| Index: net/cert/internal/verify_certificate_chain.cc
|
| diff --git a/net/cert/internal/verify_certificate_chain.cc b/net/cert/internal/verify_certificate_chain.cc
|
| index 506fb434befec20aca8d118e49021cf624313e87..9aa1db6a6f1b9c573b4702b212090544a5c6fb06 100644
|
| --- a/net/cert/internal/verify_certificate_chain.cc
|
| +++ b/net/cert/internal/verify_certificate_chain.cc
|
| @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
|
| #include <memory>
|
|
|
| #include "base/logging.h"
|
| -#include "net/cert/internal/name_constraints.h"
|
| #include "net/cert/internal/parse_certificate.h"
|
| #include "net/cert/internal/signature_algorithm.h"
|
| #include "net/cert/internal/signature_policy.h"
|
| @@ -20,14 +19,13 @@ namespace net {
|
|
|
| namespace {
|
|
|
| -// Map from OID to ParsedExtension.
|
| -using ExtensionsMap = std::map<der::Input, ParsedExtension>;
|
| -
|
| // Describes all parsed properties of a certificate that are relevant for
|
| // certificate verification.
|
| struct FullyParsedCert {
|
| - ParsedCertificate cert;
|
| - ParsedTbsCertificate tbs;
|
| + // XXX better naming.. this results in lots of non-obvious cert.cert->foo code
|
| + scoped_refptr<CertThing> cert;
|
| +
|
| + // XXX should some of this be moved into CertThing?
|
|
|
| std::unique_ptr<SignatureAlgorithm> signature_algorithm;
|
|
|
| @@ -38,21 +36,20 @@ struct FullyParsedCert {
|
| bool has_key_usage = false;
|
| der::BitString key_usage;
|
|
|
| - std::unique_ptr<GeneralNames> subject_alt_names;
|
| -
|
| bool has_name_constraints = false;
|
| ParsedExtension name_constraints_extension;
|
|
|
| // The remaining extensions (excludes the standard ones above).
|
| - ExtensionsMap unconsumed_extensions;
|
| + CertThing::ExtensionsMap unconsumed_extensions;
|
| };
|
|
|
| // Removes the extension with OID |oid| from |unconsumed_extensions| and fills
|
| // |extension| with the matching extension value. If there was no extension
|
| // matching |oid| then returns |false|.
|
| -WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool ConsumeExtension(const der::Input& oid,
|
| - ExtensionsMap* unconsumed_extensions,
|
| - ParsedExtension* extension) {
|
| +WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool ConsumeExtension(
|
| + const der::Input& oid,
|
| + CertThing::ExtensionsMap* unconsumed_extensions,
|
| + ParsedExtension* extension) {
|
| auto it = unconsumed_extensions->find(oid);
|
| if (it == unconsumed_extensions->end())
|
| return false;
|
| @@ -79,43 +76,34 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool GetSequenceValue(const der::Input& tlv,
|
| return parser.ReadTag(der::kSequence, value) && !parser.HasMore();
|
| }
|
|
|
| +// XXX update doc
|
| // Parses an X.509 Certificate fully (including the TBSCertificate and
|
| // standard extensions), saving all the properties to |out_|.
|
| -WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool FullyParseCertificate(const der::Input& cert_tlv,
|
| +WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool FullyParseCertificate(scoped_refptr<CertThing> cert,
|
| FullyParsedCert* out) {
|
| - // Parse the outer Certificate.
|
| - if (!ParseCertificate(cert_tlv, &out->cert))
|
| - return false;
|
| + // XXX move more of this into CertThing?
|
| +
|
| + out->cert = std::move(cert);
|
|
|
| // Parse the signature algorithm contained in the Certificate (there is
|
| // another one in the TBSCertificate, which is checked later by
|
| // VerifySignatureAlgorithmsMatch)
|
| - out->signature_algorithm =
|
| - SignatureAlgorithm::CreateFromDer(out->cert.signature_algorithm_tlv);
|
| + out->signature_algorithm = SignatureAlgorithm::CreateFromDer(
|
| + out->cert->parsed_cert().signature_algorithm_tlv);
|
| if (!out->signature_algorithm)
|
| return false;
|
|
|
| - // Parse the TBSCertificate.
