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| 1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| 3 // found in the LICENSE file. |
| 4 |
| 5 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_iterator.h" |
| 6 |
| 7 #include <stdint.h> |
| 8 |
| 9 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/linux_seccomp.h" |
| 10 #include "sandbox/linux/tests/unit_tests.h" |
| 11 |
| 12 namespace sandbox { |
| 13 |
| 14 namespace { |
| 15 |
| 16 const SyscallSet kSyscallSets[] = { |
| 17 SyscallSet::All(), |
| 18 SyscallSet::InvalidOnly(), |
| 19 }; |
| 20 |
| 21 SANDBOX_TEST(SyscallIterator, Monotonous) { |
| 22 for (const SyscallSet& set : kSyscallSets) { |
| 23 uint32_t prev = 0; |
| 24 bool have_prev = false; |
| 25 for (uint32_t sysnum : set) { |
| 26 if (have_prev) { |
| 27 SANDBOX_ASSERT(sysnum > prev); |
| 28 } else if (set == SyscallSet::All()) { |
| 29 // The iterator should start at 0. |
| 30 SANDBOX_ASSERT(sysnum == 0); |
| 31 } |
| 32 |
| 33 prev = sysnum; |
| 34 have_prev = true; |
| 35 } |
| 36 |
| 37 // The iterator should always return 0xFFFFFFFFu as the last value. |
| 38 SANDBOX_ASSERT(have_prev); |
| 39 SANDBOX_ASSERT(prev == 0xFFFFFFFFu); |
| 40 } |
| 41 } |
| 42 |
| 43 // AssertRange checks that SyscallIterator produces all system call |
| 44 // numbers in the inclusive range [min, max]. |
| 45 void AssertRange(uint32_t min, uint32_t max) { |
| 46 SANDBOX_ASSERT(min < max); |
| 47 uint32_t prev = min - 1; |
| 48 for (uint32_t sysnum : SyscallSet::All()) { |
| 49 if (sysnum >= min && sysnum <= max) { |
| 50 SANDBOX_ASSERT(prev == sysnum - 1); |
| 51 prev = sysnum; |
| 52 } |
| 53 } |
| 54 SANDBOX_ASSERT(prev == max); |
| 55 } |
| 56 |
| 57 SANDBOX_TEST(SyscallIterator, ValidSyscallRanges) { |
| 58 AssertRange(MIN_SYSCALL, MAX_PUBLIC_SYSCALL); |
| 59 #if defined(__arm__) |
| 60 AssertRange(MIN_PRIVATE_SYSCALL, MAX_PRIVATE_SYSCALL); |
| 61 AssertRange(MIN_GHOST_SYSCALL, MAX_SYSCALL); |
| 62 #endif |
| 63 } |
| 64 |
| 65 SANDBOX_TEST(SyscallIterator, InvalidSyscalls) { |
| 66 static const uint32_t kExpected[] = { |
| 67 #if defined(__mips__) |
| 68 0, |
| 69 MIN_SYSCALL - 1, |
| 70 #endif |
| 71 MAX_PUBLIC_SYSCALL + 1, |
| 72 #if defined(__arm__) |
| 73 MIN_PRIVATE_SYSCALL - 1, |
| 74 MAX_PRIVATE_SYSCALL + 1, |
| 75 MIN_GHOST_SYSCALL - 1, |
| 76 MAX_SYSCALL + 1, |
| 77 #endif |
| 78 0x7FFFFFFFu, |
| 79 0x80000000u, |
| 80 0xFFFFFFFFu, |
| 81 }; |
| 82 |
| 83 for (const SyscallSet& set : kSyscallSets) { |
| 84 size_t i = 0; |
| 85 for (uint32_t sysnum : set) { |
| 86 if (!SyscallSet::IsValid(sysnum)) { |
| 87 SANDBOX_ASSERT(i < arraysize(kExpected)); |
| 88 SANDBOX_ASSERT(kExpected[i] == sysnum); |
| 89 ++i; |
| 90 } |
| 91 } |
| 92 SANDBOX_ASSERT(i == arraysize(kExpected)); |
| 93 } |
| 94 } |
| 95 |
| 96 SANDBOX_TEST(SyscallIterator, InvalidOnlyIsOnlyInvalid) { |
| 97 for (uint32_t sysnum : SyscallSet::InvalidOnly()) { |
| 98 SANDBOX_ASSERT(!SyscallSet::IsValid(sysnum)); |
| 99 } |
| 100 } |
| 101 |
| 102 } // namespace |
| 103 |
| 104 } // namespace sandbox |
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