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Unified Diff: net/base/cert_verify_proc_win.cc

Issue 13006020: net: extract net/cert out of net/base (Closed) Base URL: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src
Patch Set: rebase Created 7 years, 9 months ago
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Index: net/base/cert_verify_proc_win.cc
diff --git a/net/base/cert_verify_proc_win.cc b/net/base/cert_verify_proc_win.cc
deleted file mode 100644
index 5a1de371c10fce71de399e7ad62f5908992ba743..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/net/base/cert_verify_proc_win.cc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,755 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-#include "net/base/cert_verify_proc_win.h"
-
-#include <string>
-#include <vector>
-
-#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
-#include "base/sha1.h"
-#include "base/string_util.h"
-#include "base/utf_string_conversions.h"
-#include "crypto/capi_util.h"
-#include "crypto/scoped_capi_types.h"
-#include "crypto/sha2.h"
-#include "net/base/asn1_util.h"
-#include "net/base/cert_status_flags.h"
-#include "net/base/cert_verifier.h"
-#include "net/base/cert_verify_result.h"
-#include "net/base/crl_set.h"
-#include "net/base/ev_root_ca_metadata.h"
-#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
-#include "net/base/test_root_certs.h"
-#include "net/base/x509_certificate.h"
-#include "net/base/x509_certificate_known_roots_win.h"
-
-#pragma comment(lib, "crypt32.lib")
-
-#if !defined(CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE)
-// This was introduced in Windows 8 / Windows Server 2012, but retroactively
-// ported as far back as Windows XP via system update.
-#define CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE 0x00100000
-#endif
-
-namespace net {
-
-namespace {
-
-struct FreeChainEngineFunctor {
- void operator()(HCERTCHAINENGINE engine) const {
- if (engine)
- CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine);
- }
-};
-
-struct FreeCertChainContextFunctor {
- void operator()(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context) const {
- if (chain_context)
- CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context);
- }
-};
-
-struct FreeCertContextFunctor {
- void operator()(PCCERT_CONTEXT context) const {
- if (context)
- CertFreeCertificateContext(context);
- }
-};
-
-typedef crypto::ScopedCAPIHandle<HCERTCHAINENGINE, FreeChainEngineFunctor>
- ScopedHCERTCHAINENGINE;
-
-typedef scoped_ptr_malloc<const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT,
- FreeCertChainContextFunctor>
- ScopedPCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT;
-
-typedef scoped_ptr_malloc<const CERT_CONTEXT,
- FreeCertContextFunctor> ScopedPCCERT_CONTEXT;
-
-//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-int MapSecurityError(SECURITY_STATUS err) {
- // There are numerous security error codes, but these are the ones we thus
- // far find interesting.
- switch (err) {
- case SEC_E_WRONG_PRINCIPAL: // Schannel
- case CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH: // CryptoAPI
- return ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
- case SEC_E_UNTRUSTED_ROOT: // Schannel
- case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT: // CryptoAPI
- return ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
- case SEC_E_CERT_EXPIRED: // Schannel
- case CERT_E_EXPIRED: // CryptoAPI
- return ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID;
- case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK:
- return ERR_CERT_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM;
- case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE:
- return ERR_CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION;
- case CRYPT_E_REVOKED: // Schannel and CryptoAPI
- return ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
- case SEC_E_CERT_UNKNOWN:
- case CERT_E_ROLE:
- return ERR_CERT_INVALID;
- case CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE:
- // TODO(wtc): Should we add ERR_CERT_WRONG_USAGE?
- return ERR_CERT_INVALID;
- // We received an unexpected_message or illegal_parameter alert message
- // from the server.
- case SEC_E_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE:
- return ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
- case SEC_E_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH:
- return ERR_SSL_VERSION_OR_CIPHER_MISMATCH;
- case SEC_E_INVALID_HANDLE:
- return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
- case SEC_E_OK:
- return OK;
- default:
- LOG(WARNING) << "Unknown error " << err << " mapped to net::ERR_FAILED";
- return ERR_FAILED;
- }
-}
-
-// Map the errors in the chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus returned by
-// CertGetCertificateChain to our certificate status flags.