|
| - if (!ParseTbsCertificate(out->cert.tbs_certificate_tlv, &out->tbs))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| // Reset state relating to extensions (which may not get overwritten). This is
|
| // just a precaution, since in practice |out| will already be default
|
| // initialize.
|
| out->has_basic_constraints = false;
|
| out->has_key_usage = false;
|
| - out->unconsumed_extensions.clear();
|
| - out->subject_alt_names.reset();
|
| out->has_name_constraints = false;
|
|
|
| + out->unconsumed_extensions = out->cert->unconsumed_extensions();
|
| // Parse the standard X.509 extensions and remove them from
|
| // |unconsumed_extensions|.
|
| - if (out->tbs.has_extensions) {
|
| - // ParseExtensions() ensures there are no duplicates, and maps the (unique)
|
| - // OID to the extension value.
|
| - if (!ParseExtensions(out->tbs.extensions_tlv, &out->unconsumed_extensions))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| + if (!out->unconsumed_extensions.empty()) {
|
| ParsedExtension extension;
|
|
|
| // Basic constraints.
|
| @@ -134,28 +122,6 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool FullyParseCertificate(const der::Input& cert_tlv,
|
| return false;
|
| }
|
|
|
| - // Subject alternative name.
|
| - if (ConsumeExtension(SubjectAltNameOid(), &out->unconsumed_extensions,
|
| - &extension)) {
|
| - // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6:
|
| - // SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
|
| - out->subject_alt_names = GeneralNames::CreateFromDer(extension.value);
|
| - if (!out->subject_alt_names)
|
| - return false;
|
| - // RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6:
|
| - // If subject naming information is present only in the subjectAltName
|
| - // extension (e.g., a key bound only to an email address or URI), then the
|
| - // subject name MUST be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension
|
| - // MUST be critical.
|
| - if (!extension.critical) {
|
| - der::Input subject_value;
|
| - if (!GetSequenceValue(out->tbs.subject_tlv, &subject_value))
|
| - return false;
|
| - if (subject_value.Length() == 0)
|
| - return false;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| // Name constraints.
|
| if (ConsumeExtension(NameConstraintsOid(), &out->unconsumed_extensions,
|
| &out->name_constraints_extension)) {
|
| @@ -166,23 +132,6 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool FullyParseCertificate(const der::Input& cert_tlv,
|
| return true;
|
| }
|
|
|
| -// Returns true if |name1_tlv| matches |name2_tlv|. The two inputs must be
|
| -// tag-length-value for RFC 5280's Name.
|
| -WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool NameMatches(const der::Input& name1_tlv,
|
| - const der::Input& name2_tlv) {
|
| - der::Input name1_value;
|
| - der::Input name2_value;
|
| -
|
| - // Assume that the Name is an RDNSequence. VerifyNameMatch() expects the
|
| - // value from a SEQUENCE, so strip off the tag.
|
| - if (!GetSequenceValue(name1_tlv, &name1_value) ||
|
| - !GetSequenceValue(name2_tlv, &name2_value)) {
|
| - return false;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return VerifyNameMatch(name1_value, name2_value);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| // Returns true if |cert| was self-issued. The definition of self-issuance
|
| // comes from RFC 5280 section 6.1:
|
| //
|
| @@ -195,7 +144,7 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool NameMatches(const der::Input& name1_tlv,
|
| // self-issued certificates are not counted when evaluating path length
|
| // or name constraints.
|
| WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool IsSelfIssued(const FullyParsedCert& cert) {
|
| - return NameMatches(cert.tbs.subject_tlv, cert.tbs.issuer_tlv);
|
| + return cert.cert->normalized_subject() == cert.cert->normalized_issuer();
|
| }
|
|
|
| // Returns true if |cert| is valid at time |time|.
|
| @@ -207,8 +156,8 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool IsSelfIssued(const FullyParsedCert& cert) {
|
| // notBefore through notAfter, inclusive.
|
| WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool VerifyTimeValidity(const FullyParsedCert& cert,
|
| const der::GeneralizedTime time) {
|
| - return !(time < cert.tbs.validity_not_before) &&
|
| - !(cert.tbs.validity_not_after < time);
|
| + return !(time < cert.cert->parsed_tbs().validity_not_before) &&
|
| + !(cert.cert->parsed_tbs().validity_not_after < time);
|
| }
|
|
|
| // Returns true if |signature_algorithm_tlv| is a valid algorithm encoding for
|
| @@ -244,8 +193,8 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool IsRsaWithSha1SignatureAlgorithm(
|
| // compatibility sake.
