| Index: content/common/sandbox_linux/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc
|
| diff --git a/content/common/sandbox_linux/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc b/content/common/sandbox_linux/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc
|
| index 668ff729a19a83501e3ae02a35370e7784c8a748..2f24b62719e60f32662ae1f095ccf1705a0446b2 100644
|
| --- a/content/common/sandbox_linux/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc
|
| +++ b/content/common/sandbox_linux/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc
|
| @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ namespace content {
|
| namespace {
|
|
|
| void StartSandboxWithPolicy(sandbox::bpf_dsl::Policy* policy,
|
| - base::ScopedFD proc_task_fd);
|
| + base::ScopedFD proc_fd);
|
|
|
| inline bool IsChromeOS() {
|
| #if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
|
| @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ void RunSandboxSanityChecks(const std::string& process_type) {
|
|
|
| // This function takes ownership of |policy|.
|
| void StartSandboxWithPolicy(sandbox::bpf_dsl::Policy* policy,
|
| - base::ScopedFD proc_task_fd) {
|
| + base::ScopedFD proc_fd) {
|
| // Starting the sandbox is a one-way operation. The kernel doesn't allow
|
| // us to unload a sandbox policy after it has been started. Nonetheless,
|
| // in order to make the use of the "Sandbox" object easier, we allow for
|
| @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ void StartSandboxWithPolicy(sandbox::bpf_dsl::Policy* policy,
|
| // doing so does not stop the sandbox.
|
| SandboxBPF sandbox(policy);
|
|
|
| - sandbox.SetProcTaskFd(proc_task_fd.Pass());
|
| + sandbox.SetProcFd(proc_fd.Pass());
|
| CHECK(sandbox.StartSandbox(SandboxBPF::SeccompLevel::SINGLE_THREADED));
|
| }
|
|
|
| @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ scoped_ptr<SandboxBPFBasePolicy> GetGpuProcessSandbox() {
|
| // Initialize the seccomp-bpf sandbox.
|
| bool StartBPFSandbox(const base::CommandLine& command_line,
|
| const std::string& process_type,
|
| - base::ScopedFD proc_task_fd) {
|
| + base::ScopedFD proc_fd) {
|
| scoped_ptr<SandboxBPFBasePolicy> policy;
|
|
|
| if (process_type == switches::kGpuProcess) {
|
| @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ bool StartBPFSandbox(const base::CommandLine& command_line,
|
| }
|
|
|
| CHECK(policy->PreSandboxHook());
|
| - StartSandboxWithPolicy(policy.release(), proc_task_fd.Pass());
|
| + StartSandboxWithPolicy(policy.release(), proc_fd.Pass());
|
|
|
| RunSandboxSanityChecks(process_type);
|
| return true;
|
| @@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ bool SandboxSeccompBPF::SupportsSandboxWithTsync() {
|
| }
|
|
|
| bool SandboxSeccompBPF::StartSandbox(const std::string& process_type,
|
| - base::ScopedFD proc_task_fd) {
|
| + base::ScopedFD proc_fd) {
|
| #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
|
| const base::CommandLine& command_line =
|
| *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
|
| @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ bool SandboxSeccompBPF::StartSandbox(const std::string& process_type,
|
| // If the kernel supports the sandbox, and if the command line says we
|
| // should enable it, enable it or die.
|
| bool started_sandbox =
|
| - StartBPFSandbox(command_line, process_type, proc_task_fd.Pass());
|
| + StartBPFSandbox(command_line, process_type, proc_fd.Pass());
|
| CHECK(started_sandbox);
|
| return true;
|
| }
|
| @@ -288,11 +288,11 @@ bool SandboxSeccompBPF::StartSandbox(const std::string& process_type,
|
|
|
| bool SandboxSeccompBPF::StartSandboxWithExternalPolicy(
|
| scoped_ptr<sandbox::bpf_dsl::Policy> policy,
|
| - base::ScopedFD proc_task_fd) {
|
| + base::ScopedFD proc_fd) {
|
| #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
|
| if (IsSeccompBPFDesired() && SupportsSandbox()) {
|
| CHECK(policy);
|
| - StartSandboxWithPolicy(policy.release(), proc_task_fd.Pass());
|
| + StartSandboxWithPolicy(policy.release(), proc_fd.Pass());
|
| return true;
|
| }
|
| #endif // defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
|
|
|