Add base:: qualification to some CommandLine references in content.

content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc

Index: content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
diff --git a/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc b/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
index 3f8e21611f472071e90c51c4d5b21a0f3762dbd0..6ffe46f185e26edf01d8a76f65a08a62710d16f1 100644
--- a/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
+++ b/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
@@ -241,7 +241,8 @@ class ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::SecurityState {
     // compatibility with many sites.  The similar --site-per-process flag only
     // blocks JavaScript access to cross-site cookies (in
     // CanAccessCookiesForOrigin).
-    const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
+    const base::CommandLine& command_line =
+        *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
     if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableStrictSiteIsolation))
       return true;
 
@@ -585,7 +586,8 @@ bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanLoadPage(int child_id,
                                                  ResourceType resource_type) {
   // If --site-per-process flag is passed, we should enforce
   // stronger security restrictions on page navigation.
-  if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kSitePerProcess) &&
+  if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
+          switches::kSitePerProcess) &&
       IsResourceTypeFrame(resource_type)) {
     // TODO(nasko): Do the proper check for site-per-process, once
     // out-of-process iframes is ready to go.