Move more helpers to seccomp-bpf-helpers.

sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.cc

Index: sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.cc
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.cc b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c26cfd835c1873f9192c20b3d991fd7839a85a6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "base/basictypes.h"
+#include "base/logging.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/linux_seccomp.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h"
+
+#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
+#if !defined(F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC)
+#define F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 6)
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__arm__) && !defined(MAP_STACK)
+#define MAP_STACK 0x20000  // Daisy build environment has old headers.
+#endif
+
+using playground2::arch_seccomp_data;
+using playground2::ErrorCode;
+using playground2::Sandbox;
+
+namespace {
+
+inline bool RunningOnASAN() {
+#if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
+  return true;
+#else
+  return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+inline bool IsArchitectureX86_64() {
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
+  return true;
+#else
+  return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+inline bool IsArchitectureI386() {
+#if defined(__i386__)
+  return true;
+#else
+  return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+}  // namespace.
+
+namespace sandbox {
+
+ErrorCode RestrictCloneToThreadsAndEPERMFork(Sandbox* sandbox) {
+  // Glibc's pthread.
+  if (!RunningOnASAN()) {
+    return sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                         CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES | CLONE_SIGHAND |
+                         CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SYSVSEM | CLONE_SETTLS |
+                         CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID,
+                         ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+           sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                         CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | SIGCHLD,
+                         ErrorCode(EPERM),
+           // ARM
+           sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                         CLONE_CHILD_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID | SIGCHLD,
+                         ErrorCode(EPERM),
+           sandbox->Trap(SIGSYSCloneFailure, NULL))));
+  } else {
+    return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+  }
+}
+
+ErrorCode RestrictPrctl(Sandbox* sandbox) {
+  // Will need to add seccomp compositing in the future. PR_SET_PTRACER is
+  // used by breakpad but not needed anymore.
+  return sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                       PR_SET_NAME, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                       PR_SET_DUMPABLE, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                       PR_GET_DUMPABLE, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Trap(SIGSYSPrctlFailure, NULL))));
+}
+
+ErrorCode RestrictIoctl(Sandbox* sandbox) {
+  return sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, TCGETS,
+                       ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, FIONREAD,
+                       ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+                       sandbox->Trap(SIGSYSIoctlFailure, NULL)));
+}
+
+ErrorCode RestrictMmapFlags(Sandbox* sandbox) {
+  // The flags you see are actually the allowed ones, and the variable is a
+  // "denied" mask because of the negation operator.
+  // Significantly, we don't permit MAP_HUGETLB, or the newer flags such as
+  // MAP_POPULATE.
+  // TODO(davidung), remove MAP_DENYWRITE with updated Tegra libraries.
+  uint32_t denied_mask = ~(MAP_SHARED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS |
+                           MAP_STACK | MAP_NORESERVE | MAP_FIXED |
+                           MAP_DENYWRITE);
+  return sandbox->Cond(3, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_HAS_ANY_BITS,
+                       denied_mask,
+                       sandbox->Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL),
+                       ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED));
+}
+
+ErrorCode RestrictMprotectFlags(Sandbox* sandbox) {
+  // The flags you see are actually the allowed ones, and the variable is a
+  // "denied" mask because of the negation operator.
+  // Significantly, we don't permit weird undocumented flags such as
+  // PROT_GROWSDOWN.
+  uint32_t denied_mask = ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
+  return sandbox->Cond(2, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_HAS_ANY_BITS,
+                       denied_mask,
+                       sandbox->Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL),
+                       ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED));
+}
+
+ErrorCode RestrictFcntlCommands(Sandbox* sandbox) {
+  // We also restrict the flags in F_SETFL. We don't want to permit flags with
+  // a history of trouble such as O_DIRECT. The flags you see are actually the
+  // allowed ones, and the variable is a "denied" mask because of the negation
+  // operator.
+  // Glibc overrides the kernel's O_LARGEFILE value. Account for this.
+  int kOLargeFileFlag = O_LARGEFILE;
+  if (IsArchitectureX86_64() || IsArchitectureI386())
+    kOLargeFileFlag = 0100000;
+
+  // TODO(jln): add TP_LONG/TP_SIZET types.
+  ErrorCode::ArgType mask_long_type;
+  if (sizeof(long) == 8)
+    mask_long_type = ErrorCode::TP_64BIT;
+  else if (sizeof(long) == 4)
+    mask_long_type = ErrorCode::TP_32BIT;
+  else
+    NOTREACHED();
+
+  unsigned long denied_mask = ~(O_ACCMODE | O_APPEND | O_NONBLOCK | O_SYNC |
+                                kOLargeFileFlag | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOATIME);
+  return sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
+                       ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_GETFL,
+                       ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
+                       ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_SETFL,
+                       sandbox->Cond(2, mask_long_type,
+                                     ErrorCode::OP_HAS_ANY_BITS, denied_mask,
+                                     sandbox->Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL),
+                                     ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED)),
+         sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
+                       ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_GETFD,
+                       ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
+                       ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_SETFD,
+                       ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
+                       ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_DUPFD,
+                       ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
+                       ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_SETLK,
+                       ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
+                       ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_SETLKW,
+                       ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
+                       ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_GETLK,
+                       ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
+                       ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC,
+                       ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL))))))))));
+}
+
+#if defined(__i386__)
+ErrorCode RestrictSocketcallCommand(Sandbox* sandbox) {
+  // Unfortunately, we are unable to restrict the first parameter to
+  // socketpair(2). Whilst initially sounding bad, it's noteworthy that very
+  // few protocols actually support socketpair(2). The scary call that we're
+  // worried about, socket(2), remains blocked.
+  return sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                       SYS_SOCKETPAIR, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                       SYS_SEND, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                       SYS_RECV, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                       SYS_SENDTO, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                       SYS_RECVFROM, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                       SYS_SHUTDOWN, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                       SYS_SENDMSG, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
+                       SYS_RECVMSG, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+         ErrorCode(EPERM)))))))));
+}
+#endif
+
+}  // namespace sandbox.