| Index: content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
|
| diff --git a/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc b/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
|
| index 34caa5a492393df47481c4b757c22da70acaadd3..5b03dfc713c8f31721c93b59f786a95a11848feb 100644
|
| --- a/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
|
| +++ b/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
|
| @@ -235,26 +235,6 @@ class ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::SecurityState {
|
| return origin_lock_ == site_gurl;
|
| }
|
|
|
| - bool CanSendCookiesForOrigin(const GURL& gurl) {
|
| - // We only block cross-site cookies on network requests if the
|
| - // --enable-strict-site-isolation flag is passed. This is expected to break
|
| - // compatibility with many sites. The similar --site-per-process flag only
|
| - // blocks JavaScript access to cross-site cookies (in
|
| - // CanAccessCookiesForOrigin).
|
| - const base::CommandLine& command_line =
|
| - *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
|
| - if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableStrictSiteIsolation))
|
| - return true;
|
| -
|
| - if (origin_lock_.is_empty())
|
| - return true;
|
| - // TODO(creis): We must pass the valid browser_context to convert hosted
|
| - // apps URLs. Currently, hosted apps cannot set cookies in this mode.
|
| - // See http://crbug.com/160576.
|
| - GURL site_gurl = SiteInstanceImpl::GetSiteForURL(NULL, gurl);
|
| - return origin_lock_ == site_gurl;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| void LockToOrigin(const GURL& gurl) {
|
| origin_lock_ = gurl;
|
| }
|
| @@ -822,26 +802,6 @@ bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanAccessCookiesForOrigin(
|
| return state->second->CanAccessCookiesForOrigin(gurl);
|
| }
|
|
|
| -bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanSendCookiesForOrigin(int child_id,
|
| - const GURL& gurl) {
|
| - for (PluginProcessHostIterator iter; !iter.Done(); ++iter) {
|
| - if (iter.GetData().id == child_id) {
|
| - if (iter.GetData().process_type == PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN) {
|
| - // NPAPI plugin processes are unsandboxed and so are trusted. Plugins
|
| - // can make request to any origin.
|
| - return true;
|
| - }
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
|
| - SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
|
| - if (state == security_state_.end())
|
| - return false;
|
| - return state->second->CanSendCookiesForOrigin(gurl);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::LockToOrigin(int child_id,
|
| const GURL& gurl) {
|
| // "gurl" can be currently empty in some cases, such as file://blah.
|
|
|