Certificate Transparency: Add the high-level interface for verifying SCTs over multiple logs

net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc

Index: net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc
diff --git a/net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc b/net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d2211e53bace6ff377a3058db002807ce607cb85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.h"
+
+#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
+#include "net/base/net_log.h"
+#include "net/cert/ct_log_verifier.h"
+#include "net/cert/ct_objects_extractor.h"
+#include "net/cert/ct_serialization.h"
+#include "net/cert/ct_verify_result.h"
+#include "net/cert/signed_certificate_timestamp.h"
+#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
+
+namespace net {
+
+MultiLogCTVerifier::MultiLogCTVerifier(scoped_ptr<CTLogVerifier> log_verifier) {
+  logs_.push_back(log_verifier.release());
+}
+
+MultiLogCTVerifier::~MultiLogCTVerifier() { }
+
+void MultiLogCTVerifier::AddLog(scoped_ptr<CTLogVerifier> log_verifier) {
+  logs_.push_back(log_verifier.release());
+}
+
+int MultiLogCTVerifier::Verify(
+    X509Certificate* verified_cert,
+    const std::string& sct_list_from_ocsp,
+    const std::string& sct_list_from_tls_handshake,
+    ct::CTVerifyResult* result,
+    const CompletionCallback& callback,
+    const BoundNetLog& net_log)  {
+  DCHECK(verified_cert);
+  DCHECK(result);
+
+  result->verified_scts.clear();
+  result->unverified_scts.clear();
+  result->unknown_logs_scts.clear();
+
+  bool has_verified_scts = false;
+
+  std::string embedded_scts;
+  if (!verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates().empty() &&
+      ct::ExtractEmbeddedSCTList(
+        verified_cert->os_cert_handle(),
+        &embedded_scts)) {
+    ct::LogEntry embedded_log_entry;
+
+    has_verified_scts =
+      ct::GetPrecertLogEntry(
+          verified_cert->os_cert_handle(),
+          verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates().front(),
+          &embedded_log_entry) &&
+      VerifySCTs(
+          embedded_scts,
+          embedded_log_entry,
+          ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED,
+          result);
+  }
+
+  ct::LogEntry x509_entry;
+  if (!ct::GetX509LogEntry(verified_cert->os_cert_handle(), &x509_entry)) {
+    return has_verified_scts ? OK : ERR_FAILED;
+  }
+
+  has_verified_scts |= VerifySCTs(
+      sct_list_from_ocsp,
+      x509_entry,
+      ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_OCSP_RESPONSE,
+      result);
+
+  has_verified_scts |= VerifySCTs(
+      sct_list_from_tls_handshake,
+      x509_entry,
+      ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_TLS_HANDSHAKE,
+      result);
+
+  //XXX(eranm): Add a specific error code to indicate no presence
+  // of SCTs at all.
+  return has_verified_scts ? OK : ERR_FAILED;
+}
+
+bool MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySCTs(
+    const std::string& encoded_sct_list,
+    const ct::LogEntry& expected_entry,
+    ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin origin,
+    ct::CTVerifyResult* result) {
+  if (logs_.empty())
+    return false;
+
+  base::StringPiece temp(encoded_sct_list);
+  std::vector<base::StringPiece> sct_list;
+
+  if (!ct::DecodeSCTList(&temp, &sct_list))
+    return false;
+
+  bool verified = false;
+  for (std::vector<base::StringPiece>::const_iterator it = sct_list.begin();
+       it != sct_list.end(); ++it) {
+    base::StringPiece encoded_sct(*it);
+    ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp decoded_sct;
+    if (!DecodeSignedCertificateTimestamp(&encoded_sct, &decoded_sct)) {
+      // XXX(rsleevi): Should we really just skip over bad SCTs?
+      continue;
+    }
+    decoded_sct.origin = origin;
+
+    verified |= VerifySingleSCT(decoded_sct, expected_entry, result);
+  }
+
+  return verified;
+}
+
+bool MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySingleSCT(
+    const ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp& sct,
+    const ct::LogEntry& expected_entry,
+    ct::CTVerifyResult* result) {
+
+  // Assume this SCT is untrusted until proven otherwise.
+  result->unverified_scts.push_back(sct);
+  CTLogVerifier::VerifyResult verify_result =
+      CTLogVerifier::SCT_NOT_FROM_THIS_LOG;
+
+  for (ScopedVector<CTLogVerifier>::iterator it = logs_.begin();
+       it != logs_.end() &&
+       (verify_result == CTLogVerifier::SCT_NOT_FROM_THIS_LOG);
+       ++it) {
+     verify_result = (*it)->Verify(expected_entry, sct);
+  }
+
+  if (verify_result == CTLogVerifier::SCT_NOT_FROM_THIS_LOG) {
+    DVLOG(1) << "SCT does not match any known log.";
+    result->unverified_scts.pop_back();
+    result->unknown_logs_scts.push_back(sct);
+    return false;
+  } else if (verify_result != CTLogVerifier::SCT_VERIFIED_OK) {
+    DVLOG(1) << "Unable to verify SCT signature.";
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // verify_result is SCT_VERIFIED_OK, just make sure the timestamp is
+  // legitimate.
+  if (sct.timestamp + base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(1) > base::Time::Now()) {
+    DVLOG(1) << "SCT is from the future!";
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  result->unverified_scts.pop_back();
+  result->verified_scts.push_back(sct);
+  return true;
+}
+
+} // namespace net