Index: net/cert/internal/verify_certificate_chain.cc |
diff --git a/net/cert/internal/verify_certificate_chain.cc b/net/cert/internal/verify_certificate_chain.cc |
index 506fb434befec20aca8d118e49021cf624313e87..9aa1db6a6f1b9c573b4702b212090544a5c6fb06 100644 |
--- a/net/cert/internal/verify_certificate_chain.cc |
+++ b/net/cert/internal/verify_certificate_chain.cc |
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ |
#include <memory> |
#include "base/logging.h" |
-#include "net/cert/internal/name_constraints.h" |
#include "net/cert/internal/parse_certificate.h" |
#include "net/cert/internal/signature_algorithm.h" |
#include "net/cert/internal/signature_policy.h" |
@@ -20,14 +19,13 @@ namespace net { |
namespace { |
-// Map from OID to ParsedExtension. |
-using ExtensionsMap = std::map<der::Input, ParsedExtension>; |
- |
// Describes all parsed properties of a certificate that are relevant for |
// certificate verification. |
struct FullyParsedCert { |
- ParsedCertificate cert; |
- ParsedTbsCertificate tbs; |
+ // XXX better naming.. this results in lots of non-obvious cert.cert->foo code |
+ scoped_refptr<CertThing> cert; |
+ |
+ // XXX should some of this be moved into CertThing? |
std::unique_ptr<SignatureAlgorithm> signature_algorithm; |
@@ -38,21 +36,20 @@ struct FullyParsedCert { |
bool has_key_usage = false; |
der::BitString key_usage; |
- std::unique_ptr<GeneralNames> subject_alt_names; |
- |
bool has_name_constraints = false; |
ParsedExtension name_constraints_extension; |
// The remaining extensions (excludes the standard ones above). |
- ExtensionsMap unconsumed_extensions; |
+ CertThing::ExtensionsMap unconsumed_extensions; |
}; |
// Removes the extension with OID |oid| from |unconsumed_extensions| and fills |
// |extension| with the matching extension value. If there was no extension |
// matching |oid| then returns |false|. |
-WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool ConsumeExtension(const der::Input& oid, |
- ExtensionsMap* unconsumed_extensions, |
- ParsedExtension* extension) { |
+WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool ConsumeExtension( |
+ const der::Input& oid, |
+ CertThing::ExtensionsMap* unconsumed_extensions, |
+ ParsedExtension* extension) { |
auto it = unconsumed_extensions->find(oid); |
if (it == unconsumed_extensions->end()) |
return false; |
@@ -79,43 +76,34 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool GetSequenceValue(const der::Input& tlv, |
return parser.ReadTag(der::kSequence, value) && !parser.HasMore(); |
} |
+// XXX update doc |
// Parses an X.509 Certificate fully (including the TBSCertificate and |
// standard extensions), saving all the properties to |out_|. |
-WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool FullyParseCertificate(const der::Input& cert_tlv, |
+WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool FullyParseCertificate(scoped_refptr<CertThing> cert, |
FullyParsedCert* out) { |
- // Parse the outer Certificate. |
- if (!ParseCertificate(cert_tlv, &out->cert)) |
- return false; |
+ // XXX move more of this into CertThing? |
+ |
+ out->cert = std::move(cert); |
// Parse the signature algorithm contained in the Certificate (there is |
// another one in the TBSCertificate, which is checked later by |
// VerifySignatureAlgorithmsMatch) |
- out->signature_algorithm = |
- SignatureAlgorithm::CreateFromDer(out->cert.signature_algorithm_tlv); |
+ out->signature_algorithm = SignatureAlgorithm::CreateFromDer( |
+ out->cert->parsed_cert().signature_algorithm_tlv); |
if (!out->signature_algorithm) |
return false; |
- // Parse the TBSCertificate. |
- if (!ParseTbsCertificate(out->cert.tbs_certificate_tlv, &out->tbs)) |
- return false; |
- |
// Reset state relating to extensions (which may not get overwritten). This is |
