[webcrypto] Implement AES-CTR using BoringSSL.

content/child/webcrypto/openssl/aes_ctr_openssl.cc

Index: content/child/webcrypto/openssl/aes_ctr_openssl.cc
diff --git a/content/child/webcrypto/openssl/aes_ctr_openssl.cc b/content/child/webcrypto/openssl/aes_ctr_openssl.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a36a91a2c35bec1f4d8e5fa5bcbcb028eedf38c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/child/webcrypto/openssl/aes_ctr_openssl.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+// Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "base/logging.h"
+#include "base/macros.h"
+#include "base/numerics/safe_math.h"
+#include "base/stl_util.h"
+#include "content/child/webcrypto/crypto_data.h"
+#include "content/child/webcrypto/openssl/aes_key_openssl.h"
+#include "content/child/webcrypto/openssl/key_openssl.h"
+#include "content/child/webcrypto/openssl/util_openssl.h"
+#include "content/child/webcrypto/status.h"
+#include "content/child/webcrypto/webcrypto_util.h"
+#include "crypto/openssl_util.h"
+#include "crypto/scoped_openssl_types.h"
+#include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebCryptoAlgorithmParams.h"
+
+namespace content {
+
+namespace webcrypto {
+
+namespace {
+
+const EVP_CIPHER* GetAESCipherByKeyLength(unsigned int key_length_bytes) {
+  // BoringSSL does not support 192-bit AES keys.
+  switch (key_length_bytes) {
+    case 16:
+      return EVP_aes_128_ctr();
+    case 32:
+      return EVP_aes_256_ctr();
+    default:
+      return NULL;
+  }
+}
+
+// Encrypts/decrypts given a 128-bit counter.
+//
+// |output| must be a pointer to a buffer which has a length of at least
+// |input.byte_length()|.
+Status AesCtrEncrypt128BitCounter(const EVP_CIPHER* cipher,
+                                  const CryptoData& raw_key,
+                                  const CryptoData& input,
+                                  const CryptoData& counter,
+                                  uint8_t* output) {
+  DCHECK(cipher);
+  DCHECK_EQ(16u, counter.byte_length());
+
+  crypto::OpenSSLErrStackTracer err_tracer(FROM_HERE);
+  crypto::ScopedOpenSSL<EVP_CIPHER_CTX, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free>::Type context(
+      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new());
+
+  if (!context.get())
+    return Status::OperationError();
+
+  if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(context.get(),
+                         cipher,
+                         NULL,
+                         raw_key.bytes(),
+                         counter.bytes(),
+                         ENCRYPT)) {
+    return Status::OperationError();
+  }
+
+  int output_len = 0;
+  if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(context.get(),
+                        output,
+                        &output_len,
+                        input.bytes(),
+                        input.byte_length()))
+    return Status::OperationError();

[davidben, 2014/08/25 19:25:46]

Nit: I think we usually put curlies if the conditional took multiple lines?
(Maybe I'm making this up or it was just one reviewer I had a bit ago.)

[eroman, 2014/08/26 00:25:28]

Done. I agree

+  int final_output_chunk_len = 0;
+  if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(
+          context.get(), output + output_len, &final_output_chunk_len)) {
+    return Status::OperationError();
+  }
+
+  output_len += final_output_chunk_len;
+  if (static_cast<unsigned int>(output_len) != input.byte_length())
+    return Status::ErrorUnexpected();
+
+  return Status::Success();
+}
+
+// Returns ceil(a/b), where a and b are integers.
+template <typename T>
+T CeilDiv(T a, T b) {
+  return a == 0 ? 0 : 1 + (a - 1) / b;
+}
+
+// Extracts the counter as a BIGNUM. The counter is the rightmost
+// "counter_length_bits" of the block, interpreted as a big-endian number.
+crypto::ScopedBIGNUM GetCounter(const CryptoData& counter_block,
+                                unsigned int counter_length_bits) {
+  crypto::ScopedBIGNUM result;

[davidben, 2014/08/25 19:25:46]

Unused

[eroman, 2014/08/26 00:25:28]

D'oh! Done.

