Index: chrome/browser/zygote_main_linux.cc |
=================================================================== |
--- chrome/browser/zygote_main_linux.cc (revision 75653) |
+++ chrome/browser/zygote_main_linux.cc (working copy) |
@@ -1,752 +0,0 @@ |
-// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
-// found in the LICENSE file. |
- |
-#include <dlfcn.h> |
-#include <fcntl.h> |
-#include <pthread.h> |
-#include <sys/epoll.h> |
-#include <sys/prctl.h> |
-#include <sys/signal.h> |
-#include <sys/socket.h> |
-#include <sys/stat.h> |
-#include <sys/types.h> |
-#include <sys/wait.h> |
-#include <unistd.h> |
- |
-#if defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX) |
-#include <selinux/selinux.h> |
-#include <selinux/context.h> |
-#endif |
- |
-#include "base/basictypes.h" |
-#include "base/command_line.h" |
-#include "base/eintr_wrapper.h" |
-#include "base/file_path.h" |
-#include "base/global_descriptors_posix.h" |
-#include "base/hash_tables.h" |
-#include "base/linux_util.h" |
-#include "base/path_service.h" |
-#include "base/pickle.h" |
-#include "base/process_util.h" |
-#include "base/rand_util.h" |
-#include "base/scoped_ptr.h" |
-#include "base/sys_info.h" |
-#include "build/build_config.h" |
-#include "chrome/browser/zygote_host_linux.h" |
-#include "chrome/common/chrome_descriptors.h" |
-#include "chrome/common/chrome_switches.h" |
-#include "chrome/common/font_config_ipc_linux.h" |
-#include "chrome/common/main_function_params.h" |
-#include "chrome/common/pepper_plugin_registry.h" |
-#include "chrome/common/process_watcher.h" |
-#include "chrome/common/result_codes.h" |
-#include "chrome/common/sandbox_methods_linux.h" |
-#include "chrome/common/set_process_title.h" |
-#include "chrome/common/unix_domain_socket_posix.h" |
-#include "media/base/media.h" |
-#include "seccompsandbox/sandbox.h" |
-#include "skia/ext/SkFontHost_fontconfig_control.h" |
-#include "unicode/timezone.h" |
- |
-#if defined(ARCH_CPU_X86_FAMILY) && !defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX) && \ |
- !defined(__clang__) |
-// The seccomp sandbox is enabled on all ia32 and x86-64 processor as long as |
-// we aren't using SELinux or clang. |
-#define SECCOMP_SANDBOX |
-#endif |
- |
-// http://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxZygote |
- |
-static const int kBrowserDescriptor = 3; |
-static const int kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor = 5; |
-static const int kZygoteIdDescriptor = 7; |
-static bool g_suid_sandbox_active = false; |
-#if defined(SECCOMP_SANDBOX) |
-// |g_proc_fd| is used only by the seccomp sandbox. |
-static int g_proc_fd = -1; |
-#endif |
- |
-#if defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX) |
-static void SELinuxTransitionToTypeOrDie(const char* type) { |
- security_context_t security_context; |
- if (getcon(&security_context)) |
- LOG(FATAL) << "Cannot get SELinux context"; |
- |
- context_t context = context_new(security_context); |
- context_type_set(context, type); |
- const int r = setcon(context_str(context)); |
- context_free(context); |
- freecon(security_context); |
- |
- if (r) { |
- LOG(FATAL) << "dynamic transition to type '" << type << "' failed. " |
- "(this binary has been built with SELinux support, but maybe " |
- "the policies haven't been loaded into the kernel?)"; |
- } |
-} |
-#endif // CHROMIUM_SELINUX |
- |
-// This is the object which implements the zygote. The ZygoteMain function, |
-// which is called from ChromeMain, simply constructs one of these objects and |
-// runs it. |
-class Zygote { |
- public: |
- explicit Zygote(int sandbox_flags) |
- : sandbox_flags_(sandbox_flags) { |
- } |
- |
- bool ProcessRequests() { |
- // A SOCK_SEQPACKET socket is installed in fd 3. We get commands from the |
- // browser on it. |
- // A SOCK_DGRAM is installed in fd 5. This is the sandbox IPC channel. |