// just a precaution, since in practice |out| will already be default |
// initialize. |
out->has_basic_constraints = false; |
out->has_key_usage = false; |
- out->unconsumed_extensions.clear(); |
- out->subject_alt_names.reset(); |
out->has_name_constraints = false; |
+ out->unconsumed_extensions = out->cert->unconsumed_extensions(); |
// Parse the standard X.509 extensions and remove them from |
// |unconsumed_extensions|. |
- if (out->tbs.has_extensions) { |
- // ParseExtensions() ensures there are no duplicates, and maps the (unique) |
- // OID to the extension value. |
- if (!ParseExtensions(out->tbs.extensions_tlv, &out->unconsumed_extensions)) |
- return false; |
- |
+ if (!out->unconsumed_extensions.empty()) { |
ParsedExtension extension; |
// Basic constraints. |
@@ -134,28 +122,6 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool FullyParseCertificate(const der::Input& cert_tlv, |
return false; |
} |
- // Subject alternative name. |
- if (ConsumeExtension(SubjectAltNameOid(), &out->unconsumed_extensions, |
- &extension)) { |
- // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6: |
- // SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames |
- out->subject_alt_names = GeneralNames::CreateFromDer(extension.value); |
- if (!out->subject_alt_names) |
- return false; |
- // RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6: |
- // If subject naming information is present only in the subjectAltName |
- // extension (e.g., a key bound only to an email address or URI), then the |
- // subject name MUST be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension |
- // MUST be critical. |
- if (!extension.critical) { |
- der::Input subject_value; |
- if (!GetSequenceValue(out->tbs.subject_tlv, &subject_value)) |
- return false; |
- if (subject_value.Length() == 0) |
- return false; |
- } |
- } |
- |
// Name constraints. |
if (ConsumeExtension(NameConstraintsOid(), &out->unconsumed_extensions, |
&out->name_constraints_extension)) { |
@@ -166,23 +132,6 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool FullyParseCertificate(const der::Input& cert_tlv, |
return true; |
} |
-// Returns true if |name1_tlv| matches |name2_tlv|. The two inputs must be |
-// tag-length-value for RFC 5280's Name. |
-WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool NameMatches(const der::Input& name1_tlv, |
- const der::Input& name2_tlv) { |
- der::Input name1_value; |
- der::Input name2_value; |
- |
- // Assume that the Name is an RDNSequence. VerifyNameMatch() expects the |
- // value from a SEQUENCE, so strip off the tag. |
- if (!GetSequenceValue(name1_tlv, &name1_value) || |
- !GetSequenceValue(name2_tlv, &name2_value)) { |
- return false; |
- } |
- |
- return VerifyNameMatch(name1_value, name2_value); |
-} |
- |
// Returns true if |cert| was self-issued. The definition of self-issuance |
// comes from RFC 5280 section 6.1: |
// |
@@ -195,7 +144,7 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool NameMatches(const der::Input& name1_tlv, |
// self-issued certificates are not counted when evaluating path length |
// or name constraints. |
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool IsSelfIssued(const FullyParsedCert& cert) { |
- return NameMatches(cert.tbs.subject_tlv, cert.tbs.issuer_tlv); |
+ return cert.cert->normalized_subject() == cert.cert->normalized_issuer(); |
} |
// Returns true if |cert| is valid at time |time|. |
@@ -207,8 +156,8 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool IsSelfIssued(const FullyParsedCert& cert) { |
// notBefore through notAfter, inclusive. |
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool VerifyTimeValidity(const FullyParsedCert& cert, |
const der::GeneralizedTime time) { |
- return !(time < cert.tbs.validity_not_before) && |
- !(cert.tbs.validity_not_after < time); |
