Per discussion, implement the Omaha Client Update Protocol (CUP) in src/crypto.

google_apis/cup/client_update_protocol.cc

Index: google_apis/cup/client_update_protocol.cc
===================================================================
--- google_apis/cup/client_update_protocol.cc	(revision 0)
+++ google_apis/cup/client_update_protocol.cc	(revision 0)
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "google_apis/cup/client_update_protocol.h"
+
+#include "base/base64.h"
+#include "base/logging.h"
+#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
+#include "base/sha1.h"
+#include "base/string_util.h"
+#include "base/stringprintf.h"
+#include "crypto/hmac.h"
+#include "crypto/random.h"
+
+namespace {
+
+base::StringPiece ByteVectorToSP(const std::vector<uint8>& vec) {
+  return base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&vec[0]), vec.size());
+}
+
+// This class needs to implement the same hashing and signing functions as the
+// Google Update server; for now, this is SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA1, but this may
+// change to SHA-256 in the near future.  For this reason, all primitives are
+// wrapped.  The name "SymSign" is used to mirror the CUP specification.
+size_t HashDigestSize() {
+  return base::kSHA1Length;
+}
+
+std::vector<uint8> Hash(const std::vector<uint8>& data) {
+  std::vector<uint8> result(HashDigestSize());
+  base::SHA1HashBytes(data.empty() ? NULL : &data[0],
+                      data.size(),
+                      &result[0]);
+  return result;
+}
+
+std::vector<uint8> Hash(const base::StringPiece& sdata) {
+  std::vector<uint8> result(HashDigestSize());
+  base::SHA1HashBytes(sdata.empty() ?
+                          NULL :
+                          reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(sdata.data()),
+                      sdata.length(),
+                      &result[0]);
+  return result;
+}
+
+std::vector<uint8> SymConcat(uint8 id,
+                             const std::vector<uint8>* h1,
+                             const std::vector<uint8>* h2,
+                             const std::vector<uint8>* h3) {
+  std::vector<uint8> result;
+  result.push_back(id);
+  const std::vector<uint8>* args[] = { h1, h2, h3 };
+  for (size_t i = 0; i != arraysize(args); ++i) {
+    if (args[i]) {
+      DCHECK_EQ(args[i]->size(), HashDigestSize());
+      result.insert(result.end(), args[i]->begin(), args[i]->end());
+    }
+  }
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+std::vector<uint8> SymSign(const std::vector<uint8>& key,
+                           const std::vector<uint8>& hashes) {
+  crypto::HMAC hmac(crypto::HMAC::SHA1);
+  if (!hmac.Init(&key[0], key.size()))
+    return std::vector<uint8>();
+
+  std::vector<uint8> result(hmac.DigestLength());
+  if (!hmac.Sign(ByteVectorToSP(hashes), &result[0], result.size()))
+    return std::vector<uint8>();
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+bool SymSignVerify(const std::vector<uint8>& key,
+                   const std::vector<uint8>& hashes,
+                   const std::vector<uint8>& server_proof) {
+  crypto::HMAC hmac(crypto::HMAC::SHA1);
+  if (!hmac.Init(&key[0], key.size()))
+    return false;
+
+  return hmac.Verify(ByteVectorToSP(hashes), ByteVectorToSP(server_proof));
+}
+
+// RsaPad() is implemented as described in the CUP spec.  It is NOT a general
+// purpose padding algorithm.
+std::vector<uint8> RsaPad(size_t rsa_key_size,
+                          const std::vector<uint8>& entropy) {
+  DCHECK_GE(rsa_key_size, HashDigestSize());
+
+  // The result gets padded with zeros if the result size is greater than
+  // the size of the buffer provided by the caller.
+  std::vector<uint8> result(entropy);
+  result.resize(rsa_key_size - HashDigestSize());
+
+  // For use with RSA, the input needs to be smaller than the RSA modulus,
+  // which has always the msb set.
+  result[0] &= 127;  // Reset msb
+  result[0] |= 64;   // Set second highest bit.
+
+  std::vector<uint8> digest = Hash(result);
+  result.insert(result.end(), digest.begin(), digest.end());
+  DCHECK_EQ(result.size(), rsa_key_size);
+  return result;
+}
+
+// CUP passes the versioned secret in the query portion of the URL for the
+// update check service -- that means we need URL-safe variants of Base64.
+// Omaha has its own implementation in base/security/b64.c; for Chromium,
+// call the standard Base64 encoder/decoder and then apply fixups.
+std::string UrlSafeB64Encode(const std::vector<uint8>& data) {
+  std::string result;
+  if (!base::Base64Encode(ByteVectorToSP(data), &result)) {
+    return std::string();
+  }
+
+  // Do an tr|+/|-_| on the output, and strip any '=' padding.
+  for (std::string::iterator it = result.begin(); it != result.end(); ++it) {
+    switch (*it) {
+      case '+':
+        *it = '-';
+        break;
+      case '/':
+        *it = '_';
+        break;
+      default:
+        break;
+    }
+  }
+  TrimString(result, "=", &result);
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+std::vector<uint8> UrlSafeB64Decode(const base::StringPiece& input) {
+  std::string unsafe(input.begin(), input.end());
+  for (std::string::iterator it = unsafe.begin(); it != unsafe.end(); ++it) {
+    switch (*it) {
+      case '-':
+        *it = '+';
+        break;
+      case '_':
+        *it = '/';
+        break;
+      default:
+        break;
+    }
+  }
+  while (unsafe.length() % 4 != 0) {
+    unsafe.append("=");
+  }
+
+  std::string decoded;
+  if (!base::Base64Decode(unsafe, &decoded)) {
+    return std::vector<uint8>();
+  }
+
+  return std::vector<uint8>(decoded.begin(), decoded.end());
+}
+
+}  // end namespace
+
+ClientUpdateProtocol::ClientUpdateProtocol(int key_version)
+    : pub_key_version_(key_version) {
+}
+
+ClientUpdateProtocol::~ClientUpdateProtocol() {
+}
+
+ClientUpdateProtocol* ClientUpdateProtocol::Create(
+    int key_version,
+    const base::StringPiece& public_key) {
+  DCHECK_GT(key_version, 0);
+  DCHECK(!public_key.empty());
+  if (key_version <= 0 || public_key.empty())
+    return NULL;  // At least one mandatory parameter is not valid.