- // See http://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSandboxIPC |
- |
- // We need to accept SIGCHLD, even though our handler is a no-op because |
- // otherwise we cannot wait on children. (According to POSIX 2001.) |
- struct sigaction action; |
- memset(&action, 0, sizeof(action)); |
- action.sa_handler = SIGCHLDHandler; |
- CHECK(sigaction(SIGCHLD, &action, NULL) == 0); |
- |
- if (g_suid_sandbox_active) { |
- // Let the ZygoteHost know we are ready to go. |
- // The receiving code is in chrome/browser/zygote_host_linux.cc. |
- std::vector<int> empty; |
- bool r = UnixDomainSocket::SendMsg(kBrowserDescriptor, kZygoteMagic, |
- sizeof(kZygoteMagic), empty); |
- CHECK(r) << "Sending zygote magic failed"; |
- } |
- |
- for (;;) { |
- // This function call can return multiple times, once per fork(). |
- if (HandleRequestFromBrowser(kBrowserDescriptor)) |
- return true; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- private: |
- // See comment below, where sigaction is called. |
- static void SIGCHLDHandler(int signal) { } |
- |
- // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
- // Requests from the browser... |
- |
- // Read and process a request from the browser. Returns true if we are in a |
- // new process and thus need to unwind back into ChromeMain. |
- bool HandleRequestFromBrowser(int fd) { |
- std::vector<int> fds; |
- static const unsigned kMaxMessageLength = 1024; |
- char buf[kMaxMessageLength]; |
- const ssize_t len = UnixDomainSocket::RecvMsg(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), &fds); |
- |
- if (len == 0 || (len == -1 && errno == ECONNRESET)) { |
- // EOF from the browser. We should die. |
- _exit(0); |
- return false; |
- } |
- |
- if (len == -1) { |
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Error reading message from browser"; |
- return false; |
- } |
- |
- Pickle pickle(buf, len); |
- void* iter = NULL; |
- |
- int kind; |
- if (pickle.ReadInt(&iter, &kind)) { |
- switch (kind) { |
- case ZygoteHost::kCmdFork: |
- // This function call can return multiple times, once per fork(). |
- return HandleForkRequest(fd, pickle, iter, fds); |
- case ZygoteHost::kCmdReap: |
- if (!fds.empty()) |
- break; |
- HandleReapRequest(fd, pickle, iter); |
- return false; |
- case ZygoteHost::kCmdGetTerminationStatus: |
- if (!fds.empty()) |
- break; |
- HandleGetTerminationStatus(fd, pickle, iter); |
- return false; |
- case ZygoteHost::kCmdGetSandboxStatus: |
- HandleGetSandboxStatus(fd, pickle, iter); |
- return false; |
- default: |
- NOTREACHED(); |
- break; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- LOG(WARNING) << "Error parsing message from browser"; |
- for (std::vector<int>::const_iterator |
- i = fds.begin(); i != fds.end(); ++i) |
- close(*i); |
- return false; |
- } |
- |
- void HandleReapRequest(int fd, const Pickle& pickle, void* iter) { |
- base::ProcessId child; |
- base::ProcessId actual_child; |
- |
- if (!pickle.ReadInt(&iter, &child)) { |
- LOG(WARNING) << "Error parsing reap request from browser"; |
- return; |
- } |
- |
- if (g_suid_sandbox_active) { |
- actual_child = real_pids_to_sandbox_pids[child]; |
- if (!actual_child) |
- return; |
- real_pids_to_sandbox_pids.erase(child); |
- } else { |
- actual_child = child; |
- } |
- |
- ProcessWatcher::EnsureProcessTerminated(actual_child); |
- } |
- |
- void HandleGetTerminationStatus(int fd, const Pickle& pickle, void* iter) { |
- base::ProcessHandle child; |
- |
- if (!pickle.ReadInt(&iter, &child)) { |
- LOG(WARNING) << "Error parsing GetTerminationStatus request " |
- << "from browser"; |
- return; |
- } |
- |
- base::TerminationStatus status; |
- int exit_code; |
- if (g_suid_sandbox_active) |
- child = real_pids_to_sandbox_pids[child]; |
- if (child) { |
- status = base::GetTerminationStatus(child, &exit_code); |
- } else { |
- // Assume that if we can't find the child in the sandbox, then |
