Update from https://crrev.com/305340

sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/bpf_dsl_more_unittest.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/bpf_dsl.h"
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <pthread.h>
 #include <sched.h>
@@ skipping 23 matching lines @@
 #include "build/build_config.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/policy.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/bpf_tests.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/die.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/errorcode.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/linux_seccomp.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/trap.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/services/linux_syscalls.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/services/syscall_wrappers.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_process.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/tests/scoped_temporary_file.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/tests/unit_tests.h"
 #include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
 
 // Workaround for Android's prctl.h file.
 #ifndef PR_GET_ENDIAN
 #define PR_GET_ENDIAN 19
 #endif
 #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_READ
@@ skipping 142 matching lines @@
     }
   }
 
  private:
   DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(WhitelistGetpidPolicy);
 };
 
 BPF_TEST_C(SandboxBPF, ApplyBasicWhitelistPolicy, WhitelistGetpidPolicy) {
   // getpid() should be allowed
   errno = 0;
-  BPF_ASSERT(syscall(__NR_getpid) > 0);
+  BPF_ASSERT(sys_getpid() > 0);
   BPF_ASSERT(errno == 0);
 
   // getpgid() should be denied
   BPF_ASSERT(getpgid(0) == -1);
   BPF_ASSERT(errno == ENOMEM);
 }
 
 // A simple blacklist policy, with a SIGSYS handler
 intptr_t EnomemHandler(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void* aux) {
   // We also check that the auxiliary data is correct
@@ skipping 22 matching lines @@
 
   DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(BlacklistNanosleepTrapPolicy);
 };
 
 BPF_TEST(SandboxBPF,
          BasicBlacklistWithSigsys,
          BlacklistNanosleepTrapPolicy,
          int /* (*BPF_AUX) */) {
   // getpid() should work properly
   errno = 0;
-  BPF_ASSERT(syscall(__NR_getpid) > 0);
+  BPF_ASSERT(sys_getpid() > 0);
   BPF_ASSERT(errno == 0);
 
   // Our Auxiliary Data, should be reset by the signal handler
   *BPF_AUX = -1;
   const struct timespec ts = {0, 0};
   BPF_ASSERT(syscall(__NR_nanosleep, &ts, NULL) == -1);
   BPF_ASSERT(errno == ENOMEM);
 
   // We expect the signal handler to modify AuxData
   BPF_ASSERT(*BPF_AUX == kExpectedReturnValue);
@@ skipping 245 matching lines @@
   }
 }
 #endif  // defined(__arm__)
 
 intptr_t CountSyscalls(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void* aux) {
   // Count all invocations of our callback function.
   ++*reinterpret_cast<int*>(aux);
 
   // Verify that within the callback function all filtering is temporarily
   // disabled.
-  BPF_ASSERT(syscall(__NR_getpid) > 1);
+  BPF_ASSERT(sys_getpid() > 1);
 
   // Verify that we can now call the underlying system call without causing
   // infinite recursion.
   return SandboxBPF::ForwardSyscall(args);
 }
 
 class GreyListedPolicy : public Policy {
  public:
   explicit GreyListedPolicy(int* aux) : aux_(aux) {
     // Set the global environment for unsafe traps once.
@@ skipping 16 matching lines @@
     }
   }
 
  private:
   int* aux_;
 
   DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(GreyListedPolicy);
 };
 
 BPF_TEST(SandboxBPF, GreyListedPolicy, GreyListedPolicy, int /* (*BPF_AUX) */) {
-  BPF_ASSERT(syscall(__NR_getpid) == -1);
+  BPF_ASSERT(sys_getpid() == -1);
   BPF_ASSERT(errno == EPERM);
   BPF_ASSERT(*BPF_AUX == 0);
   BPF_ASSERT(syscall(__NR_geteuid) == syscall(__NR_getuid));
   BPF_ASSERT(*BPF_AUX == 2);
   char name[17] = {};
   BPF_ASSERT(!syscall(__NR_prctl,
                       PR_GET_NAME,
                       name,
                       (void*)NULL,
                       (void*)NULL,
@@ skipping 1528 matching lines @@
   BPF_ASSERT_NE(-1, pid);
   if (pid == 0) {
     pid_t my_pid = getpid();
     BPF_ASSERT_NE(-1, ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, -1, NULL, NULL));
     BPF_ASSERT_EQ(0, raise(SIGSTOP));
     SandboxBPF sandbox;
     sandbox.SetSandboxPolicy(new TraceAllPolicy);
     BPF_ASSERT(sandbox.StartSandbox(SandboxBPF::PROCESS_SINGLE_THREADED));
 
     // getpid is allowed.
-    BPF_ASSERT_EQ(my_pid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+    BPF_ASSERT_EQ(my_pid, sys_getpid());
 
     // write to stdout is skipped and returns a fake value.
     BPF_ASSERT_EQ(kExpectedReturnValue,
                   syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, "A", 1));
 
     // kill is rewritten to exit(kExpectedReturnValue).
     syscall(__NR_kill, my_pid, SIGKILL);
 
     // Should not be reached.
     BPF_ASSERT(false);
@@ skipping 281 matching lines @@
   BPF_ASSERT_EQ(ENOSYS, errno);
 
   BPF_ASSERT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_setgid, 300));
   BPF_ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
 }
 
 }  // namespace
 
 }  // namespace bpf_dsl
 }  // namespace sandbox