-int MapCertChainErrorStatusToCertStatus(DWORD error_status) {
- CertStatus cert_status = 0;
-
- // We don't include CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED because it's obsolete and
- // we wouldn't consider it an error anyway
- const DWORD kDateInvalidErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID |
- CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID;
- if (error_status & kDateInvalidErrors)
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
-
- const DWORD kAuthorityInvalidErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT |
- CERT_TRUST_IS_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST |
- CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
- if (error_status & kAuthorityInvalidErrors)
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
-
- if ((error_status & CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN) &&
- !(error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION))
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM;
-
- if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION)
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION;
-
- if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED)
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
-
- const DWORD kWrongUsageErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE |
- CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
- if (error_status & kWrongUsageErrors) {
- // TODO(wtc): Should we add CERT_STATUS_WRONG_USAGE?
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
- }
-
- if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID) {
- // Check for a signature that does not meet the OS criteria for strong
- // signatures.
- // Note: These checks may be more restrictive than the current weak key
- // criteria implemented within CertVerifier, such as excluding SHA-1 or
- // excluding RSA keys < 2048 bits. However, if the user has configured
- // these more stringent checks, respect that configuration and err on the
- // more restrictive criteria.
- if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE) {
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY;
- } else {
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
- }
- }
-
- // The rest of the errors.
- const DWORD kCertInvalidErrors =
- CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC |
- CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION |
- CERT_TRUST_INVALID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS |
- CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS |
- CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS |
- CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID |
- CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT |
- CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_DEFINED_NAME_CONSTRAINT |
- CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT |
- CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT |
- CERT_TRUST_NO_ISSUANCE_CHAIN_POLICY |
- CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT;
- if (error_status & kCertInvalidErrors)
- cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
-
- return cert_status;
-}
-
-// Returns true if any common name in the certificate's Subject field contains
-// a NULL character.
-bool CertSubjectCommonNameHasNull(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) {
- CRYPT_DECODE_PARA decode_para;
- decode_para.cbSize = sizeof(decode_para);
- decode_para.pfnAlloc = crypto::CryptAlloc;
- decode_para.pfnFree = crypto::CryptFree;
- CERT_NAME_INFO* name_info = NULL;
- DWORD name_info_size = 0;
- BOOL rv;
- rv = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
- X509_NAME,
- cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData,
- cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData,
- CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG,
- &decode_para,
- &name_info,
- &name_info_size);
- if (rv) {
- scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_NAME_INFO> scoped_name_info(name_info);
-
- // The Subject field may have multiple common names. According to the
- // "PKI Layer Cake" paper, CryptoAPI uses every common name in the
- // Subject field, so we inspect every common name.
- //
- // From RFC 5280:
- // X520CommonName ::= CHOICE {
- // teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
- // printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
- // universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
- // utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
- // bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)) }
- //
- // We also check IA5String and VisibleString.
- for (DWORD i = 0; i < name_info->cRDN; ++i) {
- PCERT_RDN rdn = &name_info->rgRDN[i];
- for (DWORD j = 0; j < rdn->cRDNAttr; ++j) {
- PCERT_RDN_ATTR rdn_attr = &rdn->rgRDNAttr[j];
- if (strcmp(rdn_attr->pszObjId, szOID_COMMON_NAME) == 0) {
- switch (rdn_attr->dwValueType) {
- // After the CryptoAPI ASN.1 security vulnerabilities described in
- // http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS09-056.mspx
- // were patched, we get CERT_RDN_ENCODED_BLOB for a common name
- // that contains a NULL character.
- case CERT_RDN_ENCODED_BLOB:
- break;
- // Array of 8-bit characters.
- case CERT_RDN_PRINTABLE_STRING:
- case CERT_RDN_TELETEX_STRING:
- case CERT_RDN_IA5_STRING:
- case CERT_RDN_VISIBLE_STRING:
- for (DWORD k = 0; k < rdn_attr->Value.cbData; ++k) {
- if (rdn_attr->Value.pbData[k] == '\0')
- return true;
- }
- break;
- // Array of 16-bit characters.