|
| WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool VerifySignatureAlgorithmsMatch(
|
| const FullyParsedCert& cert) {
|
| - const der::Input& alg1_tlv = cert.cert.signature_algorithm_tlv;
|
| - const der::Input& alg2_tlv = cert.tbs.signature_algorithm_tlv;
|
| + const der::Input& alg1_tlv = cert.cert->parsed_cert().signature_algorithm_tlv;
|
| + const der::Input& alg2_tlv = cert.cert->parsed_tbs().signature_algorithm_tlv;
|
|
|
| // Ensure that the two DER-encoded signature algorithms are byte-for-byte
|
| // equal, but make a compatibility concession for RSA with SHA1.
|
| @@ -258,7 +207,7 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool VerifySignatureAlgorithmsMatch(
|
| //
|
| // |skip_issuer_checks| controls whether the function will skip:
|
| // - Checking that |cert|'s signature using |working_spki|
|
| -// - Checkinging that |cert|'s issuer matches |working_issuer_name|
|
| +// - Checkinging that |cert|'s issuer matches |working_normalized_issuer_name|
|
| // This should be set to true only when verifying a trusted root certificate.
|
| WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool BasicCertificateProcessing(
|
| const FullyParsedCert& cert,
|
| @@ -267,7 +216,7 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool BasicCertificateProcessing(
|
| const SignaturePolicy* signature_policy,
|
| const der::GeneralizedTime& time,
|
| const der::Input& working_spki,
|
| - const der::Input& working_issuer_name,
|
| + const der::Input& working_normalized_issuer_name,
|
| const std::vector<std::unique_ptr<NameConstraints>>&
|
| name_constraints_list) {
|
| // Check that the signature algorithms in Certificate vs TBSCertificate
|
| @@ -279,9 +228,10 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool BasicCertificateProcessing(
|
| // Verify the digital signature using the previous certificate's key (RFC
|
| // 5280 section 6.1.3 step a.1).
|
| if (!skip_issuer_checks) {
|
| - if (!VerifySignedData(
|
| - *cert.signature_algorithm, cert.cert.tbs_certificate_tlv,
|
| - cert.cert.signature_value, working_spki, signature_policy)) {
|
| + if (!VerifySignedData(*cert.signature_algorithm,
|
| + cert.cert->parsed_cert().tbs_certificate_tlv,
|
| + cert.cert->parsed_cert().signature_value,
|
| + working_spki, signature_policy)) {
|
| return false;
|
| }
|
| }
|
| @@ -297,7 +247,8 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool BasicCertificateProcessing(
|
| // Verify the certificate's issuer name matches the issuing certificate's
|
| // subject name. (RFC 5280 section 6.1.3 step a.4)
|
| if (!skip_issuer_checks) {
|
| - if (!NameMatches(cert.tbs.issuer_tlv, working_issuer_name))
|
| + if (der::Input(&cert.cert->normalized_issuer()) !=
|
| + working_normalized_issuer_name)
|
| return false;
|
| }
|
|
|
| @@ -306,11 +257,12 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool BasicCertificateProcessing(
|
| // path, skip this step for certificate i.
|
| if (!name_constraints_list.empty() &&
|
| (!IsSelfIssued(cert) || is_target_cert)) {
|
| + // XXX used normalized_subject here
|
| der::Input subject_value;
|
| - if (!GetSequenceValue(cert.tbs.subject_tlv, &subject_value))
|
| + if (!GetSequenceValue(cert.cert->parsed_tbs().subject_tlv, &subject_value))
|
| return false;
|
| for (const auto& nc : name_constraints_list) {
|
| - if (!nc->IsPermittedCert(subject_value, cert.subject_alt_names.get()))
|
| + if (!nc->IsPermittedCert(subject_value, cert.cert->subject_alt_names()))
|
| return false;
|
| }
|
| }
|
| @@ -327,20 +279,21 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool PrepareForNextCertificate(
|
| const FullyParsedCert& cert,
|
| size_t* max_path_length_ptr,
|
| der::Input* working_spki,
|
| - der::Input* working_issuer_name,
|
| + der::Input* working_normalized_issuer_name,
|
| std::vector<std::unique_ptr<NameConstraints>>* name_constraints_list) {
|
| // TODO(eroman): Steps a-b are omitted, as policy constraints are not yet
|
| // implemented.
