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Unified Diff: sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc

Issue 66723007: Make sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/ follow the style guide. (Closed) Base URL: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src
Patch Set: (empty) rebase Created 7 years, 1 month ago
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Index: sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc
index 136deb615cb514108d4e154f5e1c95cab5e7e0bd..0472448298e31a9e1896b2b5702cf921f6180545 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc
+++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc
@@ -31,27 +31,27 @@ const int kMMapNr = __NR_mmap;
#endif
TEST(Syscall, WellKnownEntryPoint) {
- // Test that SandboxSyscall(-1) is handled specially. Don't do this on ARM,
- // where syscall(-1) crashes with SIGILL. Not running the test is fine, as we
- // are still testing ARM code in the next set of tests.
+// Test that SandboxSyscall(-1) is handled specially. Don't do this on ARM,
+// where syscall(-1) crashes with SIGILL. Not running the test is fine, as we
+// are still testing ARM code in the next set of tests.
#if !defined(__arm__)
EXPECT_NE(SandboxSyscall(-1), syscall(-1));
#endif
- // If possible, test that SandboxSyscall(-1) returns the address right after
- // a kernel entry point.
+// If possible, test that SandboxSyscall(-1) returns the address right after
+// a kernel entry point.
#if defined(__i386__)
- EXPECT_EQ(0x80CDu, ((uint16_t *)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // INT 0x80
+ EXPECT_EQ(0x80CDu, ((uint16_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // INT 0x80
#elif defined(__x86_64__)
- EXPECT_EQ(0x050Fu, ((uint16_t *)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SYSCALL
+ EXPECT_EQ(0x050Fu, ((uint16_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SYSCALL
#elif defined(__arm__)
#if defined(__thumb__)
- EXPECT_EQ(0xDF00u, ((uint16_t *)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SWI 0
+ EXPECT_EQ(0xDF00u, ((uint16_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SWI 0
#else
- EXPECT_EQ(0xEF000000u, ((uint32_t *)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SVC 0
+ EXPECT_EQ(0xEF000000u, ((uint32_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SVC 0
#endif
#else
- #warning Incomplete test case; need port for target platform
+#warning Incomplete test case; need port for target platform
#endif
}
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ TEST(Syscall, TrivialSyscallOneArg) {
}
// SIGSYS trap handler that will be called on __NR_uname.
-intptr_t CopySyscallArgsToAux(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void *aux) {
+intptr_t CopySyscallArgsToAux(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void* aux) {
// |aux| is a pointer to our BPF_AUX.
std::vector<uint64_t>* const seen_syscall_args =
static_cast<std::vector<uint64_t>*>(aux);
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ intptr_t CopySyscallArgsToAux(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void *aux) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
-ErrorCode CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy(Sandbox *sandbox, int sysno, void *aux) {
+ErrorCode CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy(Sandbox* sandbox, int sysno, void* aux) {
if (!Sandbox::IsValidSyscallNumber(sysno)) {
return ErrorCode(ENOSYS);
}
@@ -91,7 +91,9 @@ ErrorCode CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy(Sandbox *sandbox, int sysno, void *aux) {
// We are testing SandboxSyscall() by making use of a BPF filter that allows us
// to inspect the system call arguments that the kernel saw.
-BPF_TEST(Syscall, SyntheticSixArgs, CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy,
+BPF_TEST(Syscall,
+ SyntheticSixArgs,
+ CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy,
std::vector<uint64_t> /* BPF_AUX */) {
const int kExpectedValue = 42;
// In this test we only pass integers to the kernel. We might want to make
@@ -105,12 +107,13 @@ BPF_TEST(Syscall, SyntheticSixArgs, CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy,
// We could use pretty much any system call we don't need here. uname() is
// nice because it doesn't have any dangerous side effects.
- BPF_ASSERT(SandboxSyscall(__NR_uname, syscall_args[0],
- syscall_args[1],
- syscall_args[2],
- syscall_args[3],
- syscall_args[4],
- syscall_args[5]) == -ENOMEM);
+ BPF_ASSERT(SandboxSyscall(__NR_uname,
+ syscall_args[0],
+ syscall_args[1],
+ syscall_args[2],
+ syscall_args[3],
+ syscall_args[4],
+ syscall_args[5]) == -ENOMEM);
// We expect the trap handler to have copied the 6 arguments.
BPF_ASSERT(BPF_AUX.size() == 6);
@@ -131,20 +134,29 @@ TEST(Syscall, ComplexSyscallSixArgs) {
ASSERT_LE(0, fd = SandboxSyscall(__NR_open, "/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0L));
// Use mmap() to allocate some read-only memory
- char *addr0;
- ASSERT_NE((char *)NULL,
- addr0 = reinterpret_cast<char *>(
- SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, (void *)NULL, 4096, PROT_READ,
- MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, fd, 0L)));
+ char* addr0;
+ ASSERT_NE((char*)NULL,
+ addr0 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(
+ SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr,
+ (void*)NULL,
+ 4096,
+ PROT_READ,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS,
+ fd,
+ 0L)));
// Try to replace the existing mapping with a read-write mapping
- char *addr1;
+ char* addr1;
ASSERT_EQ(addr0,
- addr1 = reinterpret_cast<char *>(
- SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, addr0, 4096L, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
- MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_FIXED,
- fd, 0L)));
- ++*addr1; // This should not seg fault
+ addr1 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(
+ SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr,
+ addr0,
+ 4096L,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED,
+ fd,
+ 0L)));
+ ++*addr1; // This should not seg fault
// Clean up
EXPECT_EQ(0, SandboxSyscall(__NR_munmap, addr1, 4096L));
@@ -153,21 +165,23 @@ TEST(Syscall, ComplexSyscallSixArgs) {
// Check that the offset argument (i.e. the sixth argument) is processed
// correctly.
ASSERT_GE(fd = SandboxSyscall(__NR_open, "/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY, 0L), 0);
- char *addr2, *addr3;
- ASSERT_NE((char *)NULL,
- addr2 = reinterpret_cast<char *>(
- SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, (void *)NULL, 8192L, PROT_READ,
- MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0L)));
- ASSERT_NE((char *)NULL,
- addr3 = reinterpret_cast<char *>(
- SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr, (void *)NULL, 4096L, PROT_READ,
- MAP_PRIVATE, fd,
+ char* addr2, *addr3;
+ ASSERT_NE((char*)NULL,
+ addr2 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(SandboxSyscall(
+ kMMapNr, (void*)NULL, 8192L, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0L)));
+ ASSERT_NE((char*)NULL,
+ addr3 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr,
+ (void*)NULL,
+ 4096L,
+ PROT_READ,
+ MAP_PRIVATE,
+ fd,
#if defined(__NR_mmap2)
- 1L
+ 1L
#else
- 4096L
+ 4096L
#endif
- )));
+ )));
EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(addr2 + 4096, addr3, 4096));
// Just to be absolutely on the safe side, also verify that the file
@@ -182,4 +196,4 @@ TEST(Syscall, ComplexSyscallSixArgs) {
EXPECT_EQ(0, HANDLE_EINTR(SandboxSyscall(__NR_close, fd)));
}
-} // namespace
+} // namespace
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