- case CERT_RDN_BMP_STRING:
- case CERT_RDN_UTF8_STRING: {
- DWORD num_wchars = rdn_attr->Value.cbData / 2;
- wchar_t* common_name =
- reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(rdn_attr->Value.pbData);
- for (DWORD k = 0; k < num_wchars; ++k) {
- if (common_name[k] == L'\0')
- return true;
- }
- break;
- }
- // Array of ints (32-bit).
- case CERT_RDN_UNIVERSAL_STRING: {
- DWORD num_ints = rdn_attr->Value.cbData / 4;
- int* common_name =
- reinterpret_cast<int*>(rdn_attr->Value.pbData);
- for (DWORD k = 0; k < num_ints; ++k) {
- if (common_name[k] == 0)
- return true;
- }
- break;
- }
- default:
- NOTREACHED();
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- return false;
-}
-
-// IsIssuedByKnownRoot returns true if the given chain is rooted at a root CA
-// which we recognise as a standard root.
-// static
-bool IsIssuedByKnownRoot(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context) {
- PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain_context->rgpChain[0];
- int num_elements = first_chain->cElement;
- if (num_elements < 1)
- return false;
- PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement;
- PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext;
-
- SHA1HashValue hash = X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(cert);
- return IsSHA1HashInSortedArray(
- hash, &kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes[0][0], sizeof(kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes));
-}
-
-// Saves some information about the certificate chain |chain_context| in
-// |*verify_result|. The caller MUST initialize |*verify_result| before
-// calling this function.
-void GetCertChainInfo(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context,
- CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
- if (chain_context->cChain == 0)
- return;
-
- PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain_context->rgpChain[0];
- int num_elements = first_chain->cElement;
- PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement;
-
- PCCERT_CONTEXT verified_cert = NULL;
- std::vector<PCCERT_CONTEXT> verified_chain;
-
- bool has_root_ca = num_elements > 1 &&
- !(chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
- CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
-
- // Each chain starts with the end entity certificate (i = 0) and ends with
- // either the root CA certificate or the last available intermediate. If a
- // root CA certificate is present, do not inspect the signature algorithm of
- // the root CA certificate because the signature on the trust anchor is not
- // important.
- if (has_root_ca) {
- // If a full chain was constructed, regardless of whether it was trusted,
- // don't inspect the root's signature algorithm.
- num_elements -= 1;
- }
-
- for (int i = 0; i < num_elements; ++i) {
- PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext;
- if (i == 0) {
- verified_cert = cert;
- } else {
- verified_chain.push_back(cert);
- }
-
- const char* algorithm = cert->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId;
- if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD5RSA) == 0) {
- // md5WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.4
- verify_result->has_md5 = true;
- if (i != 0)
- verify_result->has_md5_ca = true;
- } else if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD2RSA) == 0) {
- // md2WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.2
- verify_result->has_md2 = true;
- if (i != 0)
- verify_result->has_md2_ca = true;
- } else if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD4RSA) == 0) {
- // md4WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.3
- verify_result->has_md4 = true;
- }
- }
-
- if (verified_cert) {
- // Add the root certificate, if present, as it was not added above.
- if (has_root_ca)
- verified_chain.push_back(element[num_elements]->pCertContext);
- verify_result->verified_cert =
- X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_cert, verified_chain);
- }
-}
-
-// Decodes the cert's certificatePolicies extension into a CERT_POLICIES_INFO
-// structure and stores it in *output.
-void GetCertPoliciesInfo(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert,
- scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_POLICIES_INFO>* output) {
- PCERT_EXTENSION extension = CertFindExtension(szOID_CERT_POLICIES,
- cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
- cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
- if (!extension)
- return;
-
- CRYPT_DECODE_PARA decode_para;
- decode_para.cbSize = sizeof(decode_para);
- decode_para.pfnAlloc = crypto::CryptAlloc;
- decode_para.pfnFree = crypto::CryptFree;
- CERT_POLICIES_INFO* policies_info = NULL;
- DWORD policies_info_size = 0;
- BOOL rv;
- rv = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
- szOID_CERT_POLICIES,
- extension->Value.pbData,
- extension->Value.cbData,
- CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG,
- &decode_para,
- &policies_info,
- &policies_info_size);
- if (rv)
- output->reset(policies_info);
-}
-
-bool CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
- CRLSet* crl_set) {
- if (chain->cChain == 0)
- return true;
-
- const PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain->rgpChain[0];
- const PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement;
-
- const int num_elements = first_chain->cElement;
- if (num_elements == 0)
- return true;
-
- // We iterate from the root certificate down to the leaf, keeping track of
- // the issuer's SPKI at each step.