+  unsigned int counter_length_remainder_bits = (counter_length_bits % 8);
+
+  // If the counter is a multiple of 8 bits then can call BN_bin2bn() directly.
+  if (counter_length_remainder_bits == 0) {
+    unsigned int byte_length = counter_length_bits / 8;
+    return crypto::ScopedBIGNUM(BN_bin2bn(
+        counter_block.bytes() + counter_block.byte_length() - byte_length,
+        byte_length,
+        NULL));
+  }
+
+  // Otherwise make a copy of the counter and zero out the topmost bits so
+  // BN_bin2bn() can be called with a byte stream.
+  unsigned int byte_length = CeilDiv(counter_length_bits, 8u);
+  std::vector<uint8_t> counter(
+      counter_block.bytes() + counter_block.byte_length() - byte_length,
+      counter_block.bytes() + counter_block.byte_length());
+  counter[0] &= ~(0xFF << counter_length_remainder_bits);
+
+  return crypto::ScopedBIGNUM(
+      BN_bin2bn(&counter.front(), counter.size(), NULL));
+}
+
+// Returns a counter block with the counter bits all set all zero.
+std::vector<uint8_t> BlockWithZeroedCounter(const CryptoData& counter_block,
+                                            unsigned int counter_length_bits) {
+  unsigned int counter_length_bytes = counter_length_bits / 8;
+  unsigned int counter_length_bits_remainder = counter_length_bits % 8;
+
+  std::vector<uint8_t> new_counter_block(
+      counter_block.bytes(),
+      counter_block.bytes() + counter_block.byte_length());
+
+  unsigned int index = new_counter_block.size() - counter_length_bytes;
+  memset(&new_counter_block.front() + index, 0, counter_length_bytes);
+
+  if (counter_length_bits_remainder) {
+    new_counter_block[index - 1] &= 0xFF << counter_length_bits_remainder;
+  }
+
+  return new_counter_block;
+}
+
+// This function does encryption/decryption for AES-CTR (encryption and
+// decryption are the same).
+//
+// BoringSSL's interface for AES-CTR differs from that of WebCrypto. In
+// WebCrypto the caller specifies a 16-byte counter block and designates how
+// many of the right-most X bits to use as a big-endian counter. Whereas in
+// BoringSSL the entire counter block is interpreted as a 128-bit counter.
+//
+// In AES-CTR, the counter block MUST be unique across all messages that are
+// encrypted/decrypted. WebCrypto expects that the counter can start at any
+// value, and is therefore permitted to wrap around to zero on overflow.

[davidben, 2014/08/25 19:25:46]

Should we teach BoringSSL to do this internally? Maybe also to check for
wraparound. For the caller to check this kind of thing is rather a nuisance and
BoringSSL can do it in the ctr128_inc function which is less of a nuisance over
the wraparound at least. Overflow I guess we'd conceivably want to be cleverer
than checking on every increment.

[eroman, 2014/08/26 00:25:27]

I will defer to you and Adam. We discussed this briefly over email, I will
forward you the thread.

+//
+// Some care is taken to fail if the counter wraps back to an earlier value.
+// However this protection is only enforced during a *single* call to
+// encrypt/decrypt.

[davidben, 2014/08/25 19:25:46]

This is because WebCrypto doesn't maintain any context across encrypt calls?

[eroman, 2014/08/26 00:25:27]

Since the WebCrypto API doesn't describe any errors to reject with when re-using
a counter block, and exposes this through the "crypto.subtle" interface, I think
it is fair game to leave this as a responsibility of the caller.

Enforcing across multiple calls could get tricky, since I believe it would
require per-Key state which could grow boundlessly if many different counter
blocks are used with the key. This would also have to be propagated when cloning
keys, yet is easily bypassed by exporting then re-importing the key.

The reason I added it for single-call case is because it was easily detectable.

[davidben, 2014/08/26 20:53:26]

Well, putting it in the Key wouldn't really work anyway since the encrypt call
takes its own AesCtrParams parameter. So, yeah, this seems sound. If there were
some kind of EncryptionContext that you made out of an AesCtrParams once and
used repeatedly, we could stick state there, but meh.

+Status AesCtrEncryptDecrypt(const blink::WebCryptoAlgorithm& algorithm,
+                            const blink::WebCryptoKey& key,
+                            const CryptoData& data,
+                            std::vector<uint8_t>* buffer) {
+  const blink::WebCryptoAesCtrParams* params = algorithm.aesCtrParams();
+  const std::vector<uint8_t>& raw_key =
+      SymKeyOpenSsl::Cast(key)->raw_key_data();
+
+  if (params->counter().size() != 16)
+    return Status::ErrorIncorrectSizeAesCtrCounter();
+
+  unsigned int counter_length_bits = params->lengthBits();
+  if (counter_length_bits < 1 || counter_length_bits > 128)
+    return Status::ErrorInvalidAesCtrCounterLength();
+
+  // The output of AES-CTR is the same size as the input. However BoringSSL
+  // expects buffer sizes as an "int".
+  base::CheckedNumeric<int> output_max_len = data.byte_length();
+  if (!output_max_len.IsValid())
+    return Status::ErrorDataTooLarge();
+
+  const EVP_CIPHER* const cipher = GetAESCipherByKeyLength(raw_key.size());
+  if (!cipher)
+    return Status::ErrorUnexpected();
+
+  const CryptoData counter_block(params->counter());
+  buffer->resize(output_max_len.ValueOrDie());
+
+  // The total number of possible counter values is pow(2, counter_length_bits)
+  crypto::ScopedBIGNUM num_counter_values(BN_new());
+  if (!BN_lshift(num_counter_values.get(), BN_value_one(), counter_length_bits))
+    return Status::ErrorUnexpected();
+
+  crypto::ScopedBIGNUM current_counter =
+      GetCounter(counter_block, counter_length_bits);
+
+  // The number of AES blocks needed for encryption/decryption. The counter is
+  // incremented this many times.
+  crypto::ScopedBIGNUM num_output_blocks(BN_new());
+  if (!BN_set_word(
+          num_output_blocks.get(),
+          CeilDiv(buffer->size(), static_cast<size_t>(AES_BLOCK_SIZE)))) {
+    return Status::ErrorUnexpected();
+  }
+
+  // If the counter is going to be incremented more times than there are counter
+  // values, fail. (Repeating values of the counter block is bad).
+  if (BN_cmp(num_output_blocks.get(), num_counter_values.get()) > 0)

