| Index: crypto/p224_spake.cc
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| diff --git a/crypto/p224_spake.cc b/crypto/p224_spake.cc
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| deleted file mode 100644
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| index a6dec40568a6dfc4ae028fb89fb7c0cf7e5b2ccc..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
|
| --- a/crypto/p224_spake.cc
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| +++ /dev/null
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| @@ -1,268 +0,0 @@
|
| -// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
|
| -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
|
| -// found in the LICENSE file.
|
| -
|
| -// This code implements SPAKE2, a variant of EKE:
|
| -// http://www.di.ens.fr/~pointche/pub.php?reference=AbPo04
|
| -
|
| -#include <crypto/p224_spake.h>
|
| -
|
| -#include <algorithm>
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| -
|
| -#include <base/logging.h>
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| -#include <crypto/p224.h>
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| -#include <crypto/random.h>
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| -#include <crypto/secure_util.h>
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| -
|
| -namespace {
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| -
|
| -// The following two points (M and N in the protocol) are verifiable random
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| -// points on the curve and can be generated with the following code:
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| -
|
| -// #include <stdint.h>
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| -// #include <stdio.h>
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| -// #include <string.h>
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| -//
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| -// #include <openssl/ec.h>
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| -// #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
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| -// #include <openssl/sha.h>
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| -//
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| -// static const char kSeed1[] = "P224 point generation seed (M)";
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| -// static const char kSeed2[] = "P224 point generation seed (N)";
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| -//
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| -// void find_seed(const char* seed) {
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| -// SHA256_CTX sha256;
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| -// uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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| -//
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| -// SHA256_Init(&sha256);
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| -// SHA256_Update(&sha256, seed, strlen(seed));
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| -// SHA256_Final(digest, &sha256);
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| -//
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| -// BIGNUM x, y;
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| -// EC_GROUP* p224 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp224r1);
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| -// EC_POINT* p = EC_POINT_new(p224);
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| -//
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| -// for (unsigned i = 0;; i++) {
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| -// BN_init(&x);
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| -// BN_bin2bn(digest, 28, &x);
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| -//
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| -// if (EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(
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| -// p224, p, &x, digest[28] & 1, NULL)) {
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| -// BN_init(&y);
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| -// EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(p224, p, &x, &y, NULL);
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| -// char* x_str = BN_bn2hex(&x);
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| -// char* y_str = BN_bn2hex(&y);
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| -// printf("Found after %u iterations:\n%s\n%s\n", i, x_str, y_str);
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| -// OPENSSL_free(x_str);
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| -// OPENSSL_free(y_str);
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| -// BN_free(&x);
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| -// BN_free(&y);
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| -// break;
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| -// }
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| -//
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| -// SHA256_Init(&sha256);
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| -// SHA256_Update(&sha256, digest, sizeof(digest));
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| -// SHA256_Final(digest, &sha256);
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| -//
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| -// BN_free(&x);
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| -// }
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| -//
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| -// EC_POINT_free(p);
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| -// EC_GROUP_free(p224);
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| -// }
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| -//
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| -// int main() {
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| -// find_seed(kSeed1);
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| -// find_seed(kSeed2);
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| -// return 0;
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| -// }
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| -
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| -const crypto::p224::Point kM = {
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| - {174237515, 77186811, 235213682, 33849492,
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| - 33188520, 48266885, 177021753, 81038478},
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| - {104523827, 245682244, 266509668, 236196369,
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| - 28372046, 145351378, 198520366, 113345994},
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| - {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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| -};
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| -
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| -const crypto::p224::Point kN = {
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| - {136176322, 263523628, 251628795, 229292285,
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| - 5034302, 185981975, 171998428, 11653062},
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| - {197567436, 51226044, 60372156, 175772188,
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| - 42075930, 8083165, 160827401, 65097570},
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| - {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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| -};
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| -
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| -} // anonymous namespace
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| -
|
| -namespace crypto {
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| -
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| -P224EncryptedKeyExchange::P224EncryptedKeyExchange(
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| - PeerType peer_type, const base::StringPiece& password)
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| - : state_(kStateInitial),
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| - is_server_(peer_type == kPeerTypeServer) {
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| - memset(&x_, 0, sizeof(x_));
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| - memset(&expected_authenticator_, 0, sizeof(expected_authenticator_));
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| -
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| - // x_ is a random scalar.
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| - RandBytes(x_, sizeof(x_));
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| -
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| - // Calculate |password| hash to get SPAKE password value.
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| - SHA256HashString(std::string(password.data(), password.length()),
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| - pw_, sizeof(pw_));
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| -
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| - Init();
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| -}
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| -
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| -void P224EncryptedKeyExchange::Init() {
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| - // X = g**x_
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| - p224::Point X;
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| - p224::ScalarBaseMult(x_, &X);
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| -
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| - // The client masks the Diffie-Hellman value, X, by adding M**pw and the
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| - // server uses N**pw.