|
|
|
| // From RFC 5280 section 6.1.4 step c:
|
| //
|
| - // Assign the certificate subject name to working_issuer_name.
|
| - *working_issuer_name = cert.tbs.subject_tlv;
|
| + // Assign the certificate subject name to working_normalized_issuer_name.
|
| + *working_normalized_issuer_name =
|
| + der::Input(&cert.cert->normalized_subject());
|
|
|
| // From RFC 5280 section 6.1.4 step d:
|
| //
|
| // Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey to working_public_key.
|
| - *working_spki = cert.tbs.spki_tlv;
|
| + *working_spki = cert.cert->parsed_tbs().spki_tlv;
|
|
|
| // Note that steps e and f are omitted as they are handled by
|
| // the assignment to |working_spki| above. See the definition
|
| @@ -494,14 +447,14 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool WrapUp(const FullyParsedCert& cert) {
|
|
|
| } // namespace
|
|
|
| -TrustAnchor::TrustAnchor() {}
|
| -TrustAnchor::~TrustAnchor() {}
|
| +CertThing::CertThing() {}
|
| +CertThing::~CertThing() {}
|
|
|
| -std::unique_ptr<TrustAnchor> TrustAnchor::CreateFromCertificateData(
|
| +scoped_refptr<CertThing> CertThing::CreateFromCertificateData(
|
| const uint8_t* data,
|
| size_t length,
|
| DataSource source) {
|
| - std::unique_ptr<TrustAnchor> result(new TrustAnchor);
|
| + scoped_refptr<CertThing> result(new CertThing);
|
|
|
| switch (source) {
|
| case DataSource::INTERNAL_COPY:
|
| @@ -515,25 +468,64 @@ std::unique_ptr<TrustAnchor> TrustAnchor::CreateFromCertificateData(
|
| }
|
|
|
| // Parse the certificate to get its name.
|
| - ParsedCertificate cert;
|
| - if (!ParseCertificate(result->cert(), &cert))
|
| + if (!ParseCertificate(result->cert_, &result->parsed_cert_))
|
| return nullptr;
|
|
|
| - ParsedTbsCertificate tbs;
|
| - if (!ParseTbsCertificate(cert.tbs_certificate_tlv, &tbs))
|
| + if (!ParseTbsCertificate(result->parsed_cert_.tbs_certificate_tlv,
|
| + &result->parsed_tbs_))
|
| return nullptr;
|
|
|
| - result->name_ = tbs.subject_tlv;
|
| + der::Input subject_value;
|
| + if (!GetSequenceValue(result->parsed_tbs_.subject_tlv, &subject_value) ||
|
| + !NormalizeName(subject_value, &result->normalized_subject_))
|
| + return nullptr;
|
| + der::Input issuer_value;
|
| + if (!GetSequenceValue(result->parsed_tbs_.issuer_tlv, &issuer_value) ||
|
| + !NormalizeName(issuer_value, &result->normalized_issuer_))
|
| + return nullptr;
|
|
|
| - // TODO(eroman): If adding a self-signed certificate, check that its
|
| - // signature is correct? This check will not otherwise be done during
|
| - // verification.
|
| + // Parse the standard X.509 extensions and remove them from
|
| + // |unconsumed_extensions|.
|
| + if (result->parsed_tbs_.has_extensions) {
|
| + // ParseExtensions() ensures there are no duplicates, and maps the (unique)
|
| + // OID to the extension value.
|
| + if (!ParseExtensions(result->parsed_tbs_.extensions_tlv,
|
| + &result->unconsumed_extensions_))
|
| + return nullptr;
|
| +
|
| + // Subject alternative name.
|
| + if (ConsumeExtension(SubjectAltNameOid(), &result->unconsumed_extensions_,
|
| + &result->subject_alt_names_extension_)) {
|
| + // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6:
|
| + // SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
|
| + result->subject_alt_names_ = GeneralNames::CreateFromDer(
|
| + result->subject_alt_names_extension_.value);
|
| + if (!result->subject_alt_names_)
|
| + return nullptr;
|
| + // RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6:
|
| + // If subject naming information is present only in the subjectAltName
|
| + // extension (e.g., a key bound only to an email address or URI), then the
|
| + // subject name MUST be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension
|
| + // MUST be critical.
