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| 1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | 1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| 3 // found in the LICENSE file. | 3 // found in the LICENSE file. |
| 4 | 4 |
| 5 #include "sandbox/linux/services/credentials.h" | 5 #include "sandbox/linux/services/credentials.h" |
| 6 | 6 |
| 7 #include <errno.h> | 7 #include <errno.h> |
| 8 #include <fcntl.h> | 8 #include <fcntl.h> |
| 9 #include <stdio.h> | 9 #include <stdio.h> |
| 10 #include <sys/stat.h> | 10 #include <sys/stat.h> |
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| 50 | 50 |
| 51 // Give dynamic tools a simple thing to test. | 51 // Give dynamic tools a simple thing to test. |
| 52 TEST(Credentials, CreateAndDestroy) { | 52 TEST(Credentials, CreateAndDestroy) { |
| 53 { | 53 { |
| 54 Credentials cred1; | 54 Credentials cred1; |
| 55 (void) cred1; | 55 (void) cred1; |
| 56 } | 56 } |
| 57 scoped_ptr<Credentials> cred2(new Credentials); | 57 scoped_ptr<Credentials> cred2(new Credentials); |
| 58 } | 58 } |
| 59 | 59 |
| 60 TEST(Credentials, CountOpenFds) { | |
| 61 base::ScopedFD proc_fd(open("/proc", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); | |
| 62 ASSERT_TRUE(proc_fd.is_valid()); | |
| 63 Credentials creds; | |
| 64 int fd_count = creds.CountOpenFds(proc_fd.get()); | |
| 65 int fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY); | |
| 66 ASSERT_LE(0, fd); | |
| 67 EXPECT_EQ(fd_count + 1, creds.CountOpenFds(proc_fd.get())); | |
| 68 ASSERT_EQ(0, IGNORE_EINTR(close(fd))); | |
| 69 EXPECT_EQ(fd_count, creds.CountOpenFds(proc_fd.get())); | |
| 70 } | |
| 71 | |
| 72 TEST(Credentials, HasOpenDirectory) { | |
| 73 Credentials creds; | |
| 74 // No open directory should exist at startup. | |
| 75 EXPECT_FALSE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(-1)); | |
| 76 { | |
| 77 // Have a "/dev" file descriptor around. | |
| 78 int dev_fd = open("/dev", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY); | |
| 79 base::ScopedFD dev_fd_closer(dev_fd); | |
| 80 EXPECT_TRUE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(-1)); | |
| 81 } | |
| 82 EXPECT_FALSE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(-1)); | |
| 83 } | |
| 84 | |
| 85 TEST(Credentials, HasOpenDirectoryWithFD) { | |
| 86 Credentials creds; | |
| 87 | |
| 88 int proc_fd = open("/proc", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY); | |
| 89 base::ScopedFD proc_fd_closer(proc_fd); | |
| 90 ASSERT_LE(0, proc_fd); | |
| 91 | |
| 92 // Don't pass |proc_fd|, an open directory (proc_fd) should | |
| 93 // be detected. | |
| 94 EXPECT_TRUE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(-1)); | |
| 95 // Pass |proc_fd| and no open directory should be detected. | |
| 96 EXPECT_FALSE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(proc_fd)); | |
| 97 | |
| 98 { | |
| 99 // Have a "/dev" file descriptor around. | |
| 100 int dev_fd = open("/dev", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY); | |
| 101 base::ScopedFD dev_fd_closer(dev_fd); | |
| 102 EXPECT_TRUE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(proc_fd)); | |
| 103 } | |
| 104 | |
| 105 // The "/dev" file descriptor should now be closed, |proc_fd| is the only | |
| 106 // directory file descriptor open. | |
| 107 EXPECT_FALSE(creds.HasOpenDirectory(proc_fd)); | |
| 108 } | |
| 109 | |
| 110 SANDBOX_TEST(Credentials, DropAllCaps) { | 60 SANDBOX_TEST(Credentials, DropAllCaps) { |
| 111 Credentials creds; | 61 Credentials creds; |
| 112 CHECK(creds.DropAllCapabilities()); | 62 CHECK(creds.DropAllCapabilities()); |
| 113 CHECK(!creds.HasAnyCapability()); | 63 CHECK(!creds.HasAnyCapability()); |
| 114 } | 64 } |
| 115 | 65 |
| 116 SANDBOX_TEST(Credentials, GetCurrentCapString) { | 66 SANDBOX_TEST(Credentials, GetCurrentCapString) { |
| 117 Credentials creds; | 67 Credentials creds; |
| 118 CHECK(creds.DropAllCapabilities()); | 68 CHECK(creds.DropAllCapabilities()); |
| 119 const char kNoCapabilityText[] = "="; | 69 const char kNoCapabilityText[] = "="; |
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| 227 | 177 |
| 228 // The kernel should now prevent us from regaining capabilities because we | 178 // The kernel should now prevent us from regaining capabilities because we |
| 229 // are in a chroot. | 179 // are in a chroot. |
| 230 CHECK(!Credentials::SupportsNewUserNS()); | 180 CHECK(!Credentials::SupportsNewUserNS()); |
| 231 CHECK(!creds.MoveToNewUserNS()); | 181 CHECK(!creds.MoveToNewUserNS()); |
| 232 } | 182 } |
| 233 | 183 |
| 234 } // namespace. | 184 } // namespace. |
| 235 | 185 |
| 236 } // namespace sandbox. | 186 } // namespace sandbox. |
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