Certificate Transparency: Threading the CT verifier into the SSL client socket.

net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc

Index: net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc
diff --git a/net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc b/net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc
index 5a19546f4f8991bd94361f4b4d3f17eb49287584..e88c21946bbe4404864f4f31fbfeb9e80c3a28ae 100644
--- a/net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc
+++ b/net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ int MultiLogCTVerifier::Verify(
 
   ct::LogEntry x509_entry;
   if (!ct::GetX509LogEntry(cert->os_cert_handle(), &x509_entry))
-    return has_verified_scts ? OK : ERR_FAILED;
+    return has_verified_scts ? OK : ERR_CT_LOG_ENTRY_CREATION_FAILED;
 
   has_verified_scts |= VerifySCTs(
       sct_list_from_ocsp,
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ int MultiLogCTVerifier::Verify(
   if (has_verified_scts)
     return OK;
 
-  return ERR_FAILED;
+  return ERR_NO_SCTS_VERIFIED_OK;
 }
 
 bool MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySCTs(
@@ -119,7 +119,6 @@ bool MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySingleSCT(
     ct::CTVerifyResult* result) {
 
   // Assume this SCT is untrusted until proven otherwise.
-
   IDToLogMap::iterator it = logs_.find(sct->log_id);
   if (it == logs_.end()) {
     DVLOG(1) << "SCT does not match any known log.";