+ return !(time < cert.cert->parsed_tbs().validity_not_before) && |
+ !(cert.cert->parsed_tbs().validity_not_after < time); |
} |
// Returns true if |signature_algorithm_tlv| is a valid algorithm encoding for |
@@ -244,8 +193,8 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool IsRsaWithSha1SignatureAlgorithm( |
// compatibility sake. |
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool VerifySignatureAlgorithmsMatch( |
const FullyParsedCert& cert) { |
- const der::Input& alg1_tlv = cert.cert.signature_algorithm_tlv; |
- const der::Input& alg2_tlv = cert.tbs.signature_algorithm_tlv; |
+ const der::Input& alg1_tlv = cert.cert->parsed_cert().signature_algorithm_tlv; |
+ const der::Input& alg2_tlv = cert.cert->parsed_tbs().signature_algorithm_tlv; |
// Ensure that the two DER-encoded signature algorithms are byte-for-byte |
// equal, but make a compatibility concession for RSA with SHA1. |
@@ -258,7 +207,7 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool VerifySignatureAlgorithmsMatch( |
// |
// |skip_issuer_checks| controls whether the function will skip: |
// - Checking that |cert|'s signature using |working_spki| |
-// - Checkinging that |cert|'s issuer matches |working_issuer_name| |
+// - Checkinging that |cert|'s issuer matches |working_normalized_issuer_name| |
// This should be set to true only when verifying a trusted root certificate. |
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool BasicCertificateProcessing( |
const FullyParsedCert& cert, |
@@ -267,7 +216,7 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool BasicCertificateProcessing( |
const SignaturePolicy* signature_policy, |
const der::GeneralizedTime& time, |
const der::Input& working_spki, |
- const der::Input& working_issuer_name, |
+ const der::Input& working_normalized_issuer_name, |
const std::vector<std::unique_ptr<NameConstraints>>& |
name_constraints_list) { |
// Check that the signature algorithms in Certificate vs TBSCertificate |
@@ -279,9 +228,10 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool BasicCertificateProcessing( |
// Verify the digital signature using the previous certificate's key (RFC |
// 5280 section 6.1.3 step a.1). |
if (!skip_issuer_checks) { |
- if (!VerifySignedData( |
- *cert.signature_algorithm, cert.cert.tbs_certificate_tlv, |
- cert.cert.signature_value, working_spki, signature_policy)) { |
+ if (!VerifySignedData(*cert.signature_algorithm, |
+ cert.cert->parsed_cert().tbs_certificate_tlv, |
+ cert.cert->parsed_cert().signature_value, |
+ working_spki, signature_policy)) { |
return false; |
} |
} |
@@ -297,7 +247,8 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool BasicCertificateProcessing( |
// Verify the certificate's issuer name matches the issuing certificate's |
// subject name. (RFC 5280 section 6.1.3 step a.4) |
if (!skip_issuer_checks) { |
- if (!NameMatches(cert.tbs.issuer_tlv, working_issuer_name)) |
+ if (der::Input(&cert.cert->normalized_issuer()) != |
+ working_normalized_issuer_name) |
return false; |
} |
@@ -306,11 +257,12 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool BasicCertificateProcessing( |
// path, skip this step for certificate i. |
if (!name_constraints_list.empty() && |
(!IsSelfIssued(cert) || is_target_cert)) { |
+ // XXX used normalized_subject here |
der::Input subject_value; |
- if (!GetSequenceValue(cert.tbs.subject_tlv, &subject_value)) |
+ if (!GetSequenceValue(cert.cert->parsed_tbs().subject_tlv, &subject_value)) |
return false; |
for (const auto& nc : name_constraints_list) { |
- if (!nc->IsPermittedCert(subject_value, cert.subject_alt_names.get())) |
+ if (!nc->IsPermittedCert(subject_value, cert.cert->subject_alt_names())) |
return false; |
} |
} |
@@ -327,20 +279,21 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool PrepareForNextCertificate( |
