| Index: sandbox/linux/integration_tests/seccomp_broker_process_unittest.cc
|
| diff --git a/sandbox/linux/integration_tests/seccomp_broker_process_unittest.cc b/sandbox/linux/integration_tests/seccomp_broker_process_unittest.cc
|
| new file mode 100644
|
| index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9aa320997b3b43d0d33ccc077d496fe48ab1404f
|
| --- /dev/null
|
| +++ b/sandbox/linux/integration_tests/seccomp_broker_process_unittest.cc
|
| @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
|
| +// Copyright 2015 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
|
| +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
|
| +// found in the LICENSE file.
|
| +
|
| +#include <sys/types.h>
|
| +#include <sys/stat.h>
|
| +#include <fcntl.h>
|
| +#include <unistd.h>
|
| +
|
| +#include <vector>
|
| +
|
| +#include "base/bind.h"
|
| +#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
|
| +#include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
|
| +#include "build/build_config.h"
|
| +#include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/bpf_dsl.h"
|
| +#include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/policy.h"
|
| +#include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/seccomp_macros.h"
|
| +#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/bpf_tests.h"
|
| +#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h"
|
| +#include "sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_file_permission.h"
|
| +#include "sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_process.h"
|
| +#include "sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_syscalls.h"
|
| +#include "sandbox/linux/tests/unit_tests.h"
|
| +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
|
| +
|
| +namespace sandbox {
|
| +
|
| +namespace {
|
| +
|
| +using bpf_dsl::Allow;
|
| +using bpf_dsl::ResultExpr;
|
| +using bpf_dsl::Trap;
|
| +
|
| +bool NoOpCallback() {
|
| + return true;
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +// Test a trap handler that makes use of a broker process to open().
|
| +
|
| +class InitializedOpenBroker {
|
| + public:
|
| + InitializedOpenBroker() : initialized_(false) {
|
| + std::vector<syscall_broker::BrokerFilePermission> permissions;
|
| + permissions.push_back(
|
| + syscall_broker::BrokerFilePermission::ReadOnly("/proc/allowed"));
|
| + permissions.push_back(
|
| + syscall_broker::BrokerFilePermission::ReadOnly("/proc/cpuinfo"));
|
| +
|
| + broker_process_.reset(
|
| + new syscall_broker::BrokerProcess(EPERM, permissions));
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(broker_process() != NULL);
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(broker_process_->Init(base::Bind(&NoOpCallback)));
|
| +
|
| + initialized_ = true;
|
| + }
|
| + bool initialized() { return initialized_; }
|
| + class syscall_broker::BrokerProcess* broker_process() {
|
| + return broker_process_.get();
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + private:
|
| + bool initialized_;
|
| + scoped_ptr<class syscall_broker::BrokerProcess> broker_process_;
|
| + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(InitializedOpenBroker);
|
| +};
|
| +
|
| +intptr_t BrokerOpenTrapHandler(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args,
|
| + void* aux) {
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(aux);
|
| + syscall_broker::BrokerProcess* broker_process =
|
| + static_cast<syscall_broker::BrokerProcess*>(aux);
|
| + switch (args.nr) {
|
| + case __NR_faccessat: // access is a wrapper of faccessat in android
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(static_cast<int>(args.args[0]) == AT_FDCWD);
|
| + return broker_process->Access(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[1]),
|
| + static_cast<int>(args.args[2]));
|
| +#if defined(__NR_access)
|
| + case __NR_access:
|
| + return broker_process->Access(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[0]),
|
| + static_cast<int>(args.args[1]));
|
| +#endif
|
| +#if defined(__NR_open)
|
| + case __NR_open:
|
| + return broker_process->Open(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[0]),
|
| + static_cast<int>(args.args[1]));
|
| +#endif
|
| + case __NR_openat:
|
| + // We only call open() so if we arrive here, it's because glibc uses
|
| + // the openat() system call.
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(static_cast<int>(args.args[0]) == AT_FDCWD);
|
| + return broker_process->Open(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[1]),
|
| + static_cast<int>(args.args[2]));
|
| + default:
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(false);
|
| + return -ENOSYS;
|
| + }
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +class DenyOpenPolicy : public bpf_dsl::Policy {
|
| + public:
|
| + explicit DenyOpenPolicy(InitializedOpenBroker* iob) : iob_(iob) {}
|
| + ~DenyOpenPolicy() override {}
|
| +
|
| + ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const override {
|
| + DCHECK(SandboxBPF::IsValidSyscallNumber(sysno));
|
| +
|
| + switch (sysno) {
|
| + case __NR_faccessat:
|
| +#if defined(__NR_access)
|
| + case __NR_access:
|
| +#endif
|
| +#if defined(__NR_open)
|
| + case __NR_open:
|
| +#endif
|
| + case __NR_openat:
|
| + // We get a InitializedOpenBroker class, but our trap handler wants
|
| + // the syscall_broker::BrokerProcess object.
|
| + return Trap(BrokerOpenTrapHandler, iob_->broker_process());
|
| + default:
|
| + return Allow();
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + private:
|
| + InitializedOpenBroker* iob_;
|
| +
|
| + DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(DenyOpenPolicy);
|
| +};
|
| +
|
| +// We use a InitializedOpenBroker class, so that we can run unsandboxed
|
| +// code in its constructor, which is the only way to do so in a BPF_TEST.
|
| +BPF_TEST(SandboxBPF,
|
| + UseOpenBroker,
|
| + DenyOpenPolicy,
|
| + InitializedOpenBroker /* (*BPF_AUX) */) {
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(BPF_AUX->initialized());
|
| + syscall_broker::BrokerProcess* broker_process = BPF_AUX->broker_process();
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(broker_process != NULL);
|
| +
|
| + // First, use the broker "manually"
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(broker_process->Open("/proc/denied", O_RDONLY) == -EPERM);
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(broker_process->Access("/proc/denied", R_OK) == -EPERM);
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(broker_process->Open("/proc/allowed", O_RDONLY) == -ENOENT);
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(broker_process->Access("/proc/allowed", R_OK) == -ENOENT);
|
| +
|
| + // Now use glibc's open() as an external library would.
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(open("/proc/denied", O_RDONLY) == -1);
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(errno == EPERM);
|
| +
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(open("/proc/allowed", O_RDONLY) == -1);
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(errno == ENOENT);
|
| +
|
| + // Also test glibc's openat(), some versions of libc use it transparently
|
| + // instead of open().
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/denied", O_RDONLY) == -1);
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(errno == EPERM);
|
| +
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/allowed", O_RDONLY) == -1);
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(errno == ENOENT);
|
| +
|
| + // And test glibc's access().
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(access("/proc/denied", R_OK) == -1);
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(errno == EPERM);
|
| +
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(access("/proc/allowed", R_OK) == -1);
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(errno == ENOENT);
|
| +
|
| + // This is also white listed and does exist.
|
| + int cpu_info_access = access("/proc/cpuinfo", R_OK);
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(cpu_info_access == 0);
|
| + int cpu_info_fd = open("/proc/cpuinfo", O_RDONLY);
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(cpu_info_fd >= 0);
|
| + char buf[1024];
|
| + BPF_ASSERT(read(cpu_info_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) > 0);
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +} // namespace
|
| +
|
| +} // namespace sandbox
|
|
|