IPC: a way for browsertests to simulate the appearance of a malicious IPC.

content/browser/security_exploit_browsertest.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include "base/command_line.h"
 #include "base/containers/hash_tables.h"
+#include "base/strings/utf_string_conversions.h"
 #include "content/browser/dom_storage/dom_storage_context_wrapper.h"
 #include "content/browser/dom_storage/session_storage_namespace_impl.h"
 #include "content/browser/frame_host/navigator.h"
 #include "content/browser/renderer_host/render_view_host_factory.h"
 #include "content/browser/renderer_host/render_view_host_impl.h"
 #include "content/browser/web_contents/web_contents_impl.h"
+#include "content/common/frame_messages.h"
 #include "content/common/view_messages.h"
 #include "content/public/browser/browser_context.h"
+#include "content/public/browser/interstitial_page.h"
+#include "content/public/browser/interstitial_page_delegate.h"
 #include "content/public/browser/storage_partition.h"
 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
 #include "content/public/test/browser_test_utils.h"
 #include "content/public/test/content_browser_test.h"
 #include "content/public/test/content_browser_test_utils.h"
 #include "content/public/test/test_utils.h"
 #include "content/shell/browser/shell.h"
+#include "ipc/ipc_security_test_util.h"
+#include "net/dns/mock_host_resolver.h"
+#include "net/test/embedded_test_server/embedded_test_server.h"
+
+using IPC::IpcSecurityTestUtil;
 
 namespace content {
 
 namespace {
 
 // This is a helper function for the tests which attempt to create a
 // duplicate RenderViewHost or RenderWidgetHost. It tries to create two objects
 // with the same process and routing ids, which causes a collision.
 // It creates a couple of windows in process 1, which causes a few routing ids
 // to be allocated. Then a cross-process navigation is initiated, which causes a
 // new process 2 to be created and have a pending RenderViewHost for it. The
 // routing id of the RenderViewHost which is target for a duplicate is set
 // into |target_routing_id| and the pending RenderViewHost which is used for
 // the attempt is the return value.
 RenderViewHostImpl* PrepareToDuplicateHosts(Shell* shell,
                                             int* target_routing_id) {
-  GURL foo("http://foo.com/files/simple_page.html");
+  GURL foo("http://foo.com/simple_page.html");
 
   // Start off with initial navigation, so we get the first process allocated.
   NavigateToURL(shell, foo);
+  EXPECT_EQ(base::ASCIIToUTF16("OK"), shell->web_contents()->GetTitle());

[Charlie Reis, 2014/11/14 00:13:27]

I think we can put EXPECT_TRUE on the NavigateToURL line instead, now that
Alex's r304064 has landed.

 
   // Open another window, so we generate some more routing ids.
   ShellAddedObserver shell2_observer;
   EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScript(
       shell->web_contents(), "window.open(document.URL + '#2');"));
   Shell* shell2 = shell2_observer.GetShell();
 
   // The new window must be in the same process, but have a new routing id.
   EXPECT_EQ(shell->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetProcess()->GetID(),
             shell2->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetProcess()->GetID());
   *target_routing_id =
       shell2->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetRoutingID();
   EXPECT_NE(*target_routing_id,
             shell->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetRoutingID());
 
   // Now, simulate a link click coming from the renderer.
-  GURL extension_url("https://bar.com/files/simple_page.html");
+  GURL extension_url("https://bar.com/simple_page.html");
   WebContentsImpl* wc = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell->web_contents());
   wc->GetFrameTree()->root()->navigator()->RequestOpenURL(
       wc->GetFrameTree()->root()->current_frame_host(), extension_url,
       Referrer(), CURRENT_TAB,
       false, true);
 
   // Since the navigation above requires a cross-process swap, there will be a
   // pending RenderViewHost. Ensure it exists and is in a different process
   // than the initial page.
   RenderViewHostImpl* pending_rvh =
       wc->GetRenderManagerForTesting()->pending_render_view_host();
   EXPECT_TRUE(pending_rvh != NULL);
   EXPECT_NE(shell->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetProcess()->GetID(),
             pending_rvh->GetProcess()->GetID());
 
   return pending_rvh;
 }
 
 }  // namespace
 
 
 // The goal of these tests will be to "simulate" exploited renderer processes,
 // which can send arbitrary IPC messages and confuse browser process internal
 // state, leading to security bugs. We are trying to verify that the browser
 // doesn't perform any dangerous operations in such cases.
 class SecurityExploitBrowserTest : public ContentBrowserTest {
  public:
   SecurityExploitBrowserTest() {}
+
   void SetUpCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) override {
-    ASSERT_TRUE(test_server()->Start());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->InitializeAndWaitUntilReady());
 
     // Add a host resolver rule to map all outgoing requests to the test server.
     // This allows us to use "real" hostnames in URLs, which we can use to
     // create arbitrary SiteInstances.
     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(
         switches::kHostResolverRules,
-        "MAP * " + test_server()->host_port_pair().ToString() +
+        "MAP * " +
+            net::HostPortPair::FromURL(embedded_test_server()->base_url())
+                .ToString() +
             ",EXCLUDE localhost");
   }
 };
 