const FullyParsedCert& cert, |
size_t* max_path_length_ptr, |
der::Input* working_spki, |
- der::Input* working_issuer_name, |
+ der::Input* working_normalized_issuer_name, |
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<NameConstraints>>* name_constraints_list) { |
// TODO(eroman): Steps a-b are omitted, as policy constraints are not yet |
// implemented. |
// From RFC 5280 section 6.1.4 step c: |
// |
- // Assign the certificate subject name to working_issuer_name. |
- *working_issuer_name = cert.tbs.subject_tlv; |
+ // Assign the certificate subject name to working_normalized_issuer_name. |
+ *working_normalized_issuer_name = |
+ der::Input(&cert.cert->normalized_subject()); |
// From RFC 5280 section 6.1.4 step d: |
// |
// Assign the certificate subjectPublicKey to working_public_key. |
- *working_spki = cert.tbs.spki_tlv; |
+ *working_spki = cert.cert->parsed_tbs().spki_tlv; |
// Note that steps e and f are omitted as they are handled by |
// the assignment to |working_spki| above. See the definition |
@@ -494,14 +447,14 @@ WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool WrapUp(const FullyParsedCert& cert) { |
} // namespace |
-TrustAnchor::TrustAnchor() {} |
-TrustAnchor::~TrustAnchor() {} |
+CertThing::CertThing() {} |
+CertThing::~CertThing() {} |
-std::unique_ptr<TrustAnchor> TrustAnchor::CreateFromCertificateData( |
+scoped_refptr<CertThing> CertThing::CreateFromCertificateData( |
const uint8_t* data, |
size_t length, |
DataSource source) { |
- std::unique_ptr<TrustAnchor> result(new TrustAnchor); |
+ scoped_refptr<CertThing> result(new CertThing); |
switch (source) { |
case DataSource::INTERNAL_COPY: |
@@ -515,25 +468,64 @@ std::unique_ptr<TrustAnchor> TrustAnchor::CreateFromCertificateData( |
} |
// Parse the certificate to get its name. |
- ParsedCertificate cert; |
- if (!ParseCertificate(result->cert(), &cert)) |
+ if (!ParseCertificate(result->cert_, &result->parsed_cert_)) |
return nullptr; |
- ParsedTbsCertificate tbs; |
- if (!ParseTbsCertificate(cert.tbs_certificate_tlv, &tbs)) |
+ if (!ParseTbsCertificate(result->parsed_cert_.tbs_certificate_tlv, |
+ &result->parsed_tbs_)) |
return nullptr; |
- result->name_ = tbs.subject_tlv; |
+ der::Input subject_value; |
+ if (!GetSequenceValue(result->parsed_tbs_.subject_tlv, &subject_value) || |
+ !NormalizeName(subject_value, &result->normalized_subject_)) |
+ return nullptr; |
+ der::Input issuer_value; |
+ if (!GetSequenceValue(result->parsed_tbs_.issuer_tlv, &issuer_value) || |
+ !NormalizeName(issuer_value, &result->normalized_issuer_)) |
+ return nullptr; |
- // TODO(eroman): If adding a self-signed certificate, check that its |
- // signature is correct? This check will not otherwise be done during |
- // verification. |
+ // Parse the standard X.509 extensions and remove them from |
+ // |unconsumed_extensions|. |
+ if (result->parsed_tbs_.has_extensions) { |
+ // ParseExtensions() ensures there are no duplicates, and maps the (unique) |
+ // OID to the extension value. |
+ if (!ParseExtensions(result->parsed_tbs_.extensions_tlv, |
+ &result->unconsumed_extensions_)) |
+ return nullptr; |
+ |
+ // Subject alternative name. |
+ if (ConsumeExtension(SubjectAltNameOid(), &result->unconsumed_extensions_, |
+ &result->subject_alt_names_extension_)) { |
+ // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6: |
+ // SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames |
+ result->subject_alt_names_ = GeneralNames::CreateFromDer( |
+ result->subject_alt_names_extension_.value); |
+ if (!result->subject_alt_names_) |
+ return nullptr; |
+ // RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6: |
+ // If subject naming information is present only in the subjectAltName |
+ // extension (e.g., a key bound only to an email address or URI), then the |