- std::string issuer_spki_hash;
- for (int i = num_elements - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext;
-
- base::StringPiece der_bytes(
- reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert->pbCertEncoded),
- cert->cbCertEncoded);
-
- base::StringPiece spki;
- if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki)) {
- NOTREACHED();
- continue;
- }
-
- const std::string spki_hash = crypto::SHA256HashString(spki);
-
- const CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB* serial_blob = &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber;
- scoped_array<uint8> serial_bytes(new uint8[serial_blob->cbData]);
- // The bytes of the serial number are stored little-endian.
- for (unsigned j = 0; j < serial_blob->cbData; j++)
- serial_bytes[j] = serial_blob->pbData[serial_blob->cbData - j - 1];
- base::StringPiece serial(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(serial_bytes.get()),
- serial_blob->cbData);
-
- CRLSet::Result result = crl_set->CheckSPKI(spki_hash);
-
- if (result != CRLSet::REVOKED && !issuer_spki_hash.empty())
- result = crl_set->CheckSerial(serial, issuer_spki_hash);
-
- issuer_spki_hash = spki_hash;
-
- switch (result) {
- case CRLSet::REVOKED:
- return false;
- case CRLSet::UNKNOWN:
- case CRLSet::GOOD:
- continue;
- default:
- NOTREACHED();
- continue;
- }
- }
-
- return true;
-}
-
-void AppendPublicKeyHashes(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
- HashValueVector* hashes) {
- if (chain->cChain == 0)
- return;
-
- PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain->rgpChain[0];
- PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* const element = first_chain->rgpElement;
-
- const DWORD num_elements = first_chain->cElement;
- for (DWORD i = 0; i < num_elements; i++) {
- PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext;
-
- base::StringPiece der_bytes(
- reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert->pbCertEncoded),
- cert->cbCertEncoded);
- base::StringPiece spki_bytes;
- if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki_bytes))
- continue;
-
- HashValue sha1(HASH_VALUE_SHA1);
- base::SHA1HashBytes(reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(spki_bytes.data()),
- spki_bytes.size(), sha1.data());
- hashes->push_back(sha1);
-
- HashValue sha256(HASH_VALUE_SHA256);
- crypto::SHA256HashString(spki_bytes, sha1.data(), crypto::kSHA256Length);
- hashes->push_back(sha256);
- }
-}
-
-// Returns true if the certificate is an extended-validation certificate.
-//
-// This function checks the certificatePolicies extensions of the
-// certificates in the certificate chain according to Section 7 (pp. 11-12)
-// of the EV Certificate Guidelines Version 1.0 at
-// http://cabforum.org/EV_Certificate_Guidelines.pdf.
-bool CheckEV(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context,
- bool rev_checking_enabled,
- const char* policy_oid) {
- DCHECK_NE(static_cast<DWORD>(0), chain_context->cChain);
- // If the cert doesn't match any of the policies, the
- // CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE bit (0x10) in
- // chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus is set.
- DWORD error_status = chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus;
-
- if (!rev_checking_enabled) {
- // If online revocation checking is disabled then we will have still
- // requested that the revocation cache be checked. However, that will often
- // cause the following two error bits to be set. These error bits mean that
- // the local OCSP/CRL is stale or missing entries for these certificates.
- // Since they are expected, we mask them away.
- error_status &= ~(CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION |
- CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN);
- }
- if (!chain_context->cChain || error_status != CERT_TRUST_NO_ERROR)
- return false;
-
- // Check the end certificate simple chain (chain_context->rgpChain[0]).
- // If the end certificate's certificatePolicies extension contains the
- // EV policy OID of the root CA, return true.
- PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = chain_context->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement;
- int num_elements = chain_context->rgpChain[0]->cElement;
- if (num_elements < 2)
- return false;
-
- // Look up the EV policy OID of the root CA.
