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Unified Diff: chrome/browser/zygote_main_linux.cc

Issue 6538111: Move the rest of the core files in chrome\browser to content\browser.... (Closed) Base URL: svn://chrome-svn/chrome/trunk/src/
Patch Set: '' Created 9 years, 10 months ago
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Index: chrome/browser/zygote_main_linux.cc
===================================================================
--- chrome/browser/zygote_main_linux.cc (revision 75653)
+++ chrome/browser/zygote_main_linux.cc (working copy)
@@ -1,752 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-#include <dlfcn.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <pthread.h>
-#include <sys/epoll.h>
-#include <sys/prctl.h>
-#include <sys/signal.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#if defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX)
-#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-#include <selinux/context.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "base/basictypes.h"
-#include "base/command_line.h"
-#include "base/eintr_wrapper.h"
-#include "base/file_path.h"
-#include "base/global_descriptors_posix.h"
-#include "base/hash_tables.h"
-#include "base/linux_util.h"
-#include "base/path_service.h"
-#include "base/pickle.h"
-#include "base/process_util.h"
-#include "base/rand_util.h"
-#include "base/scoped_ptr.h"
-#include "base/sys_info.h"
-#include "build/build_config.h"
-#include "chrome/browser/zygote_host_linux.h"
-#include "chrome/common/chrome_descriptors.h"
-#include "chrome/common/chrome_switches.h"
-#include "chrome/common/font_config_ipc_linux.h"
-#include "chrome/common/main_function_params.h"
-#include "chrome/common/pepper_plugin_registry.h"
-#include "chrome/common/process_watcher.h"
-#include "chrome/common/result_codes.h"
-#include "chrome/common/sandbox_methods_linux.h"
-#include "chrome/common/set_process_title.h"
-#include "chrome/common/unix_domain_socket_posix.h"
-#include "media/base/media.h"
-#include "seccompsandbox/sandbox.h"
-#include "skia/ext/SkFontHost_fontconfig_control.h"
-#include "unicode/timezone.h"
-
-#if defined(ARCH_CPU_X86_FAMILY) && !defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX) && \
- !defined(__clang__)
-// The seccomp sandbox is enabled on all ia32 and x86-64 processor as long as
-// we aren't using SELinux or clang.
-#define SECCOMP_SANDBOX
-#endif
-
-// http://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxZygote
-
-static const int kBrowserDescriptor = 3;
-static const int kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor = 5;
-static const int kZygoteIdDescriptor = 7;
-static bool g_suid_sandbox_active = false;
-#if defined(SECCOMP_SANDBOX)
-// |g_proc_fd| is used only by the seccomp sandbox.
-static int g_proc_fd = -1;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX)
-static void SELinuxTransitionToTypeOrDie(const char* type) {
- security_context_t security_context;
- if (getcon(&security_context))
- LOG(FATAL) << "Cannot get SELinux context";
-
- context_t context = context_new(security_context);
- context_type_set(context, type);
- const int r = setcon(context_str(context));
- context_free(context);
- freecon(security_context);
-
- if (r) {
- LOG(FATAL) << "dynamic transition to type '" << type << "' failed. "
- "(this binary has been built with SELinux support, but maybe "
- "the policies haven't been loaded into the kernel?)";
- }
-}
-#endif // CHROMIUM_SELINUX
-
-// This is the object which implements the zygote. The ZygoteMain function,
-// which is called from ChromeMain, simply constructs one of these objects and
-// runs it.
-class Zygote {
- public:
- explicit Zygote(int sandbox_flags)
- : sandbox_flags_(sandbox_flags) {
- }
-
- bool ProcessRequests() {
- // A SOCK_SEQPACKET socket is installed in fd 3. We get commands from the
- // browser on it.
- // A SOCK_DGRAM is installed in fd 5. This is the sandbox IPC channel.
- // See http://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSandboxIPC
-
- // We need to accept SIGCHLD, even though our handler is a no-op because
- // otherwise we cannot wait on children. (According to POSIX 2001.)
- struct sigaction action;
- memset(&action, 0, sizeof(action));
- action.sa_handler = SIGCHLDHandler;
- CHECK(sigaction(SIGCHLD, &action, NULL) == 0);
-
- if (g_suid_sandbox_active) {
- // Let the ZygoteHost know we are ready to go.
- // The receiving code is in chrome/browser/zygote_host_linux.cc.
