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1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ | |
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
3 * All rights reserved. | |
4 * | |
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
8 * | |
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
15 * | |
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
17 * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
22 * | |
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 * are met: | |
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
40 * | |
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
52 * | |
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 */ | |
58 /* ==================================================================== | |
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
60 * | |
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
63 * are met: | |
64 * | |
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
67 * | |
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
71 * distribution. | |
72 * | |
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
77 * | |
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
82 * | |
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
86 * | |
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
88 * acknowledgment: | |
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
91 * | |
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
104 * ==================================================================== | |
105 * | |
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
109 * | |
110 */ | |
111 /* ==================================================================== | |
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
113 * | |
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by | |
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. | |
116 * | |
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
118 * license provided above. | |
119 * | |
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by | |
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. | |
122 * | |
123 */ | |
124 /* ==================================================================== | |
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
126 * | |
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by | |
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
129 * license. | |
130 * | |
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of | |
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites | |
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. | |
134 * | |
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in | |
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received | |
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. | |
138 * | |
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not | |
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third | |
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights | |
142 * to make use of the Contribution. | |
143 * | |
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN | |
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA | |
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY | |
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR | |
148 * OTHERWISE. | |
149 */ | |
150 | |
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG | |
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG | |
153 | |
154 #include <stdio.h> | |
155 #include "ssl_locl.h" | |
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h" | |
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
158 #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
159 #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
160 #include <openssl/ec.h> | |
161 #include <openssl/ecdsa.h> | |
162 #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
163 #include <openssl/hmac.h> | |
164 #include <openssl/sha.h> | |
165 #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
167 #include <openssl/dh.h> | |
168 #endif | |
169 #include <openssl/bn.h> | |
170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 | |
171 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> | |
172 #endif | |
173 #include <openssl/md5.h> | |
174 | |
175 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); | |
176 | |
177 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) | |
178 { | |
179 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) | |
180 return(SSLv3_server_method()); | |
181 else | |
182 return(NULL); | |
183 } | |
184 | |
185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
186 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) | |
187 { | |
188 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; | |
189 | |
190 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
191 | |
192 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && | |
193 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) | |
194 { | |
195 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) | |
196 { | |
197 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, | |
198 we do so if There is no srp login name */ | |
199 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; | |
200 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
201 } | |
202 else | |
203 { | |
204 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al); | |
205 } | |
206 } | |
207 return ret; | |
208 } | |
209 #endif | |
210 | |
211 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, | |
212 ssl3_accept, | |
213 ssl_undefined_function, | |
214 ssl3_get_server_method) | |
215 | |
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) | |
217 { | |
218 BUF_MEM *buf; | |
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); | |
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; | |
221 int ret= -1; | |
222 int new_state,state,skip=0; | |
223 | |
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); | |
225 ERR_clear_error(); | |
226 clear_sys_error(); | |
227 | |
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
229 cb=s->info_callback; | |
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; | |
232 | |
233 /* init things to blank */ | |
234 s->in_handshake++; | |
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); | |
236 | |
237 if (s->cert == NULL) | |
238 { | |
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); | |
240 return(-1); | |
241 } | |
242 | |
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS | |
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we | |
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because | |
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway. | |
247 */ | |
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) | |
249 { | |
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; | |
251 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; | |
252 } | |
253 #endif | |
254 | |
255 for (;;) | |
256 { | |
257 state=s->state; | |
258 | |
259 switch (s->state) | |
260 { | |
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: | |
262 s->renegotiate=1; | |
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ | |
264 | |
265 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: | |
266 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: | |
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: | |
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: | |
269 | |
270 s->server=1; | |
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); | |
272 | |
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3) | |
274 { | |
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
276 return -1; | |
277 } | |
278 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; | |
279 | |
280 if (s->init_buf == NULL) | |
281 { | |
282 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) | |
283 { | |
284 ret= -1; | |
285 goto end; | |
286 } | |
287 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) | |
288 { | |
289 ret= -1; | |
290 goto end; | |
291 } | |
292 s->init_buf=buf; | |
293 } | |
294 | |
295 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) | |
296 { | |
297 ret= -1; | |
298 goto end; | |
299 } | |
300 | |
301 s->init_num=0; | |
302 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; | |
303 | |
304 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) | |
305 { | |
306 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so
that | |
307 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-
) | |
308 */ | |
309 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto
end; } | |
310 | |
311 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); | |
312 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; | |
313 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; | |
314 } | |
315 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && | |
316 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGO
TIATION)) | |
317 { | |
318 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with | |
319 * client that doesn't support secure | |
320 * renegotiation. | |
321 */ | |
322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RE
NEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
323 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE
_FAILURE); | |
324 ret = -1; | |
325 goto end; | |
326 } | |
327 else | |
328 { | |
329 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, | |
330 * we will just send a HelloRequest */ | |
331 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; | |
332 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; | |
333 } | |
334 break; | |
335 | |
336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: | |
337 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: | |
338 | |
339 s->shutdown=0; | |
340 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); | |
341 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
342 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; | |
343 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; | |
344 s->init_num=0; | |
345 | |
346 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); | |
347 break; | |
348 | |
349 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: | |
350 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; | |
351 break; | |
352 | |
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: | |
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: | |
355 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: | |
356 | |
357 s->shutdown=0; | |
358 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) | |
359 { | |
360 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); | |
361 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
362 } | |
363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
364 { | |
365 int al; | |
366 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0) | |
367 { | |
368 /* callback indicates firther work to be
done */ | |
369 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
370 goto end; | |
371 } | |
372 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) | |
373 { | |
374 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); | |
375 /* This is not really an error but the only mean
s to | |
376 for a client to detect whether srp is support
ed. */ | |
377 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) | |
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHEL
LO_TLSEXT); | |
379 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
| |
380 ret= -1; | |
381 goto end; | |
382 } | |
383 } | |
384 #endif | |
385 | |
386 s->renegotiate = 2; | |
387 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; | |
388 s->init_num=0; | |
389 break; | |
390 | |
391 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: | |
392 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: | |
393 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); | |
394 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT | |
396 if (s->hit) | |
397 { | |
398 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) | |
399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; | |
400 else | |
401 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; | |
402 } | |
403 #else | |
404 if (s->hit) | |
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; | |
406 #endif | |
407 else | |
408 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; | |
409 s->init_num=0; | |
410 break; | |
411 | |
412 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: | |
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: | |
414 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ | |
415 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ | |
416 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) | |
417 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL
_kPSK) | |
418 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL
_aKRB5)) | |
419 { | |
420 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); | |
421 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT | |
423 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) | |
424 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; | |
425 else | |
426 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
427 } | |
428 else | |
429 { | |
430 skip = 1; | |
431 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
432 } | |
433 #else | |
434 } | |
435 else | |
436 skip=1; | |
437 | |
438 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
439 #endif | |
440 s->init_num=0; | |
441 break; | |
442 | |
443 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: | |
444 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: | |
445 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
446 | |
447 /* clear this, it may get reset by | |
448 * send_server_key_exchange */ | |
449 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) | |
450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 | |
451 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) | |
452 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ | |
453 ) | |
454 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary R
SA key | |
455 * even when forbidden by protocol specs | |
456 * (handshake may fail as clients are not requir
ed to | |
457 * be able to handle this) */ | |
458 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; | |
459 else | |
460 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; | |
461 | |
462 | |
463 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or | |
464 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate | |
465 * | |
466 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints | |
467 * | |
468 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange | |
469 * message only if the cipher suite is either | |
470 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the | |
471 * server certificate contains the server's | |
472 * public key for key exchange. | |
473 */ | |
474 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp | |
475 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity | |
476 * hint if provided */ | |
477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
478 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) | |
479 #endif | |
480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
481 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ | |
482 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) | |
483 #endif | |
484 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) | |
485 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) | |
486 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) | |
487 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey
== NULL | |
488 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) | |
489 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY
_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) | |
490 ) | |
491 ) | |
492 ) | |
493 ) | |
494 { | |
495 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); | |
496 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
497 } | |
498 else | |
499 skip=1; | |
500 | |
501 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; | |
502 s->init_num=0; | |
503 break; | |
504 | |
505 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: | |
506 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: | |
507 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ | |
508 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || | |
509 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, | |
510 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ | |
511 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && | |
512 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || | |
513 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites | |
514 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 d
rafts | |
515 * and in RFC 2246): */ | |
516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aN