|
| + if (!result->subject_alt_names_extension_.critical) {
|
| + der::Input subject_value;
|
| + // XXX can we use normalized_subject_ here?
|
| + if (!GetSequenceValue(result->parsed_tbs().subject_tlv, &subject_value))
|
| + return nullptr;
|
| + if (subject_value.Length() == 0)
|
| + return nullptr;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
|
|
| return result;
|
| }
|
|
|
| -bool TrustAnchor::MatchesName(const der::Input& name) const {
|
| - return NameMatches(name, name_);
|
| +scoped_refptr<CertThing> CertThing::CreateFromCertificateCopy(
|
| + const base::StringPiece& data) {
|
| + return CertThing::CreateFromCertificateData(
|
| + reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(data.data()), data.size(),
|
| + DataSource::INTERNAL_COPY);
|
| }
|
|
|
| TrustStore::TrustStore() {}
|
| @@ -543,53 +535,29 @@ void TrustStore::Clear() {
|
| anchors_.clear();
|
| }
|
|
|
| -bool TrustStore::AddTrustedCertificate(const uint8_t* data, size_t length) {
|
| - return AddTrustedCertificate(data, length,
|
| - TrustAnchor::DataSource::INTERNAL_COPY);
|
| +void TrustStore::AddTrustedCertificate(scoped_refptr<CertThing> anchor) {
|
| + // XXX should this check for duplicate certs?
|
| + anchors_.insert(
|
| + std::make_pair(anchor->normalized_subject(), std::move(anchor)));
|
| }
|
|
|
| -bool TrustStore::AddTrustedCertificate(const base::StringPiece& data) {
|
| - return AddTrustedCertificate(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(data.data()),
|
| - data.size());
|
| +void TrustStore::FindTrustAnchorsByNormalizedName(
|
| + const std::string& normalized_name,
|
| + CertVector* matches) const {
|
| + auto range = anchors_.equal_range(normalized_name);
|
| + for (auto it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it)
|
| + matches->push_back(it->second);
|
| }
|
|
|
| -bool TrustStore::AddTrustedCertificateWithoutCopying(const uint8_t* data,
|
| - size_t length) {
|
| - return AddTrustedCertificate(data, length,
|
| - TrustAnchor::DataSource::EXTERNAL_REFERENCE);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -const TrustAnchor* TrustStore::FindTrustAnchorByName(
|
| - const der::Input& name) const {
|
| - for (const auto& anchor : anchors_) {
|
| - if (anchor->MatchesName(name)) {
|
| - return anchor.get();
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - return nullptr;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -bool TrustStore::IsTrustedCertificate(const der::Input& cert_der) const {
|
| - for (const auto& anchor : anchors_) {
|
| - if (anchor->cert() == cert_der)
|
| +bool TrustStore::IsTrustedCertificate(const CertThing* cert) const {
|
| + auto range = anchors_.equal_range(cert->normalized_subject());
|
| + for (auto it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it) {
|
| + if (it->second == cert || it->second->der_cert() == cert->der_cert())
|
| return true;
|
| }
|
| return false;
|
| }
|
|
|
| -bool TrustStore::AddTrustedCertificate(const uint8_t* data,
|
| - size_t length,
|
| - TrustAnchor::DataSource source) {
|
| - auto anchor = TrustAnchor::CreateFromCertificateData(data, length, source);
|
| - if (!anchor)
|
| - return false;
|
| - anchors_.push_back(std::move(anchor));
|
| - return true;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -// TODO(eroman): Move this into existing anonymous namespace.
|
| -namespace {
|
| -
|
| // This implementation is structured to mimic the description of certificate
|
| // path verification given by RFC 5280 section 6.1.
|
| //
|
| @@ -597,19 +565,19 @@ namespace {
|
| // the chain. This root certificate is assumed to be trusted, and neither its
|
| // signature nor issuer name are verified. (It needn't be self-signed).
|
| bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot(
|
| - const std::vector<der::Input>& certs_der,
|
| + const std::vector<scoped_refptr<CertThing>>& certs,
|
| // The trust store is only used for assertions.
|
| const TrustStore& trust_store,
|
| const SignaturePolicy* signature_policy,
|
| const der::GeneralizedTime& time) {
|
| // An empty chain is necessarily invalid.