+
+  scoped_ptr<ClientUpdateProtocol> result(
+      new ClientUpdateProtocol(key_version));
+  if (!result.get())
+    return NULL;
+
+  result->public_key_impl_.reset(GetCupKeyImpl(public_key));
+  if (!result->public_key_impl_.get())
+    return NULL;  // Public key couldn't be loaded.
+
+  size_t key_size = result->public_key_impl_->PublicKeyLength();
+  if (key_size < HashDigestSize())
+    return NULL;  // Public key is too small to be used.
+
+  if (!result->BuildSharedKey(key_size, NULL))
+    return NULL;  // Failed to generate w.
+
+  return result.release();
+}
+
+std::string ClientUpdateProtocol::GetVersionedSecret() const {
+  return base::StringPrintf("%d:%s",
+                            pub_key_version_,
+                            UrlSafeB64Encode(encrypted_key_source_).c_str());
+}
+
+bool ClientUpdateProtocol::SignRequest(const base::StringPiece& url,
+                                       const base::StringPiece& request_body,
+                                       std::string* client_proof) {
+  if (encrypted_key_source_.empty())
+    return false;  // Init() hasn't been called, and/or BuildSharedKey failed.
+
+  // Compute the challenge hash:
+  //   hw = HASH(HASH(v|w)|HASH(request_url)|HASH(body)).
+  // Keep the challenge hash for later to validate the server's response.
+  std::vector<uint8> internal_hashes;
+
+  std::vector<uint8> h;
+  h = Hash(GetVersionedSecret());
+  internal_hashes.insert(internal_hashes.end(), h.begin(), h.end());
+  h = Hash(url);
+  internal_hashes.insert(internal_hashes.end(), h.begin(), h.end());
+  h = Hash(request_body);
+  internal_hashes.insert(internal_hashes.end(), h.begin(), h.end());
+  DCHECK_EQ(internal_hashes.size(), 3 * HashDigestSize());
+
+  client_challenge_hash_ = Hash(internal_hashes);
+
+  // Sign the challenge hash (hw) using the shared key (sk) to produce the
+  // client proof (cp).
+  std::vector<uint8> raw_client_proof =
+      SymSign(shared_key_, SymConcat(3, &client_challenge_hash_, NULL, NULL));
+  if (raw_client_proof.empty()) {
+    client_challenge_hash_.clear();
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (client_proof)
+    *client_proof = UrlSafeB64Encode(raw_client_proof);
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ClientUpdateProtocol::ValidateResponse(
+    const base::StringPiece& response_body,
+    const base::StringPiece& server_cookie,
+    const base::StringPiece& server_proof) {
+  if (client_challenge_hash_.empty())
+    return false;  // There hasn't been a call to SignRequest() yet.
+
+  // Decode the server proof from URL-safe Base64 to a binary HMAC for the
+  // response.
+  std::vector<uint8> sp_decoded = UrlSafeB64Decode(server_proof);
+  if (sp_decoded.empty())
+    return false;
+
+  // If the request was received by the server, the server will use its
+  // private key to decrypt |w_|, yielding the original contents of |r_|.
+  // The server can then recreate |sk_|, compute |hw_|, and SymSign(3|hw)
+  // to ensure that the cp matches the contents.  It will then use |sk_|
+  // to sign its response, producing the server proof |sp|.
+  std::vector<uint8> hm = Hash(response_body);
+  std::vector<uint8> hc = Hash(server_cookie);
+  return SymSignVerify(shared_key_,
+                       SymConcat(1, &client_challenge_hash_, &hm, &hc),
+                       sp_decoded);
+}
+
+bool ClientUpdateProtocol::BuildSharedKey(size_t public_key_length,
+                                          const uint8* opt_key_source) {
+  // Start by generating some random bytes that are suitable to be encrypted;
+  // this will be the source of the shared HMAC key that client and server use.
+  // (CUP specification calls this "r".)
+
+  DCHECK_GE(public_key_length, HashDigestSize());
+  if (public_key_length < HashDigestSize())
+    return false;
+
+  std::vector<uint8> key_source;
+  if (opt_key_source) {
+    key_source.assign(opt_key_source, opt_key_source + public_key_length);
+  } else {
+    std::vector<uint8> entropy(public_key_length - HashDigestSize());
+    crypto::RandBytes(&entropy[0], entropy.size());
+
+    key_source = RsaPad(public_key_length, entropy);
+  }
+  DCHECK_EQ(public_key_length, key_source.size());
+
+  // Hash the key source (r) to generate a new shared HMAC key (sk').
+  shared_key_ = Hash(key_source);
+
+  // Encrypt the key source (r) using the public key (pk[v]) to generate the
+  // encrypted key source (w).
+  encrypted_key_source_ = public_key_impl_->EncryptKeySource(key_source);
+  if (encrypted_key_source_.size() != public_key_length)
+    return false;
+
+  return true;
+}
+