- PCCERT_CONTEXT root_cert = element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext;
- SHA1HashValue fingerprint =
- X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(root_cert);
- EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance();
- return metadata->HasEVPolicyOID(fingerprint, policy_oid);
-}
-
-} // namespace
-
-CertVerifyProcWin::CertVerifyProcWin() {}
-
-CertVerifyProcWin::~CertVerifyProcWin() {}
-
-bool CertVerifyProcWin::SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const {
- return false;
-}
-
-int CertVerifyProcWin::VerifyInternal(
- X509Certificate* cert,
- const std::string& hostname,
- int flags,
- CRLSet* crl_set,
- const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
- CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
- PCCERT_CONTEXT cert_handle = cert->os_cert_handle();
- if (!cert_handle)
- return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
-
- // Build and validate certificate chain.
- CERT_CHAIN_PARA chain_para;
- memset(&chain_para, 0, sizeof(chain_para));
- chain_para.cbSize = sizeof(chain_para);
- // ExtendedKeyUsage.
- // We still need to request szOID_SERVER_GATED_CRYPTO and szOID_SGC_NETSCAPE
- // today because some certificate chains need them. IE also requests these
- // two usages.
- static const LPSTR usage[] = {
- szOID_PKIX_KP_SERVER_AUTH,
- szOID_SERVER_GATED_CRYPTO,
- szOID_SGC_NETSCAPE
- };
- chain_para.RequestedUsage.dwType = USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_OR;
- chain_para.RequestedUsage.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = arraysize(usage);
- chain_para.RequestedUsage.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier =
- const_cast<LPSTR*>(usage);
-
- // Get the certificatePolicies extension of the certificate.
- scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_POLICIES_INFO> policies_info;
- LPSTR ev_policy_oid = NULL;
- if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) {
- GetCertPoliciesInfo(cert_handle, &policies_info);
- if (policies_info.get()) {
- EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance();
- for (DWORD i = 0; i < policies_info->cPolicyInfo; ++i) {
- LPSTR policy_oid = policies_info->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier;
- if (metadata->IsEVPolicyOID(policy_oid)) {
- ev_policy_oid = policy_oid;
- chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.dwType = USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND;
- chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = 1;
- chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier =
- &ev_policy_oid;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- // We can set CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS to get more chains.
- DWORD chain_flags = CERT_CHAIN_CACHE_END_CERT |
- CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT;
- const bool rev_checking_enabled =
- (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED) ||
- (ev_policy_oid != NULL &&
- (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY));
-
- if (rev_checking_enabled) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
- } else {
- chain_flags |= CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY;
- }
-
- // For non-test scenarios, use the default HCERTCHAINENGINE, NULL, which
- // corresponds to HCCE_CURRENT_USER and is is initialized as needed by
- // crypt32. However, when testing, it is necessary to create a new
- // HCERTCHAINENGINE and use that instead. This is because each
- // HCERTCHAINENGINE maintains a cache of information about certificates
- // encountered, and each test run may modify the trust status of a
- // certificate.
- ScopedHCERTCHAINENGINE chain_engine(NULL);
- if (TestRootCerts::HasInstance())
- chain_engine.reset(TestRootCerts::GetInstance()->GetChainEngine());
-
- ScopedPCCERT_CONTEXT cert_list(cert->CreateOSCertChainForCert());
- PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context;
- // IE passes a non-NULL pTime argument that specifies the current system
- // time. IE passes CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT as the
- // chain_flags argument.
- if (!CertGetCertificateChain(
- chain_engine,
- cert_list.get(),
- NULL, // current system time
- cert_list->hCertStore,
- &chain_para,
- chain_flags,
- NULL, // reserved
- &chain_context)) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
- return MapSecurityError(GetLastError());
- }
-
- if (chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
- CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE) {
- ev_policy_oid = NULL;
- chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = 0;
- chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = NULL;
- CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context);
- if (!CertGetCertificateChain(
- chain_engine,
- cert_list.get(),
- NULL, // current system time
- cert_list->hCertStore,
- &chain_para,
- chain_flags,
- NULL, // reserved
- &chain_context)) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
- return MapSecurityError(GetLastError());
- }
- }
-
- ScopedPCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT scoped_chain_context(chain_context);
-
- GetCertChainInfo(chain_context, verify_result);
- verify_result->cert_status |= MapCertChainErrorStatusToCertStatus(
- chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus);
-
- // Flag certificates that have a Subject common name with a NULL character.
