| Index: base/files/scoped_file.cc
|
| diff --git a/base/files/scoped_file.cc b/base/files/scoped_file.cc
|
| new file mode 100644
|
| index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..39f064de1c46e694f19c6de3800e3d44e9ca1c29
|
| --- /dev/null
|
| +++ b/base/files/scoped_file.cc
|
| @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
| +// Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
|
| +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
|
| +// found in the LICENSE file.
|
| +
|
| +#include "base/files/scoped_file.h"
|
| +
|
| +#include "base/logging.h"
|
| +
|
| +#if defined(OS_POSIX)
|
| +#include <unistd.h>
|
| +
|
| +#include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| +namespace base {
|
| +namespace internal {
|
| +
|
| +#if defined(OS_POSIX)
|
| +
|
| +// static
|
| +void ScopedFDCloseTraits::Free(int fd) {
|
| + // It's important to crash here.
|
| + // There are security implications to not closing a file descriptor
|
| + // properly. As file descriptors are "capabilities", keeping them open
|
| + // would make the current process keep access to a resource. Much of
|
| + // Chrome relies on being able to "drop" such access.
|
| + // It's especially problematic on Linux with the setuid sandbox, where
|
| + // a single open directory would bypass the entire security model.
|
| + PCHECK(0 == IGNORE_EINTR(close(fd)));
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +#endif // OS_POSIX
|
| +
|
| +} // namespace internal
|
| +} // namespace base
|
|
|