- // it terminated normally. |
- status = base::TERMINATION_STATUS_NORMAL_TERMINATION; |
- exit_code = ResultCodes::NORMAL_EXIT; |
- } |
- |
- Pickle write_pickle; |
- write_pickle.WriteInt(static_cast<int>(status)); |
- write_pickle.WriteInt(exit_code); |
- ssize_t written = |
- HANDLE_EINTR(write(fd, write_pickle.data(), write_pickle.size())); |
- if (written != static_cast<ssize_t>(write_pickle.size())) |
- PLOG(ERROR) << "write"; |
- } |
- |
- // This is equivalent to fork(), except that, when using the SUID |
- // sandbox, it returns the real PID of the child process as it |
- // appears outside the sandbox, rather than returning the PID inside |
- // the sandbox. |
- int ForkWithRealPid() { |
- if (!g_suid_sandbox_active) |
- return fork(); |
- |
- int dummy_fd; |
- ino_t dummy_inode; |
- int pipe_fds[2] = { -1, -1 }; |
- base::ProcessId pid = 0; |
- |
- dummy_fd = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); |
- if (dummy_fd < 0) { |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create dummy FD"; |
- goto error; |
- } |
- if (!base::FileDescriptorGetInode(&dummy_inode, dummy_fd)) { |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get inode for dummy FD"; |
- goto error; |
- } |
- if (pipe(pipe_fds) != 0) { |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create pipe"; |
- goto error; |
- } |
- |
- pid = fork(); |
- if (pid < 0) { |
- goto error; |
- } else if (pid == 0) { |
- // In the child process. |
- close(pipe_fds[1]); |
- char buffer[1]; |
- // Wait until the parent process has discovered our PID. We |
- // should not fork any child processes (which the seccomp |
- // sandbox does) until then, because that can interfere with the |
- // parent's discovery of our PID. |
- if (HANDLE_EINTR(read(pipe_fds[0], buffer, 1)) != 1 || |
- buffer[0] != 'x') { |
- LOG(FATAL) << "Failed to synchronise with parent zygote process"; |
- } |
- close(pipe_fds[0]); |
- close(dummy_fd); |
- return 0; |
- } else { |
- // In the parent process. |
- close(dummy_fd); |
- dummy_fd = -1; |
- close(pipe_fds[0]); |
- pipe_fds[0] = -1; |
- uint8_t reply_buf[512]; |
- Pickle request; |
- request.WriteInt(LinuxSandbox::METHOD_GET_CHILD_WITH_INODE); |
- request.WriteUInt64(dummy_inode); |
- |
- const ssize_t r = UnixDomainSocket::SendRecvMsg( |
- kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor, reply_buf, sizeof(reply_buf), NULL, |
- request); |
- if (r == -1) { |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get child process's real PID"; |
- goto error; |
- } |
- |
- base::ProcessId real_pid; |
- Pickle reply(reinterpret_cast<char*>(reply_buf), r); |
- void* iter2 = NULL; |
- if (!reply.ReadInt(&iter2, &real_pid)) |
- goto error; |
- if (real_pid <= 0) { |
- // METHOD_GET_CHILD_WITH_INODE failed. Did the child die already? |
- LOG(ERROR) << "METHOD_GET_CHILD_WITH_INODE failed"; |
- goto error; |
- } |
- real_pids_to_sandbox_pids[real_pid] = pid; |
- if (HANDLE_EINTR(write(pipe_fds[1], "x", 1)) != 1) { |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to synchronise with child process"; |
- goto error; |
- } |
- close(pipe_fds[1]); |
- return real_pid; |
- } |
- |
- error: |
- if (pid > 0) { |
- if (waitpid(pid, NULL, WNOHANG) == -1) |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to wait for process"; |
- } |
- if (dummy_fd >= 0) |
- close(dummy_fd); |
- if (pipe_fds[0] >= 0) |
- close(pipe_fds[0]); |
- if (pipe_fds[1] >= 0) |
- close(pipe_fds[1]); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- // Handle a 'fork' request from the browser: this means that the browser |
- // wishes to start a new renderer. |
- bool HandleForkRequest(int fd, const Pickle& pickle, void* iter, |
- std::vector<int>& fds) { |
- std::vector<std::string> args; |
- int argc, numfds; |
- base::GlobalDescriptors::Mapping mapping; |
- base::ProcessId child; |
- |
- if (!pickle.ReadInt(&iter, &argc)) |
- goto error; |