|
| - if (certs_der.empty())
|
| + if (certs.empty())
|
| return false;
|
|
|
| // IMPORTANT: the assumption being made is that the root certificate in
|
| // the given path is the trust anchor (and has already been verified as
|
| // such).
|
| - DCHECK(trust_store.IsTrustedCertificate(certs_der.back()));
|
| + DCHECK(trust_store.IsTrustedCertificate(certs.back().get()));
|
|
|
| // Will contain a NameConstraints for each previous cert in the chain which
|
| // had nameConstraints. This corresponds to the permitted_subtrees and
|
| @@ -632,12 +600,12 @@ bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot(
|
| // signature of a certificate.
|
| der::Input working_spki;
|
|
|
| - // |working_issuer_name| corresponds with the same named variable in RFC 5280
|
| - // section 6.1.2:
|
| + // |working_normalized_issuer_name| is the normalized value of the
|
| + // working_issuer_name variable in RFC 5280 section 6.1.2:
|
| //
|
| // working_issuer_name: the issuer distinguished name expected
|
| // in the next certificate in the chain.
|
| - der::Input working_issuer_name;
|
| + der::Input working_normalized_issuer_name;
|
|
|
| // |max_path_length| corresponds with the same named variable in RFC 5280
|
| // section 6.1.2:
|
| @@ -647,7 +615,7 @@ bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot(
|
| // and may be reduced to the value in the path length constraint
|
| // field within the basic constraints extension of a CA
|
| // certificate.
|
| - size_t max_path_length = certs_der.size();
|
| + size_t max_path_length = certs.size();
|
|
|
| // Iterate over all the certificates in the reverse direction: starting from
|
| // the trust anchor and progressing towards the target certificate.
|
| @@ -656,13 +624,13 @@ bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot(
|
| //
|
| // * i=0 : Trust anchor.
|
| // * i=N-1 : Target certificate.
|
| - for (size_t i = 0; i < certs_der.size(); ++i) {
|
| - const size_t index_into_certs_der = certs_der.size() - i - 1;
|
| + for (size_t i = 0; i < certs.size(); ++i) {
|
| + const size_t index_into_certs = certs.size() - i - 1;
|
|
|
| // |is_target_cert| is true if the current certificate is the target
|
| // certificate being verified. The target certificate isn't necessarily an
|
| // end-entity certificate.
|
| - const bool is_target_cert = index_into_certs_der == 0;
|
| + const bool is_target_cert = index_into_certs == 0;
|
|
|
| // |is_trust_anchor| is true if the current certificate is the trust
|
| // anchor. This certificate is implicitly trusted.
|
| @@ -670,8 +638,7 @@ bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot(
|
|
|
| // Parse the current certificate into |cert|.
|
| FullyParsedCert cert;
|
| - const der::Input& cert_der = certs_der[index_into_certs_der];
|
| - if (!FullyParseCertificate(cert_der, &cert))
|
| + if (!FullyParseCertificate(certs[index_into_certs], &cert))
|
| return false;
|
|
|
| // Per RFC 5280 section 6.1:
|
| @@ -679,14 +646,15 @@ bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot(
|
| // * If it is the last certificate in the path (target certificate)
|
| // - Then run "Wrap up"
|
| // - Otherwise run "Prepare for Next cert"
|
| - if (!BasicCertificateProcessing(
|
| - cert, is_target_cert, is_trust_anchor, signature_policy, time,
|
| - working_spki, working_issuer_name, name_constraints_list)) {
|
| + if (!BasicCertificateProcessing(cert, is_target_cert, is_trust_anchor,
|
| + signature_policy, time, working_spki,
|
| + working_normalized_issuer_name,
|
| + name_constraints_list)) {
|
| return false;
|
| }
|
| if (!is_target_cert) {
|
| if (!PrepareForNextCertificate(cert, &max_path_length, &working_spki,
|
| - &working_issuer_name,
|
| + &working_normalized_issuer_name,
|
| &name_constraints_list)) {
|
| return false;
|
| }
|
| @@ -704,60 +672,56 @@ bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot(
|
| return true;
|
| }
|
|
|
| -// TODO(eroman): This function is a temporary hack in the absence of full
|
| -// path building. It may insert 1 certificate at the root of the
|
| -// chain to ensure that the path's root certificate is a trust anchor.
