| Index: swarm_client/third_party/requests/packages/urllib3/packages/ssl_match_hostname/__init__.py
|
| ===================================================================
|
| --- swarm_client/third_party/requests/packages/urllib3/packages/ssl_match_hostname/__init__.py (revision 235167)
|
| +++ swarm_client/third_party/requests/packages/urllib3/packages/ssl_match_hostname/__init__.py (working copy)
|
| @@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
|
| -"""The match_hostname() function from Python 3.2, essential when using SSL."""
|
| -
|
| -import re
|
| -
|
| -__version__ = '3.2.2'
|
| -
|
| -class CertificateError(ValueError):
|
| - pass
|
| -
|
| -def _dnsname_match(dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1):
|
| - """Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
|
| -
|
| - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
|
| - """
|
| - pats = []
|
| - if not dn:
|
| - return False
|
| -
|
| - parts = dn.split(r'.')
|
| - leftmost = parts[0]
|
| -
|
| - wildcards = leftmost.count('*')
|
| - if wildcards > max_wildcards:
|
| - # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
|
| - # than one wildcard per fragment. A survery of established
|
| - # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
|
| - # reasonable choice.
|
| - raise CertificateError(
|
| - "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn))
|
| -
|
| - # speed up common case w/o wildcards
|
| - if not wildcards:
|
| - return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
|
| -
|
| - # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
|
| - # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
|
| - # the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
|
| - if leftmost == '*':
|
| - # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
|
| - # fragment.
|
| - pats.append('[^.]+')
|
| - elif leftmost.startswith('xn--') or hostname.startswith('xn--'):
|
| - # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
|
| - # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
|
| - # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
|
| - # U-label of an internationalized domain name.
|
| - pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
|
| - else:
|
| - # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
|
| - pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r'\*', '[^.]*'))
|
| -
|
| - # add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
|
| - for frag in parts[1:]:
|
| - pats.append(re.escape(frag))
|
| -
|
| - pat = re.compile(r'\A' + r'\.'.join(pats) + r'\Z', re.IGNORECASE)
|
| - return pat.match(hostname)
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -def match_hostname(cert, hostname):
|
| - """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
|
| - SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*. RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
|
| - rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
|
| -
|
| - CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
|
| - returns nothing.
|
| - """
|
| - if not cert:
|
| - raise ValueError("empty or no certificate")
|
| - dnsnames = []
|
| - san = cert.get('subjectAltName', ())
|
| - for key, value in san:
|
| - if key == 'DNS':
|
| - if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
|
| - return
|
| - dnsnames.append(value)
|
| - if not dnsnames:
|
| - # The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
|
| - # in subjectAltName
|
| - for sub in cert.get('subject', ()):
|
| - for key, value in sub:
|
| - # XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
|
| - # must be used.
|
| - if key == 'commonName':
|
| - if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
|
| - return
|
| - dnsnames.append(value)
|
| - if len(dnsnames) > 1:
|
| - raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
|
| - "doesn't match either of %s"
|
| - % (hostname, ', '.join(map(repr, dnsnames))))
|
| - elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
|
| - raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
|
| - "doesn't match %r"
|
| - % (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
|
| - else:
|
| - raise CertificateError("no appropriate commonName or "
|
| - "subjectAltName fields were found")
|
|
|