| Index: sandbox/linux/services/credentials.cc
|
| diff --git a/sandbox/linux/services/credentials.cc b/sandbox/linux/services/credentials.cc
|
| index cea757c535860c0d1c12d4d7fbb479b848d6bef4..4f041dc2887b681fb20538b07beeb52627af48a2 100644
|
| --- a/sandbox/linux/services/credentials.cc
|
| +++ b/sandbox/linux/services/credentials.cc
|
| @@ -163,9 +163,15 @@ bool Credentials::HasOpenDirectory(int proc_fd) {
|
| } else {
|
| proc_self_fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/fd", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
|
| if (proc_self_fd < 0) {
|
| + // If this process has been chrooted (eg into /proc/self/fdinfo) then
|
| + // the new root dir will not have directory listing permissions for us
|
| + // (hence EACCES). And if we do have this permission, then /proc won't
|
| + // exist anyway (hence ENOENT).
|
| + DPCHECK(errno == EACCES || errno == ENOENT)
|
| + << "Unexpected failure when trying to open /proc/self/fd: ("
|
| + << errno << ") " << strerror(errno);
|
| +
|
| // If not available, guess false.
|
| - // TODO(mostynb@opera.com): add a CHECK_EQ(ENOENT, errno); Figure out what
|
| - // other situations are here. http://crbug.com/314985
|
| return false;
|
| }
|
| }
|
|
|