ULL) && | |
517 /* ... except when the application insists on v
erification | |
518 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts th
is for SSL 3) */ | |
519 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_C
ERT)) || | |
520 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
*/ | |
521 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKR
B5) | |
522 /* With normal PSK Certificates and | |
523 * Certificate Requests are omitted */ | |
524 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_
kPSK)) | |
525 { | |
526 /* no cert request */ | |
527 skip=1; | |
528 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; | |
529 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; | |
530 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) | |
531 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) | |
532 return -1; | |
533 } | |
534 else | |
535 { | |
536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; | |
537 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); | |
538 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
539 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG | |
540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; | |
541 #else | |
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; | |
543 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; | |
544 #endif | |
545 s->init_num=0; | |
546 } | |
547 break; | |
548 | |
549 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: | |
550 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: | |
551 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); | |
552 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
553 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; | |
554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; | |
555 s->init_num=0; | |
556 break; | |
557 | |
558 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: | |
559 | |
560 /* This code originally checked to see if | |
561 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO | |
562 * and then flushed. This caused problems | |
563 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed | |
564 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue | |
565 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING | |
566 * still exist. So instead we just flush | |
567 * unconditionally. | |
568 */ | |
569 | |
570 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; | |
571 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) | |
572 { | |
573 ret= -1; | |
574 goto end; | |
575 } | |
576 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; | |
577 | |
578 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; | |
579 break; | |
580 | |
581 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: | |
582 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: | |
583 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ | |
584 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); | |
585 if (ret <= 0) | |
586 goto end; | |
587 if (ret == 2) | |
588 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; | |
589 else { | |
590 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) | |
591 { | |
592 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); | |
593 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
594 } | |
595 s->init_num=0; | |
596 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
597 } | |
598 break; | |
599 | |
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: | |
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: | |
602 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); | |
603 if (ret <= 0) | |
604 goto end; | |
605 if (ret == 2) | |
606 { | |
607 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when | |
608 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in | |
609 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify | |
610 * message is not sent. | |
611 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when | |
612 * the client uses its key from the certificate | |
613 * for key exchange. | |
614 */ | |
615 s->init_num = 0; | |
616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT; | |
617 } | |
618 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
619 { | |
620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; | |
621 s->init_num=0; | |
622 if (!s->session->peer) | |
623 break; | |
624 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer | |
625 * at this point and digest cached records. | |
626 */ | |
627 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) | |
628 { | |
629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_
ERROR); | |
630 return -1; | |
631 } | |
632 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; | |
633 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) | |
634 return -1; | |
635 } | |
636 else | |
637 { | |
638 int offset=0; | |
639 int dgst_num; | |
640 | |
641 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; | |
642 s->init_num=0; | |
643 | |
644 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is | |
645 * a client cert, it can be verified | |
646 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVeri
fy | |
647 * should be generalized. But it is next step | |
648 */ | |
649 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) | |
650 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) | |
651 return -1; | |
652 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_nu
m++) | |
653 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) | |
654 { | |
655 int dgst_size; | |
656 | |
657 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify
_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify
_md[offset])); | |
658 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3-
>handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); | |
659 if (dgst_size < 0) | |
660 { | |
661 ret = -1; | |
662 goto end; | |
663 } | |
664 offset+=dgst_size; | |
665 } | |
666 } | |
667 break; | |
668 | |
669 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: | |
670 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: | |
671 | |
672 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; | |
673 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ | |
674 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); | |
675 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
676 | |
677 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT; | |
678 s->init_num=0; | |
679 break; | |
680 | |
681 case SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT: { | |
682 char next_proto_neg = 0; | |
683 char channel_id = 0; | |
684 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) | |
685 # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) | |
686 next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; | |
687 # endif | |
688 channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid; | |
689 #endif | |
690 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; | |
691 | |
692 if (next_proto_neg) | |
693 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; | |
694 else if (channel_id) | |
695 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A; | |
696 else | |
697 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; | |
698 break; | |
699 } | |
700 | |
701 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) | |
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: | |
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: | |
704 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); | |
705 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
706 s->init_num = 0; | |
707 if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) | |
708 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A; | |
709 else | |
710 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; | |
711 break; | |
712 #endif | |
713 | |
714 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) | |
715 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A: | |
716 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B: | |
717 ret=ssl3_get_channel_id(s); | |
718 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
719 s->init_num = 0; | |
720 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; | |
721 break; | |
722 #endif | |
723 | |
724 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: | |
725 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: | |
726 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; | |
727 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, | |
728 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); | |
729 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
730 if (s->hit) | |
731 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; | |
732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT | |
733 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) | |
734 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; | |
735 #endif | |
736 else | |
737 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; | |
738 s->init_num=0; | |
739 break; | |
740 | |
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT | |
742 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: | |
743 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: | |
744 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); | |
745 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
746 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; | |
747 s->init_num=0; | |
748 break; | |
749 | |
750 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: | |
751 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: | |
752 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); | |
753 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
754 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
755 s->init_num=0; | |
756 break; | |
757 | |
758 #endif | |
759 | |
760 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: | |
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: | |
762 | |
763 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
764 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) | |
765 { ret= -1; goto end; } | |
766 | |
767 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, | |
768 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); | |
769 | |
770 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
771 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; | |
772 s->init_num=0; | |
773 | |
774 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
775 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) | |
776 { | |
777 ret= -1; | |
778 goto end; | |
779 } | |
780 | |
781 break; | |
782 | |
783 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: | |
784 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: | |
785 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, | |
786 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, | |
787 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, | |
788 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); | |
789 if (ret <= 0) goto end; | |
790 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; | |
791 if (s->hit) | |
792 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CER
T; | |
793 else | |
794 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; | |
795 s->init_num=0; | |
796 break; | |
797 | |
798 case SSL_ST_OK: | |
799 /* clean a few things up */ | |
800 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); | |
801 | |
802 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
803 s->init_buf=NULL; | |
804 | |
805 /* remove buffering on output */ | |
806 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); | |
807 | |
808 s->init_num=0; | |
809 | |
810 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a He
lloRequest */ | |
811 { | |
812 s->renegotiate=0; | |
813 s->new_session=0; | |
814 | |
815 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); | |
816 | |
817 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; | |
818 /* s->server=1; */ | |
819 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; | |
820 | |
821 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); | |
822 } | |
823 | |
824 ret = 1; | |
825 goto end; | |
826 /* break; */ | |
827 | |
828 default: | |
829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); | |
830 ret= -1; | |
831 goto end; | |
832 /* break; */ | |
833 } | |
834 | |
835 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) | |
836 { | |
837 if (s->debug) | |
838 { | |
839 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) | |
840 goto end; | |
841 } | |
842 | |
843 | |
844 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) | |
845 { | |
846 new_state=s->state; | |
847 s->state=state; | |
848 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); | |
849 s->state=new_state; | |
850 } | |
851 } | |
852 skip=0; | |
853 } | |
854 end: | |
855 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ | |
856 | |
857 s->in_handshake--; | |
858 if (cb != NULL) | |
859 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); | |
860 return(ret); | |
861 } | |
862 | |
863 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) | |
864 { | |
865 unsigned char *p; | |
866 | |
867 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) | |
868 { | |
869 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
870 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; | |
871 *(p++)=0; | |
872 *(p++)=0; | |
873 *(p++)=0; | |
874 | |
875 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; | |
876 /* number of bytes to write */ | |
877 s->init_num=4; | |
878 s->init_off=0; | |
879 } | |
880 | |
881 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ | |
882 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
883 } | |
884 | |
885 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) | |
886 { | |
887 int ok; | |
888 long n; | |
889 | |
890 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, | |
891 * so permit appropriate message length */ | |
892 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, | |
893 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, | |
894 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, | |
895 -1, | |
896 s->max_cert_list, | |
897 &ok); | |
898 if (!ok) return((int)n); | |
899 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; | |
900 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) | |
901 { | |
902 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per | |
903 * negotiation. */ | |
904 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) | |
905 { | |
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC
_RESTARTS); | |
907 return -1; | |
908 } | |
909 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, | |
910 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too muc
h.) */ | |
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
912 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) | |
913 { | |
914 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); | |
915 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; | |
916 } | |
917 #endif | |
918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH | |
919 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) | |
920 { | |
921 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); | |
922 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; | |
923 } | |
924 #endif | |
925 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; | |
926 return 2; | |
927 } | |
928 return 1; | |
929 } | |
930 | |
931 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) | |
932 { | |
933 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; | |
934 unsigned int cookie_len; | |
935 long n; | |
936 unsigned long id; | |
937 unsigned char *p,*d,*q; | |
938 SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
940 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; | |
941 #endif | |
942 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; | |
943 | |
944 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. | |
945 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, | |
946 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. | |
947 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with | |
948 * TLSv1. | |
949 */ | |
950 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A | |
951 ) | |
952 { | |
953 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; | |
954 } | |
955 s->first_packet=1; | |
956 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, | |
957 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, | |
958 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, | |
959 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
960 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, | |
961 &ok); | |
962 | |
963 if (!ok) return((int)n); | |
964 s->first_packet=0; | |
965 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; | |
966 | |
967 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header | |