+ // subject name MUST be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension |
+ // MUST be critical. |
+ if (!result->subject_alt_names_extension_.critical) { |
+ der::Input subject_value; |
+ // XXX can we use normalized_subject_ here? |
+ if (!GetSequenceValue(result->parsed_tbs().subject_tlv, &subject_value)) |
+ return nullptr; |
+ if (subject_value.Length() == 0) |
+ return nullptr; |
+ } |
+ } |
+ } |
return result; |
} |
-bool TrustAnchor::MatchesName(const der::Input& name) const { |
- return NameMatches(name, name_); |
+scoped_refptr<CertThing> CertThing::CreateFromCertificateCopy( |
+ const base::StringPiece& data) { |
+ return CertThing::CreateFromCertificateData( |
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(data.data()), data.size(), |
+ DataSource::INTERNAL_COPY); |
} |
TrustStore::TrustStore() {} |
@@ -543,53 +535,29 @@ void TrustStore::Clear() { |
anchors_.clear(); |
} |
-bool TrustStore::AddTrustedCertificate(const uint8_t* data, size_t length) { |
- return AddTrustedCertificate(data, length, |
- TrustAnchor::DataSource::INTERNAL_COPY); |
+void TrustStore::AddTrustedCertificate(scoped_refptr<CertThing> anchor) { |
+ // XXX should this check for duplicate certs? |
+ anchors_.insert( |
+ std::make_pair(anchor->normalized_subject(), std::move(anchor))); |
} |
-bool TrustStore::AddTrustedCertificate(const base::StringPiece& data) { |
- return AddTrustedCertificate(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(data.data()), |
- data.size()); |
+void TrustStore::FindTrustAnchorsByNormalizedName( |
+ const std::string& normalized_name, |
+ CertVector* matches) const { |
+ auto range = anchors_.equal_range(normalized_name); |
+ for (auto it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it) |
+ matches->push_back(it->second); |
} |
-bool TrustStore::AddTrustedCertificateWithoutCopying(const uint8_t* data, |
- size_t length) { |
- return AddTrustedCertificate(data, length, |
- TrustAnchor::DataSource::EXTERNAL_REFERENCE); |
-} |
- |
-const TrustAnchor* TrustStore::FindTrustAnchorByName( |
- const der::Input& name) const { |
- for (const auto& anchor : anchors_) { |
- if (anchor->MatchesName(name)) { |
- return anchor.get(); |
- } |
- } |
- return nullptr; |
-} |
- |
-bool TrustStore::IsTrustedCertificate(const der::Input& cert_der) const { |
- for (const auto& anchor : anchors_) { |
- if (anchor->cert() == cert_der) |
+bool TrustStore::IsTrustedCertificate(const CertThing* cert) const { |
+ auto range = anchors_.equal_range(cert->normalized_subject()); |
+ for (auto it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it) { |
+ if (it->second == cert || it->second->der_cert() == cert->der_cert()) |
return true; |
} |
return false; |
} |
-bool TrustStore::AddTrustedCertificate(const uint8_t* data, |
- size_t length, |
- TrustAnchor::DataSource source) { |
- auto anchor = TrustAnchor::CreateFromCertificateData(data, length, source); |
- if (!anchor) |
- return false; |
- anchors_.push_back(std::move(anchor)); |
- return true; |
-} |
- |
-// TODO(eroman): Move this into existing anonymous namespace. |
-namespace { |
- |
// This implementation is structured to mimic the description of certificate |
// path verification given by RFC 5280 section 6.1. |
// |
@@ -597,19 +565,19 @@ namespace { |
// the chain. This root certificate is assumed to be trusted, and neither its |
// signature nor issuer name are verified. (It needn't be self-signed). |
bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot( |
- const std::vector<der::Input>& certs_der, |
+ const std::vector<scoped_refptr<CertThing>>& certs, |
// The trust store is only used for assertions. |
const TrustStore& trust_store, |
const SignaturePolicy* signature_policy, |
const der::GeneralizedTime& time) { |
// An empty chain is necessarily invalid. |