- std::vector<int> empty;
- bool r = UnixDomainSocket::SendMsg(kBrowserDescriptor, kZygoteMagic,
- sizeof(kZygoteMagic), empty);
- CHECK(r) << "Sending zygote magic failed";
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- // This function call can return multiple times, once per fork().
- if (HandleRequestFromBrowser(kBrowserDescriptor))
- return true;
- }
- }
-
- private:
- // See comment below, where sigaction is called.
- static void SIGCHLDHandler(int signal) { }
-
- // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
- // Requests from the browser...
-
- // Read and process a request from the browser. Returns true if we are in a
- // new process and thus need to unwind back into ChromeMain.
- bool HandleRequestFromBrowser(int fd) {
- std::vector<int> fds;
- static const unsigned kMaxMessageLength = 1024;
- char buf[kMaxMessageLength];
- const ssize_t len = UnixDomainSocket::RecvMsg(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), &fds);
-
- if (len == 0 || (len == -1 && errno == ECONNRESET)) {
- // EOF from the browser. We should die.
- _exit(0);
- return false;
- }
-
- if (len == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Error reading message from browser";
- return false;
- }
-
- Pickle pickle(buf, len);
- void* iter = NULL;
-
- int kind;
- if (pickle.ReadInt(&iter, &kind)) {
- switch (kind) {
- case ZygoteHost::kCmdFork:
- // This function call can return multiple times, once per fork().
- return HandleForkRequest(fd, pickle, iter, fds);
- case ZygoteHost::kCmdReap:
- if (!fds.empty())
- break;
- HandleReapRequest(fd, pickle, iter);
- return false;
- case ZygoteHost::kCmdGetTerminationStatus:
- if (!fds.empty())
- break;
- HandleGetTerminationStatus(fd, pickle, iter);
- return false;
- case ZygoteHost::kCmdGetSandboxStatus:
- HandleGetSandboxStatus(fd, pickle, iter);
- return false;
- default:
- NOTREACHED();
- break;
- }
- }
-
- LOG(WARNING) << "Error parsing message from browser";
- for (std::vector<int>::const_iterator
- i = fds.begin(); i != fds.end(); ++i)
- close(*i);
- return false;
- }
-
- void HandleReapRequest(int fd, const Pickle& pickle, void* iter) {
- base::ProcessId child;
- base::ProcessId actual_child;
-
- if (!pickle.ReadInt(&iter, &child)) {
- LOG(WARNING) << "Error parsing reap request from browser";
- return;
- }
-
- if (g_suid_sandbox_active) {
- actual_child = real_pids_to_sandbox_pids[child];
- if (!actual_child)
- return;
- real_pids_to_sandbox_pids.erase(child);
- } else {
- actual_child = child;
- }
-
- ProcessWatcher::EnsureProcessTerminated(actual_child);
- }
-
- void HandleGetTerminationStatus(int fd, const Pickle& pickle, void* iter) {
- base::ProcessHandle child;
-
- if (!pickle.ReadInt(&iter, &child)) {
- LOG(WARNING) << "Error parsing GetTerminationStatus request "
- << "from browser";
- return;
- }
-
- base::TerminationStatus status;
- int exit_code;
- if (g_suid_sandbox_active)
- child = real_pids_to_sandbox_pids[child];
- if (child) {
- status = base::GetTerminationStatus(child, &exit_code);
- } else {
- // Assume that if we can't find the child in the sandbox, then
- // it terminated normally.
- status = base::TERMINATION_STATUS_NORMAL_TERMINATION;
- exit_code = ResultCodes::NORMAL_EXIT;
- }
-
- Pickle write_pickle;
- write_pickle.WriteInt(static_cast<int>(status));
- write_pickle.WriteInt(exit_code);
- ssize_t written =
- HANDLE_EINTR(write(fd, write_pickle.data(), write_pickle.size()));
- if (written != static_cast<ssize_t>(write_pickle.size()))
- PLOG(ERROR) << "write";
- }
-
- // This is equivalent to fork(), except that, when using the SUID
- // sandbox, it returns the real PID of the child process as it
- // appears outside the sandbox, rather than returning the PID inside
- // the sandbox.