968 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ | |
969 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; | |
970 p+=2; | |
971 | |
972 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || | |
973 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) | |
974 { | |
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
976 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) | |
977 { | |
978 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote v
ersion number */ | |
979 s->version = s->client_version; | |
980 } | |
981 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
982 goto f_err; | |
983 } | |
984 | |
985 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't | |
986 * contain one, just return since we do not want to | |
987 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... | |
988 */ | |
989 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) | |
990 { | |
991 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; | |
992 | |
993 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
994 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); | |
995 | |
996 if (cookie_length == 0) | |
997 return 1; | |
998 } | |
999 | |
1000 /* load the client random */ | |
1001 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1002 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; | |
1003 | |
1004 /* get the session-id */ | |
1005 j= *(p++); | |
1006 | |
1007 s->hit=0; | |
1008 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in rene
gotiation. | |
1009 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumpti
on requests | |
1010 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new f
lag rather | |
1011 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on thi
s for security | |
1012 * won't even compile against older library versions). | |
1013 * | |
1014 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
request | |
1015 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): f
or servers, | |
1016 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_
RENEGOTIATION | |
1017 * setting will be ignored. | |
1018 */ | |
1019 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_REN
EGOTIATION))) | |
1020 { | |
1021 if (!s->session_creation_enabled) | |
1022 { | |
1023 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
); | |
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT
_BE_CREATED); | |
1025 goto err; | |
1026 } | |
1027 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) | |
1028 goto err; | |
1029 } | |
1030 else | |
1031 { | |
1032 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); | |
1033 if (i == 1) | |
1034 { /* previous session */ | |
1035 s->hit=1; | |
1036 } | |
1037 else if (i == -1) | |
1038 goto err; | |
1039 else /* i == 0 */ | |
1040 { | |
1041 if (!s->session_creation_enabled) | |
1042 { | |
1043 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE
_FAILURE); | |
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION
_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); | |
1045 goto err; | |
1046 } | |
1047 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) | |
1048 goto err; | |
1049 } | |
1050 } | |
1051 | |
1052 p+=j; | |
1053 | |
1054 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
1055 { | |
1056 /* cookie stuff */ | |
1057 cookie_len = *(p++); | |
1058 | |
1059 /* | |
1060 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the | |
1061 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it | |
1062 * does not cause an overflow. | |
1063 */ | |
1064 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) | |
1065 { | |
1066 /* too much data */ | |
1067 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATC
H); | |
1069 goto f_err; | |
1070 } | |
1071 | |
1072 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ | |
1073 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && | |
1074 cookie_len > 0) | |
1075 { | |
1076 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); | |
1077 | |
1078 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) | |
1079 { | |
1080 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd
_cookie, | |
1081 cookie_len) == 0) | |
1082 { | |
1083 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1085 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
1086 goto f_err; | |
1087 } | |
1088 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ | |
1089 } | |
1090 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, | |
1091 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* de
fault verification */ | |
1092 { | |
1093 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1095 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
1096 goto f_err; | |
1097 } | |
1098 | |
1099 ret = 2; | |
1100 } | |
1101 | |
1102 p += cookie_len; | |
1103 } | |
1104 | |
1105 n2s(p,i); | |
1106 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) | |
1107 { | |
1108 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ | |
1109 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); | |
1111 goto f_err; | |
1112 } | |
1113 if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) | |
1114 { | |
1115 /* not enough data */ | |
1116 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1118 goto f_err; | |
1119 } | |
1120 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) | |
1121 == NULL)) | |
1122 { | |
1123 goto err; | |
1124 } | |
1125 p+=i; | |
1126 | |
1127 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ | |
1128 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) | |
1129 { | |
1130 j=0; | |
1131 id=s->session->cipher->id; | |
1132 | |
1133 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG | |
1134 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); | |
1135 #endif | |
1136 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) | |
1137 { | |
1138 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); | |
1139 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG | |
1140 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", | |
1141 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); | |
1142 #endif | |
1143 if (c->id == id) | |
1144 { | |
1145 j=1; | |
1146 break; | |
1147 } | |
1148 } | |
1149 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade | |
1150 * attack: CVE-2010-4180. | |
1151 */ | |
1152 #if 0 | |
1153 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_
BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) | |
1154 { | |
1155 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously
used cipher may | |
1156 * not be in the current list, the client instead might
be trying to | |
1157 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due
to server | |
1158 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if
the cipher is not | |
1159 * enabled, though. */ | |
1160 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); | |
1161 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) | |
1162 { | |
1163 s->session->cipher = c; | |
1164 j = 1; | |
1165 } | |
1166 } | |
1167 #endif | |
1168 if (j == 0) | |
1169 { | |
1170 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher | |
1171 * list if we are asked to reuse it */ | |
1172 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER
_MISSING); | |
1174 goto f_err; | |
1175 } | |
1176 } | |
1177 | |
1178 /* compression */ | |
1179 i= *(p++); | |
1180 if ((p+i) > (d+n)) | |
1181 { | |
1182 /* not enough data */ | |
1183 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1185 goto f_err; | |
1186 } | |
1187 q=p; | |
1188 for (j=0; j<i; j++) | |
1189 { | |
1190 if (p[j] == 0) break; | |
1191 } | |
1192 | |
1193 p+=i; | |
1194 if (j >= i) | |
1195 { | |
1196 /* no compress */ | |
1197 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIE
D); | |
1199 goto f_err; | |
1200 } | |
1201 | |
1202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT | |
1203 /* TLS extensions*/ | |
1204 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) | |
1205 { | |
1206 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) | |
1207 { | |
1208 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ | |
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); | |
1210 goto f_err; | |
1211 } | |
1212 } | |
1213 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { | |
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLS
EXT); | |
1215 goto err; | |
1216 } | |
1217 | |
1218 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this | |
1219 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate | |
1220 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow | |
1221 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ | |
1222 { | |
1223 unsigned long Time; | |
1224 unsigned char *pos; | |
1225 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ | |
1226 pos=s->s3->server_random; | |
1227 l2n(Time,pos); | |
1228 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) | |
1229 { | |
1230 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1231 goto f_err; | |
1232 } | |
1233 } | |
1234 | |
1235 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) | |
1236 { | |
1237 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; | |
1238 | |
1239 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); | |
1240 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->sessi
on->master_key_length, | |
1241 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) | |
1242 { | |
1243 s->hit=1; | |
1244 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; | |
1245 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; | |
1246 | |
1247 ciphers=NULL; | |
1248 | |
1249 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ | |
1250 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_ciph
er(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
1251 if (pref_cipher == NULL) | |
1252 { | |
1253 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHAR
ED_CIPHER); | |
1255 goto f_err; | |
1256 } | |
1257 | |
1258 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; | |
1259 | |
1260 if (s->cipher_list) | |
1261 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); | |
1262 | |
1263 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) | |
1264 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); | |
1265 | |
1266 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); | |
1267 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->cip
hers); | |
1268 } | |
1269 } | |
1270 #endif | |
1271 | |
1272 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other | |
1273 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression | |
1274 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ | |
1275 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; | |
1276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1277 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ | |
1278 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) | |
1279 { | |
1280 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; | |
1281 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ | |
1282 /* Can't disable compression */ | |
1283 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1284 { | |
1285 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_CO
MPRESSION); | |
1287 goto f_err; | |
1288 } | |
1289 /* Look for resumed compression method */ | |
1290 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) | |
1291 { | |
1292 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); | |
1293 if (comp_id == comp->id) | |
1294 { | |
1295 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; | |
1296 break; | |
1297 } | |
1298 } | |
1299 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) | |
1300 { | |
1301 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRES
SION_ALGORITHM); | |
1303 goto f_err; | |
1304 } | |
1305 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ | |
1306 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) | |
1307 { | |
1308 if (q[m] == comp_id) | |
1309 break; | |
1310 } | |
1311 if (m >= i) | |
1312 { | |
1313 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRE
SSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); | |
1315 goto f_err; | |
1316 } | |
1317 } | |
1318 else if (s->hit) | |
1319 comp = NULL; | |
1320 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) | |
1321 { /* See if we have a match */ | |
1322 int m,nn,o,v,done=0; | |
1323 | |
1324 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); | |
1325 for (m=0; m<nn; m++) | |
1326 { | |
1327 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); | |
1328 v=comp->id; | |
1329 for (o=0; o<i; o++) | |
1330 { | |
1331 if (v == q[o]) | |
1332 { | |
1333 done=1; | |
1334 break; | |
1335 } | |
1336 } | |
1337 if (done) break; | |
1338 } | |
1339 if (done) | |
1340 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; | |
1341 else | |
1342 comp=NULL; | |
1343 } | |
1344 #else | |
1345 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
1346 * using compression. | |
1347 */ | |
1348 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) | |
1349 { | |
1350 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSIO
N); | |
1352 goto f_err; | |
1353 } | |
1354 #endif | |
1355 | |
1356 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must | |
1357 * pick a cipher */ | |
1358 | |
1359 if (!s->hit) | |
1360 { | |
1361 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1362 s->session->compress_meth=0; | |
1363 #else | |
1364 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; | |
1365 #endif | |
1366 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) | |
1367 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); | |
1368 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; | |
1369 if (ciphers == NULL) | |
1370 { | |
1371 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASS
ED); | |
1373 goto f_err; | |
1374 } | |
1375 ciphers=NULL; | |
1376 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, | |
1377 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
1378 | |
1379 if (c == NULL) | |
1380 { | |
1381 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHE
R); | |
1383 goto f_err; | |
1384 } | |
1385 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; | |
1386 } | |
1387 else | |
1388 { | |
1389 /* Session-id reuse */ | |
1390 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG | |
1391 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
1392 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; | |
1393 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; | |
1394 | |
1395 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) | |
1396 { | |
1397 sk=s->session->ciphers; | |
1398 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) | |
1399 { | |
1400 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); | |
1401 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) | |
1402 nc=c; | |
1403 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) | |
1404 ec=c; | |
1405 } | |
1406 if (nc != NULL) | |
1407 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; | |
1408 else if (ec != NULL) | |
1409 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; | |
1410 else | |
1411 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; | |
1412 } | |
1413 else | |
1414 #endif | |
1415 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; | |
1416 } | |
1417 | |
1418 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIF
Y_PEER)) | |
1419 { | |
1420 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) | |
1421 { | |
1422 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1423 goto f_err; | |
1424 } | |
1425 } | |
1426 | |
1427 /* we now have the following setup. | |
1428 * client_random | |
1429 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers | |
1430 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers | |
1431 * compression - basically ignored right now | |
1432 * ssl version is set - sslv3 | |
1433 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. | |
1434 * s->hit - session reuse flag | |
1435 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. | |
1436 */ | |
1437 | |
1438 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ | |
1439 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) | |
1440 { | |
1441 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) | |
1442 { | |
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TL
SEXT); | |
1444 goto err; | |
1445 } | |
1446 } | |
1447 | |
1448 if (ret < 0) ret=1; | |
1449 if (0) | |
1450 { | |
1451 f_err: | |
1452 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); | |
1453 } | |
1454 err: | |
1455 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
1456 return(ret); | |
1457 } | |
1458 | |
1459 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) | |
1460 { | |
1461 unsigned char *buf; | |
1462 unsigned char *p,*d; | |
1463 int i,sl; | |
1464 unsigned long l; | |