- |
- for (int i = 0; i < argc; ++i) { |
- std::string arg; |
- if (!pickle.ReadString(&iter, &arg)) |
- goto error; |
- args.push_back(arg); |
- } |
- |
- if (!pickle.ReadInt(&iter, &numfds)) |
- goto error; |
- if (numfds != static_cast<int>(fds.size())) |
- goto error; |
- |
- for (int i = 0; i < numfds; ++i) { |
- base::GlobalDescriptors::Key key; |
- if (!pickle.ReadUInt32(&iter, &key)) |
- goto error; |
- mapping.push_back(std::make_pair(key, fds[i])); |
- } |
- |
- mapping.push_back(std::make_pair( |
- static_cast<uint32_t>(kSandboxIPCChannel), kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor)); |
- |
- child = ForkWithRealPid(); |
- |
- if (!child) { |
-#if defined(SECCOMP_SANDBOX) |
- // Try to open /proc/self/maps as the seccomp sandbox needs access to it |
- if (g_proc_fd >= 0) { |
- int proc_self_maps = openat(g_proc_fd, "self/maps", O_RDONLY); |
- if (proc_self_maps >= 0) { |
- SeccompSandboxSetProcSelfMaps(proc_self_maps); |
- } |
- close(g_proc_fd); |
- g_proc_fd = -1; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- close(kBrowserDescriptor); // our socket from the browser |
- if (g_suid_sandbox_active) |
- close(kZygoteIdDescriptor); // another socket from the browser |
- base::GlobalDescriptors::GetInstance()->Reset(mapping); |
- |
-#if defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX) |
- SELinuxTransitionToTypeOrDie("chromium_renderer_t"); |
-#endif |
- |
- // Reset the process-wide command line to our new command line. |
- CommandLine::Reset(); |
- CommandLine::Init(0, NULL); |
- CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->InitFromArgv(args); |
- |
- // Update the process title. The argv was already cached by the call to |
- // SetProcessTitleFromCommandLine in ChromeMain, so we can pass NULL here |
- // (we don't have the original argv at this point). |
- SetProcessTitleFromCommandLine(NULL); |
- |
- // The fork() request is handled further up the call stack. |
- return true; |
- } else if (child < 0) { |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Zygote could not fork: " << errno; |
- goto error; |
- } |
- |
- for (std::vector<int>::const_iterator |
- i = fds.begin(); i != fds.end(); ++i) |
- close(*i); |
- |
- if (HANDLE_EINTR(write(fd, &child, sizeof(child))) < 0) |
- PLOG(ERROR) << "write"; |
- return false; |
- |
- error: |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error parsing fork request from browser"; |
- for (std::vector<int>::const_iterator |
- i = fds.begin(); i != fds.end(); ++i) |
- close(*i); |
- return false; |
- } |
- |
- bool HandleGetSandboxStatus(int fd, const Pickle& pickle, void* iter) { |
- if (HANDLE_EINTR(write(fd, &sandbox_flags_, sizeof(sandbox_flags_)) != |
- sizeof(sandbox_flags_))) { |
- PLOG(ERROR) << "write"; |
- } |
- |
- return false; |
- } |
- |
- // In the SUID sandbox, we try to use a new PID namespace. Thus the PIDs |
- // fork() returns are not the real PIDs, so we need to map the Real PIDS |
- // into the sandbox PID namespace. |
- typedef base::hash_map<base::ProcessHandle, base::ProcessHandle> ProcessMap; |
- ProcessMap real_pids_to_sandbox_pids; |
- |
- const int sandbox_flags_; |
-}; |
- |
-// With SELinux we can carve out a precise sandbox, so we don't have to play |
-// with intercepting libc calls. |
-#if !defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX) |
- |
-static void ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser(time_t input, struct tm* output, |
- char* timezone_out, |
- size_t timezone_out_len) { |
- Pickle request; |
- request.WriteInt(LinuxSandbox::METHOD_LOCALTIME); |
- request.WriteString( |
- std::string(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&input), sizeof(input))); |
- |
- uint8_t reply_buf[512]; |
- const ssize_t r = UnixDomainSocket::SendRecvMsg( |
- kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor, reply_buf, sizeof(reply_buf), NULL, request); |
