; k++) | |
| 295 { | |
| 296 /* Parallel threads may interfere with this, | |
| 297 * but always each byte of the new state is | |
| 298 * the XOR of some previous value of its | |
| 299 * and local_md (itermediate values may be lost). | |
| 300 * Alway using locking could hurt performance more | |
| 301 * than necessary given that conflicts occur only | |
| 302 * when the total seeding is longer than the random | |
| 303 * state. */ | |
| 304 state[st_idx++]^=local_md[k]; | |
| 305 if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE) | |
| 306 st_idx=0; | |
| 307 } | |
| 308 } | |
| 309 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); | |
| 310 | |
| 311 if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
| 312 /* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that | |
| 313 * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for | |
| 314 * the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as | |
| 315 * much entropy as fits into md. */ | |
| 316 for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) | |
| 317 { | |
| 318 md[k] ^= local_md[k]; | |
| 319 } | |
| 320 if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ | |
| 321 entropy += add; | |
| 322 if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
| 323 | |
| 324 #if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) | |
| 325 assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]); | |
| 326 #endif | |
| 327 } | |
| 328 | |
| 329 static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) | |
| 330 { | |
| 331 ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num); | |
| 332 } | |
| 333 | |
| 334 static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) | |
| 335 { | |
| 336 static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; | |
| 337 int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx; | |
| 338 int num_ceil; | |
| 339 int ok; | |
| 340 long md_c[2]; | |
| 341 unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
| 342 EVP_MD_CTX m; | |
| 343 #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS | |
| 344 pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); | |
| 345 #endif | |
| 346 int do_stir_pool = 0; | |
| 347 | |
| 348 #ifdef PREDICT | |
| 349 if (rand_predictable) | |
| 350 { | |
| 351 static unsigned char val=0; | |
| 352 | |
| 353 for (i=0; i<num; i++) | |
| 354 buf[i]=val++; | |
| 355 return(1); | |
| 356 } | |
| 357 #endif | |
| 358 | |
| 359 if (num <= 0) | |
| 360 return 1; | |
| 361 | |
| 362 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m); | |
| 363 /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ | |
| 364 num_ceil = (1 + (num-1)/(MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2); | |
| 365 | |
| 366 /* | |
| 367 * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:) | |
| 368 * | |
| 369 * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following: | |
| 370 * | |
| 371 * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized fro
m | |
| 372 * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are t
o | |
| 373 * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state' | |
| 374 * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept | |
| 375 * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the | |
| 376 * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'. | |
| 377 * | |
| 378 * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the | |
| 379 * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' | |
| 380 * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the | |
| 381 * global 'md'. | |
| 382 */ | |
| 383 | |
| 384 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
| 385 | |
| 386 /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ | |
| 387 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); | |
| 388 CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid); | |
| 389 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); | |
| 390 crypto_lock_rand = 1; | |
| 391 | |
| 392 if (!initialized) | |
| 393 { | |
| 394 RAND_poll(); | |
| 395 initialized = 1; | |
| 396 } | |
| 397 | |
| 398 if (!stirred_pool) | |
| 399 do_stir_pool = 1; | |
| 400 | |
| 401 ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); | |
| 402 if (!ok) | |
| 403 { | |
| 404 /* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing | |
| 405 * the PRNG output may help attackers to determine the new | |
| 406 * state; thus we have to decrease the entropy estimate. | |
| 407 * Once we've had enough initial seeding we don't bother to | |
| 408 * adjust the entropy count, though, because we're not ambitious | |
| 409 * to provide *information-theoretic* randomness. | |
| 410 * | |
| 411 * NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before | |
| 412 * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected | |
| 413 * in a separate input pool and be transferred to the | |
| 414 * output pool only when the entropy limit has been reached. | |
| 415 */ | |
| 416 entropy -= num; | |
| 417 if (entropy < 0) | |
| 418 entropy = 0; | |
| 419 } | |
| 420 | |
| 421 if (do_stir_pool) | |
| 422 { | |
| 423 /* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, | |
| 424 * so we better make sure that the required entropy gets | |
| 425 * 'evenly distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. | |
| 426 * The input function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md', | |
| 427 * which makes it more suitable for this purpose. | |
| 428 */ | |
| 429 | |
| 430 int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed *
/ | |
| 431 while (n > 0) | |
| 432 { | |
| 433 #if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 | |
| 434 # error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED." | |
| 435 #endif | |
| 436 #define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */ | |
| 437 /* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that | |