1465 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT | |
1466 unsigned long Time; | |
1467 #endif | |
1468 | |
1469 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) | |
1470 { | |
1471 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1472 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT | |
1473 p=s->s3->server_random; | |
1474 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */ | |
1475 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ | |
1476 l2n(Time,p); | |
1477 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) | |
1478 return -1; | |
1479 #endif | |
1480 /* Do the message type and length last */ | |
1481 d=p= &(buf[4]); | |
1482 | |
1483 *(p++)=s->version>>8; | |
1484 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; | |
1485 | |
1486 /* Random stuff */ | |
1487 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1488 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; | |
1489 | |
1490 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send | |
1491 * back in the server hello: | |
1492 * - For session reuse from the session cache, | |
1493 * we send back the old session ID. | |
1494 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) | |
1495 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" | |
1496 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). | |
1497 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new | |
1498 * session ID. | |
1499 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, | |
1500 * we send back a 0-length session ID. | |
1501 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, | |
1502 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed | |
1503 * to send back. | |
1504 */ | |
1505 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) | |
1506 && !s->hit) | |
1507 s->session->session_id_length=0; | |
1508 | |
1509 sl=s->session->session_id_length; | |
1510 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) | |
1511 { | |
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERRO
R); | |
1513 return -1; | |
1514 } | |
1515 *(p++)=sl; | |
1516 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); | |
1517 p+=sl; | |
1518 | |
1519 /* put the cipher */ | |
1520 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); | |
1521 p+=i; | |
1522 | |
1523 /* put the compression method */ | |
1524 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1525 *(p++)=0; | |
1526 #else | |
1527 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) | |
1528 *(p++)=0; | |
1529 else | |
1530 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; | |
1531 #endif | |
1532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT | |
1533 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) | |
1534 { | |
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TL
SEXT); | |
1536 return -1; | |
1537 } | |
1538 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_
LENGTH)) == NULL) | |
1539 { | |
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
); | |
1541 return -1; | |
1542 } | |
1543 #endif | |
1544 /* do the header */ | |
1545 l=(p-d); | |
1546 d=buf; | |
1547 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; | |
1548 l2n3(l,d); | |
1549 | |
1550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; | |
1551 /* number of bytes to write */ | |
1552 s->init_num=p-buf; | |
1553 s->init_off=0; | |
1554 } | |
1555 | |
1556 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ | |
1557 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
1558 } | |
1559 | |
1560 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) | |
1561 { | |
1562 unsigned char *p; | |
1563 | |
1564 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) | |
1565 { | |
1566 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1567 | |
1568 /* do the header */ | |
1569 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
1570 *(p++)=0; | |
1571 *(p++)=0; | |
1572 *(p++)=0; | |
1573 | |
1574 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; | |
1575 /* number of bytes to write */ | |
1576 s->init_num=4; | |
1577 s->init_off=0; | |
1578 } | |
1579 | |
1580 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ | |
1581 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
1582 } | |
1583 | |
1584 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) | |
1585 { | |
1586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA | |
1587 unsigned char *q; | |
1588 int j,num; | |
1589 RSA *rsa; | |
1590 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
1591 unsigned int u; | |
1592 #endif | |
1593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
1594 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; | |
1595 #endif | |
1596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH | |
1597 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; | |
1598 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; | |
1599 int encodedlen = 0; | |
1600 int curve_id = 0; | |
1601 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; | |
1602 #endif | |
1603 EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
1604 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
1605 unsigned char *p,*d; | |
1606 int al,i; | |
1607 unsigned long type; | |
1608 int n; | |
1609 CERT *cert; | |
1610 BIGNUM *r[4]; | |
1611 int nr[4],kn; | |
1612 BUF_MEM *buf; | |
1613 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
1614 | |
1615 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); | |
1616 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) | |
1617 { | |
1618 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
1619 cert=s->cert; | |
1620 | |
1621 buf=s->init_buf; | |
1622 | |
1623 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; | |
1624 n=0; | |
1625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA | |
1626 if (type & SSL_kRSA) | |
1627 { | |
1628 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; | |
1629 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) | |
1630 { | |
1631 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, | |
1632 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), | |
1633 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cip
her)); | |
1634 if(rsa == NULL) | |
1635 { | |
1636 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHAN
GE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); | |
1638 goto f_err; | |
1639 } | |
1640 RSA_up_ref(rsa); | |
1641 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; | |
1642 } | |
1643 if (rsa == NULL) | |
1644 { | |
1645 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R
_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); | |
1647 goto f_err; | |
1648 } | |
1649 r[0]=rsa->n; | |
1650 r[1]=rsa->e; | |
1651 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; | |
1652 } | |
1653 else | |
1654 #endif | |
1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
1656 if (type & SSL_kEDH) | |
1657 { | |
1658 dhp=cert->dh_tmp; | |
1659 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) | |
1660 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, | |
1661 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), | |
1662 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cip
her)); | |
1663 if (dhp == NULL) | |
1664 { | |
1665 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R
_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
1667 goto f_err; | |
1668 } | |
1669 | |
1670 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) | |
1671 { | |
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_
R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1673 goto err; | |
1674 } | |
1675 | |
1676 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) | |
1677 { | |
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R
_DH_LIB); | |
1679 goto err; | |
1680 } | |
1681 | |
1682 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; | |
1683 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || | |
1684 dhp->priv_key == NULL || | |
1685 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) | |
1686 { | |
1687 if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) | |
1688 { | |
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1690 ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
1691 goto err; | |
1692 } | |
1693 } | |
1694 else | |
1695 { | |
1696 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); | |
1697 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); | |
1698 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || | |
1699 (dh->priv_key == NULL)) | |
1700 { | |
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHAN
GE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
1702 goto err; | |
1703 } | |
1704 } | |
1705 r[0]=dh->p; | |
1706 r[1]=dh->g; | |
1707 r[2]=dh->pub_key; | |
1708 } | |
1709 else | |
1710 #endif | |
1711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH | |
1712 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) | |
1713 { | |
1714 const EC_GROUP *group; | |
1715 | |
1716 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; | |
1717 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) | |
1718 { | |
1719 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, | |
1720 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), | |
1721 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cip
her)); | |
1722 } | |
1723 if (ecdhp == NULL) | |
1724 { | |
1725 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R
_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); | |
1727 goto f_err; | |
1728 } | |
1729 | |
1730 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) | |
1731 { | |
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_
R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1733 goto err; | |
1734 } | |
1735 | |
1736 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ | |
1737 if (ecdhp == NULL) | |
1738 { | |
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R
_ECDH_LIB); | |
1740 goto err; | |
1741 } | |
1742 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) | |
1743 { | |
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R
_ECDH_LIB); | |
1745 goto err; | |
1746 } | |
1747 | |
1748 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; | |
1749 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || | |
1750 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || | |
1751 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) | |
1752 { | |
1753 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) | |
1754 { | |
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,E
RR_R_ECDH_LIB); | |
1756 goto err; | |
1757 } | |
1758 } | |
1759 | |
1760 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || | |
1761 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || | |
1762 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) | |
1763 { | |
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R
_ECDH_LIB); | |
1765 goto err; | |
1766 } | |
1767 | |
1768 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && | |
1769 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) | |
1770 { | |
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R
_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); | |
1772 goto err; | |
1773 } | |
1774 | |
1775 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH | |
1776 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For | |
1777 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. | |
1778 */ | |
1779 if ((curve_id = | |
1780 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))
) | |
1781 == 0) | |
1782 { | |
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R
_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); | |
1784 goto err; | |
1785 } | |
1786 | |
1787 /* Encode the public key. | |
1788 * First check the size of encoding and | |
1789 * allocate memory accordingly. | |
1790 */ | |
1791 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, | |
1792 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), | |
1793 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, | |
1794 NULL, 0, NULL); | |
1795 | |
1796 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) | |
1797 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); | |
1798 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); | |
1799 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) | |
1800 { | |
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R
_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1802 goto err; | |
1803 } | |
1804 | |
1805 | |
1806 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, | |
1807 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), | |
1808 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, | |
1809 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); | |
1810 | |
1811 if (encodedlen == 0) | |
1812 { | |
1813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R
_ECDH_LIB); | |
1814 goto err; | |
1815 } | |
1816 | |
1817 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; | |
1818 | |
1819 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not | |
1820 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. | |
1821 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes | |
1822 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams | |
1823 * structure. | |
1824 */ | |
1825 n = 4 + encodedlen; | |
1826 | |
1827 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message | |
1828 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs | |
1829 */ | |
1830 r[0]=NULL; | |
1831 r[1]=NULL; | |
1832 r[2]=NULL; | |
1833 r[3]=NULL; | |
1834 } | |
1835 else | |
1836 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ | |
1837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
1838 if (type & SSL_kPSK) | |
1839 { | |
1840 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identi
ty hint*/ | |
1841 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); | |
1842 } | |
1843 else | |
1844 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ | |
1845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
1846 if (type & SSL_kSRP) | |
1847 { | |
1848 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || | |
1849 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || | |
1850 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || | |
1851 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) | |
1852 { | |
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R
_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); | |
1854 goto err; | |
1855 } | |
1856 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N; | |
1857 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g; | |
1858 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s; | |
1859 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B; | |
1860 } | |
1861 else | |
1862 #endif | |
1863 { | |
1864 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN
_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); | |
1866 goto f_err; | |
1867 } | |
1868 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++) | |
1869 { | |
1870 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); | |
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
1872 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) | |
1873 n+=1+nr[i]; | |
1874 else | |
1875 #endif | |
1876 n+=2+nr[i]; | |
1877 } | |
1878 | |
1879 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) | |
1880 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) | |
1881 { | |
1882 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md)
) | |
1883 == NULL) | |
1884 { | |
1885 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1886 goto f_err; | |
1887 } | |
1888 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
1889 } | |
1890 else | |
1891 { | |
1892 pkey=NULL; | |
1893 kn=0; | |
1894 } | |
1895 | |
1896 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) | |
1897 { | |
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); | |
1899 goto err; | |
1900 } | |
1901 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1902 p= &(d[4]); | |
1903 | |
1904 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++) | |
1905 { | |
1906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
1907 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) | |
1908 { | |
1909 *p = nr[i]; | |
1910 p++; | |
1911 } | |
1912 else | |
1913 #endif | |
1914 s2n(nr[i],p); | |
1915 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); | |
1916 p+=nr[i]; | |
1917 } | |
1918 | |
1919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH | |
1920 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) | |
1921 { | |
1922 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) cur
ves. | |
1923 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: | |
1924 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] | |
1925 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by | |