- if (certs_der.empty()) |
+ if (certs.empty()) |
return false; |
// IMPORTANT: the assumption being made is that the root certificate in |
// the given path is the trust anchor (and has already been verified as |
// such). |
- DCHECK(trust_store.IsTrustedCertificate(certs_der.back())); |
+ DCHECK(trust_store.IsTrustedCertificate(certs.back().get())); |
// Will contain a NameConstraints for each previous cert in the chain which |
// had nameConstraints. This corresponds to the permitted_subtrees and |
@@ -632,12 +600,12 @@ bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot( |
// signature of a certificate. |
der::Input working_spki; |
- // |working_issuer_name| corresponds with the same named variable in RFC 5280 |
- // section 6.1.2: |
+ // |working_normalized_issuer_name| is the normalized value of the |
+ // working_issuer_name variable in RFC 5280 section 6.1.2: |
// |
// working_issuer_name: the issuer distinguished name expected |
// in the next certificate in the chain. |
- der::Input working_issuer_name; |
+ der::Input working_normalized_issuer_name; |
// |max_path_length| corresponds with the same named variable in RFC 5280 |
// section 6.1.2: |
@@ -647,7 +615,7 @@ bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot( |
// and may be reduced to the value in the path length constraint |
// field within the basic constraints extension of a CA |
// certificate. |
- size_t max_path_length = certs_der.size(); |
+ size_t max_path_length = certs.size(); |
// Iterate over all the certificates in the reverse direction: starting from |
// the trust anchor and progressing towards the target certificate. |
@@ -656,13 +624,13 @@ bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot( |
// |
// * i=0 : Trust anchor. |
// * i=N-1 : Target certificate. |
- for (size_t i = 0; i < certs_der.size(); ++i) { |
- const size_t index_into_certs_der = certs_der.size() - i - 1; |
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < certs.size(); ++i) { |
+ const size_t index_into_certs = certs.size() - i - 1; |
// |is_target_cert| is true if the current certificate is the target |
// certificate being verified. The target certificate isn't necessarily an |
// end-entity certificate. |
- const bool is_target_cert = index_into_certs_der == 0; |
+ const bool is_target_cert = index_into_certs == 0; |
// |is_trust_anchor| is true if the current certificate is the trust |
// anchor. This certificate is implicitly trusted. |
@@ -670,8 +638,7 @@ bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot( |
// Parse the current certificate into |cert|. |
FullyParsedCert cert; |
- const der::Input& cert_der = certs_der[index_into_certs_der]; |
- if (!FullyParseCertificate(cert_der, &cert)) |
+ if (!FullyParseCertificate(certs[index_into_certs], &cert)) |
return false; |
// Per RFC 5280 section 6.1: |
@@ -679,14 +646,15 @@ bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot( |
// * If it is the last certificate in the path (target certificate) |
// - Then run "Wrap up" |
// - Otherwise run "Prepare for Next cert" |
- if (!BasicCertificateProcessing( |
- cert, is_target_cert, is_trust_anchor, signature_policy, time, |
- working_spki, working_issuer_name, name_constraints_list)) { |
+ if (!BasicCertificateProcessing(cert, is_target_cert, is_trust_anchor, |
+ signature_policy, time, working_spki, |
+ working_normalized_issuer_name, |
+ name_constraints_list)) { |
return false; |
} |
if (!is_target_cert) { |
if (!PrepareForNextCertificate(cert, &max_path_length, &working_spki, |
- &working_issuer_name, |
+ &working_normalized_issuer_name, |
&name_constraints_list)) { |
return false; |
} |
@@ -704,60 +672,56 @@ bool VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot( |
return true; |
} |
-// TODO(eroman): This function is a temporary hack in the absence of full |
