Index: content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc |
diff --git a/content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc b/content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc |
index ce9dca78328ec9cda0898908d9b3fc48bb32758c..48801a0adbff506570c29a95f5a41cc7fc30bed0 100644 |
--- a/content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc |
+++ b/content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc |
@@ -20,10 +20,6 @@ |
#include <vector> |
-#if defined(__arm__) && !defined(MAP_STACK) |
-#define MAP_STACK 0x20000 // Daisy build environment has old headers. |
-#endif |
- |
#include "base/basictypes.h" |
#include "base/bind.h" |
#include "base/callback.h" |
@@ -43,6 +39,8 @@ |
#if defined(SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX) |
#include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h" |
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.h" |
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h" |
#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h" |
#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h" |
#include "sandbox/linux/services/linux_syscalls.h" |
@@ -59,14 +57,6 @@ namespace { |
void StartSandboxWithPolicy(Sandbox::EvaluateSyscall syscall_policy, |
BrokerProcess* broker_process); |
-inline bool RunningOnASAN() { |
-#if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) |
- return true; |
-#else |
- return false; |
-#endif |
-} |
- |
inline bool IsChromeOS() { |
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) |
return true; |
@@ -107,121 +97,6 @@ inline bool IsUsingToolKitGtk() { |
#endif |
} |
-// Write |error_message| to stderr. Similar to RawLog(), but a bit more careful |
-// about async-signal safety. |size| is the size to write and should typically |
-// not include a terminating \0. |
-void WriteToStdErr(const char* error_message, size_t size) { |
- while (size > 0) { |
- // TODO(jln): query the current policy to check if send() is available and |
- // use it to perform a non blocking write. |
- const int ret = HANDLE_EINTR(write(STDERR_FILENO, error_message, size)); |
- // We can't handle any type of error here. |
- if (ret <= 0 || static_cast<size_t>(ret) > size) break; |
- size -= ret; |
- error_message += ret; |
- } |
-} |
- |
-// Print a seccomp-bpf failure to handle |sysno| to stderr in an |
-// async-signal safe way. |
-void PrintSyscallError(uint32_t sysno) { |
- if (sysno >= 1024) |
- sysno = 0; |
- // TODO(markus): replace with async-signal safe snprintf when available. |
- const size_t kNumDigits = 4; |
- char sysno_base10[kNumDigits]; |
- uint32_t rem = sysno; |
- uint32_t mod = 0; |
- for (int i = kNumDigits - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
- mod = rem % 10; |
- rem /= 10; |
- sysno_base10[i] = '0' + mod; |
- } |
- static const char kSeccompErrorPrefix[] = |
- __FILE__":**CRASHING**:seccomp-bpf failure in syscall "; |
- static const char kSeccompErrorPostfix[] = "\n"; |
- WriteToStdErr(kSeccompErrorPrefix, sizeof(kSeccompErrorPrefix) - 1); |
- WriteToStdErr(sysno_base10, sizeof(sysno_base10)); |
- WriteToStdErr(kSeccompErrorPostfix, sizeof(kSeccompErrorPostfix) - 1); |
-} |
- |
-intptr_t CrashSIGSYS_Handler(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void* aux) { |
- uint32_t syscall = args.nr; |
- if (syscall >= 1024) |
- syscall = 0; |
- PrintSyscallError(syscall); |
- |
- // Encode 8-bits of the 1st two arguments too, so we can discern which socket |
- // type, which fcntl, ... etc., without being likely to hit a mapped |
- // address. |
- // Do not encode more bits here without thinking about increasing the |
- // likelihood of collision with mapped pages. |
- syscall |= ((args.args[0] & 0xffUL) << 12); |
- syscall |= ((args.args[1] & 0xffUL) << 20); |
- // Purposefully dereference the syscall as an address so it'll show up very |
- // clearly and easily in crash dumps. |
- volatile char* addr = reinterpret_cast<volatile char*>(syscall); |
- *addr = '\0'; |
- // In case we hit a mapped address, hit the null page with just the syscall, |
- // for paranoia. |
- syscall &= 0xfffUL; |
- addr = reinterpret_cast<volatile char*>(syscall); |
- *addr = '\0'; |
- for (;;) |
- _exit(1); |
-} |
- |
-// TODO(jln): rewrite reporting functions. |
-intptr_t SIGSYSCloneFailure(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void* aux) { |
- // "flags" in the first argument in the kernel's clone(). |
