Certificate Transparency TLS extension patch for NSS

net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslsock.c

Index: net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslsock.c
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslsock.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslsock.c
index 072fad5ba0b3fdcab9368d8326dda4f1eb332232..8072f2334cfbf66d23ee95a30b181d030357b84e 100644
--- a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslsock.c
+++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslsock.c
@@ -173,7 +173,8 @@ static sslOptions ssl_defaults = {
     PR_FALSE,   /* requireSafeNegotiation */
     PR_FALSE,   /* enableFalseStart   */
     PR_TRUE,    /* cbcRandomIV        */
-    PR_FALSE    /* enableOCSPStapling */
+    PR_FALSE,   /* enableOCSPStapling */
+    PR_FALSE    /* enableSignedCertTimestamps */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -863,6 +864,10 @@ SSL_OptionSet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 which, PRBool on)
        ss->opt.enableOCSPStapling = on;
        break;
 
+      case SSL_ENABLE_SIGNED_CERT_TIMESTAMPS:
+       ss->opt.enableSignedCertTimestamps = on;
+       break;
+
       default:
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 	rv = SECFailure;
@@ -933,6 +938,9 @@ SSL_OptionGet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 which, PRBool *pOn)
     case SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START:  on = ss->opt.enableFalseStart;   break;
     case SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV:       on = ss->opt.cbcRandomIV;        break;
     case SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING: on = ss->opt.enableOCSPStapling; break;
+    case SSL_ENABLE_SIGNED_CERT_TIMESTAMPS:
+       on = ss->opt.enableSignedCertTimestamps;
+       break;
 
     default:
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
@@ -994,6 +1002,9 @@ SSL_OptionGetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRBool *pOn)
     case SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING:
        on = ssl_defaults.enableOCSPStapling;
        break;
+    case SSL_ENABLE_SIGNED_CERT_TIMESTAMPS:
+       ssl_defaults.enableSignedCertTimestamps = on;

[wtc, 2013/11/08 19:51:31]

BUG: this should be
    on = ssl_defaults.enableSignedCertTimestamps;

[ekasper, 2013/11/18 17:47:18]

Yikes, I appear to have completely botched this file when migrating the patch to
chromium. Fixed, thanks!

+       break;
 
     default:
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
@@ -1991,6 +2002,28 @@ SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(PRFileDesc *fd)
     return &ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus;
 }
 
+const SECItem *
+SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+    sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+
+    if (!ss) {
+       SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps",
+		SSL_GETPID(), fd));
+       return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!ss->sec.ci.sid) {
+       PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+       return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+	return NULL;

[wtc, 2013/11/08 19:51:31]

Please add:
    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SSL2);

Strictly speaking, this feature (which requires a TLS extension) won't work for
SSL 3.0 either, right?

[ekasper, 2013/11/18 17:47:18]

Strictly speaking yes, but I think it's nicer to allow the caller to just "see
if anything was sent" rather than force a check for the negotiated version.

There's still the SSLv2 version case left (because the data comes from u.ssl3)
but unless the application has SSLv2 enabled, they won't need to worry about
distinguishing this case.

Does this sound reasonable?

[wtc, 2013/11/19 23:52:28]

Yes, it does. Thanks.

To make it clear it's the u.ssl3 union member access that we are checking, we
can use ss->sec.ci.sid->version instead of ss->version in the check above.

[ekasper, 2013/11/20 16:06:27]

Done.

+    }
+    return &ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps;
+}
+
 SECStatus
 SSL_HandshakeResumedSession(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool *handshake_resumed) {
     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
@@ -3131,4 +3164,3 @@ loser:
     }
     return ss;
 }
-