Update from chromium 62675d9fb31fb8cedc40f68e78e8445a74f362e7

sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h

Index: sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h
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+++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h
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+// Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#ifndef SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_HELPERS_SYSCALL_PARAMETERS_RESTRICTIONS_H_
+#define SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_HELPERS_SYSCALL_PARAMETERS_RESTRICTIONS_H_
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "build/build_config.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/bpf_dsl.h"
+#include "sandbox/sandbox_export.h"
+
+// These are helpers to build seccomp-bpf policies, i.e. policies for a
+// sandbox that reduces the Linux kernel's attack surface. They return a
+// bpf_dsl::ResultExpr suitable to restrict certain system call parameters.
+
+namespace sandbox {
+
+// Allow clone(2) for threads.
+// Reject fork(2) attempts with EPERM.
+// Don't restrict on ASAN.
+// Crash if anything else is attempted.
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictCloneToThreadsAndEPERMFork();
+
+// Allow PR_SET_NAME, PR_SET_DUMPABLE, PR_GET_DUMPABLE.
+// Crash if anything else is attempted.
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictPrctl();
+
+// Allow TCGETS and FIONREAD.
+// Crash if anything else is attempted.
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictIoctl();
+
+// Restrict the flags argument in mmap(2).
+// Only allow: MAP_SHARED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS |
+// MAP_STACK | MAP_NORESERVE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_DENYWRITE.
+// Crash if any other flag is used.
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictMmapFlags();
+
+// Restrict the prot argument in mprotect(2).
+// Only allow: PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC.
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictMprotectFlags();
+
+// Restrict fcntl(2) cmd argument to:
+// We allow F_GETFL, F_SETFL, F_GETFD, F_SETFD, F_DUPFD, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC,
+// F_SETLK, F_SETLKW and F_GETLK.
+// Also, in F_SETFL, restrict the allowed flags to: O_ACCMODE | O_APPEND |
+// O_NONBLOCK | O_SYNC | O_LARGEFILE | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOATIME.
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictFcntlCommands();
+
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__mips__)
+// Restrict socketcall(2) to only allow socketpair(2), send(2), recv(2),
+// sendto(2), recvfrom(2), shutdown(2), sendmsg(2) and recvmsg(2).
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictSocketcallCommand();
+#endif
+
+// Restrict |sysno| (which must be kill, tkill or tgkill) by allowing tgkill or
+// kill iff the first parameter is |target_pid|, crashing otherwise or if
+// |sysno| is tkill.
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictKillTarget(pid_t target_pid,
+                                                      int sysno);
+
+// Crash if FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI is used in the second argument of futex(2).
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictFutex();
+
+// Crash if |which| is not PRIO_PROCESS. EPERM if |who| is not 0, neither
+// |target_pid| while calling setpriority(2) / getpriority(2).
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictGetSetpriority(pid_t target_pid);
+
+// Restrict |clk_id| for clock_getres(), clock_gettime() and clock_settime().
+// We allow accessing only CLOCK_MONOTONIC, CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID,
+// CLOCK_REALTIME, and CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID.  In particular, this disallows
+// access to arbitrary per-{process,thread} CPU-time clock IDs (such as those
+// returned by {clock,pthread}_getcpuclockid), which can leak information
+// about the state of the host OS.
+// On Chrome OS, base::TimeTicks::kClockSystemTrace is also allowed.
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictClockID();
+
+// Restricts |pid| for sched_* syscalls which take a pid as the first argument.
+// We only allow calling these syscalls if the pid argument is equal to the pid
+// of the sandboxed process or 0 (indicating the current thread).  The following
+// syscalls are supported:
+//
+// sched_getaffinity(), sched_getattr(), sched_getparam(), sched_getscheduler(),
+// sched_rr_get_interval(), sched_setaffinity(), sched_setattr(),
+// sched_setparam(), sched_setscheduler()
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictSchedTarget(pid_t target_pid,
+                                                       int sysno);
+
+}  // namespace sandbox.
+
+#endif  // SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_HELPERS_SYSCALL_PARAMETERS_RESTRICTIONS_H_