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DescriptionTake care of a FIXME in SecurityOrigin.cpp to check the validity of any innerURL during construction and to handle invalidity as a 'unique' origin.
TBR=mkwst
BUG=514076
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=201022
Patch Set 1 #Patch Set 2 : x #Patch Set 3 : #
Total comments: 2
Patch Set 4 : #
Total comments: 2
Messages
Total messages: 37 (11 generated)
michaeln@chromium.org changed reviewers: + jsbell@chromium.org
ptal
lgtm, palmer@ should probably take a look too?
michaeln@chromium.org changed reviewers: + palmer@chromium.org
@palmer, ptal
palmer@chromium.org changed reviewers: + mkwst@chromium.org
LGTM, but mkwst is also a good origin maven to consult.
On 2015/08/17 at 19:07:33, palmer wrote: > LGTM, but mkwst is also a good origin maven to consult. This looks correct to me, but I'd suggest adding tests to SecurityOriginTest.cpp to verify that it's doing what we expect.
ptal, hooray for unittests! blink arghhh, it took me a while to figure out the includes ordering check is case sensitive
https://codereview.chromium.org/1294933004/diff/40001/Source/platform/weborig... File Source/platform/weborigin/SecurityOriginTest.cpp (right): https://codereview.chromium.org/1294933004/diff/40001/Source/platform/weborig... Source/platform/weborigin/SecurityOriginTest.cpp:393: "data:text/plain,hello_world", What should happen for file: URLs? And filesystem:, and others?
https://codereview.chromium.org/1294933004/diff/40001/Source/platform/weborig... File Source/platform/weborigin/SecurityOriginTest.cpp (right): https://codereview.chromium.org/1294933004/diff/40001/Source/platform/weborig... Source/platform/weborigin/SecurityOriginTest.cpp:393: "data:text/plain,hello_world", i've added some more cases, if you'd like to see other cases comment with the { url, expectedBool, expectedString } lines and i'll plug them in
palmer@ ping care to take a look at the tests?
LGTM. Thanks!
The CQ bit was checked by michaeln@chromium.org
The patchset sent to the CQ was uploaded after l-g-t-m from jsbell@chromium.org Link to the patchset: https://codereview.chromium.org/1294933004/#ps60001 (title: " ")
CQ is trying da patch. Follow status at https://chromium-cq-status.appspot.com/patch-status/1294933004/60001 View timeline at https://chromium-cq-status.appspot.com/patch-timeline/1294933004/60001
The CQ bit was unchecked by commit-bot@chromium.org
Try jobs failed on following builders: chromium_presubmit on tryserver.chromium.linux (JOB_FAILED, http://build.chromium.org/p/tryserver.chromium.linux/builders/chromium_presub...)
michaeln@chromium.org changed reviewers: + brettw@chromium.org
brettw@ for owners review, ptal
LGTM stampity stamp.
On 2015/08/21 18:41:20, Mike West (traveling) wrote: > LGTM stampity stamp. thnx, i was just adding you as tbr and about to hit the commitQ button :)
The CQ bit was checked by michaeln@chromium.org
CQ is trying da patch. Follow status at https://chromium-cq-status.appspot.com/patch-status/1294933004/60001 View timeline at https://chromium-cq-status.appspot.com/patch-timeline/1294933004/60001
The CQ bit was unchecked by commit-bot@chromium.org
Try jobs failed on following builders: linux_chromium_asan_rel_ng on tryserver.chromium.linux (JOB_FAILED, http://build.chromium.org/p/tryserver.chromium.linux/builders/linux_chromium_...)
The CQ bit was checked by michaeln@chromium.org
CQ is trying da patch. Follow status at https://chromium-cq-status.appspot.com/patch-status/1294933004/60001 View timeline at https://chromium-cq-status.appspot.com/patch-timeline/1294933004/60001
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Committed patchset #4 (id:60001) as https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=201022
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A revert of this CL (patchset #4 id:60001) has been created in https://codereview.chromium.org/1315793002/ by dstockwell@chromium.org. The reason for reverting is: Speculative revert for "Too many opened files in the system"..
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sigbjornf@opera.com changed reviewers: + sigbjornf@opera.com
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https://codereview.chromium.org/1294933004/diff/60001/Source/platform/weborig... File Source/platform/weborigin/SecurityOrigin.cpp (right): https://codereview.chromium.org/1294933004/diff/60001/Source/platform/weborig... Source/platform/weborigin/SecurityOrigin.cpp:112: if (schemeRequiresAuthority(relevantURL) && relevantURL.host().isEmpty()) If relevantURL is now checked for validity, is this check needed? The String(Impl) allocation churn it brings, pains me :)
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https://codereview.chromium.org/1294933004/diff/60001/Source/platform/weborig... File Source/platform/weborigin/SecurityOrigin.cpp (right): https://codereview.chromium.org/1294933004/diff/60001/Source/platform/weborig... Source/platform/weborigin/SecurityOrigin.cpp:112: if (schemeRequiresAuthority(relevantURL) && relevantURL.host().isEmpty()) On 2015/08/25 13:39:52, sof wrote: > If relevantURL is now checked for validity, is this check needed? The > String(Impl) allocation churn it brings, pains me :) hmmm... good question... i'm not sure?
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On 2015/08/25 22:47:42, michaeln wrote: > https://codereview.chromium.org/1294933004/diff/60001/Source/platform/weborig... > File Source/platform/weborigin/SecurityOrigin.cpp (right): > > https://codereview.chromium.org/1294933004/diff/60001/Source/platform/weborig... > Source/platform/weborigin/SecurityOrigin.cpp:112: if > (schemeRequiresAuthority(relevantURL) && relevantURL.host().isEmpty()) > On 2015/08/25 13:39:52, sof wrote: > > If relevantURL is now checked for validity, is this check needed? The > > String(Impl) allocation churn it brings, pains me :) > > hmmm... good question... i'm not sure? Me neither, but with the extra validity check added by this CL, I think we should try to remove it. https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=72342 mooted it as removable some time ago.
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On 2015/08/26 07:38:26, sof wrote: > On 2015/08/25 22:47:42, michaeln wrote: > > > https://codereview.chromium.org/1294933004/diff/60001/Source/platform/weborig... > > File Source/platform/weborigin/SecurityOrigin.cpp (right): > > > > > https://codereview.chromium.org/1294933004/diff/60001/Source/platform/weborig... > > Source/platform/weborigin/SecurityOrigin.cpp:112: if > > (schemeRequiresAuthority(relevantURL) && relevantURL.host().isEmpty()) > > On 2015/08/25 13:39:52, sof wrote: > > > If relevantURL is now checked for validity, is this check needed? The > > > String(Impl) allocation churn it brings, pains me :) > > > > hmmm... good question... i'm not sure? > > Me neither, but with the extra validity check added by this CL, I think we > should try to remove it. https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=72342 mooted it > as removable some time ago. I guess the question is whether an http+s or ftp url can be valid with an empty host?
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> I guess the question is whether an http+s or ftp url can be valid with an empty > host? I don't believe so, no.
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ok, lets see wha happens over in https://codereview.chromium.org/1320793002/ |