Remove --enable-strict-site-isolation

content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include "content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.h"
 
 #include "base/command_line.h"
 #include "base/files/file_path.h"
 #include "base/logging.h"
 #include "base/metrics/histogram.h"
@@ skipping 217 matching lines @@
   bool CanAccessCookiesForOrigin(const GURL& gurl) {
     if (origin_lock_.is_empty())
       return true;
     // TODO(creis): We must pass the valid browser_context to convert hosted
     // apps URLs.  Currently, hosted apps cannot set cookies in this mode.
     // See http://crbug.com/160576.
     GURL site_gurl = SiteInstanceImpl::GetSiteForURL(NULL, gurl);
     return origin_lock_ == site_gurl;
   }
 
-  bool CanSendCookiesForOrigin(const GURL& gurl) {
-    // We only block cross-site cookies on network requests if the
-    // --enable-strict-site-isolation flag is passed.  This is expected to break
-    // compatibility with many sites.  The similar --site-per-process flag only
-    // blocks JavaScript access to cross-site cookies (in
-    // CanAccessCookiesForOrigin).
-    const base::CommandLine& command_line =
-        *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
-    if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableStrictSiteIsolation))
-      return true;
-
-    if (origin_lock_.is_empty())
-      return true;
-    // TODO(creis): We must pass the valid browser_context to convert hosted
-    // apps URLs.  Currently, hosted apps cannot set cookies in this mode.
-    // See http://crbug.com/160576.
-    GURL site_gurl = SiteInstanceImpl::GetSiteForURL(NULL, gurl);
-    return origin_lock_ == site_gurl;
-  }
-
   void LockToOrigin(const GURL& gurl) {
     origin_lock_ = gurl;
   }
 
   bool has_web_ui_bindings() const {
     return enabled_bindings_ & BINDINGS_POLICY_WEB_UI;
   }
 
   bool can_read_raw_cookies() const {
     return can_read_raw_cookies_;
@@ skipping 547 matching lines @@
 
 bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanAccessCookiesForOrigin(
     int child_id, const GURL& gurl) {
   base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
   SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
   if (state == security_state_.end())
     return false;
   return state->second->CanAccessCookiesForOrigin(gurl);
 }
 
-bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanSendCookiesForOrigin(int child_id,
-                                                             const GURL& gurl) {
-  for (PluginProcessHostIterator iter; !iter.Done(); ++iter) {
-    if (iter.GetData().id == child_id) {
-      if (iter.GetData().process_type == PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN) {
-        // NPAPI plugin processes are unsandboxed and so are trusted. Plugins
-        // can make request to any origin.
-        return true;
-      }
-      break;
-    }
-  }
-
-  base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
-  SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
-  if (state == security_state_.end())
-    return false;
-  return state->second->CanSendCookiesForOrigin(gurl);
-}
-
 void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::LockToOrigin(int child_id,
                                                   const GURL& gurl) {
   // "gurl" can be currently empty in some cases, such as file://blah.
   DCHECK(SiteInstanceImpl::GetSiteForURL(NULL, gurl) == gurl);
   base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
   SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
   DCHECK(state != security_state_.end());
   state->second->LockToOrigin(gurl);
 }
 
@@ skipping 32 matching lines @@
   base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
 
   SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
   if (state == security_state_.end())
     return false;
 
   return state->second->can_send_midi_sysex();
 }
 
 }  // namespace content