1926 * the actual encoded point itself | |
1927 */ | |
1928 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; | |
1929 p += 1; | |
1930 *p = 0; | |
1931 p += 1; | |
1932 *p = curve_id; | |
1933 p += 1; | |
1934 *p = encodedlen; | |
1935 p += 1; | |
1936 memcpy((unsigned char*)p, | |
1937 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, | |
1938 encodedlen); | |
1939 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
1940 encodedPoint = NULL; | |
1941 p += encodedlen; | |
1942 } | |
1943 #endif | |
1944 | |
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
1946 if (type & SSL_kPSK) | |
1947 { | |
1948 /* copy PSK identity hint */ | |
1949 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); | |
1950 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->
ctx->psk_identity_hint)); | |
1951 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); | |
1952 } | |
1953 #endif | |
1954 | |
1955 /* not anonymous */ | |
1956 if (pkey != NULL) | |
1957 { | |
1958 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) | |
1959 * and p points to the space at the end. */ | |
1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA | |
1961 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA | |
1962 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1963 { | |
1964 q=md_buf; | |
1965 j=0; | |
1966 for (num=2; num > 0; num--) | |
1967 { | |
1968 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, | |
1969 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); | |
1970 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) | |
1971 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL)
; | |
1972 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client
_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1973 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server
_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1974 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); | |
1975 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, | |
1976 (unsigned int *)&i); | |
1977 q+=i; | |
1978 j+=i; | |
1979 } | |
1980 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, | |
1981 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) | |
1982 { | |
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHAN
GE,ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
1984 goto err; | |
1985 } | |
1986 s2n(u,p); | |
1987 n+=u+2; | |
1988 } | |
1989 else | |
1990 #endif | |
1991 if (md) | |
1992 { | |
1993 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature | |
1994 * algorithm */ | |
1995 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1996 { | |
1997 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) | |
1998 { | |
1999 /* Should never happen */ | |
2000 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KE
Y_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2002 goto f_err; | |
2003 } | |
2004 p+=2; | |
2005 } | |
2006 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
2007 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", | |
2008 EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
2009 #endif | |
2010 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); | |
2011 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]
),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
2012 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]
),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
2013 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); | |
2014 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), | |
2015 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) | |
2016 { | |
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHAN
GE,ERR_LIB_EVP); | |
2018 goto err; | |
2019 } | |
2020 s2n(i,p); | |
2021 n+=i+2; | |
2022 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
2023 n+= 2; | |
2024 } | |
2025 else | |
2026 { | |
2027 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ | |
2028 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R
_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); | |
2030 goto f_err; | |
2031 } | |
2032 } | |
2033 | |
2034 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
2035 l2n3(n,d); | |
2036 | |
2037 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send | |
2038 * it off */ | |
2039 s->init_num=n+4; | |
2040 s->init_off=0; | |
2041 } | |
2042 | |
2043 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; | |
2044 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
2045 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
2046 f_err: | |
2047 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); | |
2048 err: | |
2049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH | |
2050 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
2051 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); | |
2052 #endif | |
2053 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
2054 return(-1); | |
2055 } | |
2056 | |
2057 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) | |
2058 { | |
2059 unsigned char *p,*d; | |
2060 int i,j,nl,off,n; | |
2061 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; | |
2062 X509_NAME *name; | |
2063 BUF_MEM *buf; | |
2064 | |
2065 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) | |
2066 { | |
2067 buf=s->init_buf; | |
2068 | |
2069 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); | |
2070 | |
2071 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ | |
2072 p++; | |
2073 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); | |
2074 d[0]=n; | |
2075 p+=n; | |
2076 n++; | |
2077 | |
2078 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
2079 { | |
2080 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); | |
2081 s2n(nl, p); | |
2082 p += nl + 2; | |
2083 n += nl + 2; | |
2084 } | |
2085 | |
2086 off=n; | |
2087 p+=2; | |
2088 n+=2; | |
2089 | |
2090 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); | |
2091 nl=0; | |
2092 if (sk != NULL) | |
2093 { | |
2094 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) | |
2095 { | |
2096 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); | |
2097 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); | |
2098 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) | |
2099 { | |
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUE
ST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
2101 goto err; | |
2102 } | |
2103 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); | |
2104 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) | |
2105 { | |
2106 s2n(j,p); | |
2107 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); | |
2108 n+=2+j; | |
2109 nl+=2+j; | |
2110 } | |
2111 else | |
2112 { | |
2113 d=p; | |
2114 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); | |
2115 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; | |
2116 n+=j; | |
2117 nl+=j; | |
2118 } | |
2119 } | |
2120 } | |
2121 /* else no CA names */ | |
2122 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); | |
2123 s2n(nl,p); | |
2124 | |
2125 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; | |
2126 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; | |
2127 l2n3(n,d); | |
2128 | |
2129 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send | |
2130 * it off */ | |
2131 | |
2132 s->init_num=n+4; | |
2133 s->init_off=0; | |
2134 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG | |
2135 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; | |
2136 | |
2137 /* do the header */ | |
2138 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
2139 *(p++)=0; | |
2140 *(p++)=0; | |
2141 *(p++)=0; | |
2142 s->init_num += 4; | |
2143 #endif | |
2144 | |
2145 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; | |
2146 } | |
2147 | |
2148 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ | |
2149 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
2150 err: | |
2151 return(-1); | |
2152 } | |
2153 | |
2154 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) | |
2155 { | |
2156 int i,al,ok; | |
2157 long n; | |
2158 unsigned long alg_k; | |
2159 unsigned char *p; | |
2160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA | |
2161 RSA *rsa=NULL; | |
2162 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; | |
2163 #endif | |
2164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2165 BIGNUM *pub=NULL; | |
2166 DH *dh_srvr; | |
2167 #endif | |
2168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 | |
2169 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; | |
2170 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ | |
2171 | |
2172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH | |
2173 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; | |
2174 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; | |
2175 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; | |
2176 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; | |
2177 #endif | |
2178 | |
2179 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, | |
2180 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, | |
2181 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, | |
2182 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2183 2048, /* ??? */ | |
2184 &ok); | |
2185 | |
2186 if (!ok) return((int)n); | |
2187 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; | |
2188 | |
2189 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
2190 | |
2191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA | |
2192 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) | |
2193 { | |
2194 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ | |
2195 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) | |
2196 { | |
2197 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) | |
2198 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; | |
2199 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should | |
2200 * be sent already */ | |
2201 if (rsa == NULL) | |
2202 { | |
2203 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_
MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); | |
2205 goto f_err; | |
2206 | |
2207 } | |
2208 } | |
2209 else | |
2210 { | |
2211 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; | |
2212 if ( (pkey == NULL) || | |
2213 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || | |
2214 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) | |
2215 { | |
2216 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_
MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); | |
2218 goto f_err; | |
2219 } | |
2220 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; | |
2221 } | |
2222 | |
2223 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ | |
2224 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
2225 { | |
2226 n2s(p,i); | |
2227 if (n != i+2) | |
2228 { | |
2229 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) | |
2230 { | |
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANG
E,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); | |
2232 goto err; | |
2233 } | |
2234 else | |
2235 p-=2; | |
2236 } | |
2237 else | |
2238 n=i; | |
2239 } | |
2240 | |
2241 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); | |
2242 | |
2243 al = -1; | |
2244 | |
2245 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) | |
2246 { | |
2247 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2248 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_R
SA_DECRYPT); */ | |
2249 } | |
2250 | |
2251 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] ==
(s->client_version & 0xff)))) | |
2252 { | |
2253 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version nu
mber as the | |
2254 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (stran
gely, the | |
2255 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH cipher
suites). | |
2256 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated
protocol | |
2257 * version instead if the server does not support the re
quested | |
2258 * protocol version. | |
2259 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clie
nts. */ | |
2260 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && | |
2261 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->versio
n & 0xff)))) | |
2262 { | |
2263 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2264 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL
_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ | |
2265 | |
2266 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenb
acher's attack | |
2267 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits t
he version | |
2268 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an
alert would | |
2269 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to so
me ciphertext | |
2270 * made up by the adversary is properly formatte
d except | |
2271 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid s
uch attacks, | |
2272 * we should treat this just like any other decr
yption error. */ | |
2273 } | |
2274 } | |
2275 | |
2276 if (al != -1) | |
2277 { | |
2278 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead a
s countermeasure | |
2279 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA p
adding | |
2280 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ | |
2281 ERR_clear_error(); | |
2282 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; | |
2283 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; | |
2284 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; | |
2285 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_
bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ | |
2286 goto err; | |
2287 } | |
2288 | |
2289 s->session->master_key_length= | |
2290 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
2291 s->session->master_key, | |
2292 p,i); | |
2293 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); | |
2294 } | |
2295 else | |
2296 #endif | |
2297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2298 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) | |
2299 { | |
2300 n2s(p,i); | |
2301 if (n != i+2) | |
2302 { | |
2303 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) | |
2304 { | |
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_
DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); | |
2306 goto err; | |
2307 } | |
2308 else | |
2309 { | |
2310 p-=2; | |
2311 i=(int)n; | |
2312 } | |
2313 } | |
2314 | |
2315 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ | |
2316 { | |
2317 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_T
O_DECODE_DH_CERTS); | |
2319 goto f_err; | |
2320 } | |
2321 else | |
2322 { | |
2323 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) | |
2324 { | |
2325 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_
MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
2327 goto f_err; | |
2328 } | |
2329 else | |
2330 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; | |
2331 } | |
2332 | |
2333 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); | |
2334 if (pub == NULL) | |
2335 { | |
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); | |
2337 goto err; | |
2338 } | |
2339 | |
2340 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); | |
2341 | |
2342 if (i <= 0) | |
2343 { | |
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
2345 BN_clear_free(pub); | |
2346 goto err; | |
2347 } | |
2348 | |
2349 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); | |
2350 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; | |
2351 | |
2352 BN_clear_free(pub); | |
2353 pub=NULL; | |
2354 s->session->master_key_length= | |
2355 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
2356 s->session->master_key,p,i); | |
2357 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); | |
2358 } | |
2359 else | |
2360 #endif | |
2361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 | |
2362 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) | |
2363 { | |
2364 krb5_error_code krb5rc; | |
2365 krb5_data enc_ticket; | |
2366 krb5_data authenticator; | |
2367 krb5_data enc_pms; | |
2368 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; | |
2369 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; | |
2370 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; | |
2371 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; | |
2372 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH | |
2373 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; | |
2374 int padl, outl; | |
2375 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; | |
2376 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; | |
2377 | |
2378 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); | |
2379 | |
2380 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); | |
2381 | |
2382 n2s(p,i); | |
2383 enc_ticket.length = i; | |
2384 | |
2385 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) | |
2386 { | |
