Remove CanLoadPage; it's essentially unused, and not compatible with

content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc

Index: content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
diff --git a/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc b/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
index 58bf3e36ed02f95b3597094821260202ee853dee..8a67465b9f4a683adcb2a4deecc5076f1c9fd0f8 100644
--- a/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
+++ b/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
@@ -214,17 +214,6 @@ class ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::SecurityState {
     return false;
   }
 
-  bool CanLoadPage(const GURL& gurl) {
-    if (origin_lock_.is_empty())
-      return true;
-
-    // TODO(creis): We must pass the valid browser_context to convert hosted
-    // apps URLs.  Currently, hosted apps cannot be loaded in this mode.
-    // See http://crbug.com/160576.
-    GURL site_gurl = SiteInstanceImpl::GetSiteForURL(NULL, gurl);
-    return origin_lock_ == site_gurl;
-  }
-
   bool CanAccessDataForOrigin(const GURL& gurl) {
     if (origin_lock_.is_empty())
       return true;
@@ -561,21 +550,6 @@ void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::RevokeReadRawCookies(int child_id) {
   state->second->RevokeReadRawCookies();
 }
 
-bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanLoadPage(int child_id,
-                                                 const GURL& url,
-                                                 ResourceType resource_type) {
-  // If --site-per-process flag is passed, we should enforce
-  // stronger security restrictions on page navigation.
-  if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
-          switches::kSitePerProcess) &&
-      IsResourceTypeFrame(resource_type)) {
-    // TODO(nasko): Do the proper check for site-per-process, once
-    // out-of-process iframes is ready to go.
-    return true;
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
 bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanRequestURL(
     int child_id, const GURL& url) {
   if (!url.is_valid())