Chromium Code Reviews| Index: sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h |
| diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h |
| index 32fe2a7d7480ca960021f9bff24b6c6c5e956a90..1a9ce43b920932ea51c96500f3f456cb665680ea 100644 |
| --- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h |
| +++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h |
| @@ -95,6 +95,10 @@ class SANDBOX_EXPORT SandboxBPF { |
| // provided by the caller. |
| static SandboxStatus SupportsSeccompSandbox(int proc_fd); |
| + // Determines if the kernel has support for the seccomp() system call to |
| + // synchronize BPF filters across a thread group. |
| + static SandboxStatus SupportsSeccompThreadFilterSynchronization(); |
|
jln (very slow on Chromium)
2014/08/20 21:34:20
I think I would rather have this and SupportsSecco
Robert Sesek
2014/08/21 16:50:18
I agree that SupportsSeccompSandbox should do this
|
| + |
| // The sandbox needs to be able to access files in "/proc/self". If this |
| // directory is not accessible when "startSandbox()" gets called, the caller |
| // can provide an already opened file descriptor by calling "set_proc_fd()". |