+// Fails because the process kill on Android does not succeed.
+// http://crbug.com/433068
+#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
+#define MAYBE_SetWebUIProperty DISABLED_SetWebUIProperty
+#else
+#define MAYBE_SetWebUIProperty SetWebUIProperty
+#endif
+
 // Ensure that we kill the renderer process if we try to give it WebUI
 // properties and it doesn't have enabled WebUI bindings.
-IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(SecurityExploitBrowserTest, SetWebUIProperty) {
-  GURL foo("http://foo.com/files/simple_page.html");
+IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(SecurityExploitBrowserTest, MAYBE_SetWebUIProperty) {
+  GURL foo("http://foo.com/simple_page.html");
 
   NavigateToURL(shell(), foo);
+  EXPECT_EQ(base::ASCIIToUTF16("OK"), shell()->web_contents()->GetTitle());
   EXPECT_EQ(0,
       shell()->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetEnabledBindings());
 
   content::RenderProcessHostWatcher terminated(
       shell()->web_contents(),
       content::RenderProcessHostWatcher::WATCH_FOR_PROCESS_EXIT);
   shell()->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->SetWebUIProperty(
       "toolkit", "views");
   terminated.Wait();
 }
@@ skipping 43 matching lines @@
 
   // Since this test executes on the UI thread and hopping threads might cause
   // different timing in the test, let's simulate a CreateNewWidget call coming
   // from the IO thread.  Use the existing window routing id to cause a
   // deliberate collision.
   pending_rvh->CreateNewWidget(duplicate_routing_id, blink::WebPopupTypeSelect);
 
   // If the above operation doesn't crash, the test has succeeded!
 }
 
+class SecurityExploitTestInterstitialPage : public InterstitialPageDelegate {
+ public:
+  explicit SecurityExploitTestInterstitialPage(WebContents* contents) {
+    InterstitialPage* interstitial = InterstitialPage::Create(
+        contents, true, contents->GetLastCommittedURL(), this);
+    interstitial->Show();
+  }
+
+  // InterstitialPageDelegate implementation.
+  void CommandReceived(const std::string& command) override {
+    last_command_ = command;
+  }
+
+  std::string GetHTMLContents() override {
+    return "<html><head><script>"
+           "window.domAutomationController.setAutomationId(1);"
+           "window.domAutomationController.send(\"okay\");"
+           "</script></head>"
+           "<body>this page is an interstitial</body></html>";
+  }
+
+  std::string last_command() { return last_command_; }
+
+ private:
+  std::string last_command_;
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(SecurityExploitTestInterstitialPage);
+};
+
+// Fails due to InterstitialPage's reliance on PostNonNestableTask
+// http://crbug.com/432737
+#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
+#define MAYBE_InterstitialCommandFromUnderlyingContent \
+  DISABLED_InterstitialCommandFromUnderlyingContent
+#else
+#define MAYBE_InterstitialCommandFromUnderlyingContent \
+  InterstitialCommandFromUnderlyingContent
+#endif
+
+// The interstitial should not be controllable by the underlying content.
+IN_PROC_BROWSER_TEST_F(SecurityExploitBrowserTest,
+                       MAYBE_InterstitialCommandFromUnderlyingContent) {
+  // Start off with initial navigation, to allocate the process.
+  GURL foo("http://foo.com/simple_page.html");
+  NavigateToURL(shell(), foo);
+  EXPECT_EQ(base::ASCIIToUTF16("OK"), shell()->web_contents()->GetTitle());
+
+  DOMMessageQueue message_queue;
+
+  // Install and show an interstitial page.
+  SecurityExploitTestInterstitialPage* interstitial =
+      new SecurityExploitTestInterstitialPage(shell()->web_contents());
+
+  ASSERT_EQ("", interstitial->last_command());
+  content::WaitForInterstitialAttach(shell()->web_contents());
+
+  InterstitialPage* interstitial_page =
+      shell()->web_contents()->GetInterstitialPage();
+  ASSERT_TRUE(interstitial_page != NULL);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(shell()->web_contents()->ShowingInterstitialPage());
+  ASSERT_TRUE(interstitial_page->GetDelegateForTesting() == interstitial);

[Charlie Reis, 2014/11/14 00:13:27]

nit: ASSERT_EQ

+
+  // The interstitial page ought to be able to send a message.
+  std::string message;
+  ASSERT_TRUE(message_queue.WaitForMessage(&message));
+  ASSERT_EQ("\"okay\"", message);
+  ASSERT_EQ("\"okay\"", interstitial->last_command());
+
+  // Send an automation message from the underlying content and wait for it to
+  // be dispatched on this thread. This message should not be received by the
+  // interstitial.
+  content::RenderFrameHost* compromised_renderer =
+      shell()->web_contents()->GetMainFrame();
+  FrameHostMsg_DomOperationResponse evil(compromised_renderer->GetRoutingID(),
+                                         "evil", MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
+  IpcSecurityTestUtil::PwnMessageReceived(
+      compromised_renderer->GetProcess()->GetChannel(), evil);
+
+  ASSERT_TRUE(message_queue.WaitForMessage(&message));
+  ASSERT_EQ("evil", message)
+      << "Automation message should be received by WebContents.";
+  ASSERT_EQ("\"okay\"", interstitial->last_command())
+      << "Interstitial should not be affected.";
+
+  // Send a second message from the interstitial page, and make sure that the
+  // "evil" message doesn't arrive in the intervening period.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScript(
+      interstitial_page->GetRenderViewHostForTesting(),
+      "window.domAutomationController.send(\"okay2\");"));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(message_queue.WaitForMessage(&message));
+  ASSERT_EQ("\"okay2\"", message);
+  ASSERT_EQ("\"okay2\"", interstitial->last_command());
+}
+
 }  // namespace content