- int ForkWithRealPid() {
- if (!g_suid_sandbox_active)
- return fork();
-
- int dummy_fd;
- ino_t dummy_inode;
- int pipe_fds[2] = { -1, -1 };
- base::ProcessId pid = 0;
-
- dummy_fd = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
- if (dummy_fd < 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create dummy FD";
- goto error;
- }
- if (!base::FileDescriptorGetInode(&dummy_inode, dummy_fd)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get inode for dummy FD";
- goto error;
- }
- if (pipe(pipe_fds) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create pipe";
- goto error;
- }
-
- pid = fork();
- if (pid < 0) {
- goto error;
- } else if (pid == 0) {
- // In the child process.
- close(pipe_fds[1]);
- char buffer[1];
- // Wait until the parent process has discovered our PID. We
- // should not fork any child processes (which the seccomp
- // sandbox does) until then, because that can interfere with the
- // parent's discovery of our PID.
- if (HANDLE_EINTR(read(pipe_fds[0], buffer, 1)) != 1 ||
- buffer[0] != 'x') {
- LOG(FATAL) << "Failed to synchronise with parent zygote process";
- }
- close(pipe_fds[0]);
- close(dummy_fd);
- return 0;
- } else {
- // In the parent process.
- close(dummy_fd);
- dummy_fd = -1;
- close(pipe_fds[0]);
- pipe_fds[0] = -1;
- uint8_t reply_buf[512];
- Pickle request;
- request.WriteInt(LinuxSandbox::METHOD_GET_CHILD_WITH_INODE);
- request.WriteUInt64(dummy_inode);
-
- const ssize_t r = UnixDomainSocket::SendRecvMsg(
- kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor, reply_buf, sizeof(reply_buf), NULL,
- request);
- if (r == -1) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get child process's real PID";
- goto error;
- }
-
- base::ProcessId real_pid;
- Pickle reply(reinterpret_cast<char*>(reply_buf), r);
- void* iter2 = NULL;
- if (!reply.ReadInt(&iter2, &real_pid))
- goto error;
- if (real_pid <= 0) {
- // METHOD_GET_CHILD_WITH_INODE failed. Did the child die already?
- LOG(ERROR) << "METHOD_GET_CHILD_WITH_INODE failed";
- goto error;
- }
- real_pids_to_sandbox_pids[real_pid] = pid;
- if (HANDLE_EINTR(write(pipe_fds[1], "x", 1)) != 1) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to synchronise with child process";
- goto error;
- }
- close(pipe_fds[1]);
- return real_pid;
- }
-
- error:
- if (pid > 0) {
- if (waitpid(pid, NULL, WNOHANG) == -1)
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to wait for process";
- }
- if (dummy_fd >= 0)
- close(dummy_fd);
- if (pipe_fds[0] >= 0)
- close(pipe_fds[0]);
- if (pipe_fds[1] >= 0)
- close(pipe_fds[1]);
- return -1;
- }
-
- // Handle a 'fork' request from the browser: this means that the browser
- // wishes to start a new renderer.
- bool HandleForkRequest(int fd, const Pickle& pickle, void* iter,
- std::vector<int>& fds) {
- std::vector<std::string> args;
- int argc, numfds;
- base::GlobalDescriptors::Mapping mapping;
- base::ProcessId child;
-
- if (!pickle.ReadInt(&iter, &argc))
- goto error;
-
- for (int i = 0; i < argc; ++i) {
- std::string arg;
- if (!pickle.ReadString(&iter, &arg))
- goto error;
- args.push_back(arg);
- }
-
- if (!pickle.ReadInt(&iter, &numfds))
- goto error;
- if (numfds != static_cast<int>(fds.size()))
- goto error;
-
- for (int i = 0; i < numfds; ++i) {
- base::GlobalDescriptors::Key key;
- if (!pickle.ReadUInt32(&iter, &key))
- goto error;
- mapping.push_back(std::make_pair(key, fds[i]));
- }
-
- mapping.push_back(std::make_pair(
- static_cast<uint32_t>(kSandboxIPCChannel), kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor));
-
- child = ForkWithRealPid();
-
- if (!child) {
-#if defined(SECCOMP_SANDBOX)
- // Try to open /proc/self/maps as the seccomp sandbox needs access to it
- if (g_proc_fd >= 0) {
- int proc_self_maps = openat(g_proc_fd, "self/maps", O_RDONLY);
- if (proc_self_maps >= 0) {
- SeccompSandboxSetProcSelfMaps(proc_self_maps);
- }
- close(g_proc_fd);
- g_proc_fd = -1;
- }
-#endif
-
- close(kBrowserDescriptor); // our socket from the browser
- if (g_suid_sandbox_active)
- close(kZygoteIdDescriptor); // another socket from the browser
- base::GlobalDescriptors::GetInstance()->Reset(mapping);
-
-#if defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX)
- SELinuxTransitionToTypeOrDie("chromium_renderer_t");
-#endif
-
- // Reset the process-wide command line to our new command line.
