Align SSLClientSocketOpenSSL and SSLClientSocketNSS histograms.

net/socket/ssl_client_socket_nss.cc

Index: net/socket/ssl_client_socket_nss.cc
diff --git a/net/socket/ssl_client_socket_nss.cc b/net/socket/ssl_client_socket_nss.cc
index 92af627b7f871e3edc19ae201c9da6919fc0a5ee..7231c77e9444c5a91bd5be12d55e52921ca099d7 100644
--- a/net/socket/ssl_client_socket_nss.cc
+++ b/net/socket/ssl_client_socket_nss.cc
@@ -2456,26 +2456,6 @@ void SSLClientSocketNSS::Core::UpdateConnectionStatus() {
       VLOG(1) << "The server " << host_and_port_.ToString()
               << " does not support the TLS renegotiation_info extension.";
     }
-    UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.RenegotiationExtensionSupported",
-                              peer_supports_renego_ext, 2);
-
-    // We would like to eliminate fallback to SSLv3 for non-buggy servers
-    // because of security concerns. For example, Google offers forward
-    // secrecy with ECDHE but that requires TLS 1.0. An attacker can block
-    // TLSv1 connections and force us to downgrade to SSLv3 and remove forward
-    // secrecy.
-    //
-    // Yngve from Opera has suggested using the renegotiation extension as an
-    // indicator that SSLv3 fallback was mistaken:
-    // tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pettersen-tls-version-rollback-removal-00 .
-    //
-    // As a first step, measure how often clients perform version fallback
-    // while the server advertises support secure renegotiation.
-    if (ssl_config_.version_fallback &&
-        channel_info.protocolVersion == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
-      UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.SSLv3FallbackToRenegoPatchedServer",
-                            peer_supports_renego_ext == PR_TRUE);
-    }
   }
 
   if (ssl_config_.version_fallback) {