- if (CertSubjectCommonNameHasNull(cert_handle))
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
-
- if (crl_set && !CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(chain_context, crl_set))
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
-
- std::wstring wstr_hostname = ASCIIToWide(hostname);
-
- SSL_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA extra_policy_para;
- memset(&extra_policy_para, 0, sizeof(extra_policy_para));
- extra_policy_para.cbSize = sizeof(extra_policy_para);
- extra_policy_para.dwAuthType = AUTHTYPE_SERVER;
- extra_policy_para.fdwChecks = 0;
- extra_policy_para.pwszServerName =
- const_cast<wchar_t*>(wstr_hostname.c_str());
-
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA policy_para;
- memset(&policy_para, 0, sizeof(policy_para));
- policy_para.cbSize = sizeof(policy_para);
- policy_para.dwFlags = 0;
- policy_para.pvExtraPolicyPara = &extra_policy_para;
-
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS policy_status;
- memset(&policy_status, 0, sizeof(policy_status));
- policy_status.cbSize = sizeof(policy_status);
-
- if (!CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL,
- chain_context,
- &policy_para,
- &policy_status)) {
- return MapSecurityError(GetLastError());
- }
-
- if (policy_status.dwError) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= MapNetErrorToCertStatus(
- MapSecurityError(policy_status.dwError));
-
- // CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy reports only one error (in
- // policy_status.dwError) if the certificate has multiple errors.
- // CertGetCertificateChain doesn't report certificate name mismatch, so
- // CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy is the only function that can report
- // certificate name mismatch.
- //
- // To prevent a potential certificate name mismatch from being hidden by
- // some other certificate error, if we get any other certificate error,
- // we call CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy again, ignoring all other
- // certificate errors. Both extra_policy_para.fdwChecks and
- // policy_para.dwFlags allow us to ignore certificate errors, so we set
- // them both.
- if (policy_status.dwError != CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH) {
- const DWORD extra_ignore_flags =
- 0x00000080 | // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REVOCATION
- 0x00000100 | // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CA
- 0x00002000 | // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_DATE_INVALID
- 0x00000200; // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE
- extra_policy_para.fdwChecks = extra_ignore_flags;
- const DWORD ignore_flags =
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_ALL_NOT_TIME_VALID_FLAGS |
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_FLAG |
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_CA_FLAG |
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE_FLAG |
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_INVALID_NAME_FLAG |
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_INVALID_POLICY_FLAG |
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_ALL_REV_UNKNOWN_FLAGS |
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_ALLOW_TESTROOT_FLAG |
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_TRUST_TESTROOT_FLAG |
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT_FLAG |
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_PEER_TRUST_FLAG;
- policy_para.dwFlags = ignore_flags;
- if (!CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(
- CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL,
- chain_context,
- &policy_para,
- &policy_status)) {
- return MapSecurityError(GetLastError());
- }
- if (policy_status.dwError) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= MapNetErrorToCertStatus(
- MapSecurityError(policy_status.dwError));
- }
- }
- }
-
- // TODO(wtc): Suppress CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM for now to be
- // compatible with WinHTTP, which doesn't report this error (bug 3004).
- verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM;
-
- if (!rev_checking_enabled) {
- // If we didn't do online revocation checking then Windows will report
- // CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION unless it had cached OCSP or CRL
- // information for every certificate. We only want to put up revoked
- // statuses from the offline checks so we squash this error.
- verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION;
- }
-
- AppendPublicKeyHashes(chain_context, &verify_result->public_key_hashes);
- verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root = IsIssuedByKnownRoot(chain_context);
-
- if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status))
- return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
-
- if (ev_policy_oid &&
- CheckEV(chain_context, rev_checking_enabled, ev_policy_oid)) {
- verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
- }
- return OK;
-}
-
-} // namespace net
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