- CommandLine::Reset();
- CommandLine::Init(0, NULL);
- CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->InitFromArgv(args);
-
- // Update the process title. The argv was already cached by the call to
- // SetProcessTitleFromCommandLine in ChromeMain, so we can pass NULL here
- // (we don't have the original argv at this point).
- SetProcessTitleFromCommandLine(NULL);
-
- // The fork() request is handled further up the call stack.
- return true;
- } else if (child < 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Zygote could not fork: " << errno;
- goto error;
- }
-
- for (std::vector<int>::const_iterator
- i = fds.begin(); i != fds.end(); ++i)
- close(*i);
-
- if (HANDLE_EINTR(write(fd, &child, sizeof(child))) < 0)
- PLOG(ERROR) << "write";
- return false;
-
- error:
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error parsing fork request from browser";
- for (std::vector<int>::const_iterator
- i = fds.begin(); i != fds.end(); ++i)
- close(*i);
- return false;
- }
-
- bool HandleGetSandboxStatus(int fd, const Pickle& pickle, void* iter) {
- if (HANDLE_EINTR(write(fd, &sandbox_flags_, sizeof(sandbox_flags_)) !=
- sizeof(sandbox_flags_))) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "write";
- }
-
- return false;
- }
-
- // In the SUID sandbox, we try to use a new PID namespace. Thus the PIDs
- // fork() returns are not the real PIDs, so we need to map the Real PIDS
- // into the sandbox PID namespace.
- typedef base::hash_map<base::ProcessHandle, base::ProcessHandle> ProcessMap;
- ProcessMap real_pids_to_sandbox_pids;
-
- const int sandbox_flags_;
-};
-
-// With SELinux we can carve out a precise sandbox, so we don't have to play
-// with intercepting libc calls.
-#if !defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX)
-
-static void ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser(time_t input, struct tm* output,
- char* timezone_out,
- size_t timezone_out_len) {
- Pickle request;
- request.WriteInt(LinuxSandbox::METHOD_LOCALTIME);
- request.WriteString(
- std::string(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&input), sizeof(input)));
-
- uint8_t reply_buf[512];
- const ssize_t r = UnixDomainSocket::SendRecvMsg(
- kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor, reply_buf, sizeof(reply_buf), NULL, request);
- if (r == -1) {
- memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
- return;
- }
-
- Pickle reply(reinterpret_cast<char*>(reply_buf), r);
- void* iter = NULL;
- std::string result, timezone;
- if (!reply.ReadString(&iter, &result) ||
- !reply.ReadString(&iter, &timezone) ||
- result.size() != sizeof(struct tm)) {
- memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
- return;
- }
-
- memcpy(output, result.data(), sizeof(struct tm));
- if (timezone_out_len) {
- const size_t copy_len = std::min(timezone_out_len - 1, timezone.size());
- memcpy(timezone_out, timezone.data(), copy_len);
- timezone_out[copy_len] = 0;
- output->tm_zone = timezone_out;
- } else {
- output->tm_zone = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-static bool g_am_zygote_or_renderer = false;
-
-// Sandbox interception of libc calls.
-//
-// Because we are running in a sandbox certain libc calls will fail (localtime
-// being the motivating example - it needs to read /etc/localtime). We need to
-// intercept these calls and proxy them to the browser. However, these calls
-// may come from us or from our libraries. In some cases we can't just change
-// our code.
-//
-// It's for these cases that we have the following setup:
-//
-// We define global functions for those functions which we wish to override.
-// Since we will be first in the dynamic resolution order, the dynamic linker
-// will point callers to our versions of these functions. However, we have the
-// same binary for both the browser and the renderers, which means that our
-// overrides will apply in the browser too.
-//
-// The global |g_am_zygote_or_renderer| is true iff we are in a zygote or
-// renderer process. It's set in ZygoteMain and inherited by the renderers when
-// they fork. (This means that it'll be incorrect for global constructor
-// functions and before ZygoteMain is called - beware).
-//
-// Our replacement functions can check this global and either proxy
-// the call to the browser over the sandbox IPC
-// (http://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSandboxIPC) or they can use
-// dlsym with RTLD_NEXT to resolve the symbol, ignoring any symbols in the
-// current module.