- if (r == -1) { |
- memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm)); |
- return; |
- } |
- |
- Pickle reply(reinterpret_cast<char*>(reply_buf), r); |
- void* iter = NULL; |
- std::string result, timezone; |
- if (!reply.ReadString(&iter, &result) || |
- !reply.ReadString(&iter, &timezone) || |
- result.size() != sizeof(struct tm)) { |
- memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm)); |
- return; |
- } |
- |
- memcpy(output, result.data(), sizeof(struct tm)); |
- if (timezone_out_len) { |
- const size_t copy_len = std::min(timezone_out_len - 1, timezone.size()); |
- memcpy(timezone_out, timezone.data(), copy_len); |
- timezone_out[copy_len] = 0; |
- output->tm_zone = timezone_out; |
- } else { |
- output->tm_zone = NULL; |
- } |
-} |
- |
-static bool g_am_zygote_or_renderer = false; |
- |
-// Sandbox interception of libc calls. |
-// |
-// Because we are running in a sandbox certain libc calls will fail (localtime |
-// being the motivating example - it needs to read /etc/localtime). We need to |
-// intercept these calls and proxy them to the browser. However, these calls |
-// may come from us or from our libraries. In some cases we can't just change |
-// our code. |
-// |
-// It's for these cases that we have the following setup: |
-// |
-// We define global functions for those functions which we wish to override. |
-// Since we will be first in the dynamic resolution order, the dynamic linker |
-// will point callers to our versions of these functions. However, we have the |
-// same binary for both the browser and the renderers, which means that our |
-// overrides will apply in the browser too. |
-// |
-// The global |g_am_zygote_or_renderer| is true iff we are in a zygote or |
-// renderer process. It's set in ZygoteMain and inherited by the renderers when |
-// they fork. (This means that it'll be incorrect for global constructor |
-// functions and before ZygoteMain is called - beware). |
-// |
-// Our replacement functions can check this global and either proxy |
-// the call to the browser over the sandbox IPC |
-// (http://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSandboxIPC) or they can use |
-// dlsym with RTLD_NEXT to resolve the symbol, ignoring any symbols in the |
-// current module. |
-// |
-// Other avenues: |
-// |
-// Our first attempt involved some assembly to patch the GOT of the current |
-// module. This worked, but was platform specific and doesn't catch the case |
-// where a library makes a call rather than current module. |
-// |
-// We also considered patching the function in place, but this would again by |
-// platform specific and the above technique seems to work well enough. |
- |
-typedef struct tm* (*LocaltimeFunction)(const time_t* timep); |
-typedef struct tm* (*LocaltimeRFunction)(const time_t* timep, |
- struct tm* result); |
- |
-static pthread_once_t g_libc_localtime_funcs_guard = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT; |
-static LocaltimeFunction g_libc_localtime; |
-static LocaltimeRFunction g_libc_localtime_r; |
- |
-static void InitLibcLocaltimeFunctions() { |
- g_libc_localtime = reinterpret_cast<LocaltimeFunction>( |
- dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "localtime")); |
- g_libc_localtime_r = reinterpret_cast<LocaltimeRFunction>( |
- dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "localtime_r")); |
- |
- if (!g_libc_localtime || !g_libc_localtime_r) { |
- // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=16800 |
- // |
- // Nvidia's libGL.so overrides dlsym for an unknown reason and replaces |
- // it with a version which doesn't work. In this case we'll get a NULL |
- // result. There's not a lot we can do at this point, so we just bodge it! |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Your system is broken: dlsym doesn't work! This has been " |
