Chromium Code Reviews| Index: net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ext.c |
| diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ext.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ext.c |
| index 523e49a275308777ace1607a41393437e6e6eacb..e1a99c124353be91350a9cfe12c8f75250c7a714 100644 |
| --- a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ext.c |
| +++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/ssl3ext.c |
| @@ -56,10 +56,14 @@ static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, |
| PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); |
| static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, |
| PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); |
| +static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, |
| + SECItem *data); |
| +static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, |
| + PRUint32 maxBytes); |
| static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, |
| PRUint32 maxBytes); |
| -static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, |
| - PRUint32 maxBytes); |
| +static PRInt32 ssl3_ServerSendAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, |
| + PRUint32 maxBytes); |
| static PRInt32 ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, |
| PRUint32 maxBytes); |
| static SECStatus ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, |
| @@ -247,6 +251,7 @@ static const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler clientHelloHandlers[] = { |
| { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn }, |
| { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn }, |
| { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn }, |
| + { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn }, |
| { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn }, |
| { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn }, |
| { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn }, |
| @@ -578,7 +583,8 @@ ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn( |
| /* handle an incoming Next Protocol Negotiation extension. */ |
| static SECStatus |
| -ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) |
| +ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, |
| + SECItem *data) |
| { |
| if (ss->firstHsDone || data->len != 0) { |
| /* Clients MUST send an empty NPN extension, if any. */ |
| @@ -623,14 +629,93 @@ ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(const unsigned char* data, unsigned int length) |
| return SECSuccess; |
| } |
| +/* protocol selection handler for ALPN (server side) and NPN (client side) */ |
| static SECStatus |
| -ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, |
| - SECItem *data) |
| +ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) |
| { |
| SECStatus rv; |
| unsigned char resultBuffer[255]; |
| SECItem result = { siBuffer, resultBuffer, 0 }; |
| + rv = ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(data->data, data->len); |
| + if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| + return rv; |
| + |
| + PORT_Assert(ss->nextProtoCallback); |
| + rv = ss->nextProtoCallback(ss->nextProtoArg, ss->fd, data->data, data->len, |
| + result.data, &result.len, sizeof resultBuffer); |
| + if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| + return rv; |
| + /* If the callback wrote more than allowed to |result| it has corrupted our |
| + * stack. */ |
| + if (result.len > sizeof resultBuffer) { |
| + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); |
| + return SECFailure; |
| + } |
| + |
| + if (ex_type == ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn && |
| + ss->ssl3.nextProtoState != SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED) { |
| + /* The callback might say OK, but then it's picked a default. |
|
agl
2014/09/26 17:39:46
It's acceptable for ALPN too. Most implementations
wtc
2014/09/26 18:12:00
Are you suggesting that we should delete this if s
agl
2014/09/26 18:14:53
I imagine that he's following the wording of the R
wtc
2014/09/26 18:16:56
OK, I took a quick look. This if statement is the
wtc
2014/09/29 17:59:10
Yes, I'd like to merge the current NSS upstream as
|
| + * That's OK for NPN, but not ALPN. */ |
| + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE); |
| + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_PROTOCOL); |
| + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, no_application_protocol); |
| + return SECFailure; |
| + } |
| + |
| + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; |
| + |
| + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE); |
| + return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.nextProto, &result); |
| +} |
| + |
| +/* handle an incoming ALPN extension at the server */ |
| +static SECStatus |
| +ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) |
| +{ |
| + int count; |
| + SECStatus rv; |
| + |
| + /* We expressly don't want to allow ALPN on renegotiation, |
| + * despite it being permitted by the spec. */ |
| + if (ss->firstHsDone || data->len == 0) { |
| + /* Clients MUST send a non-empty ALPN extension. */ |
| + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); |
| + return SECFailure; |
| + } |
| + |
| + /* unlike NPN, ALPN has extra redundant length information so that |
| + * the extension is the same in both ClientHello and ServerHello */ |
| + count = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &data->data, &data->len); |
| + if (count < 0) { |
| + return SECFailure; /* fatal alert was sent */ |
| + } |
| + if (count != data->len) { |
| + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); |
| + } |
| + |
| + if (!ss->nextProtoCallback) { |
| + /* we're not configured for it */ |
| + return SECSuccess; |
| + } |
| + |
| + rv = ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(ss, ex_type, data); |
| + if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| + return rv; |
| + } |
| + |
| + /* prepare to send back a response, if we negotiated */ |
| + if (ss->ssl3.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED) { |
| + return ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender( |
| + ss, ex_type, ssl3_ServerSendAppProtoXtn); |
| + } |
| + return SECSuccess; |
| +} |
| + |
| +static SECStatus |
| +ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, |
| + SECItem *data) |
| +{ |
| PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone); |
| if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn)) { |
| @@ -643,37 +728,16 @@ ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, |
| return SECFailure; |
| } |
| - rv = ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(data->data, data->len); |
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| - return rv; |
| - |
| - /* ss->nextProtoCallback cannot normally be NULL if we negotiated the |
| - * extension. However, It is possible that an application erroneously |
| - * cleared the callback between the time we sent the ClientHello and now. |
| - */ |
| - PORT_Assert(ss->nextProtoCallback != NULL); |
| + /* We should only get this call if we sent the extension, so |
| + * ss->nextProtoCallback needs to be non-NULL. However, it is possible |
| + * that an application erroneously cleared the callback between the time |
| + * we sent the ClientHello and now. */ |
| if (!ss->nextProtoCallback) { |
| - /* XXX Use a better error code. This is an application error, not an |
| - * NSS bug. */ |
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
| + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_CALLBACK); |
| return SECFailure; |
| } |
| - rv = ss->nextProtoCallback(ss->nextProtoArg, ss->fd, data->data, data->len, |
| - result.data, &result.len, sizeof resultBuffer); |
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| - return rv; |
| - /* If the callback wrote more than allowed to |result| it has corrupted our |
| - * stack. */ |
| - if (result.len > sizeof resultBuffer) { |
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); |
| - return SECFailure; |
| - } |
| - |
| - ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; |
| - |
| - SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE); |
| - return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.nextProto, &result); |
| + return ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(ss, ex_type, data); |
| } |
| static SECStatus |
| @@ -814,6 +878,48 @@ loser: |
| return -1; |
| } |
| +static PRInt32 |
| +ssl3_ServerSendAppProtoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) |
| +{ |
| + PRInt32 extension_length; |
| + |
| + /* we're in over our heads if any of these fail */ |
|
agl
2014/09/26 17:39:46
This comment isn't useful.
wtc
2014/09/29 17:59:10
Done.
|
| + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.enableALPN); |
| + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.nextProto.data); |
| + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.nextProto.len > 0); |
| + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED); |
| + PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone); |
| + |
| + extension_length = 2 /* extension type */ + 2 /* extension length */ + |
| + 2 /* protocol name list */ + 1 /* name length */ + |
| + ss->ssl3.nextProto.len; |
| + |
| + if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) { |
| + SECStatus rv; |
| + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, 2); |
| + if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| + return -1; |
| + } |
| + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2); |
| + if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| + return -1; |
| + } |
| + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.nextProto.len + 1, 2); |
| + if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| + return -1; |
| + } |
| + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->ssl3.nextProto.data, |
| + ss->ssl3.nextProto.len, 1); |
| + if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| + return -1; |
| + } |
| + } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) { |
| + return 0; |
| + } |
| + |
| + return extension_length; |
| +} |
| + |
| static SECStatus |
| ssl3_ClientHandleChannelIDXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, |
| SECItem *data) |