-//
-// Other avenues:
-//
-// Our first attempt involved some assembly to patch the GOT of the current
-// module. This worked, but was platform specific and doesn't catch the case
-// where a library makes a call rather than current module.
-//
-// We also considered patching the function in place, but this would again by
-// platform specific and the above technique seems to work well enough.
-
-typedef struct tm* (*LocaltimeFunction)(const time_t* timep);
-typedef struct tm* (*LocaltimeRFunction)(const time_t* timep,
- struct tm* result);
-
-static pthread_once_t g_libc_localtime_funcs_guard = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT;
-static LocaltimeFunction g_libc_localtime;
-static LocaltimeRFunction g_libc_localtime_r;
-
-static void InitLibcLocaltimeFunctions() {
- g_libc_localtime = reinterpret_cast<LocaltimeFunction>(
- dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "localtime"));
- g_libc_localtime_r = reinterpret_cast<LocaltimeRFunction>(
- dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "localtime_r"));
-
- if (!g_libc_localtime || !g_libc_localtime_r) {
- // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=16800
- //
- // Nvidia's libGL.so overrides dlsym for an unknown reason and replaces
- // it with a version which doesn't work. In this case we'll get a NULL
- // result. There's not a lot we can do at this point, so we just bodge it!
- LOG(ERROR) << "Your system is broken: dlsym doesn't work! This has been "
- "reported to be caused by Nvidia's libGL. You should expect"
- " time related functions to misbehave. "
- "http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=16800";
- }
-
- if (!g_libc_localtime)
- g_libc_localtime = gmtime;
- if (!g_libc_localtime_r)
- g_libc_localtime_r = gmtime_r;
-}
-
-struct tm* localtime(const time_t* timep) {
- if (g_am_zygote_or_renderer) {
- static struct tm time_struct;
- static char timezone_string[64];
- ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser(*timep, &time_struct, timezone_string,
- sizeof(timezone_string));
- return &time_struct;
- } else {
- CHECK_EQ(0, pthread_once(&g_libc_localtime_funcs_guard,
- InitLibcLocaltimeFunctions));
- return g_libc_localtime(timep);
- }
-}
-
-struct tm* localtime_r(const time_t* timep, struct tm* result) {
- if (g_am_zygote_or_renderer) {
- ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser(*timep, result, NULL, 0);
- return result;
- } else {
- CHECK_EQ(0, pthread_once(&g_libc_localtime_funcs_guard,
- InitLibcLocaltimeFunctions));
- return g_libc_localtime_r(timep, result);
- }
-}
-
-#endif // !CHROMIUM_SELINUX
-
-// This function triggers the static and lazy construction of objects that need
-// to be created before imposing the sandbox.
-static void PreSandboxInit() {
- base::RandUint64();
-
- base::SysInfo::MaxSharedMemorySize();
-
- // ICU DateFormat class (used in base/time_format.cc) needs to get the
- // Olson timezone ID by accessing the zoneinfo files on disk. After
- // TimeZone::createDefault is called once here, the timezone ID is
- // cached and there's no more need to access the file system.
- scoped_ptr<icu::TimeZone> zone(icu::TimeZone::createDefault());
-
- FilePath module_path;
- if (PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &module_path))
- media::InitializeMediaLibrary(module_path);
-
- // Ensure access to the Pepper plugins before the sandbox is turned on.
- PepperPluginRegistry::PreloadModules();
-}
-
-#if !defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX)
-static bool EnterSandbox() {
- // The SUID sandbox sets this environment variable to a file descriptor
- // over which we can signal that we have completed our startup and can be
- // chrooted.
- const char* const sandbox_fd_string = getenv("SBX_D");
-
- if (sandbox_fd_string) {
- // Use the SUID sandbox. This still allows the seccomp sandbox to
- // be enabled by the process later.
