[Autofill] Remove warning for CC autofill on secure pages with mixed passive content

chrome/browser/ui/autofill/chrome_autofill_client.cc

Index: chrome/browser/ui/autofill/chrome_autofill_client.cc
diff --git a/chrome/browser/ui/autofill/chrome_autofill_client.cc b/chrome/browser/ui/autofill/chrome_autofill_client.cc
index 437886c1e99dd6b25284a8484f99f5032937d3fa..db90ae21e1c75f5a7eb183737cab7497789b2e3e 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/ui/autofill/chrome_autofill_client.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/ui/autofill/chrome_autofill_client.cc
@@ -384,9 +384,10 @@ bool ChromeAutofillClient::IsContextSecure(const GURL& form_origin) {
   ssl_status = navigation_entry->GetSSL();
   // Note: If changing the implementation below, also change
   // AwAutofillClient::IsContextSecure. See crbug.com/505388
-  return ssl_status.security_style ==
-      content::SECURITY_STYLE_AUTHENTICATED &&
-      ssl_status.content_status == content::SSLStatus::NORMAL_CONTENT;
+  return ssl_status.security_style == content::SECURITY_STYLE_AUTHENTICATED &&
+         (ssl_status.content_status == content::SSLStatus::NORMAL_CONTENT ||
+          ssl_status.content_status ==
+              content::SSLStatus::DISPLAYED_INSECURE_CONTENT);

[Evan Stade, 2016/02/01 20:40:36]

nit: perhaps

!(ssl_status.content_status & content::SSLStatus::RAN_INSECURE_CONTENT)

instead of these two equality checks? equality checks seem weird when dealing
with a bitmask.

[Mathieu, 2016/02/01 20:49:56]

Done.

 }
 
 }  // namespace autofill