Chromium Code Reviews| Index: net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc |
| diff --git a/net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc b/net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc |
| new file mode 100644 |
| index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..49a73ce57c346dc3d662a47065c36993c0b2d9d5 |
| --- /dev/null |
| +++ b/net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc |
| @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ |
| +// Copyright 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| +// found in the LICENSE file. |
| + |
| +#include "net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.h" |
| + |
| +#include "net/base/net_errors.h" |
| +#include "net/cert/ct_log_verifier.h" |
| +#include "net/cert/ct_objects_extractor.h" |
| +#include "net/cert/ct_serialization.h" |
| +#include "net/cert/ct_verify_result.h" |
| +#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h" |
| + |
| +namespace net { |
| + |
| +MultiLogCTVerifier::MultiLogCTVerifier() { } |
| + |
| +MultiLogCTVerifier::~MultiLogCTVerifier() { } |
| + |
| +void MultiLogCTVerifier::AddLog(scoped_ptr<CTLogVerifier> log_verifier) { |
| + if (!log_verifier) |
| + return; |
|
wtc
2013/11/21 23:26:34
Are you sure we need to allow a null |log_verifier
Eran M. (Google)
2013/11/23 21:02:07
No, but I wouldn't want to crash here in productio
wtc
2013/11/25 23:15:50
A crash may help expose a bug sooner. If we know n
|
| + |
| + std::string log_id(log_verifier->key_id()); |
| + logs_[log_id].reset(log_verifier.release()); |
| +} |
| + |
| +int MultiLogCTVerifier::Verify( |
| + X509Certificate* cert, |
| + const std::string& sct_list_from_ocsp, |
| + const std::string& sct_list_from_tls_extension, |
| + ct::CTVerifyResult* result) { |
| + DCHECK(cert); |
| + DCHECK(result); |
| + |
| + result->verified_scts.clear(); |
| + result->unverified_scts.clear(); |
| + result->unknown_logs_scts.clear(); |
| + |
| + bool has_verified_scts = false; |
| + |
| + std::string embedded_scts; |
| + if (!cert->GetIntermediateCertificates().empty() && |
| + ct::ExtractEmbeddedSCTList( |
| + cert->os_cert_handle(), |
| + &embedded_scts)) { |
| + ct::LogEntry precert_entry; |
| + |
| + has_verified_scts = |
| + ct::GetPrecertLogEntry( |
| + cert->os_cert_handle(), |
| + cert->GetIntermediateCertificates().front(), |
| + &precert_entry) && |
| + VerifySCTs( |
| + embedded_scts, |
| + precert_entry, |
| + ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, |
| + result); |
| + } |
| + |
| + ct::LogEntry x509_entry; |
| + if (!ct::GetX509LogEntry(cert->os_cert_handle(), &x509_entry)) |
| + return has_verified_scts ? OK : ERR_CT_LOG_ENTRY_CREATION_FAILED; |
| + |
| + has_verified_scts |= VerifySCTs( |
| + sct_list_from_ocsp, |
| + x509_entry, |
| + ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_OCSP_RESPONSE, |
| + result); |
| + |
| + has_verified_scts |= VerifySCTs( |
| + sct_list_from_tls_extension, |
| + x509_entry, |
| + ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_TLS_HANDSHAKE, |
| + result); |
| + |
| + if (has_verified_scts) |
| + return OK; |
| + |
| + if (!result->unverified_scts.empty()) |
| + return ERR_NO_SCTS_VERIFIED_OK; |
| + |
| + if (!result->unknown_logs_scts.empty()) |
| + return ERR_NO_SCTS_FROM_KNOWN_LOGS; |
| + |
| + return ERR_NO_SCTS_PRESENT; |
|
wtc
2013/11/21 23:26:34
It should be sufficient to just use one error code
Eran M. (Google)
2013/11/23 21:02:07
Will be done in the next patch, when I introduce t
|
| +} |
| + |
| +bool MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySCTs( |
| + const std::string& encoded_sct_list, |
| + const ct::LogEntry& expected_entry, |
| + ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin origin, |
| + ct::CTVerifyResult* result) { |
| + if (logs_.empty()) |
| + return false; |
| + |
| + base::StringPiece temp(encoded_sct_list); |
| + std::vector<base::StringPiece> sct_list; |
| + |
| + if (!ct::DecodeSCTList(&temp, &sct_list)) |
| + return false; |
| + |
| + bool verified = false; |
| + for (std::vector<base::StringPiece>::const_iterator it = sct_list.begin(); |
| + it != sct_list.end(); ++it) { |
| + base::StringPiece encoded_sct(*it); |
| + ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp decoded_sct; |
| + if (!DecodeSignedCertificateTimestamp(&encoded_sct, &decoded_sct)) { |
| + // XXX(rsleevi): Should we really just skip over bad SCTs? |
| + continue; |
| + } |
| + decoded_sct.origin = origin; |
| + |
| + verified |= VerifySingleSCT(decoded_sct, expected_entry, result); |
| + } |
| + |
| + return verified; |
| +} |
| + |
| +bool MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySingleSCT( |
| + const ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp& sct, |
| + const ct::LogEntry& expected_entry, |
| + ct::CTVerifyResult* result) { |
| + |
| + // Assume this SCT is untrusted until proven otherwise. |
| + |
| + IDToLogMap::iterator it = logs_.find(sct.log_id); |
| + if (it == logs_.end()) { |
| + DVLOG(1) << "SCT does not match any known log."; |
| + result->unknown_logs_scts.push_back(sct); |
| + return false; |
| + } |
| + |
| + if (!it->second->Verify(expected_entry, sct)) { |
| + DVLOG(1) << "Unable to verify SCT signature."; |
| + result->unverified_scts.push_back(sct); |
| + return false; |
| + } |
| + |
| + // SCT verified ok, just make sure the timestamp is legitimate. |
| + // Add 1 second to allow some slack for accepting SCTs which have *Just* |
| + // been issued. |
|
wtc
2013/11/21 23:26:34
1. The comment in the reference implementation say
Eran M. (Google)
2013/11/23 21:02:07
I've dropped this 1 second interval entirely. You'
|
| + if (sct.timestamp + base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(1) > base::Time::Now()) { |
| + DVLOG(1) << "SCT is from the future!"; |
| + result->unverified_scts.push_back(sct); |
| + return false; |
| + } |
| + |
| + result->verified_scts.push_back(sct); |
| + return true; |
| +} |
| + |
| +} // namespace net |