- g_suid_sandbox_active = true;
-
- char* endptr;
- const long fd_long = strtol(sandbox_fd_string, &endptr, 10);
- if (!*sandbox_fd_string || *endptr || fd_long < 0 || fd_long > INT_MAX)
- return false;
- const int fd = fd_long;
-
- PreSandboxInit();
-
- static const char kMsgChrootMe = 'C';
- static const char kMsgChrootSuccessful = 'O';
-
- if (HANDLE_EINTR(write(fd, &kMsgChrootMe, 1)) != 1) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to write to chroot pipe: " << errno;
- return false;
- }
-
- // We need to reap the chroot helper process in any event:
- wait(NULL);
-
- char reply;
- if (HANDLE_EINTR(read(fd, &reply, 1)) != 1) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read from chroot pipe: " << errno;
- return false;
- }
-
- if (reply != kMsgChrootSuccessful) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error code reply from chroot helper";
- return false;
- }
-
- SkiaFontConfigSetImplementation(
- new FontConfigIPC(kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor));
-
- // Previously, we required that the binary be non-readable. This causes the
- // kernel to mark the process as non-dumpable at startup. The thinking was
- // that, although we were putting the renderers into a PID namespace (with
- // the SUID sandbox), they would nonetheless be in the /same/ PID
- // namespace. So they could ptrace each other unless they were non-dumpable.
- //
- // If the binary was readable, then there would be a window between process
- // startup and the point where we set the non-dumpable flag in which a
- // compromised renderer could ptrace attach.
- //
- // However, now that we have a zygote model, only the (trusted) zygote
- // exists at this point and we can set the non-dumpable flag which is
- // inherited by all our renderer children.
- //
- // Note: a non-dumpable process can't be debugged. To debug sandbox-related
- // issues, one can specify --allow-sandbox-debugging to let the process be
- // dumpable.
- const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
- if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowSandboxDebugging)) {
- prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
- if (prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set non-dumpable flag";
- return false;
- }
- }
- } else if (switches::SeccompSandboxEnabled()) {
- PreSandboxInit();
- SkiaFontConfigSetImplementation(
- new FontConfigIPC(kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor));
- } else {
- SkiaFontConfigUseDirectImplementation();
- }
-
- return true;
-}
-#else // CHROMIUM_SELINUX
-
-static bool EnterSandbox() {
- PreSandboxInit();
- SkiaFontConfigUseIPCImplementation(kMagicSandboxIPCDescriptor);
- return true;
-}
-
-#endif // CHROMIUM_SELINUX
-
-bool ZygoteMain(const MainFunctionParams& params) {
-#if !defined(CHROMIUM_SELINUX)
- g_am_zygote_or_renderer = true;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(SECCOMP_SANDBOX)
- // The seccomp sandbox needs access to files in /proc, which might be denied
- // after one of the other sandboxes have been started. So, obtain a suitable
- // file handle in advance.
- if (switches::SeccompSandboxEnabled()) {
- g_proc_fd = open("/proc", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
- if (g_proc_fd < 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "WARNING! Cannot access \"/proc\". Disabling seccomp "
- "sandboxing.";
- }
- }
-#endif // SECCOMP_SANDBOX
-
- // Turn on the SELinux or SUID sandbox
- if (!EnterSandbox()) {
- LOG(FATAL) << "Failed to enter sandbox. Fail safe abort. (errno: "
- << errno << ")";
- return false;
- }
-
- int sandbox_flags = 0;
- if (getenv("SBX_D"))
- sandbox_flags |= ZygoteHost::kSandboxSUID;
- if (getenv("SBX_PID_NS"))
- sandbox_flags |= ZygoteHost::kSandboxPIDNS;
- if (getenv("SBX_NET_NS"))
- sandbox_flags |= ZygoteHost::kSandboxNetNS;
-
-#if defined(SECCOMP_SANDBOX)
- // The seccomp sandbox will be turned on when the renderers start. But we can
- // already check if sufficient support is available so that we only need to
- // print one error message for the entire browser session.
- if (g_proc_fd >= 0 && switches::SeccompSandboxEnabled()) {
- if (!SupportsSeccompSandbox(g_proc_fd)) {
- // There are a good number of users who cannot use the seccomp sandbox
- // (e.g. because their distribution does not enable seccomp mode by
- // default). While we would prefer to deny execution in this case, it
- // seems more realistic to continue in degraded mode.
- LOG(ERROR) << "WARNING! This machine lacks support needed for the "
- "Seccomp sandbox. Running renderers with Seccomp "
- "sandboxing disabled.";
- } else {
- VLOG(1) << "Enabling experimental Seccomp sandbox.";
- sandbox_flags |= ZygoteHost::kSandboxSeccomp;
- }
- }
-#endif // SECCOMP_SANDBOX
-
- Zygote zygote(sandbox_flags);
- // This function call can return multiple times, once per fork().
- return zygote.ProcessRequests();
-}
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