- "reported to be caused by Nvidia's libGL. You should expect" |
- " time related functions to misbehave. " |
- "http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=16800"; |
- } |
- |
- if (!g_libc_localtime) |
- g_libc_localtime = gmtime; |
- if (!g_libc_localtime_r) |
- g_libc_localtime_r = gmtime_r; |
-} |
- |
-struct tm* localtime(const time_t* timep) { |
- if (g_am_zygote_or_renderer) { |
- static struct tm time_struct; |
- static char timezone_string[64]; |
- ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser(*timep, &time_struct, timezone_string, |
- sizeof(timezone_string)); |
- return &time_struct; |
- } else { |
- CHECK_EQ(0, pthread_once(&g_libc_localtime_funcs_guard, |
- InitLibcLocaltimeFunctions)); |
- return g_libc_localtime(timep); |
- } |
-} |
- |
-struct tm* localtime_r(const time_t* timep, struct tm* result) { |
- if (g_am_zygote_or_renderer) { |
- ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser(*timep, result, NULL, 0); |
- return result; |
- } else { |
- CHECK_EQ(0, pthread_once(&g_libc_localtime_funcs_guard, |
- InitLibcLocaltimeFunctions)); |
- return g_libc_localtime_r(timep, result); |
- } |
-} |
- |
-#endif // !CHROMIUM_SELINUX |
- |
-// This function triggers the static and lazy construction of objects that need |
-// to be created before imposing the sandbox. |
-static void PreSandboxInit() { |
- base::RandUint64(); |
- |
- base::SysInfo::MaxSharedMemorySize(); |
- |
- // ICU DateFormat class (used in base/time_format.cc) needs to get the |
- // Olson timezone ID by accessing the zoneinfo files on disk. After |
- // TimeZone::createDefault is called once here, the timezone ID is |
- // cached and there's no more need to access the file system. |
- scoped_ptr<icu::TimeZone> zone(icu::TimeZone::createDefault()); |
- |
- FilePath module_path; |
- if (PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &module_path)) |
- media::InitializeMediaLibrary(module_path); |
- |
- // Ensure access to the Pepper plugins before the sandbox is turned on. |
- PepperPluginRegistry::PreloadModules(); |
-} |
- |
-#if !defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX) |
-static bool EnterSandbox() { |
- // The SUID sandbox sets this environment variable to a file descriptor |
- // over which we can signal that we have completed our startup and can be |
- // chrooted. |
- const char* const sandbox_fd_string = getenv("SBX_D"); |
- |
- if (sandbox_fd_string) { |
- // Use the SUID sandbox. This still allows the seccomp sandbox to |
- // be enabled by the process later. |
- g_suid_sandbox_active = true; |
- |
- char* endptr; |
- const long fd_long = strtol(sandbox_fd_string, &endptr, 10); |
- if (!*sandbox_fd_string || *endptr || fd_long < 0 || fd_long > INT_MAX) |
- return false; |
- const int fd = fd_long; |
- |
- PreSandboxInit(); |
- |
- static const char kMsgChrootMe = 'C'; |
- static const char kMsgChrootSuccessful = 'O'; |
- |
- if (HANDLE_EINTR(write(fd, &kMsgChrootMe, 1)) != 1) { |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to write to chroot pipe: " << errno; |
- return false; |
- } |
- |
- // We need to reap the chroot helper process in any event: |
- wait(NULL); |
- |
- char reply; |
- if (HANDLE_EINTR(read(fd, &reply, 1)) != 1) { |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read from chroot pipe: " << errno; |
- return false; |
- } |
- |
- if (reply != kMsgChrootSuccessful) { |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error code reply from chroot helper"; |
- return false; |
- } |
- |
- SkiaFontConfigSetImplementation( |
- new FontConfigIPC(kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor)); |
- |
- // Previously, we required that the binary be non-readable. This causes the |
- // kernel to mark the process as non-dumpable at startup. The thinking was |
- // that, although we were putting the renderers into a PID namespace (with |