[davidben, 2014/08/25 19:25:46]

Seems odd to use BIGNUMs for this (and some of the other logic) when we know
num_counter_values is bounded by size_t or so. Unfortunately, size_t(1) <<
output_max_len doesn't seem to behave sensibly when output_max_len > NUM_BITS,
so the check might be a little screwy...

...or we could make this BoringSSL's problem...

[eroman, 2014/08/26 00:25:28]

Agreed.

This check can be written without BIGNUMs, but it is uglier in my opinion. When
I tried that I ended up with some compile asserts to make sure I knew something
about the size of the datatypes.

+    return Status::ErrorAesCtrInputTooLongCounterRepeated();
+
+  // This is the number of blocks that can be successfully encrypted without
+  // overflowing the counter. Encrypting the subsequent block will need to
+  // reset the counter to zero.
+  crypto::ScopedBIGNUM num_blocks_until_reset(BN_new());
+
+  if (!BN_sub(num_blocks_until_reset.get(),
+              num_counter_values.get(),
+              current_counter.get())) {
+    return Status::ErrorUnexpected();
+  }
+
+  // If the counter can be incremented for the entire input without
+  // wrapping-around, do it as a single call into BoringSSL.
+  if (BN_cmp(num_blocks_until_reset.get(), num_output_blocks.get()) >= 0) {
+    return AesCtrEncrypt128BitCounter(cipher,
+                                      CryptoData(raw_key),
+                                      data,
+                                      counter_block,
+                                      vector_as_array(buffer));
+  }
+
+  // Otherwise the encryption needs to be done in 2 parts. The first part using
+  // the current counter_block, and the next part resetting the counter portion
+  // of the block to zero.
+
+  // This is guaranteed to fit in an "unsigned int" because input size in bytes
+  // fits in an "unsigned int".
+  BN_ULONG num_blocks_part1 = BN_get_word(num_blocks_until_reset.get());
+  BN_ULONG input_size_part1 = num_blocks_part1 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+  DCHECK_LT(input_size_part1, data.byte_length());
+
+  // Encrypt the first part (before wrap-around).
+  Status status =
+      AesCtrEncrypt128BitCounter(cipher,
+                                 CryptoData(raw_key),
+                                 CryptoData(data.bytes(), input_size_part1),
+                                 counter_block,
+                                 vector_as_array(buffer));
+  if (status.IsError())
+    return status;
+
+  // Encrypt the second part (after wrap-around).
+  std::vector<uint8_t> counter_block_part2 =
+      BlockWithZeroedCounter(counter_block, counter_length_bits);
+
+  return AesCtrEncrypt128BitCounter(
+      cipher,
+      CryptoData(raw_key),
+      CryptoData(data.bytes() + input_size_part1,
+                 data.byte_length() - input_size_part1),
+      CryptoData(counter_block_part2),
+      vector_as_array(buffer) + input_size_part1);
+}
+
+class AesCtrImplementation : public AesAlgorithm {
+ public:
+  AesCtrImplementation() : AesAlgorithm("CTR") {}
+
+  virtual Status Encrypt(const blink::WebCryptoAlgorithm& algorithm,
+                         const blink::WebCryptoKey& key,
+                         const CryptoData& data,
+                         std::vector<uint8_t>* buffer) const OVERRIDE {
+    return AesCtrEncryptDecrypt(algorithm, key, data, buffer);
+  }
+
+  virtual Status Decrypt(const blink::WebCryptoAlgorithm& algorithm,
+                         const blink::WebCryptoKey& key,
+                         const CryptoData& data,
+                         std::vector<uint8_t>* buffer) const OVERRIDE {
+    return AesCtrEncryptDecrypt(algorithm, key, data, buffer);
+  }
+};
+
+}  // namespace
+
+AlgorithmImplementation* CreatePlatformAesCtrImplementation() {
+  return new AesCtrImplementation;
+}
+
+}  // namespace webcrypto
+
+}  // namespace content