Add TaskForPID()

util/mach/task_for_pid.cc

Index: util/mach/task_for_pid.cc
diff --git a/util/mach/task_for_pid.cc b/util/mach/task_for_pid.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..29871980f18c1d8c2b63e0334c035e9e13f406ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/util/mach/task_for_pid.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+// Copyright 2014 The Crashpad Authors. All rights reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include "util/mach/task_for_pid.h"
+
+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <iterator>
+#include <set>
+
+#include "base/basictypes.h"
+#include "base/mac/mach_logging.h"
+#include "base/mac/scoped_mach_port.h"
+#include "util/posix/process_info.h"
+
+namespace crashpad {
+
+namespace {
+
+//! \brief Determines whether the groups that \a process_reader belongs to are
+//!     a subset of the groups that the current process belongs to.
+//!
+//! This function is similar to 10.9.5
+//! `xnu-2422.115.4/bsd/kern/kern_credential.c` `kauth_cred_gid_subset()`.
+bool TaskForPIDGroupCheck(const ProcessInfo& process_info) {
+  std::set<gid_t> groups = process_info.AllGroups();
+
+  ProcessInfo process_info_self;
+  if (!process_info_self.Initialize(getpid())) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  std::set<gid_t> groups_self = process_info_self.AllGroups();
+
+  // different_groups will only contain elements of groups not present in

[Robert Sesek, 2014/11/14 22:50:15]

difference

+  // groups_self. It will not contain elements of groups_self not present in
+  // groups. (That would be std::set_symmetric_difference.)
+  std::set<gid_t> difference;
+  std::set_difference(groups.begin(),
+                      groups.end(),
+                      groups_self.begin(),
+                      groups_self.end(),
+                      std::inserter(difference, difference.begin()));
+  if (!difference.empty()) {
+    LOG(ERROR) << "permission denied (gid)";
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+//! \brief Determines whether the current process should have permission to
+//!     access the specified task port.
+//!
+//! This function is similar to 10.9.5
+//! `xnu-2422.115.4/bsd/vm/vm_unix.c` `task_for_pid_posix_check()`.
+//!
+//! This function accepts a `task_t` argument instead of a `pid_t` argument,
+//! implying that the task send right must be retrieved before it can be
+//! checked. This is done because a `pid_t` argument may refer to a different
+//! task in between the time that access is checked and its corresponding
+//! `task_t` is obtained by `task_for_pid()`. When `task_for_pid()` is called
+//! first, any operations requiring the process ID will call `pid_for_task()`
+//! and be guaranteed to use the process ID corresponding to the correct task,
+//! or to fail if that task is no longer running. If the task dies and the PID
+//! is recycled, it is still possible to look up the wrong PID, but falsely
+//! granting task access based on the new process’ characteristics is harmless
+//! because the task will be a dead name at that point.
+bool TaskForPIDCheck(task_t task) {
+  // If the effective user ID is not 0, then this code is not running as root at
+  // all, and the kernel’s own checks are sufficient to determine access. The
+  // point of this function is to simulate the kernel’s own checks when the
+  // effective user ID is 0 but the real user ID is anything else.
+  if (geteuid() != 0) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // If the real user ID is 0, then this code is not running setuid root, it’s
+  // genuinely running as root, and it should be allowed maximum access.
+  uid_t uid = getuid();
+  if (uid == 0) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // task_for_pid_posix_check() would permit access to the running process’ own
+  // task here, and would then check the kern.tfp.policy sysctl. If set to
+  // KERN_TFP_POLICY_DENY, it would deny access.
+  //
+  // This behavior is not duplicated here because the point of this function is
+  // to permit task_for_pid() access for setuid root programs. It is assumed
+  // that a setuid root program ought to be able to overcome any policy set in
+  // kern.tfp.policy.
+  //
+  // Access to the running process’ own task is not granted outright and is
+  // instead subjected to the same user/group ID checks as any other process.
+  // This has the effect of denying access to the running process’ own task when
+  // it is setuid root. This is intentional, because it prevents the same sort
+  // of cross-privilege disclosure discussed below at the DidChangePriveleges()
+  // check. The running process can still access its own task port via
+  // mach_task_self(), but a non-root user cannot coerce a setuid root tool to
+  // operate on itself by specifying its own process ID to this TaskForPID()
+  // interface.
+
+  ProcessInfo process_info;
+  if (!process_info.InitializeFromTask(task)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // The target process’ real user ID, effective user ID, and saved set-user ID
+  // must match this process’ own real user ID. task_for_pid_posix_check()
+  // checks against the current process’ effective user ID, but for the purposes
+  // of this function, when running setuid root, the real user ID is the correct
+  // choice.
+  if (process_info.RealUserID() != uid ||
+      process_info.EffectiveUserID() != uid ||
+      process_info.SavedUserID() != uid) {
+    LOG(ERROR) << "permission denied (uid)";
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // The target process must not have changed privileges. The rationale for this
+  // check is explained in 10.9.5 xnu-2422.115.4/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
+  // issetugid(): processes that have changed privileges may have loaded data
+  // using different credentials than they are currently operating with, and
+  // allowing other processes access to this data based solely on a check of the
+  // current credentials could violate confidentiality.
+  if (process_info.DidChangePrivileges()) {
+    LOG(ERROR) << "permission denied (P_SUGID)";
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return TaskForPIDGroupCheck(process_info);
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+task_t TaskForPID(pid_t pid) {
+  task_t task;
+  kern_return_t kr = task_for_pid(mach_task_self(), pid, &task);
+  if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
+    MACH_LOG(ERROR, kr) << "task_for_pid";
+    return TASK_NULL;
+  }
+
+  base::mac::ScopedMachSendRight task_owner(task);
+
+  if (!TaskForPIDCheck(task)) {
+    return TASK_NULL;
+  }
+
+  return task_owner.release();
+}
+
+}  // namespace crashpad