| 438 * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash. */ | |
| 439 ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); | |
| 440 n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH; | |
| 441 } | |
| 442 if (ok) | |
| 443 stirred_pool = 1; | |
| 444 } | |
| 445 | |
| 446 st_idx=state_index; | |
| 447 st_num=state_num; | |
| 448 md_c[0] = md_count[0]; | |
| 449 md_c[1] = md_count[1]; | |
| 450 memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); | |
| 451 | |
| 452 state_index+=num_ceil; | |
| 453 if (state_index > state_num) | |
| 454 state_index %= state_num; | |
| 455 | |
| 456 /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] | |
| 457 * are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */ | |
| 458 | |
| 459 md_count[0] += 1; | |
| 460 | |
| 461 /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ | |
| 462 crypto_lock_rand = 0; | |
| 463 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
| 464 | |
| 465 while (num > 0) | |
| 466 { | |
| 467 /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ | |
| 468 j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num; | |
| 469 num-=j; | |
| 470 MD_Init(&m); | |
| 471 #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS | |
| 472 if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */ | |
| 473 { | |
| 474 MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid); | |
| 475 curr_pid = 0; | |
| 476 } | |
| 477 #endif | |
| 478 MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
| 479 MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); | |
| 480 | |
| 481 #ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */ | |
| 482 /* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small | |
| 483 * source of entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised | |
| 484 * it may cause programs such as purify or valgrind to | |
| 485 * complain. So for those builds it is not used: the removal | |
| 486 * of such a small source of entropy has negligible impact on | |
| 487 * security. | |
| 488 */ | |
| 489 MD_Update(&m,buf,j); | |
| 490 #endif | |
| 491 | |
| 492 k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num; | |
| 493 if (k > 0) | |
| 494 { | |
| 495 MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k); | |
| 496 MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k); | |
| 497 } | |
| 498 else | |
| 499 MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2); | |
| 500 MD_Final(&m,local_md); | |
| 501 | |
| 502 for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++) | |
| 503 { | |
| 504 state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i]; /* may compete with other
threads */ | |
| 505 if (st_idx >= st_num) | |
| 506 st_idx=0; | |
| 507 if (i < j) | |
| 508 *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]; | |
| 509 } | |
| 510 } | |
| 511 | |
| 512 MD_Init(&m); | |
| 513 MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); | |
| 514 MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
| 515 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
| 516 MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
| 517 MD_Final(&m,md); | |
| 518 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
| 519 | |
| 520 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); | |
| 521 if (ok) | |
| 522 return(1); | |
| 523 else if (pseudo) | |
| 524 return 0; | |
| 525 else | |
| 526 { | |
| 527 RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); | |
| 528 ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " | |
| 529 "http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html"); | |
| 530 return(0); | |
| 531 } | |
| 532 } | |
| 533 | |
| 534 static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) | |
| 535 { | |
| 536 return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0); | |
| 537 } | |
| 538 | |
| 539 /* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not | |
| 540 unpredictable */ | |
| 541 static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) | |
| 542 { | |
| 543 return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1); | |
| 544 } | |
| 545 | |
| 546 static int ssleay_rand_status(void) | |
| 547 { | |
| 548 CRYPTO_THREADID cur; | |
| 549 int ret; | |
| 550 int do_not_lock; | |
| 551 | |
| 552 CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); | |
| 553 /* check if we already have the lock | |
| 554 * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */ | |
| 555 if (crypto_lock_rand) | |
| 556 { | |
| 557 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); | |
| 558 do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); | |
| 559 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); | |
| 560 } | |
| 561 else | |
| 562 do_not_lock = 0; | |
| 563 | |
| 564 if (!do_not_lock) | |
| 565 { | |
| 566 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
| 567 | |
| 568 /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock ag
ain */ | |
| 569 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); | |
| 570 CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur); | |
| 571 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); | |
| 572 crypto_lock_rand = 1; | |
| 573 } | |
| 574 | |
| 575 if (!initialized) | |
| 576 { | |
| 577 RAND_poll(); | |
| 578 initialized = 1; | |
| 579 } | |
| 580 | |
| 581 ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED; | |
| 582 | |
| 583 if (!do_not_lock) | |
| 584 { | |
| 585 /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ | |
| 586 crypto_lock_rand = 0; | |
| 587 | |
| 588 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
| 589 } | |
| 590 | |
| 591 return ret; | |
| 592 } | |
| OLD | NEW |
|---|
Chromium Code Reviews
Issue 2072073002:
Delete bundled copy of OpenSSL and replace with README. (Closed)
Base URL: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/deps/openssl@master