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2388 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
2389 goto err; | |
2390 } | |
2391 | |
2392 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; | |
2393 p+=enc_ticket.length; | |
2394 | |
2395 n2s(p,i); | |
2396 authenticator.length = i; | |
2397 | |
2398 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) | |
2399 { | |
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2401 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
2402 goto err; | |
2403 } | |
2404 | |
2405 authenticator.data = (char *)p; | |
2406 p+=authenticator.length; | |
2407 | |
2408 n2s(p,i); | |
2409 enc_pms.length = i; | |
2410 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; | |
2411 p+=enc_pms.length; | |
2412 | |
2413 /* Note that the length is checked again below, | |
2414 ** after decryption | |
2415 */ | |
2416 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) | |
2417 { | |
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2419 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
2420 goto err; | |
2421 } | |
2422 | |
2423 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + | |
2424 enc_pms.length + 6)) | |
2425 { | |
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2427 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
2428 goto err; | |
2429 } | |
2430 | |
2431 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, | |
2432 &kssl_err)) != 0) | |
2433 { | |
2434 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
2435 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", | |
2436 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); | |
2437 if (kssl_err.text) | |
2438 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); | |
2439 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2441 kssl_err.reason); | |
2442 goto err; | |
2443 } | |
2444 | |
2445 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, | |
2446 ** but will return authtime == 0. | |
2447 */ | |
2448 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, | |
2449 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) | |
2450 { | |
2451 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
2452 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", | |
2453 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); | |
2454 if (kssl_err.text) | |
2455 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); | |
2456 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2458 kssl_err.reason); | |
2459 goto err; | |
2460 } | |
2461 | |
2462 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) | |
2463 { | |
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); | |
2465 goto err; | |
2466 } | |
2467 | |
2468 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
2469 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); | |
2470 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
2471 | |
2472 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); | |
2473 if (enc == NULL) | |
2474 goto err; | |
2475 | |
2476 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ | |
2477 | |
2478 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) | |
2479 { | |
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2481 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
2482 goto err; | |
2483 } | |
2484 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, | |
2485 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.l
ength)) | |
2486 { | |
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2488 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
2489 goto err; | |
2490 } | |
2491 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) | |
2492 { | |
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2494 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
2495 goto err; | |
2496 } | |
2497 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) | |
2498 { | |
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2500 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
2501 goto err; | |
2502 } | |
2503 outl += padl; | |
2504 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) | |
2505 { | |
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2507 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
2508 goto err; | |
2509 } | |
2510 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->clien
t_version & 0xff)))) | |
2511 { | |
2512 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number
as the | |
2513 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely
, the | |
2514 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuit
es). | |
2515 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes inste
ad of | |
2516 * the protocol version. | |
2517 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
| |
2518 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerb
eros cipher) | |
2519 */ | |
2520 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) | |
2521 { | |
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2523 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
2524 goto err; | |
2525 } | |
2526 } | |
2527 | |
2528 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); | |
2529 | |
2530 s->session->master_key_length= | |
2531 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
2532 s->session->master_key, pms, outl); | |
2533 | |
2534 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) | |
2535 { | |
2536 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); | |
2537 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) | |
2538 { | |
2539 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; | |
2540 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->c
lient_princ,len); | |
2541 } | |
2542 } | |
2543 | |
2544 | |
2545 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, | |
2546 ** but it caused problems for apache. | |
2547 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); | |
2548 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; | |
2549 */ | |
2550 } | |
2551 else | |
2552 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ | |
2553 | |
2554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH | |
2555 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) | |
2556 { | |
2557 int ret = 1; | |
2558 int field_size = 0; | |
2559 const EC_KEY *tkey; | |
2560 const EC_GROUP *group; | |
2561 const BIGNUM *priv_key; | |
2562 | |
2563 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ | |
2564 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) | |
2565 { | |
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2567 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2568 goto err; | |
2569 } | |
2570 | |
2571 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ | |
2572 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) | |
2573 { | |
2574 /* use the certificate */ | |
2575 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; | |
2576 } | |
2577 else | |
2578 { | |
2579 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when | |
2580 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. | |
2581 */ | |
2582 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; | |
2583 } | |
2584 | |
2585 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); | |
2586 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); | |
2587 | |
2588 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || | |
2589 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) | |
2590 { | |
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2592 ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
2593 goto err; | |
2594 } | |
2595 | |
2596 /* Let's get client's public key */ | |
2597 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) | |
2598 { | |
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2600 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2601 goto err; | |
2602 } | |
2603 | |
2604 if (n == 0L) | |
2605 { | |
2606 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ | |
2607 | |
2608 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) | |
2609 { | |
2610 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R
_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); | |
2612 goto f_err; | |
2613 } | |
2614 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) | |
2615 == NULL) || | |
2616 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) | |
2617 { | |
2618 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client | |
2619 * authentication using ECDH certificates | |
2620 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is | |
2621 * never executed. When that support is | |
2622 * added, we ought to ensure the key | |
2623 * received in the certificate is | |
2624 * authorized for key agreement. | |
2625 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that | |
2626 * the two ECDH shares are for the same | |
2627 * group. | |
2628 */ | |
2629 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2631 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); | |
2632 goto f_err; | |
2633 } | |
2634 | |
2635 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, | |
2636 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0
) | |
2637 { | |
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2639 ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
2640 goto err; | |
2641 } | |
2642 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ | |
2643 } | |
2644 else | |
2645 { | |
2646 /* Get client's public key from encoded point | |
2647 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. | |
2648 */ | |
2649 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) | |
2650 { | |
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2652 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2653 goto err; | |
2654 } | |
2655 | |
2656 /* Get encoded point length */ | |
2657 i = *p; | |
2658 p += 1; | |
2659 if (n != 1 + i) | |
2660 { | |
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2662 ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
2663 goto err; | |
2664 } | |
2665 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, | |
2666 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) | |
2667 { | |
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2669 ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
2670 goto err; | |
2671 } | |
2672 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer | |
2673 * currently, so set it to the start | |
2674 */ | |
2675 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
2676 } | |
2677 | |
2678 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ | |
2679 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); | |
2680 if (field_size <= 0) | |
2681 { | |
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2683 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); | |
2684 goto err; | |
2685 } | |
2686 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecd
h, NULL); | |
2687 if (i <= 0) | |
2688 { | |
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2690 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); | |
2691 goto err; | |
2692 } | |
2693 | |
2694 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); | |
2695 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); | |
2696 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); | |
2697 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); | |
2698 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); | |
2699 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; | |
2700 | |
2701 /* Compute the master secret */ | |
2702 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ | |
2703 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); | |
2704 | |
2705 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); | |
2706 return (ret); | |
2707 } | |
2708 else | |
2709 #endif | |
2710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
2711 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) | |
2712 { | |
2713 unsigned char *t = NULL; | |
2714 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; | |
2715 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; | |
2716 int psk_err = 1; | |
2717 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; | |
2718 | |
2719 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2720 | |
2721 n2s(p,i); | |
2722 if (n != i+2) | |
2723 { | |
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2725 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2726 goto psk_err; | |
2727 } | |
2728 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) | |
2729 { | |
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2731 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
2732 goto psk_err; | |
2733 } | |
2734 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) | |
2735 { | |
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2737 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); | |
2738 goto psk_err; | |
2739 } | |
2740 | |
2741 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity | |
2742 * string for the callback */ | |
2743 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); | |
2744 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); | |
2745 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, | |
2746 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); | |
2747 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1); | |
2748 | |
2749 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) | |
2750 { | |
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2752 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2753 goto psk_err; | |
2754 } | |
2755 else if (psk_len == 0) | |
2756 { | |
2757 /* PSK related to the given identity not found *
/ | |
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2759 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
2760 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
2761 goto psk_err; | |
2762 } | |
2763 | |
2764 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ | |
2765 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len; | |
2766 t = psk_or_pre_ms; | |
2767 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len)
; | |
2768 s2n(psk_len, t); | |
2769 memset(t, 0, psk_len); | |
2770 t+=psk_len; | |
2771 s2n(psk_len, t); | |
2772 | |
2773 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) | |
2774 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); | |
2775 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); | |
2776 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) | |
2777 { | |
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2779 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2780 goto psk_err; | |
2781 } | |
2782 | |
2783 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) | |
2784 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); | |
2785 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_i
dentity_hint); | |
2786 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && | |
2787 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) | |
2788 { | |
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2790 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2791 goto psk_err; | |
2792 } | |
2793 | |
2794 s->session->master_key_length= | |
2795 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
2796 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, p
re_ms_len); | |
2797 psk_err = 0; | |
2798 psk_err: | |
2799 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); | |
2800 if (psk_err != 0) | |
2801 goto f_err; | |
2802 } | |
2803 else | |
2804 #endif | |
2805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
2806 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) | |
2807 { | |
2808 int param_len; | |
2809 | |
2810 n2s(p,i); | |
2811 param_len=i+2; | |
2812 if (param_len > n) | |
2813 { | |
2814 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_
BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); | |
2816 goto f_err; | |
2817 } | |
2818 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) | |
2819 { | |
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_
BN_LIB); | |
2821 goto err; | |
2822 } | |
2823 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) | |
2824 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); | |
2825 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
2826 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) | |
2827 { | |
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2829 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2830 goto err; | |
2831 } | |
2832 | |
2833 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server
_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0) | |
2834 { | |
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_
INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2836 goto err; | |
2837 } | |
2838 | |
2839 p+=i; | |
2840 } | |
2841 else | |
2842 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ | |
