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Unified Diff: sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h

Issue 670183003: Update from chromium 62675d9fb31fb8cedc40f68e78e8445a74f362e7 (Closed) Base URL: git@github.com:domokit/mojo.git@master
Patch Set: Created 6 years, 2 months ago
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Index: sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1dbd9492932dcb03fcfe3134ec219df3763aa5d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#ifndef SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_HELPERS_SYSCALL_SETS_H_
+#define SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_HELPERS_SYSCALL_SETS_H_
+
+#include "base/basictypes.h"
+#include "build/build_config.h"
+#include "sandbox/sandbox_export.h"
+
+// These are helpers to build seccomp-bpf policies, i.e. policies for a
+// sandbox that reduces the Linux kernel's attack surface. Given their
+// nature, they don't have any clear semantics and are completely
+// "implementation-defined".
+
+namespace sandbox {
+
+class SANDBOX_EXPORT SyscallSets {
+ public:
+ static bool IsKill(int sysno);
+ static bool IsAllowedGettime(int sysno);
+ static bool IsCurrentDirectory(int sysno);
+ static bool IsUmask(int sysno);
+ // System calls that directly access the file system. They might acquire
+ // a new file descriptor or otherwise perform an operation directly
+ // via a path.
+ static bool IsFileSystem(int sysno);
+ static bool IsAllowedFileSystemAccessViaFd(int sysno);
+ static bool IsDeniedFileSystemAccessViaFd(int sysno);
+ static bool IsGetSimpleId(int sysno);
+ static bool IsProcessPrivilegeChange(int sysno);
+ static bool IsProcessGroupOrSession(int sysno);
+ static bool IsAllowedSignalHandling(int sysno);
+ static bool IsAllowedOperationOnFd(int sysno);
+ static bool IsKernelInternalApi(int sysno);
+ // This should be thought through in conjunction with IsFutex().
+ static bool IsAllowedProcessStartOrDeath(int sysno);
+ // It's difficult to restrict those, but there is attack surface here.
+ static bool IsAllowedFutex(int sysno);
+ static bool IsAllowedEpoll(int sysno);
+ static bool IsAllowedGetOrModifySocket(int sysno);
+ static bool IsDeniedGetOrModifySocket(int sysno);
+
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__mips__)
+ // Big multiplexing system call for sockets.
+ static bool IsSocketCall(int sysno);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__mips__) || \
+ defined(__aarch64__)
+ static bool IsNetworkSocketInformation(int sysno);
+#endif
+
+ static bool IsAllowedAddressSpaceAccess(int sysno);
+ static bool IsAllowedGeneralIo(int sysno);
+ static bool IsPrctl(int sysno);
+ static bool IsSeccomp(int sysno);
+ static bool IsAllowedBasicScheduler(int sysno);
+ static bool IsAdminOperation(int sysno);
+ static bool IsKernelModule(int sysno);
+ static bool IsGlobalFSViewChange(int sysno);
+ static bool IsFsControl(int sysno);
+ static bool IsNuma(int sysno);
+ static bool IsMessageQueue(int sysno);
+ static bool IsGlobalProcessEnvironment(int sysno);
+ static bool IsDebug(int sysno);
+ static bool IsGlobalSystemStatus(int sysno);
+ static bool IsEventFd(int sysno);
+ // Asynchronous I/O API.
+ static bool IsAsyncIo(int sysno);
+ static bool IsKeyManagement(int sysno);
+#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
+ static bool IsSystemVSemaphores(int sysno);
+#endif
+#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
+ // These give a lot of ambient authority and bypass the setuid sandbox.
+ static bool IsSystemVSharedMemory(int sysno);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
+ static bool IsSystemVMessageQueue(int sysno);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__mips__)
+ // Big system V multiplexing system call.
+ static bool IsSystemVIpc(int sysno);
+#endif
+
+ static bool IsAnySystemV(int sysno);
+ static bool IsAdvancedScheduler(int sysno);
+ static bool IsInotify(int sysno);
+ static bool IsFaNotify(int sysno);
+ static bool IsTimer(int sysno);
+ static bool IsAdvancedTimer(int sysno);
+ static bool IsExtendedAttributes(int sysno);
+ static bool IsMisc(int sysno);
+#if defined(__arm__)
+ static bool IsArmPciConfig(int sysno);
+ static bool IsArmPrivate(int sysno);
+#endif // defined(__arm__)
+#if defined(__mips__)
+ static bool IsMipsPrivate(int sysno);
+ static bool IsMipsMisc(int sysno);
+#endif // defined(__mips__)
+ private:
+ DISALLOW_IMPLICIT_CONSTRUCTORS(SyscallSets);
+};
+
+} // namespace sandbox.
+
+#endif // SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_HELPERS_SYSCALL_SETS_H_

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