- // the SUID sandbox), they would nonetheless be in the /same/ PID |
- // namespace. So they could ptrace each other unless they were non-dumpable. |
- // |
- // If the binary was readable, then there would be a window between process |
- // startup and the point where we set the non-dumpable flag in which a |
- // compromised renderer could ptrace attach. |
- // |
- // However, now that we have a zygote model, only the (trusted) zygote |
- // exists at this point and we can set the non-dumpable flag which is |
- // inherited by all our renderer children. |
- // |
- // Note: a non-dumpable process can't be debugged. To debug sandbox-related |
- // issues, one can specify --allow-sandbox-debugging to let the process be |
- // dumpable. |
- const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); |
- if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowSandboxDebugging)) { |
- prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0); |
- if (prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) { |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set non-dumpable flag"; |
- return false; |
- } |
- } |
- } else if (switches::SeccompSandboxEnabled()) { |
- PreSandboxInit(); |
- SkiaFontConfigSetImplementation( |
- new FontConfigIPC(kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor)); |
- } else { |
- SkiaFontConfigUseDirectImplementation(); |
- } |
- |
- return true; |
-} |
-#else // CHROMIUM_SELINUX |
- |
-static bool EnterSandbox() { |
- PreSandboxInit(); |
- SkiaFontConfigUseIPCImplementation(kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor); |
- return true; |
-} |
- |
-#endif // CHROMIUM_SELINUX |
- |
-bool ZygoteMain(const MainFunctionParams& params) { |
-#if !defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX) |
- g_am_zygote_or_renderer = true; |
-#endif |
- |
-#if defined(SECCOMP_SANDBOX) |
- // The seccomp sandbox needs access to files in /proc, which might be denied |
- // after one of the other sandboxes have been started. So, obtain a suitable |
- // file handle in advance. |
- if (switches::SeccompSandboxEnabled()) { |
- g_proc_fd = open("/proc", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY); |
- if (g_proc_fd < 0) { |
- LOG(ERROR) << "WARNING! Cannot access \"/proc\". Disabling seccomp " |
- "sandboxing."; |
- } |
- } |
-#endif // SECCOMP_SANDBOX |
- |
- // Turn on the SELinux or SUID sandbox |
- if (!EnterSandbox()) { |
- LOG(FATAL) << "Failed to enter sandbox. Fail safe abort. (errno: " |
- << errno << ")"; |
- return false; |
- } |
- |
- int sandbox_flags = 0; |
- if (getenv("SBX_D")) |
- sandbox_flags |= ZygoteHost::kSandboxSUID; |
- if (getenv("SBX_PID_NS")) |
- sandbox_flags |= ZygoteHost::kSandboxPIDNS; |
- if (getenv("SBX_NET_NS")) |
- sandbox_flags |= ZygoteHost::kSandboxNetNS; |
- |
-#if defined(SECCOMP_SANDBOX) |
- // The seccomp sandbox will be turned on when the renderers start. But we can |
- // already check if sufficient support is available so that we only need to |
- // print one error message for the entire browser session. |
- if (g_proc_fd >= 0 && switches::SeccompSandboxEnabled()) { |
- if (!SupportsSeccompSandbox(g_proc_fd)) { |
- // There are a good number of users who cannot use the seccomp sandbox |
- // (e.g. because their distribution does not enable seccomp mode by |
- // default). While we would prefer to deny execution in this case, it |
- // seems more realistic to continue in degraded mode. |
- LOG(ERROR) << "WARNING! This machine lacks support needed for the " |
- "Seccomp sandbox. Running renderers with Seccomp " |
- "sandboxing disabled."; |
- } else { |
- VLOG(1) << "Enabling experimental Seccomp sandbox."; |
- sandbox_flags |= ZygoteHost::kSandboxSeccomp; |
- } |
- } |
-#endif // SECCOMP_SANDBOX |
- |
- Zygote zygote(sandbox_flags); |
- // This function call can return multiple times, once per fork(). |
- return zygote.ProcessRequests(); |
-} |