|
| -//
|
| -// Beyond this no other verification is done on the chain. The caller is
|
| -// responsible for verifying the subsequent chain's correctness.
|
| -WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool BuildSimplePathToTrustAnchor(
|
| - const std::vector<der::Input>& certs_der,
|
| - const TrustStore& trust_store,
|
| - std::vector<der::Input>* certs_der_trusted_root) {
|
| - // Copy the input chain.
|
| - *certs_der_trusted_root = certs_der;
|
| -
|
| - if (certs_der.empty())
|
| - return false;
|
| +} // namespace net
|
|
|
| - // Check if the current root certificate is trusted. If it is then no
|
| - // extra work is needed.
|
| - if (trust_store.IsTrustedCertificate(certs_der_trusted_root->back()))
|
| - return true;
|
| -
|
| - // Otherwise if it is not trusted, check whether its issuer is trusted. If
|
| - // so, make *that* trusted certificate the root. If the issuer is not in
|
| - // the trust store then give up and fail (this is not full path building).
|
| - ParsedCertificate cert;
|
| - ParsedTbsCertificate tbs;
|
| - if (!ParseCertificate(certs_der.back(), &cert) ||
|
| - !ParseTbsCertificate(cert.tbs_certificate_tlv, &tbs)) {
|
| - return false;
|
| - }
|
| +// XXX this is ick that verify_certificate_chain.cc uses path_builder.h
|
| +// and path_builder.cc uses verify_certificate_chain.h. Reorganize some things
|
| +// or remove this entirely.
|
| +#include "base/memory/ptr_util.h"
|
| +#include "path_builder.h"
|
|
|
| - auto trust_anchor = trust_store.FindTrustAnchorByName(tbs.issuer_tlv);
|
| - if (!trust_anchor)
|
| - return false;
|
| - certs_der_trusted_root->push_back(trust_anchor->cert());
|
| - return true;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -} // namespace
|
| +namespace net {
|
|
|
| bool VerifyCertificateChain(const std::vector<der::Input>& certs_der,
|
| const TrustStore& trust_store,
|
| const SignaturePolicy* signature_policy,
|
| const der::GeneralizedTime& time) {
|
| - // Modify the certificate chain so that its root is a trusted certificate.
|
| - std::vector<der::Input> certs_der_trusted_root;
|
| - if (!BuildSimplePathToTrustAnchor(certs_der, trust_store,
|
| - &certs_der_trusted_root)) {
|
| + if (certs_der.empty())
|
| return false;
|
| +
|
| + scoped_refptr<CertThing> target_cert(CertThing::CreateFromCertificateData(
|
| + certs_der.front().UnsafeData(), certs_der.front().Length(),
|
| + CertThing::DataSource::EXTERNAL_REFERENCE));
|
| + if (!target_cert)
|
| + return false;
|
| +
|
| + CertPathBuilder::CertSources cert_sources;
|
| + std::unique_ptr<StaticCertSource> intermediate_cert_source;
|
| + std::vector<scoped_refptr<CertThing>> intermediates;
|
| + for (size_t i = 1; i < certs_der.size(); ++i) {
|
| + const auto& cert_der = certs_der[i];
|
| + scoped_refptr<CertThing> cert(CertThing::CreateFromCertificateData(
|
| + cert_der.UnsafeData(), cert_der.Length(),
|
| + CertThing::DataSource::EXTERNAL_REFERENCE));
|
| + if (!cert)
|
| + return false;
|
| + intermediates.push_back(std::move(cert));
|
| + }
|
| + if (!intermediates.empty()) {
|
| + intermediate_cert_source =
|
| + base::WrapUnique(new StaticCertSource(intermediates));
|
| + cert_sources.push_back(intermediate_cert_source.get());
|
| }
|
|
|
| // Verify the chain.
|
| - return VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot(
|
| - certs_der_trusted_root, trust_store, signature_policy, time);
|
| + CertPathBuilder::Result result;
|
| + CertPathBuilder path_builder(target_cert, cert_sources, trust_store,
|
| + signature_policy, time, &result);
|
| + int rv = path_builder.Run(CompletionCallback());
|
| + // Assume that CertPathBuilder will complete synchronously since only a
|
| + // StaticCertSource was passed in. If it did return ERR_IO_PENDING, just
|
| + // return failure here.
|
| + return rv == OK;
|
| }
|
|
|
| } // namespace net
|
|
|