2843 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) | |
2844 { | |
2845 int ret = 0; | |
2846 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; | |
2847 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; | |
2848 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; | |
2849 size_t outlen=32, inlen; | |
2850 unsigned long alg_a; | |
2851 | |
2852 /* Get our certificate private key*/ | |
2853 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
2854 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) | |
2855 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; | |
2856 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) | |
2857 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
2858 | |
2859 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL); | |
2860 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); | |
2861 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same t
ype, maybe | |
2862 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from | |
2863 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely va
lid to use | |
2864 * a client certificate for authorization only. */ | |
2865 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
2866 if (client_pub_pkey) | |
2867 { | |
2868 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pu
b_pkey) <= 0) | |
2869 ERR_clear_error(); | |
2870 } | |
2871 /* Decrypt session key */ | |
2872 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))) | |
2873 { | |
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_
DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
2875 goto gerr; | |
2876 } | |
2877 if (p[1] == 0x81) | |
2878 { | |
2879 start = p+3; | |
2880 inlen = p[2]; | |
2881 } | |
2882 else if (p[1] < 0x80) | |
2883 { | |
2884 start = p+2; | |
2885 inlen = p[1]; | |
2886 } | |
2887 else | |
2888 { | |
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_
DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
2890 goto gerr; | |
2891 } | |
2892 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,s
tart,inlen) <=0) | |
2893 | |
2894 { | |
2895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_
DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
2896 goto gerr; | |
2897 } | |
2898 /* Generate master secret */ | |
2899 s->session->master_key_length= | |
2900 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
2901 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,
32); | |
2902 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ | |
2903 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PE
ER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) | |
2904 ret = 2; | |
2905 else | |
2906 ret = 1; | |
2907 gerr: | |
2908 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); | |
2909 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
2910 if (ret) | |
2911 return ret; | |
2912 else | |
2913 goto err; | |
2914 } | |
2915 else | |
2916 { | |
2917 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2919 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); | |
2920 goto f_err; | |
2921 } | |
2922 | |
2923 return(1); | |
2924 f_err: | |
2925 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); | |
2926 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_E
CDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) | |
2927 err: | |
2928 #endif | |
2929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH | |
2930 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); | |
2931 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); | |
2932 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) | |
2933 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); | |
2934 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); | |
2935 #endif | |
2936 return(-1); | |
2937 } | |
2938 | |
2939 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) | |
2940 { | |
2941 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; | |
2942 unsigned char *p; | |
2943 int al,ok,ret=0; | |
2944 long n; | |
2945 int type=0,i,j; | |
2946 X509 *peer; | |
2947 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2948 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; | |
2949 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); | |
2950 | |
2951 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, | |
2952 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, | |
2953 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, | |
2954 -1, | |
2955 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */ | |
2956 &ok); | |
2957 | |
2958 if (!ok) return((int)n); | |
2959 | |
2960 if (s->session->peer != NULL) | |
2961 { | |
2962 peer=s->session->peer; | |
2963 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); | |
2964 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); | |
2965 } | |
2966 else | |
2967 { | |
2968 peer=NULL; | |
2969 pkey=NULL; | |
2970 } | |
2971 | |
2972 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) | |
2973 { | |
2974 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; | |
2975 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) | |
2976 { | |
2977 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
2978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_M
ESSAGE); | |
2979 goto f_err; | |
2980 } | |
2981 ret=1; | |
2982 goto end; | |
2983 } | |
2984 | |
2985 if (peer == NULL) | |
2986 { | |
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED)
; | |
2988 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
2989 goto f_err; | |
2990 } | |
2991 | |
2992 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) | |
2993 { | |
2994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNIN
G_CERTIFICATE); | |
2995 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
2996 goto f_err; | |
2997 } | |
2998 | |
2999 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) | |
3000 { | |
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
3002 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
3003 goto f_err; | |
3004 } | |
3005 | |
3006 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ | |
3007 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; | |
3008 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ | |
3009 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare | |
3010 * signature without length field */ | |
3011 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 || | |
3012 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) | |
3013 { | |
3014 i=64; | |
3015 } | |
3016 else | |
3017 { | |
3018 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
3019 { | |
3020 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); | |
3021 /* Should never happen */ | |
3022 if (sigalg == -1) | |
3023 { | |
3024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL
_ERROR); | |
3025 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3026 goto f_err; | |
3027 } | |
3028 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ | |
3029 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) | |
3030 { | |
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SI
GNATURE_TYPE); | |
3032 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3033 goto f_err; | |
3034 } | |
3035 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); | |
3036 if (md == NULL) | |
3037 { | |
3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_
DIGEST); | |
3039 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3040 goto f_err; | |
3041 } | |
3042 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
3043 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
3044 #endif | |
3045 p += 2; | |
3046 n -= 2; | |
3047 } | |
3048 n2s(p,i); | |
3049 n-=2; | |
3050 if (i > n) | |
3051 { | |
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH)
; | |
3053 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3054 goto f_err; | |
3055 } | |
3056 } | |
3057 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
3058 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) | |
3059 { | |
3060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
3061 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3062 goto f_err; | |
3063 } | |
3064 | |
3065 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
3066 { | |
3067 long hdatalen = 0; | |
3068 void *hdata; | |
3069 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); | |
3070 if (hdatalen <= 0) | |
3071 { | |
3072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)
; | |
3073 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3074 goto f_err; | |
3075 } | |
3076 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
3077 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", | |
3078 EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
3079 #endif | |
3080 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) | |
3081 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) | |
3082 { | |
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
3084 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3085 goto f_err; | |
3086 } | |
3087 | |
3088 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0) | |
3089 { | |
3090 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
3092 goto f_err; | |
3093 } | |
3094 } | |
3095 else | |
3096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA | |
3097 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) | |
3098 { | |
3099 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, | |
3100 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, | |
3101 pkey->pkey.rsa); | |
3102 if (i < 0) | |
3103 { | |
3104 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT)
; | |
3106 goto f_err; | |
3107 } | |
3108 if (i == 0) | |
3109 { | |
3110 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
3111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATUR
E); | |
3112 goto f_err; | |
3113 } | |
3114 } | |
3115 else | |
3116 #endif | |
3117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA | |
3118 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) | |
3119 { | |
3120 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, | |
3121 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), | |
3122 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); | |
3123 if (j <= 0) | |
3124 { | |
3125 /* bad signature */ | |
3126 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
3127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATUR
E); | |
3128 goto f_err; | |
3129 } | |
3130 } | |
3131 else | |
3132 #endif | |
3133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA | |
3134 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) | |
3135 { | |
3136 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, | |
3137 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), | |
3138 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); | |
3139 if (j <= 0) | |
3140 { | |
3141 /* bad signature */ | |
3142 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
3143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, | |
3144 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); | |
3145 goto f_err; | |
3146 } | |
3147 } | |
3148 else | |
3149 #endif | |
3150 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_
2001) | |
3151 { unsigned char signature[64]; | |
3152 int idx; | |
3153 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); | |
3154 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); | |
3155 if (i!=64) { | |
3156 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i); | |
3157 } | |
3158 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) { | |
3159 signature[63-idx]=p[idx]; | |
3160 } | |
3161 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_veri
fy_md,32); | |
3162 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
3163 if (j<=0) | |
3164 { | |
3165 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
3166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, | |
3167 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); | |
3168 goto f_err; | |
3169 } | |
3170 } | |
3171 else | |
3172 { | |
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3174 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
3175 goto f_err; | |
3176 } | |
3177 | |
3178 | |
3179 ret=1; | |
3180 if (0) | |
3181 { | |
3182 f_err: | |
3183 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); | |
3184 } | |
3185 end: | |
3186 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) | |
3187 { | |
3188 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); | |
3189 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
3190 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; | |
3191 } | |
3192 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); | |
3193 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
3194 return(ret); | |
3195 } | |
3196 | |
3197 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) | |
3198 { | |
3199 int i,ok,al,ret= -1; | |
3200 X509 *x=NULL; | |
3201 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; | |
3202 const unsigned char *p,*q; | |
3203 unsigned char *d; | |
3204 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; | |
3205 | |
3206 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, | |
3207 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, | |
3208 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, | |
3209 -1, | |
3210 s->max_cert_list, | |
3211 &ok); | |
3212 | |
3213 if (!ok) return((int)n); | |
3214 | |
3215 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) | |
3216 { | |
3217 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
3218 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) | |
3219 { | |
3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_
NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); | |
3221 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
3222 goto f_err; | |
3223 } | |
3224 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 li
st */ | |
3225 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) | |
3226 { | |
3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_
DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); | |
3228 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
3229 goto f_err; | |
3230 } | |
3231 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; | |
3232 return(1); | |
3233 } | |
3234 | |
3235 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) | |
3236 { | |
3237 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYP
E); | |
3239 goto f_err; | |
3240 } | |
3241 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; | |
3242 | |
3243 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) | |
3244 { | |
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3246 goto err; | |
3247 } | |
3248 | |
3249 n2l3(p,llen); | |
3250 if (llen+3 != n) | |
3251 { | |
3252 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
3254 goto f_err; | |
3255 } | |
3256 for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) | |
3257 { | |
3258 n2l3(p,l); | |
3259 if ((l+nc+3) > llen) | |
3260 { | |
3261 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENG
TH_MISMATCH); | |
3263 goto f_err; | |
3264 } | |
3265 | |
3266 q=p; | |
3267 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); | |
3268 if (x == NULL) | |
3269 { | |
3270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB)
; | |
3271 goto err; | |
3272 } | |
3273 if (p != (q+l)) | |
3274 { | |
3275 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENG
TH_MISMATCH); | |
3277 goto f_err; | |
3278 } | |
3279 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) | |
3280 { | |
3281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FA
ILURE); | |
3282 goto err; | |
3283 } | |
3284 x=NULL; | |
3285 nc+=l+3; | |
3286 } | |
3287 | |
3288 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) | |
3289 { | |
3290 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ | |
3291 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) | |
3292 { | |
3293 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIF
ICATES_RETURNED); | |
3295 goto f_err; | |
3296 } | |
3297 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ | |
3298 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
3299 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) | |
3300 { | |
3301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_
NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); | |
3302 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
3303 goto f_err; | |
3304 } | |
3305 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ | |
3306 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) | |
3307 { | |
3308 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3309 goto f_err; | |
3310 } | |
3311 } | |
3312 else | |
3313 { | |
3314 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); | |
3315 if (i <= 0) | |
3316 { | |
3317 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); | |