- // Mark as volatile to be able to find the value on the stack in a minidump. |
-#if !defined(NDEBUG) |
- RAW_LOG(ERROR, __FILE__":**CRASHING**:clone() failure\n"); |
-#endif |
- volatile uint64_t clone_flags = args.args[0]; |
- volatile char* addr; |
- if (IsArchitectureX86_64()) { |
- addr = reinterpret_cast<volatile char*>(clone_flags & 0xFFFFFF); |
- *addr = '\0'; |
- } |
- // Hit the NULL page if this fails to fault. |
- addr = reinterpret_cast<volatile char*>(clone_flags & 0xFFF); |
- *addr = '\0'; |
- for (;;) |
- _exit(1); |
-} |
- |
-// TODO(jln): rewrite reporting functions. |
-intptr_t SIGSYSPrctlFailure(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, |
- void* /* aux */) { |
- // Mark as volatile to be able to find the value on the stack in a minidump. |
-#if !defined(NDEBUG) |
- RAW_LOG(ERROR, __FILE__":**CRASHING**:prctl() failure\n"); |
-#endif |
- volatile uint64_t option = args.args[0]; |
- volatile char* addr = |
- reinterpret_cast<volatile char*>(option & 0xFFF); |
- *addr = '\0'; |
- for (;;) |
- _exit(1); |
-} |
- |
-intptr_t SIGSYSIoctlFailure(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, |
- void* /* aux */) { |
- // Make "request" volatile so that we can see it on the stack in a minidump. |
-#if !defined(NDEBUG) |
- RAW_LOG(ERROR, __FILE__":**CRASHING**:ioctl() failure\n"); |
-#endif |
- volatile uint64_t request = args.args[1]; |
- volatile char* addr = reinterpret_cast<volatile char*>(request & 0xFFFF); |
- *addr = '\0'; |
- // Hit the NULL page if this fails. |
- addr = reinterpret_cast<volatile char*>(request & 0xFFF); |
- *addr = '\0'; |
- for (;;) |
- _exit(1); |
-} |
- |
bool IsAcceleratedVideoDecodeEnabled() { |
// Accelerated video decode is currently enabled on Chrome OS, |
// but not on Linux: crbug.com/137247. |
@@ -325,116 +200,6 @@ bool IsBaselinePolicyWatched(int sysno) { |
} |
} |
-ErrorCode RestrictMmapFlags(Sandbox* sandbox) { |
- // The flags you see are actually the allowed ones, and the variable is a |
- // "denied" mask because of the negation operator. |
- // Significantly, we don't permit MAP_HUGETLB, or the newer flags such as |
- // MAP_POPULATE. |
- // TODO(davidung), remove MAP_DENYWRITE with updated Tegra libraries. |
- uint32_t denied_mask = ~(MAP_SHARED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | |
- MAP_STACK | MAP_NORESERVE | MAP_FIXED | |
- MAP_DENYWRITE); |
- return sandbox->Cond(3, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_HAS_ANY_BITS, |
- denied_mask, |
- sandbox->Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL), |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED)); |
-} |
- |
-ErrorCode RestrictMprotectFlags(Sandbox* sandbox) { |
- // The flags you see are actually the allowed ones, and the variable is a |
- // "denied" mask because of the negation operator. |
- // Significantly, we don't permit weird undocumented flags such as |
- // PROT_GROWSDOWN. |
- uint32_t denied_mask = ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC); |
- return sandbox->Cond(2, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_HAS_ANY_BITS, |
- denied_mask, |
- sandbox->Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL), |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED)); |
-} |
- |
-ErrorCode RestrictFcntlCommands(Sandbox* sandbox) { |
- // We allow F_GETFL, F_SETFL, F_GETFD, F_SETFD, F_DUPFD, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, |
- // F_SETLK, F_SETLKW and F_GETLK. |
- // We also restrict the flags in F_SETFL. We don't want to permit flags with |
- // a history of trouble such as O_DIRECT. The flags you see are actually the |
- // allowed ones, and the variable is a "denied" mask because of the negation |
- // operator. |
- // Glibc overrides the kernel's O_LARGEFILE value. Account for this. |
- int kOLargeFileFlag = O_LARGEFILE; |
- if (IsArchitectureX86_64() || IsArchitectureI386()) |
- kOLargeFileFlag = 0100000; |
- |
- // TODO(jln): add TP_LONG/TP_SIZET types. |
- ErrorCode::ArgType mask_long_type; |
- if (sizeof(long) == 8) |
- mask_long_type = ErrorCode::TP_64BIT; |
- else if (sizeof(long) == 4) |
- mask_long_type = ErrorCode::TP_32BIT; |
- else |
- NOTREACHED(); |
- |
- unsigned long denied_mask = ~(O_ACCMODE | O_APPEND | O_NONBLOCK | O_SYNC | |
- kOLargeFileFlag | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOATIME); |
- return sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, |
- ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_GETFL, |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, |
- ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_SETFL, |
- sandbox->Cond(2, mask_long_type, |
- ErrorCode::OP_HAS_ANY_BITS, denied_mask, |
- sandbox->Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL), |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED)), |
- sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, |
- ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_GETFD, |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, |
- ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_SETFD, |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, |
- ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_DUPFD, |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, |
- ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_SETLK, |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, |
- ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_SETLKW, |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, |
- ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_GETLK, |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, |
- ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL)))))))))); |
-} |
- |
-#if defined(__i386__) |
-ErrorCode RestrictSocketcallCommand(Sandbox* sandbox) { |
- // Allow the same individual syscalls as we do on ARM or x86_64. |
- // The main difference is that we're unable to restrict the first parameter |
- // to socketpair(2). Whilst initially sounding bad, it's noteworthy that very |
- // few protocols actually support socketpair(2). The scary call that we're |
- // worried about, socket(2), remains blocked. |
- return sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- SYS_SOCKETPAIR, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- SYS_SEND, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- SYS_RECV, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- SYS_SENDTO, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- SYS_RECVFROM, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- SYS_SHUTDOWN, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- SYS_SENDMSG, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- SYS_RECVMSG, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- ErrorCode(EPERM))))))))); |
-} |
-#endif |
- |
const int kFSDeniedErrno = EPERM; |
ErrorCode BaselinePolicy(Sandbox* sandbox, int sysno) { |
@@ -618,53 +383,6 @@ ErrorCode ArmGpuBrokerProcessPolicy(Sandbox* sandbox, |
} |
} |
-// Allow clone(2) for threads. |
-// Reject fork(2) attempts with EPERM. |
-// Crash if anything else is attempted. |
-// Don't restrict on ASAN. |
-ErrorCode RestrictCloneToThreadsAndEPERMFork(Sandbox* sandbox) { |
- // Glibc's pthread. |
- if (!RunningOnASAN()) { |
- return sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES | CLONE_SIGHAND | |
- CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SYSVSEM | CLONE_SETTLS | |
- CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID, |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | SIGCHLD, |
- ErrorCode(EPERM), |
- // ARM |
- sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- CLONE_CHILD_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID | SIGCHLD, |
- ErrorCode(EPERM), |
- sandbox->Trap(SIGSYSCloneFailure, NULL)))); |
- } else { |
- return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED); |
- } |
-} |
- |
-ErrorCode RestrictPrctl(Sandbox* sandbox) { |
- // Allow PR_SET_NAME, PR_SET_DUMPABLE, PR_GET_DUMPABLE. Will need to add |
- // seccomp compositing in the future. |
- // PR_SET_PTRACER is used by breakpad but not needed anymore. |
- return sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- PR_SET_NAME, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- PR_SET_DUMPABLE, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, |
- PR_GET_DUMPABLE, ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Trap(SIGSYSPrctlFailure, NULL)))); |
-} |
- |
-ErrorCode RestrictIoctl(Sandbox* sandbox) { |
- // Allow TCGETS and FIONREAD, trap to SIGSYSIoctlFailure otherwise. |
- return sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, TCGETS, |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, FIONREAD, |
- ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED), |
- sandbox->Trap(SIGSYSIoctlFailure, NULL))); |
-} |
- |
ErrorCode RendererOrWorkerProcessPolicy(Sandbox* sandbox, int sysno, void*) { |
switch (sysno) { |
case __NR_clone: |