-// path building. It may insert 1 certificate at the root of the |
-// chain to ensure that the path's root certificate is a trust anchor. |
-// |
-// Beyond this no other verification is done on the chain. The caller is |
-// responsible for verifying the subsequent chain's correctness. |
-WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool BuildSimplePathToTrustAnchor( |
- const std::vector<der::Input>& certs_der, |
- const TrustStore& trust_store, |
- std::vector<der::Input>* certs_der_trusted_root) { |
- // Copy the input chain. |
- *certs_der_trusted_root = certs_der; |
- |
- if (certs_der.empty()) |
- return false; |
+} // namespace net |
- // Check if the current root certificate is trusted. If it is then no |
- // extra work is needed. |
- if (trust_store.IsTrustedCertificate(certs_der_trusted_root->back())) |
- return true; |
- |
- // Otherwise if it is not trusted, check whether its issuer is trusted. If |
- // so, make *that* trusted certificate the root. If the issuer is not in |
- // the trust store then give up and fail (this is not full path building). |
- ParsedCertificate cert; |
- ParsedTbsCertificate tbs; |
- if (!ParseCertificate(certs_der.back(), &cert) || |
- !ParseTbsCertificate(cert.tbs_certificate_tlv, &tbs)) { |
- return false; |
- } |
+// XXX this is ick that verify_certificate_chain.cc uses path_builder.h |
+// and path_builder.cc uses verify_certificate_chain.h. Reorganize some things |
+// or remove this entirely. |
+#include "base/memory/ptr_util.h" |
+#include "path_builder.h" |
- auto trust_anchor = trust_store.FindTrustAnchorByName(tbs.issuer_tlv); |
- if (!trust_anchor) |
- return false; |
- certs_der_trusted_root->push_back(trust_anchor->cert()); |
- return true; |
-} |
- |
-} // namespace |
+namespace net { |
bool VerifyCertificateChain(const std::vector<der::Input>& certs_der, |
const TrustStore& trust_store, |
const SignaturePolicy* signature_policy, |
const der::GeneralizedTime& time) { |
- // Modify the certificate chain so that its root is a trusted certificate. |
- std::vector<der::Input> certs_der_trusted_root; |
- if (!BuildSimplePathToTrustAnchor(certs_der, trust_store, |
- &certs_der_trusted_root)) { |
+ if (certs_der.empty()) |
return false; |
+ |
+ scoped_refptr<CertThing> target_cert(CertThing::CreateFromCertificateData( |
+ certs_der.front().UnsafeData(), certs_der.front().Length(), |
+ CertThing::DataSource::EXTERNAL_REFERENCE)); |
+ if (!target_cert) |
+ return false; |
+ |
+ CertPathBuilder::CertSources cert_sources; |
+ std::unique_ptr<StaticCertSource> intermediate_cert_source; |
+ std::vector<scoped_refptr<CertThing>> intermediates; |
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < certs_der.size(); ++i) { |
+ const auto& cert_der = certs_der[i]; |
+ scoped_refptr<CertThing> cert(CertThing::CreateFromCertificateData( |
+ cert_der.UnsafeData(), cert_der.Length(), |
+ CertThing::DataSource::EXTERNAL_REFERENCE)); |
+ if (!cert) |
+ return false; |
+ intermediates.push_back(std::move(cert)); |
+ } |
+ if (!intermediates.empty()) { |
+ intermediate_cert_source = |
+ base::WrapUnique(new StaticCertSource(intermediates)); |
+ cert_sources.push_back(intermediate_cert_source.get()); |
} |
// Verify the chain. |
- return VerifyCertificateChainAssumingTrustedRoot( |
- certs_der_trusted_root, trust_store, signature_policy, time); |
+ CertPathBuilder::Result result; |
+ CertPathBuilder path_builder(target_cert, cert_sources, trust_store, |
+ signature_policy, time, &result); |
+ int rv = path_builder.Run(CompletionCallback()); |
+ // Assume that CertPathBuilder will complete synchronously since only a |
+ // StaticCertSource was passed in. If it did return ERR_IO_PENDING, just |
+ // return failure here. |
+ return rv == OK; |
} |
} // namespace net |