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Unified Diff: extensions/common/csp_validator.cc

Issue 760513003: Only allow insecure object-src directives for whitelisted mime types (Closed) Base URL: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git@extensions-csp3
Patch Set: Created 6 years, 1 month ago
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Index: extensions/common/csp_validator.cc
diff --git a/extensions/common/csp_validator.cc b/extensions/common/csp_validator.cc
index 23af91c75787c06964b62ea5ea1ee393e6deb19d..54f8a6ce35c4d3c3ea95cc0f0415e08547286bf8 100644
--- a/extensions/common/csp_validator.cc
+++ b/extensions/common/csp_validator.cc
@@ -22,11 +22,19 @@ namespace {
const char kDefaultSrc[] = "default-src";
const char kScriptSrc[] = "script-src";
const char kObjectSrc[] = "object-src";
+const char kPluginTypes[] = "plugin-types";
const char kSandboxDirectiveName[] = "sandbox";
const char kAllowSameOriginToken[] = "allow-same-origin";
const char kAllowTopNavigation[] = "allow-top-navigation";
+// This is the list of plugin types which are fully sandboxed and are safe to
+// load up in an extension, regardless of the URL they are navigated to.
+const char* const kSandboxedPluginTypes[] = {
+ "application/pdf",
+ "application/x-pnacl"
+};
+
struct DirectiveStatus {
explicit DirectiveStatus(const char* name)
: directive_name(name)
@@ -107,7 +115,7 @@ bool isNonWildcardTLD(const std::string& url,
}
bool HasOnlySecureTokens(base::StringTokenizer& tokenizer,
- Manifest::Type type) {
+ int options) {
while (tokenizer.GetNext()) {
std::string source = tokenizer.token();
base::StringToLowerASCII(&source);
@@ -131,9 +139,7 @@ bool HasOnlySecureTokens(base::StringTokenizer& tokenizer,
continue;
}
- // crbug.com/146487
- if (type == Manifest::TYPE_EXTENSION ||
- type == Manifest::TYPE_LEGACY_PACKAGED_APP) {
+ if (options & OPTIONS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_EVAL) {
if (source == "'unsafe-eval'")
continue;
}
@@ -148,16 +154,71 @@ bool HasOnlySecureTokens(base::StringTokenizer& tokenizer,
bool UpdateStatus(const std::string& directive_name,
base::StringTokenizer& tokenizer,
DirectiveStatus* status,
- Manifest::Type type) {
+ int options) {
if (status->seen_in_policy)
return false;
if (directive_name != status->directive_name)
return false;
status->seen_in_policy = true;
- status->is_secure = HasOnlySecureTokens(tokenizer, type);
+ status->is_secure = HasOnlySecureTokens(tokenizer, options);
+ return true;
+}
+
+// Parses the plugin-types directive and returns the list of mime types
+// specified in |plugin_types|.
+bool ParsePluginTypes(const std::string& directive_name,
+ base::StringTokenizer& tokenizer,
+ std::vector<std::string>* plugin_types) {
+ DCHECK(plugin_types);
+
+ if (directive_name != kPluginTypes || !plugin_types->empty())
+ return false;
+
+ while (tokenizer.GetNext()) {
+ std::string mime_type = tokenizer.token();
+ base::StringToLowerASCII(&mime_type);
+ // Since we're comparing the mime types to a whitelist, we don't check them
+ // for strict validity right now.
+ plugin_types->push_back(mime_type);
+ }
+
return true;
}
+// Returns true if the |plugin_type| is one of the fully sandboxed plugin types.
+bool PluginTypeAllowed(const std::string& plugin_type) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kSandboxedPluginTypes); ++i) {
+ if (plugin_type == kSandboxedPluginTypes[i])
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+// Returns true if the policy is allowed to contain an insecure object-src
+// directive. This requires OPTIONS_ALLOW_INSECURE_OBJECT_SRC to be specified
+// as an option and the plugin-types that can be loaded must be restricted to
+// the set specified in kSandboxedPluginTypes.
+bool AllowedToHaveInsecureObjectSrc(
+ int options,
+ const std::vector<std::string>& plugin_types) {
+ if (!(options & OPTIONS_ALLOW_INSECURE_OBJECT_SRC))
+ return false;
+
+ // plugin-types must be specified.
+ if (plugin_types.empty())
+ return false;
+
+ bool only_sandboxed_plugins_specified = true;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < plugin_types.size(); ++i) {
+ if (!PluginTypeAllowed(plugin_types[i])) {
+ only_sandboxed_plugins_specified = false;
Mike West 2014/11/25 13:42:36 This is probably equally clear if you just return
raymes 2014/11/25 13:51:05 Done.
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return only_sandboxed_plugins_specified;
+}
+
} // namespace
bool ContentSecurityPolicyIsLegal(const std::string& policy) {
@@ -170,7 +231,7 @@ bool ContentSecurityPolicyIsLegal(const std::string& policy) {
}
bool ContentSecurityPolicyIsSecure(const std::string& policy,
- Manifest::Type type) {
+ int options) {
// See http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/#parse-a-csp-policy for parsing algorithm.
std::vector<std::string> directives;
base::SplitString(policy, ';', &directives);
@@ -179,6 +240,8 @@ bool ContentSecurityPolicyIsSecure(const std::string& policy,
DirectiveStatus script_src_status(kScriptSrc);
DirectiveStatus object_src_status(kObjectSrc);
+ std::vector<std::string> plugin_types;
+
for (size_t i = 0; i < directives.size(); ++i) {
std::string& input = directives[i];
base::StringTokenizer tokenizer(input, " \t\r\n");
@@ -188,19 +251,25 @@ bool ContentSecurityPolicyIsSecure(const std::string& policy,
std::string directive_name = tokenizer.token();
base::StringToLowerASCII(&directive_name);
- if (UpdateStatus(directive_name, tokenizer, &default_src_status, type))
+ if (UpdateStatus(directive_name, tokenizer, &default_src_status, options))
continue;
- if (UpdateStatus(directive_name, tokenizer, &script_src_status, type))
+ if (UpdateStatus(directive_name, tokenizer, &script_src_status, options))
continue;
- if (UpdateStatus(directive_name, tokenizer, &object_src_status, type))
+ if (UpdateStatus(directive_name, tokenizer, &object_src_status, options))
+ continue;
+ if (ParsePluginTypes(directive_name, tokenizer, &plugin_types))
continue;
}
if (script_src_status.seen_in_policy && !script_src_status.is_secure)
return false;
- if (object_src_status.seen_in_policy && !object_src_status.is_secure)
- return false;
+ if (object_src_status.seen_in_policy && !object_src_status.is_secure) {
+ // Note that this does not fully check the object-src source list for
+ // validity but Blink will do this anyway.
+ if (!AllowedToHaveInsecureObjectSrc(options, plugin_types))
+ return false;
+ }
if (default_src_status.seen_in_policy && !default_src_status.is_secure) {
return script_src_status.seen_in_policy &&

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