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| - p224::Point MNpw;
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| - p224::ScalarMult(is_server_ ? kN : kM, pw_, &MNpw);
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| -
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| - // X* = X + (N|M)**pw
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| - p224::Point Xstar;
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| - p224::Add(X, MNpw, &Xstar);
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| -
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| - next_message_ = Xstar.ToString();
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| -}
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| -
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| -const std::string& P224EncryptedKeyExchange::GetNextMessage() {
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| - if (state_ == kStateInitial) {
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| - state_ = kStateRecvDH;
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| - return next_message_;
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| - } else if (state_ == kStateSendHash) {
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| - state_ = kStateRecvHash;
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| - return next_message_;
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| - }
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| -
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| - LOG(FATAL) << "P224EncryptedKeyExchange::GetNextMessage called in"
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| - " bad state " << state_;
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| - next_message_ = "";
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| - return next_message_;
|
| -}
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| -
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| -P224EncryptedKeyExchange::Result P224EncryptedKeyExchange::ProcessMessage(
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| - const base::StringPiece& message) {
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| - if (state_ == kStateRecvHash) {
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| - // This is the final state of the protocol: we are reading the peer's
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| - // authentication hash and checking that it matches the one that we expect.
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| - if (message.size() != sizeof(expected_authenticator_)) {
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| - error_ = "peer's hash had an incorrect size";
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| - return kResultFailed;
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| - }
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| - if (!SecureMemEqual(message.data(), expected_authenticator_,
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| - message.size())) {
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| - error_ = "peer's hash had incorrect value";
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| - return kResultFailed;
|
| - }
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| - state_ = kStateDone;
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| - return kResultSuccess;
|
| - }
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| -
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| - if (state_ != kStateRecvDH) {
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| - LOG(FATAL) << "P224EncryptedKeyExchange::ProcessMessage called in"
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| - " bad state " << state_;
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| - error_ = "internal error";
|
| - return kResultFailed;
|
| - }
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| -
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| - // Y* is the other party's masked, Diffie-Hellman value.
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| - p224::Point Ystar;
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| - if (!Ystar.SetFromString(message)) {
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| - error_ = "failed to parse peer's masked Diffie-Hellman value";
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| - return kResultFailed;
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| - }
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| -
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| - // We calculate the mask value: (N|M)**pw
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| - p224::Point MNpw, minus_MNpw, Y, k;
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| - p224::ScalarMult(is_server_ ? kM : kN, pw_, &MNpw);
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| - p224::Negate(MNpw, &minus_MNpw);
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| -
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| - // Y = Y* - (N|M)**pw
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| - p224::Add(Ystar, minus_MNpw, &Y);
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| -
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| - // K = Y**x_
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| - p224::ScalarMult(Y, x_, &k);
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| -
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| - // If everything worked out, then K is the same for both parties.
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| - key_ = k.ToString();
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| -
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| - std::string client_masked_dh, server_masked_dh;
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| - if (is_server_) {
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| - client_masked_dh = message.as_string();
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| - server_masked_dh = next_message_;
|
| - } else {
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| - client_masked_dh = next_message_;
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| - server_masked_dh = message.as_string();
|
| - }
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| -
|
| - // Now we calculate the hashes that each side will use to prove to the other
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| - // that they derived the correct value for K.
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| - uint8 client_hash[kSHA256Length], server_hash[kSHA256Length];
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| - CalculateHash(kPeerTypeClient, client_masked_dh, server_masked_dh, key_,
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| - client_hash);
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| - CalculateHash(kPeerTypeServer, client_masked_dh, server_masked_dh, key_,
|
| - server_hash);
|
| -
|
| - const uint8* my_hash = is_server_ ? server_hash : client_hash;
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| - const uint8* their_hash = is_server_ ? client_hash : server_hash;
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| -
|
| - next_message_ =
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| - std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(my_hash), kSHA256Length);
|
| - memcpy(expected_authenticator_, their_hash, kSHA256Length);
|
| - state_ = kStateSendHash;
|
| - return kResultPending;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -void P224EncryptedKeyExchange::CalculateHash(
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| - PeerType peer_type,
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| - const std::string& client_masked_dh,
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| - const std::string& server_masked_dh,
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| - const std::string& k,
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| - uint8* out_digest) {
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| - std::string hash_contents;
|
| -
|
| - if (peer_type == kPeerTypeServer) {
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| - hash_contents = "server";
|
| - } else {
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| - hash_contents = "client";
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - hash_contents += client_masked_dh;
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| - hash_contents += server_masked_dh;
|
| - hash_contents +=
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| - std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char *>(pw_), sizeof(pw_));
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| - hash_contents += k;
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| -
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| - SHA256HashString(hash_contents, out_digest, kSHA256Length);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -const std::string& P224EncryptedKeyExchange::error() const {
|
| - return error_;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -const std::string& P224EncryptedKeyExchange::GetKey() const {
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| - DCHECK_EQ(state_, kStateDone);
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| - return GetUnverifiedKey();
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -const std::string& P224EncryptedKeyExchange::GetUnverifiedKey() const {
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| - // Key is already final when state is kStateSendHash. Subsequent states are
|
| - // used only for verification of the key. Some users may combine verification
|
| - // with sending verifiable data instead of |expected_authenticator_|.
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| - DCHECK_GE(state_, kStateSendHash);
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| - return key_;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -void P224EncryptedKeyExchange::SetXForTesting(const std::string& x) {
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| - memset(&x_, 0, sizeof(x_));
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| - memcpy(&x_, x.data(), std::min(x.size(), sizeof(x_)));
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| - Init();
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -} // namespace crypto
|
|
|