3318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIF
ICATE_RETURNED); | |
3319 goto f_err; | |
3320 } | |
3321 } | |
3322 | |
3323 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ | |
3324 X509_free(s->session->peer); | |
3325 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); | |
3326 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
3327 | |
3328 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL | |
3329 * when we arrive here. */ | |
3330 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) | |
3331 { | |
3332 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); | |
3333 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) | |
3334 { | |
3335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_F
AILURE); | |
3336 goto err; | |
3337 } | |
3338 } | |
3339 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) | |
3340 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); | |
3341 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; | |
3342 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the | |
3343 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ | |
3344 | |
3345 sk=NULL; | |
3346 | |
3347 ret=1; | |
3348 if (0) | |
3349 { | |
3350 f_err: | |
3351 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); | |
3352 } | |
3353 err: | |
3354 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); | |
3355 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); | |
3356 return(ret); | |
3357 } | |
3358 | |
3359 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) | |
3360 { | |
3361 unsigned long l; | |
3362 X509 *x; | |
3363 | |
3364 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) | |
3365 { | |
3366 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); | |
3367 if (x == NULL) | |
3368 { | |
3369 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ | |
3370 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5)
|| | |
3371 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) | |
3372 { | |
3373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_
INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3374 return(0); | |
3375 } | |
3376 } | |
3377 | |
3378 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); | |
3379 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; | |
3380 s->init_num=(int)l; | |
3381 s->init_off=0; | |
3382 } | |
3383 | |
3384 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ | |
3385 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
3386 } | |
3387 | |
3388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT | |
3389 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ | |
3390 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) | |
3391 { | |
3392 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) | |
3393 { | |
3394 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; | |
3395 const unsigned char *const_p; | |
3396 int len, slen_full, slen; | |
3397 SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
3398 unsigned int hlen; | |
3399 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; | |
3400 HMAC_CTX hctx; | |
3401 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; | |
3402 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; | |
3403 unsigned char key_name[16]; | |
3404 | |
3405 /* get session encoding length */ | |
3406 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); | |
3407 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is | |
3408 * too long | |
3409 */ | |
3410 if (slen_full > 0xFF00) | |
3411 return -1; | |
3412 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); | |
3413 if (!senc) | |
3414 return -1; | |
3415 p = senc; | |
3416 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); | |
3417 | |
3418 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean
up */ | |
3419 const_p = senc; | |
3420 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); | |
3421 if (sess == NULL) | |
3422 { | |
3423 OPENSSL_free(senc); | |
3424 return -1; | |
3425 } | |
3426 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket
*/ | |
3427 | |
3428 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); | |
3429 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */ | |
3430 { | |
3431 OPENSSL_free(senc); | |
3432 return -1; | |
3433 } | |
3434 p = senc; | |
3435 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); | |
3436 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
3437 | |
3438 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as | |
3439 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length | |
3440 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + | |
3441 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + | |
3442 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session | |
3443 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). | |
3444 */ | |
3445 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, | |
3446 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + | |
3447 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) | |
3448 return -1; | |
3449 | |
3450 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
3451 /* do the header */ | |
3452 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; | |
3453 /* Skip message length for now */ | |
3454 p += 3; | |
3455 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
3456 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); | |
3457 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present | |
3458 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values | |
3459 * from parent ctx. | |
3460 */ | |
3461 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) | |
3462 { | |
3463 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, | |
3464 &hctx, 1) < 0) | |
3465 { | |
3466 OPENSSL_free(senc); | |
3467 return -1; | |
3468 } | |
3469 } | |
3470 else | |
3471 { | |
3472 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); | |
3473 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, | |
3474 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); | |
3475 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, | |
3476 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); | |
3477 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); | |
3478 } | |
3479 | |
3480 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): | |
3481 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity
), | |
3482 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long | |
3483 * as their sessions. */ | |
3484 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); | |
3485 | |
3486 /* Skip ticket length for now */ | |
3487 p += 2; | |
3488 /* Output key name */ | |
3489 macstart = p; | |
3490 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); | |
3491 p += 16; | |
3492 /* output IV */ | |
3493 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); | |
3494 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); | |
3495 /* Encrypt session data */ | |
3496 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); | |
3497 p += len; | |
3498 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); | |
3499 p += len; | |
3500 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
3501 | |
3502 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); | |
3503 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); | |
3504 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); | |
3505 | |
3506 p += hlen; | |
3507 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ | |
3508 /* Total length */ | |
3509 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
3510 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; | |
3511 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ | |
3512 p += 4; | |
3513 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ | |
3514 | |
3515 /* number of bytes to write */ | |
3516 s->init_num= len; | |
3517 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; | |
3518 s->init_off=0; | |
3519 OPENSSL_free(senc); | |
3520 } | |
3521 | |
3522 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ | |
3523 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
3524 } | |
3525 | |
3526 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) | |
3527 { | |
3528 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) | |
3529 { | |
3530 unsigned char *p; | |
3531 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as | |
3532 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + | |
3533 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) | |
3534 * + (ocsp response) | |
3535 */ | |
3536 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) | |
3537 return -1; | |
3538 | |
3539 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
3540 | |
3541 /* do the header */ | |
3542 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; | |
3543 /* message length */ | |
3544 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); | |
3545 /* status type */ | |
3546 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; | |
3547 /* length of OCSP response */ | |
3548 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); | |
3549 /* actual response */ | |
3550 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); | |
3551 /* number of bytes to write */ | |
3552 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; | |
3553 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; | |
3554 s->init_off = 0; | |
3555 } | |
3556 | |
3557 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ | |
3558 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
3559 } | |
3560 | |
3561 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
3562 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It | |
3563 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ | |
3564 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) | |
3565 { | |
3566 int ok; | |
3567 int proto_len, padding_len; | |
3568 long n; | |
3569 const unsigned char *p; | |
3570 | |
3571 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the | |
3572 * extension in their ClientHello */ | |
3573 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) | |
3574 { | |
3575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EX
TENSION); | |
3576 return -1; | |
3577 } | |
3578 | |
3579 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, | |
3580 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, | |
3581 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, | |
3582 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, | |
3583 514, /* See the payload format below */ | |
3584 &ok); | |
3585 | |
3586 if (!ok) | |
3587 return((int)n); | |
3588 | |
3589 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received | |
3590 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset | |
3591 * by ssl3_get_finished). */ | |
3592 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) | |
3593 { | |
3594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_C
CS); | |
3595 return -1; | |
3596 } | |
3597 | |
3598 if (n < 2) | |
3599 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ | |
3600 | |
3601 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; | |
3602 | |
3603 /* The payload looks like: | |
3604 * uint8 proto_len; | |
3605 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; | |
3606 * uint8 padding_len; | |
3607 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; | |
3608 */ | |
3609 proto_len = p[0]; | |
3610 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) | |
3611 return 0; | |
3612 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; | |
3613 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) | |
3614 return 0; | |
3615 | |
3616 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); | |
3617 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) | |
3618 { | |
3619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3620 return 0; | |
3621 } | |
3622 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); | |
3623 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; | |
3624 | |
3625 return 1; | |
3626 } | |
3627 # endif | |
3628 | |
3629 /* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */ | |
3630 int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s) | |
3631 { | |
3632 int ret = -1, ok; | |
3633 long n; | |
3634 const unsigned char *p; | |
3635 unsigned short extension_type, extension_len; | |
3636 EC_GROUP* p256 = NULL; | |
3637 EC_KEY* key = NULL; | |
3638 EC_POINT* point = NULL; | |
3639 ECDSA_SIG sig; | |
3640 BIGNUM x, y; | |
3641 | |
3642 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A && s->init_num == 0) | |
3643 { | |
3644 /* The first time that we're called we take the current | |
3645 * handshake hash and store it. */ | |
3646 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
3647 unsigned int len; | |
3648 | |
3649 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); | |
3650 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL); | |
3651 if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s)) | |
3652 return -1; | |
3653 len = sizeof(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id); | |
3654 EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, &len); | |
3655 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
3656 } | |
3657 | |
3658 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, | |
3659 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A, | |
3660 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B, | |
3661 SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, | |
3662 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, | |
3663 &ok); | |
3664 | |
3665 if (!ok) | |
3666 return((int)n); | |
3667 | |
3668 ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char*)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4); | |
3669 | |
3670 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received | |
3671 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset | |
3672 * by ssl3_get_finished). */ | |
3673 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) | |
3674 { | |
3675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_C
CS); | |
3676 return -1; | |
3677 } | |
3678 | |
3679 if (n != 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) | |
3680 { | |
3681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE); | |
3682 return -1; | |
3683 } | |
3684 | |
3685 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; | |
3686 | |
3687 /* The payload looks like: | |
3688 * uint16 extension_type | |
3689 * uint16 extension_len; | |
3690 * uint8 x[32]; | |
3691 * uint8 y[32]; | |
3692 * uint8 r[32]; | |
3693 * uint8 s[32]; | |
3694 */ | |
3695 n2s(p, extension_type); | |
3696 n2s(p, extension_len); | |
3697 | |
3698 if (extension_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id || | |
3699 extension_len != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) | |
3700 { | |
3701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE); | |
3702 return -1; | |
3703 } | |
3704 | |
3705 p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); | |
3706 if (!p256) | |
3707 { | |
3708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT); | |
3709 return -1; | |
3710 } | |
3711 | |
3712 BN_init(&x); | |
3713 BN_init(&y); | |
3714 sig.r = BN_new(); | |
3715 sig.s = BN_new(); | |
3716 | |
3717 if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL || | |
3718 BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL || | |
3719 BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL || | |
3720 BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL) | |
3721 goto err; | |
3722 | |
3723 point = EC_POINT_new(p256); | |
3724 if (!point || | |
3725 !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL)) | |
3726 goto err; | |
3727 | |
3728 key = EC_KEY_new(); | |
3729 if (!key || | |
3730 !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) || | |
3731 !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) | |
3732 goto err; | |
3733 | |
3734 /* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time | |
3735 * that we were called. */ | |
3736 switch (ECDSA_do_verify(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
&sig, key)) { | |
3737 case 1: | |
3738 break; | |
3739 case 0: | |
3740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVA
LID); | |
3741 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; | |
3742 goto err; | |
3743 default: | |
3744 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; | |
3745 goto err; | |
3746 } | |
3747 | |
3748 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64); | |
3749 ret = 1; | |
3750 | |
3751 err: | |
3752 BN_free(&x); | |
3753 BN_free(&y); | |
3754 BN_free(sig.r); | |
3755 BN_free(sig.s); | |
3756 if (key) | |
3757 EC_KEY_free(key); | |
3758 if (point) | |
3759 EC_POINT_free(point); | |
3760 if (p256) | |
3761 EC_GROUP_free(p256); | |
3762 return ret; | |
3763 } | |
3764 #endif | |
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